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THE FEDERALIST: 



COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, WRITTEN IN FAVOR 

OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION, AS 

AGREED UPON BY 

THE FCEDERAL CONVENTION, 

SEPTEMBER 17, 1787. 
REPRINTED FROM THE ORIGINAL TEXT. 

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SUPERVISION OF 

HENRY B. DAWSON. 



NEW YORK: 

CHAELES SCRIBNER'S SONS, 

1888. 



JKl5~f 

dopy ^ 



Entered according to Act of Congress in the year 1864, hy 

Henry B. Dawson, 

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of New York 



SEPT. 3, 1946 
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



RIVERSIDE, CAMBRIDGE: 

STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED B9 

H. 0. HOUGHTON AND COMPANY. 



PKEFACE. 



The use of The Federalist as a text-book, in the 
collegiate institutions of the United States, is by no 
means a new and untried experiment ; and the recent 
introduction of the work into the classes of the venera- 
ble University at Cambridge, and the proposed intro- 
duction of it into those of other institutions in other 
States of the Union, will, it is hoped, be productive of 
the best results in the future of our country's political 
history. 

To promote so commendable a purpose this edition 
has been prepared; in which, beside the original text, 
a carefully prepared Analysis of the work, and of the 
claims to authorship of its several Numbers, have been 
introduced. 

The text employed is that which the distinguished 
Authors themselves originally gave to the world, with- 
out addition, abridgment, or the least alteration, except 
where typographical errors were subsequently corrected 
by the Authors themselves, or are apparent and unques- 
tionable ; and as the People for whom it was written, 



iv Preface* 

and to whom it was especially addressed, received and 
acted on it in the form in which its Authors presented 
it, the Editor has neither felt at liberty to alter that 
form in the least degree himself, nor to recognize any 
such alterations by others, except in the cases already 
referred to. Henry B. Dawson. 

Morrisania, N. T., September, 1864. 






SYNOPTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



Essay. Page 

I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION, No. I. 1 

II. "THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR [the People of 

the State of New York] POLITICAL PRO SPERIT Y," II. 6 

1. introduction, 6 

2. in its political relations with foreign nations, III. 12 

A. by securing it against dangers from foreign arms and influence, 12 

A. through a removal of the usual causes of just war, 13 

a. violations of compacts and treaties, 13 

A. by securing a more perfect administration of govern- 
ment, 13 

a. by the employment of better men than those employed 

in State governments, 13 

b. by an uniform interpretation of the provisions of those 

compacts and treaties, 14 

c. by avoiding the local temptation to bad faith to which 

a single State may yield, 14 

d. by avoiding local prejudices to which a single State may 

be subject, 14 

b. direct and unlawful violence, 15 

B. through the greater ability which it will afford to settle ami- 

cably those causes of just war, 16 

a. in the absence of local pride and prejudices, 16 

b. in the greater strength of the States when united, 16 

C. through its removal beyond the influence of unjust causes, IV. 17 

a. the superior power of neighboring nations, 17 

b. ths jealousy of foreign powers from successful trade, 18 

B. by securing it from similar influences in the several States, if 

disunited, V. 22 

C. by preventing European alliances with rival States or con- 

federacies, 26 

8. in its political relations with the Peoples of other States, VI. 27 

A by securing it from inter-State hostilities, 27 

a. the danger of hostilities arising between "independent, un- 
connected sovereignties," 27 

a. through love of power 28 

b. through jealousy of power, 28 

c. through competitions of commerce, 28 

d. through individual passions and influences, 28 



vi Contents. 

Essay. Pag« 

A. Pericles and Aspasia referred to, No. VI. 28 

B. the Peloponnesian war referred to, 28 

C. Cardinal Wolsey referred to, 29 

D. Madame de Maintenon referred to, 29 

E. Duchess of Marlborough referred to, 29 

F. Madame de Pompadour referred to, 29 

G. Shays and the rebellion in Massachusetts referred to,. . 30 

B. objections of anti-constitutionists answered, 30 

a. " the genius of republics is pacific," 30 

b. " the spirit of commerce tends to peace," 30 

A. Introductory remarks, 30 

B. Sparta referred to, 31 

C. Athens referred to, 31 

D. Pome referred to, 31 

E. Cartilage referred to, , , 31 

F. Venice referred to, 31 

G. Holland referred to, . , 31 

17. Great Britain referred to, 32 

c. an appeal to the People, founded on these examples, ... 32 

C. the inducements which the disunited States could have to 

make war on each other considered, VII. 34 

a. the same which have produced wars elsewhere, 34 

b. special causes within themselves, 34 

A. unadjusted territorial disputes, 34 

a. introductory remarks, 34 

b. crown-lands, within the States, 34 

c. western lands, 35 

d. Wyoming lands, 36 

e. New Hampshire grants, 36 

B. commercial rivalry, 37 

a. disregard of local revenue laws generally, 37 

6. jealousy of New York in New Jersey and Connecticut, 38 

C the existing debt of the confederacy, 38 

a. in its apportionment among the States, . . 38 

6. in its extinguishment, 38 

D. local laws violative of private contracts, 40 

E. incompatible alliances between individual States and 

foreign powers, 40 

p. the consequences of inter-State hostilities, VIII. 41 

a. primarily, great destruction of life and property, 42 

b. ultimately, 43 

A. the establishment of standing armies,. 43 

B. the extension of the power of the executive, 44 

C. the elevation of the military over the civil power, 44 

C. objections answered, . 44 

A. standing armies were not created in ancient Greece, ... 46 



Contents. vii 

Essay. Page. 
B. the impotency of the army in Great Britain,. No. VIII. 46 
d. the general subject discussed, and the value of the Union 

enforced, , ,-.-.47,. 

/ 4. in affording a barrier to domestic faction and insurrection,. » .IX. 48 

A. liability of republics to experience these troubles, />rrT"38 

B. they afford arguments for the advocates of despotism, 49 

C. the utility of a confederacy to guard against these troubles, 50 
a. resorted to in other ages and countries, 50 

B. approved by most authors on the subject of politics, 50 

a. Montesquieu's sentiments concerning extended territories, 

under republican governments, misrepresented by the 
Anti-foederalists, 50 

b. his views on a confederate republic, 51 

C. distinction between a confederacy and a consolidation of the 

States discussed, 53 

a. what a confederacy is said to be, 53 

b. what a confederacy really is, 53 

A. the proposed Constitution a confederate republican 
form of government, 54 

B. the Lycian Confederacy a confederate republic, 54 

D. the propensity of popular governments to faction, ^X. J ffi 

E. the United States liable to the same result, 55 

F. what constitutes " a faction," 56 

G. in what way its mischief may be cured, 56 

A. by removing its causes, 56 

a. in the destruction of the liberty of the People, 56 

b. by causing every citizen to possess the same opinions, 

passions, and interests, 56 

C. the first unwise, the second impracticable, 56 

B. by controlling its effects, 56 

a. the nature and purposes of " factions," 57 

b. when the faction is a minority, " by regular vote," 59 

c. when the faction is a majority, 59 

A. by dividing the prevailing influences, 60 

B. by preventing the concentration of those influences, 60 

H. the advantage of a representative government over a democracy 

in curing the mischiefs of faction, 60 

L the advantages of an extended republic over a small one, in like 

cases, 6^ 

6. in their commercial relations with foreign nations, XI. 

A. the growing commerce of America has excited the jealousy 

of foreign powers, 65 

B. the necessity of uniformity of action in America in order to 

secure the benefits arising from its own markets, 65 

C. the establishment of a Foederal navy another resource for 

commanding the respect of foreign nations, , . 67 



viii Contents. 

Essay. Page 

D. " a steady adherence to the Union " necessary to secure all the 

commercial advantages which America possesses, No. XI. 67 

E. the effects of disunion on the commerce of America, 68 

A. the rivalship of the different parts would frustrate all their 

natural advantages for promoting commerce, 68 

B. it would become " a prey to the wanton intermeddling of all 

nations who are at war with each other/' 68 

a. neutrality is respected only when it can be adequately de- 
fended, 68 

C. it would produce "little arts of little politicians to control or 

vary the irresistible course of nature " in the growth of 
our commerce, 68 

D. it would invite foreign nations to interfere with our rights, 68 

a. by prescribing the conditions of our political existence, ... 68 

b. by embarrassing our commerce, 68 

c. by interfering with the commercial rights of the Union, 

which had been then acquired, 69 

A. in the fisheries, 69 

a. the importance of the fisheries to France and Britain, 69 

b. our " decided mastery " therein, a subject of impor- 

tance to those powers, 69 

ir. their importance to all the commercial States, 69 

i. in affording a field for their enterprise, 69 

ii. in affording a nursery for the mercantile marine,. . 69 
d. their importance in promoting the establishment of a 

Foederal navy, 70 

B. in the navigation of the western lakes, 69 

C. in the navigation of the Mississippi River, 69 

a. the jealousy of Spain on that subject, 69 

6. in promoting the establishment of a Foederal navy, 70 

A. such a navy would be mutually advantageous to all the States, 70 

7. in their commercial relations with the Peoples of other States,... 70 

A. it would promote the interchange of their respective produc- 

tions, 70 

B. " the veins of commerce would be replenished " and invig- 

orated, 70 

C. a greater variety would be afforded to the commerce of the 

country, 71 

D. the aggregate balance of trade would be increased, in favor 

of America, 71 

E. objection, concerning the necessary course of inter-State com- 

merce, in any event, answered, 71 

F. the assumed superiority of Europe referred to, and Americans 

appealed to to disprove it, 71 

8. in respect to revenue, XII. 73 

A. commerce the most productive source of national wealth, .... 78 



Contents. ix 

Essay. Page 

B. it increases the ability of the inhabitants to pay taxes, No. XII. 74 

C. the system of u direct taxation " unsuccessful in the United 

States, 7 J 

D. " indirect taxation " the main dependence for the necessary 

revenues, 75 

a. because " the genius of the People " is opposed to excise 

laws, 75 

B. because the scarcity of money will render the collection of 
excise duties difficult, 75 

E. the union of the States will best enable us to improve this 

resource, 75 

A by being conducive to commerce from whence it is drawn,.. 76 

b. by simplifying the regulations for its collection, 76 

F. the separation of the States would destroy this source of 

revenue, 76 

a. by promoting illicit trade, 76 

B. by promoting jealousy between the States, and ultimate re- 

duction of impost duties, in order to secure trade, 76 

C. from the absence of sufficiently rigorous border-guards be- 

tween the States, and the improbability of their establish- 
ment, 76 

a. the ordinary powers of border-guards intolerable in a free 

country, 76 

b. border-guards unnecessary with the States united, 77 

6. the effect of a destruction of this resource, 78 

a. necessity of revenue to the existence of a nation, 78 

B. if it cannot be obtained from commerce it must be taken 
from the real estate of the inhabitants, 79 

a. because excises will not be available, 79 

b. because the objects proper for excise within the agricul- 

tural States will be insufficient to produce the requisite 

revenue, 79 

c. because it is difficult to trace personal property, 79 

in the greater economy in the administration of government, XIII. 80 

A. " if the States are united under one government, there will 

be but one national civil list to support," 80 

B. "if they are divided into several confederacies, there will be 

as many national civil lists to be provided for," 80 

A. speculations on the number of confederacies to be formed 

from the d€bris of the Union, 80 

B. each small confederacy will require a civil list as extended 

as has been proposed in the new system for the aggregate 
of all the States, 80 

a. because of the extent of territory which each will occupy. 80 

b. because of the necessary plurality of the revenue depart 

ments 82 



x Contents. 

Essay. P*ge 
c. because of the necessary plurality of the military estab- 
lishments, No. XIII. 83 

10. the objection which has been drawn from the extent of territory 
which the Union occupies, answered, XIV 83 

A. the distinction between a republic and a democracy noticed,.. 84 

B. the errors of political writers concerning the turbulence in 

the ancient republics, 84 

C. practicability of extending the limits of a republic., , 85 

D. the territory of the United States not too extended for their 

proper government, 85 

E. the territory of the United States compared with those of 

some European nations, 86 

F. the jurisdiction of the United States limited to objects of general 

interest, 86 

G. the objects of the proposed Constitution are to secure the union 

of the thirteen primitive States, and to add to their number,. 87 
H. the intercourse between the States will be daily facilitated by 

improvements for transit of passengers, etc., 87 

I. almost every State being a frontier State, all will be exposed to 

foreign aggression, and all, alike, need protection, 87 

J. an appeal to the People of New York to avoid disunion, 88 

III. " THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFED- 
ERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION," XV. 90 

1. introductory remarks, 90 

2. the proposition neither controverted nor doubted, 91 

3. disastrous result of its inefficacy, 91 

4. an appeal to the People to " break the charm" of the confedera- 

tion, 93 

6. the character of the opposition to the Constitution, and its incon- 
sistency, , 93 

6. the character of the defects in the confederacy, 94 

A. the legislation for States, in their corporate capacity, 94 

A. the bad effect of this evil in raising men and money, 94 

b. the opposition to the new system, because it deviates from 

this principle, considered generally, 94 

c. the peculiarities of a simple league between independent 

nations, considered, 94 

D. tlie eiiectof a simple league, as the bond of union between 
the States, considered generally, 95 

B. such a bond of union inconsistent with the organization of 

" a superintending power, under the direction of a common 

council," 96 

F. it is also inconsistent with the authority, over the persons of 
the citizens, Avhich is necessary in the establishment of a 

government, 96 

a. the purposes of government considered generally, 96 



Contents, xi 



b. the penalties which governments find it necessary to in- 
flict on offenders against their laws, No. XV. 9d 

A. the coercion of the magistracy, which is applicable only 

to men, 96 

B. the coercion of arms, which is applicable only to States, 96 

a. it would be productive of constant war 96 

b. it would be subversive of every purpose of govern- 

ment, 96 

C. the argument that breaches of the laws by the States need 

not be expected, considered, 96 

A. such breaches would arise from the passions of the in- 

dividual members of the States, 97 

B. from the impatience of control which arises from the 

sovereign powers of the States, 97 

Q. the improbability of the execution of the Fcederal measures, 

in a simple league of the States, considered and averred, . . 98 

a. supported by the natural constitution of the local author- 

ities, 98 

b. supported by the experience of the United States, under 

the old confederation, = 99 

C. supported by the experience of similar confederacies, else- 
where, XVI. 100 

A. the Lycian and Achsean leagues not thus exposed, 100 

H. the employment of force in executing the measures of such 

a league, " in its application to us," considered, 100 

a. it would be productive of constant war between the States, 101 

b. it would lead to counter-alliances between individual 

States, 101 

c. it would lead to alliances between foreign nations and 

portions of the Union, 101 

d. it would lead to " the violent death of the confederacy," 102 

e. and to the establishment of a military despotism, 103 

1. the impracticability of sustaining the Union by military co- 
ercion, 103 

1. an efficient government can only be established on the re- 
sponsibility of individual citizens, 103 

a. objections answered ; that the States, as such, may still 

interpose their authority, and obstruct the execution of 
the laws, 104 

b. that individuals, also, more or less numerous, may still 

oppose the government, 105 

c. that the reserved rights of the States would be invaded 

by the Fcederal government,. XVII. 107 

A. the absence of any competent inducement, 107 

B. the People of the several States, through the House of 

Representatives, could frustrate such an attempt, .... 108 



sii Contents. 

Essay. Page 
C. the greater danger that the delegated authority of the 
Fcederal government will be invaded by the State 
governments, No. XVII. 108 

a. from the superior influence which they will exercise 

over the People, 108 

l. from the diffusive construction of the Foederal gov- 
ernment, 108 

ii. from the nature of the objects of local control, ... 108 

b. the general subject considered, 169 

i. enforced by argument, 109 

ii. illustrated from the history of the feudal system, . 110 

iii. illustrated from the history of Scotland, Ill 

iv. illustrated from the history of the Amphictyonic 

league, XVIII. 112 

V. illustrated from the history of the Achaean league, 115 
vi. illustrated from the history of the Germanic 

league, ' XIX. 119 

vii. illustrated from the history of Poland, 125 

viii. illustrated from the history of Switzerland, 125 

ix. illustrated from the history of the United Nether- 
lands, XX. 126 

K. concluding remarks, 131^ 

B. " the total want of a sanction to its laws," XXI. 132 

A. the Foederal government possesses no power to exact obe- 

dience, 132 

B. the Foederal government possesses no power to punish dis- 

obedience, 132 

C. the Foederal government has received no express delegation 

of authority to use force against the States ; 132 

C. " the want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments," 133 

A. the consequent absence of authority in the Foederal govern- 

ment to assist a State in enforcing its own laws, 134 

B. the danger of an " officious interference in the domestic 

concerns of its members" by the Foederal government 

considered, 134 

D " the principle of regulating the contributions of the States 

to the common treasury, by quotas," 135 

A. the standard of constitutional wealth, 135 

b. the causes on which it is dependent, 136 

c. the rule of the confederation, on taxation, is unequal and 

oppressive, 136 

D. this cause alone is sufficient to work the destruction of the 

Union, 136 

fi. the remedy proposed for this evil, 137 

a. the advantages of taxes on articles of consumption, 137 

b. the advantages attending indirect taxation, 138 



Contents. lit 

Essay. Page 

E. " the want of a power to regulate commerce," No. XXII. 139 

a. it operates as a bar to the formation of commercial treaties, 189 

b. it has given occasion for dissatisfaction between the States, 139 

F. the raising of troops by quotas, 140 

a. it produces great expense in raising troops, 140 

b. it is not conducive to a vigorous system of defence, 140 

c. it is unequal in the burden it imposes on the several States, 141 

G. the right of equal suffrage among the States, in the Congress, 141 
A. arising from the inequality of weight among the States,. . 142 

a. objection that sovereigns are equal, answered, 142 

b. objection that " a majority of the States will be a major- 

ity of confederated America," answered, 142 

c. objection that two thirds of the States, in approval, are 

necessary to the most important acts, 142 

A. the mischief which is incident to the last-named rule, 143 

B. the danger from foreign corruption which it imposes, 144 

a. republics particularly exposed to this evil, 145 

6. instances when this evil has prevailed, 146 

i. the deputies of the United Provinces, 146 

ii. the authorities in Sweden, 146 

H. " the want of a judiciary power," 146 

A. to expound and define the true meaning and operation of 

the laws, 146 

b. to ascertain the true import of treaties with foreign na- 
tions, 146 

C. to secure uniformity in the decision of the judges, 147 

L " the organization of Congress utterly improper for the ex- 
ercise of those powers which are necessary to a Foederal 

Union, 148 

J. the existing Foederal system never had a ratification by the 

People, 149 

[V. "THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST 
EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, 
TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT " [the preser- 
vation of the Union], XXIII. 150 

1 concerning " the objects to be provided for by the Foederal 

government," 150 

A. " the common defence of the members," 150 

a. "the authorities essential to the care of the common de- 
fence," 150 

a. " to raise armies," 150 

b. " to build and equip fleets," 150 

C. " to prescribe rules for the government of both " the ar- 
mies and the fleets, 150 

d. " to direct their operations," 150 

e. " to provide for their support," 150 



xiv Contents. 

Essay. Page 
B " these powers ought to exist without limitation," No. XXIII. 160 

a. " because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent 

and variety of national exigencies," 150, 151 

b. because it is impossible to foresee "the extent and 

variety of means which may be necessary to satisfy " 

those exigencies, 150, 151 

C. this principle fully recognized in the Articles of Confed- 
eration, 151 

d. no " proper or adequate provision for its exercise " 

made in those articles, 151 

e. the expectations concerning it of the framers of those 

articles, 152 

f. " this expectation was ill-founded and illusory," 152 

g. the effect of that failure, 152 

h. the remedy therefor, the measures proposed in the new 

Constitution, 152 

C. objection, the danger of standing armies, considered, 

XXIV. 156 

a. the powers referred to are delegated to the legisla- 

tive department, not to the executive of the Union, 15G 

b. the Congress itself, in the exercise of the powers re- 

ferred to, is expressly limited by the terms of the 
proposed Constitution, 157 

c. the State constitutions, with two exceptions, contain no 

interdiction of standing armies, in time of peace, 157 

d. the Articles of Confederation "had not imposed a single 

restraint on the authority of the United States " on 
this subject, 158 

e. the constant danger of the United States from foreign 

and Indian hostilities renders such authority in the 
Foederal government necessary, 159 

f. the growing commerce of the United States demands a 

navy for its protection, 161 

D. objection, " that the objects enumerated above ought to 

be provided for by the 'State governments," considered, 

XXV. 162 
a. " it would be an inversion of the primary principle of 
our political association," by transferring the care of 
the common defence to the individual members of the 
Union, 162 

A. the result of which would be "oppressive to some 

States," 162 

B. it might become dangerous to all the States, through 

the inefficiency or inability of some of them, 163 

C. it would create jealousy by increasing the military 

power of some of the States, 168 



Contents. x^ 

Essay. Pagt 
D. it might afford temptation for invading the constitu- 
tional authority of the Union, No. XXV. 163 

b. the provisions of the Articles of Confederation on State 

military and naval establishments, referred to, 164 

K. the impropriety of restraining the discretion of Congress, 

on keeping up armies, further considered, . 164 

a. the uncertainty of the period or extent of the danger to 

be guarded against, 164 

b. it presumes a possibility of collusion between the Con- 

gress and the executive, in schemes of usurpation,. . . . 165 
F. the impropriety of restraining Congress in raising armies 

in times of peace considered, 165 

0. the objection that " the militia of the country is its natu- 

ral bulwark," considered, 166 

a. it often wants " vigor and stability," 166 

b. it is not the most economical, 166 

c. standing armies sometimes necessary in times of external 

peace, 167 

A. instance of Pennsylvania, notwithstanding her Bill of 

Rights, 167 

B. instance of Massachusetts, notwithstanding the Arti- 

cles of Confederation, 167 

H. the danger of " fettering the government with restric- 
tions " considered, 167 

1. " the idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the 

means of providing for the national defence," further con- 
sidered, XXVI. 169 

a. its origin, 169 

b. it never found much favor in America, 169 

J. " the idea which aims at the exclusion of military estab- 
lishments in times of peace," further considered, 170 

a. its origin and progress, 170 

b. vesting authority on the subject in the Congress, a suffi- 

cient safeguard, 171 

A. because the subject must be reconsidered every two 

3 7 ears, 173 

'B. because "schemes to subvert the liberties of a people 
require time to mature them for execution," which 
cannot be secured, 174 

C. objection, that the executive may seize supplies, an- 

swered, 175 

D. an appeal for the Union based on this objection, 175 

B. concerning the administration of the laws, XXVII. 176 

A. the assertion that the laws which the Constitution au- 
thorizes cannot be executed without the aid of a military 
force, considered, 176 



tvi Contents. 

Essay Pag« 

a. unless the Foederal government shall be worse admin- 

istered than the State governments, there will be no 
danger from popular ill-will, No. XXVII. 176 

b. it is probable that the former will be better administered 

than the latter, 177 

A. from the greater latitude of choice, in the selection of 

officers, 177 

B. from the peculiar care and judgment with which the 

Foederal Senate will be composed, 177 

C. from the superior intelligence of the Foederal Con- 

gress, 177 

D. from the absence of faction therein, 177 

c. there will be less liability to sedition, because there will 

be a greater power to suppress it, 178 

d. the Foederal government " will be strengthened by its 

extension to matters of internal concern," 178 

S. the proposed form of government " bids much fairer to 
avoid the necessity of using force," than that proposed 
by its opponents, 179 

a. because " it enables the Foederal government to employ 

the ordinary magistracy of each State, in the execution 

of its laws," 179 

b. because it displays to the People the common origin of 

both the Foederal and the State governments, 179 

c. because it conveys to the People the consideration of its 

superior power to enforce obedience, and thereby checks 

disaffection, 179 

A. "the laws of the confederacy, as to the enumerated 
and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction, the supreme 

law of the land," 180 

O. "there may happen cases in which the National govern- 
ment may be necessitated to resort to force,".. .XXVIII. 181 

a. in which cases force must be employed, 181 

A. examples referred to, in the individual States, 182 

B. it would be equally necessary in the plan proposed by 

the opponents of the new system, 182 

b. it will be entirely controlled by the representatives of 

the People, 183 

A. if the Congress betrays the People there is no remedy 

but " the original right of self-defence, which is para- 
mount to all positive forms of government," 183 

B. in that case it may be remedied better than if a State 

government should be similarly treacherous, 183 

V, tho State governments the greatest security against 
Foederal usurpations of power by the Foederal au- 
thorities. . 186 



Contents. xvii 

Essay. Page 

D. the great extent of our territory affords additional se- 

curity, No. XXVIII. 185 

E. the limited resources of the country afford still more 

security, 185 

C. concerning " a general power of taxation,". XXIX. 186 

A. such authority is necessary in every constitution, .... 187 

a. the want of such authority leads either to official plunder, 

or, 187 

b. to " a fatal atrophy " in the government, and speedy dis- 

solution, 187 

B in the present confederation, the want of it has produced 

disaster, 187 

0. the only remedy is " that of permitting the National gov- 
ernment to raise its own revenues by the ordinary meth- 
ods of taxation," . . . . 188 

O. objection, that the authority of Congress should be limited 

to " external taxation," answered, .... 188 

B. reply, "that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions 

upon the States," considered, 189 

a. the "vices and deformities" of the system of requisi- 

tions, considered, 189 

b. its effect in time of war, 190 

A. primarily, no " proper dependence " on the plan, 191 

B. secondly, the diversion of other funds, already appro- 

priated, to the defence of the State, 191 

C. thirdly, the destruction of public credit, 191 

D. fourthly, difficulty in procuring loans, 191 

E. finally, disaster to the country, 191 

F. surrejoinder, "that, from the scantiness of the resources 

of the country, the necessity of diverting the established 
funds would exist, though the National government should 
possess this power," considered, 191 

a. " the resources of the community, in their full extent, 

will be brought into activity for the benefit of the 
Union," 191 

b. " whatever deficiency there may be, can readily be sup- 

plied by loans, 191 

A. confidence inspired, among lenders, by the delegation 

of this authority of taxation, 192 

B. distrust arising from the absence of that authority, in 

the Confederation, removed, 192 

©. the necessity of " a general power of taxation *' further 

considered, XXX. 192 

a. the importance of " first principles," on every general 

subject, 192 

b. " first principles " in morals and politic* less frequently 

b 



fcviii Contents. 

Bssay. Pag* 
assented to than those of other branches of knowl- 
edge, No. XXX. 194 

c. the reason for that diversity of opinion in morals and 

politics is the passions and prejudices of the rea- 
soner, 194 

d. the same influences prevail among the opponents of the 

new system, 194 

A. the reasoning of the anti-Foederalists reviewed, 194 

B. their fairness, in argument, considered, 195 

C. a review of Publius's arguments on the powers of the 

government, 197 

D. a review of the anti-Foederal arguments on the proba- 

bility of usurpation by the Foederal government, 197 

* E. a review of the arguments on the probable aggres- 
sions of the State governments on the Foederal au- 
thority, 197 

a. the sympathy of the People with the State govern- 
ments, 197 

& objection, that such a power in the Foederal government 
would interfere with the State governments in their 
levies of money, considered, XXXI. 198 

a. the sense of the People, a barrier to the oppressive use 

of this power by the Foederal authorities, 198 

b. the hazard of provoking the resentments of the State 

governments, another barrier thereto, 198 

c. a conviction of the utility and necessity of local adminis- 

trations, for local purposes, a third barrier thereto, 198 

d. the several States would still retain an independent and 

uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues, . . . 198 

A. an attempt, by the Foederal authorities, to abridge that 

authority will be a violent assumption of unconstitu- 
tional power, 199 

B. the sovereignty of the Foederal authorities limited in 

extent, 199 

a. " where the Constitution in express terms grants an ex- 
clusive authority to the Union," 199 

6. "where it grants an authority to the Union and 
prohibits the States from exercising the like au- 
thority," 199 

c. " where it grants an authority to the Union, to which 
a similar authority in the States would be absolutely 

and totally contradictory and repugnant," 199 

C the only exclusive power of taxation which is delegated 
to the Foederal government is that of imposing taxes 

on imports, 200 

D the authority to impose taxes on all other articles is 



Contents. xix 

Essay. Pagr 
concurrent and coequal in the Foederal and the State 

authorities, No. XXXI. 200 

a. it has not been exclusively granted to the Union, 200 

6. it has not been prohibited to the several States, 200 

c. it is a necessary deduction from the particular re- 

straint which has been imposed on the States con- 
cerning duties on exports and imports, 200 

i. the contrary would be an unnecessary restraint on 

the States, 201 

ii. it would also be a dangerous restraint on them, 201 

ill. " the restriction in question is a negative preg- 
nant," 201 

d. there is no repugnancy between the authority to 

levy taxes by the Foederal authorities, and that un- 
der which the State governments do the same, . . . 202 

e. concurrent authority to levy taxes the necessary re- 

sult of a division of the sovereign power, 202 

I. objection to the delegation of incidental powers of taxation 

to the Foederal government considered, 203 

a. no authority delegated which it Avould not have necessarily 

possessed, 203 

b. the authority to levy taxes carries with it all the incidental 

authority which may be necessary and proper to carry it 
into execution, 204 

c. the express delegation of incidental authority an act of 

caution, 205 

d. the Foederal authorities must judge, in the first instance, 

what may be necessary and proper powers for them to 
exercise, 205 

e. the constituents of that government must be the ultimate 

judge of the necessity and propriety of employing such 
powers, 205 

A. how the constitutional impropriety of a Foederal meas- 

ure must be determined, 206 

B. instances wherein such impropriety would be evident, 206 
/. objection, that the laws of the Union concerning taxation 

are supreme, considered, 206 

a. any other than supreme laws would be useless, 206 

b. all laws must, necessarily, be supreme to those to whom 

they apply, 206 

C. " acts which are not pursuant to the Constitution are 
merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treat- 
ed as such," 207 

d. the new system " expressly confines this supremacy to 

laws made pursuant to the Constitution," 207 

•. any act of the United States which interferes with a 



*x Contents, 

Essay. Page 
State tax-law (unless upon imports and exports) an un- 
constitutional usurpation of power, No. XXXI. 207 

K. " concurrent authority concerning taxation the only ad- 
missible substitute for an entire subordination of the 
States," XXXII. 208 

a. absurdity of denying the practical impossibility of coor- 

dinate authority, 208 

b. illustrations of its practicability, from Roman history,. . . 209 

c. difficulties which will interfere with its execution less 

powerful than those which existed in Rome, 209 

d. purposes of a Foederal revenue more extended than those 

which the State governments must provide for, ... 210 

A. " there ought to be a capacity to provide for future 

contingencies," 210 

JB. there must be a capacity to provide for the public de- 
fence, 210 

C. for the payment of public debts, 212 

e. concluding remarks, urging that a delegation of concur- 

rent authority was preferable to an entire subordi- 
nation of the States to the Foederal authorities, 214 

L. objection, "that the jurisdiction of the National govern- 
ment, in the article of revenue, should be restricted to 
particular objects," considered, XXXIII. 215 

a. it would oppress particular branches of industry, 215 

b. taxes would be unequally distributed, 215 

C. illustration from the proposed limitation of its jurisdic- 
tion to duties on imports, 215 

A. objections against a high tariff, 216 

a. it encourages smuggling, 216 

b. it renders other classes tributary to the manufactur- 

ing classes, who will hold a monopoly of the mar- 
kets 216 

c. it will force industry out of its more natural channels 

into those which are less beneficial, 216 

d. it will oppress the merchant in the payment, of duties,. 216 

B. the limitation proposed would be productive of in- 

equality of taxation among the several States, 216 

C. the objection, " that the interest of the revenue itself 

would be a sufficient guard against an extreme 

tariff," considered, 217 

M. objection, that the House of Representatives cannot con- 
tain representatives of all classes of tax-paying citizens, 
considered, 218 

a. such a special representation of each class impracticable, 219 

b. merchants the natural representatives of the mechanic 

and manufacturing classes, 219 



Contents. xxi 

Essay Page 

c. the learned professions form no distinct class in so- 

ciety, No. XXXIII. 21S 

d. the landholders will be well represented by those in 

whom they have most confidence, without regard to 
the extent of their property, 220 

e. the good effects of a mixed representation, and the 

impracticability of special delegations from particular 
classes, 220 

f. men possessing the most extensive information will best 

represent all classes, 221 

g. men of strong minds, who belong to no particular class, 

will sometimes command the attention which is due to 

their merit, XXXIV. 222 

h. men of different trades will seldom possess greater sym- 
pathy for each other than the merchant will for both, . . 222 
H. objection, that a power of internal taxation in the Fced- 
eral Congress cannot be exercised with advantage for the 
want of sufficient knowledge of local circumstances, con- 
sidered, 224 

a. the memhers from each State can obtain the necessary 

information, 224 

b. systems of finance are usually framed by a few per- 

sons, 224 

c. local disabilities may be easily ascertained and under- 

stood, 225 

d. the assessment of property to be taxed will devolve on 

discreet persons who are acquainted with " local de- 
tails," 225 

e. " the National legislature can make use of the system of 

each State within that State," 226 

f. the proportion of taxes among the States is fixed, and 

is "to be determined by the numbers of each State," 
respectively, 226 

g. if this power should prove " to be really inconvenient," 

it need not be used, and requisitions may be resorted 

to, 226 

A. " why not omit that ambiguous power, in the first in- 
stance, and rely on requisitions 1 " answered, 227 

a. because, if convenient, this mode will be prefer- 

able, : 22 

b. because the existence of such authority will give 

greater efficacy to requisitions, 227 

O. clashing of authority concerning taxation, State and Fed- 
eral, cannot occur, 227 

p. minor objections to the delegation of authority to levy 
taxes considered, 227 



xxii Contents. 

Essay. Page 

a. double sets of revenue officers, No. XXXIV. 228 

b. "duplication of the popular burdens by double taxa- 

tions," 229 

c. " the frightful forms of odious and oppressive poll- 

taxes," ^ 229 

2. in " the power of regulating the militia, and of commanding 
its services in times of insurrection and invasion,". XXXV. 231 

A. uniformity in its organization and discipline is desirable,. . . . 231 

B. that uniformity is attainable only by confiding the regulation 

of the militia to the Foederal authorities, 231 

C. the weakness of those who oppose the delegation of this au- 

thority to the Foederal authorities, 232 

D. objection, that no provision has been made for calling out 

the posse comitatus, to assist the Foederal magistrate, con-, 
sidered, 232 

E. objection, that danger may be apprehended from the dele- 

gation of such an authority, considered, 233 

A. the project for a militia establishment which " Pdblius " 

approved, 233 

B. the necessity for a military establishment would, thereby, 

be diminished, 235 

C. the pretence of danger from a disciplined militia ridiculed,. 235 
d. the authority absolutely retained by the States, to appoint 

the officers of the militia, a sufficient safeguard, 235 

F. objection, based on the authority to order the militia into 

distant States, considered, 236 

V. " THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITU- 
TION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN 

GOVERNMENT," XXXVI. 238 

1. introductory remarks, 238 

A. difficulty of investigating public measures with moderation 

and candor, 239 

B. the manner in which the proposed Constitution has been dis- 

cussed, considered, 239 

a. the predetermined friend of the new system may be up- 
right, 2d0 

B. the predetermined opponent "cannot be upright and must be 

culpable," 240 

C. The FazderaUst not addressed either to predetermined enemies 

or friends of the measure, but to those who desire the happi- 
ness of their country, 240 

D. in considering the plan allowances must be made for the dif- 

ficulties, inherent in the very nature of the undertaking, 
which the Convention experienced, , 240 

A. the novelty of the undertaking, 240 

B. the difficulty of " combining the requisite stability and en- 



Contents. xxiii 

Essay. Pag« 
ergy in government with a due regard to liberty and the 
republican form/' No. XXXVI. 241 

O. the difficulty of " marking the proper line of partition be- 
tween the authority of the General, and that of the State 
governments," 242 

D. " the interfering pretensions of the larger and smaller 
States," 245 

B. " other combinations [of the States], resulting from a dif- 
ference of local position and policy," 245 

E. it need not excite wonder if the proposed Constitution shall 

want harmony between its several parts, 246 

F. the experience of the past, on similar subjects, when com- 

pared with the result in this case, proves, 246 

a. that the Convention was not afflicted with party animosi- 
ties, and, 247 

B. that "all the deputations composing the Convention were 

finally accommodated," 247 

6. " in every case reported by ancient history in which gov- 
ernment has been established with deliberation and con- 
sent," it has been framed by a single individual, 

XXXVII. 247 
H. the difficulties which they experienced in the establishment 

of their governments, 248 

I. the errors which the new system contains are rather the re- 
sult of the defect of antecedent experience, than of the 
want of accuracy and care in preparing it, 249 

a. proved from general causes, 249 

b. from the peculiar amendments to the Articles of Confedera- 

tion which have been proposed for ratification, 250 

J. the present situation of America considered, 250 

a. the severity of " her malady," 251 

b. the diversity of the advice given for her relief, 251 

c. improbability that those who object to the new system 

could improve it, 254 

D. the proposed Constitution, notwithstanding its defects, an 

improvement on the old one, 254 

B. the principal grounds of objection to the new one exist, or 

are permitted to be exercised, under the old one, 255 

F. answer, that notwithstanding these practices, under the 

old constitution, they are rendered harmless by the entire 
dependence of the Congress on the constituent States, 
considered, 255 

G. the Congress not open to censure for assuming doubtful 

authority, 257 

% ' a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the 
Convention," XXXVHI. 258 



xxiv Contents. 

Essay. Page 

A. no other than a strictly republican form of government recon- 

cilable with the genius of the People of America, 

No. XXXVIII. 258 
A., what are the distinctive characters of the republican form, 

considered, „ 258 

a. the example of Holland referred to, 258 

b. the example of Venice referred to, 258 

c. the example of Poland referred to, 258 

d. the example of England referred to, 259 

e. the general subject discussed, 259 

B. the proposed Constitution conforms to the standard here fixed, 260 
a. in the tenure of its offices, 260 

B. in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, 261 

C. objection, that it has not preserved the Foederal form, but 

provides for a National government, considered, . . . 261 

a. what is the real character of the proposed government, . . 261 

A. it will be founded on the assent and ratification of 

the People of the several States, as such, 262 

B. the sources from which its ordinary powers will be 

drawn, 263 

a. the House of Representatives, from the People of 

America, 263 

b. the Senate, from the States, as such, 263 

c. the Executive, 263 

i. immediately from the States in their political char- 
acters, 263 

ii. eventually by the House of Representatives, as 
representatives of the States, as distinct and co- 
equal bodies politic, 263 

C. the operation of its ordinary powers, 263 

D. the extent of its ordinary powers, 264 

E. the authority by which amendments are to be made, . 265 

F. the subject generally discussed, 266 

b was the Convention authorized to frame and propose a 

mixed system, XXXIX. 266 

A. the commissions of its members examined, ... 266 

B. the recommendatory acts considered, 266 

C. the authority of the Convention deduced therefrom,. 267 
a. " to establish, in these States, a firm National govern- 
ment," 267 

6. that government to be "adequate to the exigencies of 

government, and the preservation of the Union" 267 

e. these purposes were " to be effected by alterations and 

provisions in the Articles of Confederation," 268 

d. these alterations were to be reported to the Congress 

and to the States, for approval and ratification, 268 



Contents. xxv 

Essay Page 

D. the general subject discussed, No. XXXIX. 268 

C how far considerations of duty might have supplied any 

defect of regular authority in the Convention, 272 

A. as its powers were merely advisory and recommen- 

datory, the proposed system is harmless until it 
shall be approved, 272 

B. the importance, to the United States, of the result of 

its deliberations, 273 

C. the necessity which existed for a radical change in 

the form of government, 274 

D. the question whether the Convention exceeded its 

powers does not affect the propriety of ratifying 

the proposed Constitution, 275 

C. the Constitution proposed by the Convention considered,. XL. 276 
A. "the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the [Foed- 

eral] government " considered 276 

a. is the aggregate of that power greater than it should be,. 276 

A. the arguments of opponents considered generally, 277 

B. the objects of those powers considered, 277 

a. concerning " security against foreign danger," . 278 

i. the power of declaring war and granting letters of 

marque, 278 

ii. that of providing armies and fleets, 278 

i. it must be indefinite, 278 

ii. it must extend to times of peace as well as to 

those of war, 278 

Hi. the danger from military establishments consid- 
ered, 279 

iii. that of regulating and calling forth the militia,. . . 284 

iv. that of levying and borrowing money, 284 

i. the authority to levy internal taxes considered, . . 285 
ii. the indefinite character of the authority consid- 
ered, 285 

A. it has been sufficiently restricted, 286 

33. it was copied from the old system, 287 

C. an appeal to the objectors, 287 

b. concerning the " regulation of the intercourse with 

foreign nations," XLI. 288 

L the power to send and receive ambassadors and 

consuls and to make treaties, 288 

ii. to punish piracies and felonies committed on the 

high seas, and offences against the laws of nations, 289 

iii. to regulate foreign commerce, 29C 

i. reflections on the sanction of the slave-trade... . . 290 
ii. objection to the Constitution, based on that 

clause, considered, 291 



ix vi Contents. 

Essay. Pa^e 

c. the " maintenance of harmony and proper inter- 

course among the States," No. XLI. 291 

i. to regulate commerce among the States and the 

Indian tribes, 292 

ii. to coin money, and to regulate its value and that 

of foreign coin, 294 

. iii. to provide for the punishment of counterfeiters of 

coin and public securities, 294 

iv. to fix the standard of weights and measures, 294 

v. to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, .... 294 

vi. to establish an uniform law of bankruptcy, 296 

vii. to establish a rule by which public acts, etc., 

shall be proved, and with what effect, 296 

viii. to establish post-roads and post-offices, 296 

d. " miscellaneous powers," XLIL 297 

i. the power to pass laws for securing the exclusive 

right to their works to authors and inventors, . . 297 
ii. the exclusive right of legislation over the seat of 

the Foederal government, 297 

iii. the punishment of treason against the United 

States, 299 

iv. to admit new States into the Union, 299 

v. to dispose of and govern the territories and public 

property of the United States, 30C 

vi. to guarantee to every State a republican form of 

government, 300 

vii. to protect the States against invasion, 302 

viii. to protect the States against domestic violence, . 302 
i. the powers and rights of majorities and minori- 
ties of the several States discussed, 302 

•V. the probability of a general, overpowering in- 
surrection within all the States considered,... 304 

IX. to assume the payment of outstanding debts of 

the United States, 305 

t. its purpose, 305 

ii. objection, that it does not assert the continued 
validity of debts due to the United States, an- 
swered, 305 

X. to provide for amendments to the Constitution,.. . 306 

XI. the establishment of the new system, when nine 

States shall have approved it 306 

i. the violation, by this provision, of the Articles of 

Confederation considered, 307 

at. the relations which will exist between the as- 
senting and the dissenting States of the Union 
considered, $& 



Contents. xxvii 

Essay. Page 
0. " restrictions on the authority of the several States," 

No.XLIII. 308 
i. forbidding the establishment of treaties and alli- 
ances between them, 309 

ii. forbidding the issue of letters of marque and re- 
prisal, 308 

iii. forbidding the coinage of money by them, 309 

iv. forbidding the issue of bills of credit by them,. . . 309 
v. forbidding the establishment of any other legal 

tender than gold and silver, 310 

vi. forbidding the passage of bills of attainder, 310 

vii. forbidding the passage of ex post facto laws, 310 

viii. forbidding the passage of laws impairing con- 
tracts, 310 

ix. forbidding the establishment of titles of nobility,. 311 
X. forbidding the imposition of duties on exports or 

imports, 312 

f. " the several powers and provisions by which effi- 
cacy is given to all the rest," 312 

i. the power to make all necessary and proper laws for 

carrying the preceding powers into execution,.. 312 
t. the necessity of such authority in the United 

States, 312 

ii. other methods considered, 312 

A. prohibiting the exercise of any power not 

expressly delegated to the Union, 313 

B« a positive enumeration of the general powers 

so delegated, 313 

C. a negative enumeration of them, by a specifi- 

cation of the reserved powers, 314 

D. entire silence on the subject, 314 

1*7. the remedy for an abuse of this authority, .... 315 

Ii. the supremacy of the Constitution and constitu- 
tional laws of the United States, and of their 

treaties with other powers, 315 

*. the effect of reserving the supremacy of the 

State constitutions therefrom, considered, 316 

iii. the various officers, State and Eoederal, to be 

bound by oath to support it, 317 

i. why State officers are to be thus obligated, 317 

C. conclusion, that no part of the powers delegated to the 

Fcederal government is unnecessary or improper, 317 

b. will the aggregated powers of the Union be dangerous 

to the reserved authority of the several States, . .XLIV. 318 
A. if the objects of the Union can be attained only through 
the proposed Constitution, it is not a valid objection 



txviii Contents. 

Lssay. Page 
tliat it abridges the authority of the State govern- 
ments No XLIV. 318 

B. the new Constitution will not prove fatal to the State 

governments, 319 

a. because of the tendency, in confederacies, to despoil 

the General government of its delegated powers, . . 319 
6. because the State governments will possess more in- 
fluence among the People, 321 

c. because the State governments are constituent and 

essential parts of the Foederal government, 321 

d. because the employees of the United States will be 

less numerous than those of the States, 321 

e. because the powers reserved by the States are rel- 

atively greater and more numerous than those 
■which are delegated to the Union, 323 

f. because the proposed change consists less in the addi- 

tion of new powers to the Union, than in the invig- 
oration of its old ones, 324 

g. because the State governments will possess more in- 

fluence among the People, resumed, XLV. 325 

i. the State and the Foederal governments are in fact 
only different agents for the People, with differ- 
ent powers and for different purposes, 326 

it. they both depend on the sentiments and sanction of 

common constituents for their respective powers, 325 
iii. the first and most natural attachment of the Peo- 
ple will be to their respective State governments, 326 
t. from the greater number of offices in the latter, 326 
ii. from the character of the interests which they 

provide for, 326 

Hi. from the greater familiarity of the People with 

them, 326 

iv. from the history of the country during the war, 326 
iv. if the popular favor should rest on the Foederal 
government, it will be only because that will be 

better administered than the others, 327 

k, because the prepossessions of the members of the 

Foederal government will be in favor of their States, 327 
i. because the respective States possess the means of 

defeating Foederal encroachments, 329 

J. because other States would sympathize with the suf- 
fering State, and combine for its support, 330 

k. the objection, that the military power will be in the 

Foederal government, answered, 330 

L the impossibility of collecting a force for such a pur- 
pose, , 881 



Contents, xxix 

Essay. Pagt 
ii, the superior power of the militia to resist and over- 
come it, No. XLV. 331 

i concluding remarks on this particular branch of the 

subject, 332 

C. concluding remarks, on the danger that the Foederal 
powers will be formidable to reserved powers of indi- 
vidual States, 333 

" the particular structure of the Foederal government 
and the distribution of its powers among its constituent 

parts," XL VI. 333 

I. " its supposed violation of the maxim, that the legis- 
lative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to 
be separate and distinct," considered, 333 

A. the truth of the maxim conceded, 334 

B. the proposed Constitution does not violate it, 334 

a. the meaning of the maxim discussed, 334 

i. the views of Montesquieu examined, 334 

i. the British Constitution, as his standard of gov- 
ernment, referred to, 334 

ii. his own expressed reasons referred to, 335 

ii. the provisions of the State constitutions, rela- 

» tive thereto, examined, 337 

i. New Hampshire, 337 

ii. Massachusetts, 338 

Hi. New York, 339 

iv. New Jersey, 339 

v. Pennsylvania, 339 

vi. Delaware, 340 

vii. Maryland, 340 

viii. Virginia, 346 

ix. North Carolina, 341 

x. South Carolina, 341 

xi. Georgia, 341 

xii. general remarks on the State constitutions 34i 

h. the necessity that " these departments shall be so 
far connected and blended as to give to each a con- 
stitutional control over the others," considered,.. . . 

XLVII. 343 
i. " the powers belonging to one department ought not 
to be directly and completely administered by 

either of the others," conceded, 343 

ii. "neither of them ought to possess an overruling 
influence over the others in the administration 

of their powers," conceded, 343 

ill. what practical security can be provided for each, 

against the invasion of the others, considered,. . . 348 



tx\ Contents. 



Essay. Page 
I. the insufficiency of naked constitutional restric- 
tions, No. XLVII. 343 

A. the tendency of the legislature to absorb 
the others, 348 

a. from the nature of our political organiza- 

tion, 344 

b. from " an intrepid confidence in its own 

strength," 344 

C. from necessary extent of its powers, 345 

d. from its control of the pecuniary resources 

of the country, and the indefiniteness of its 
authority in many cases, 345 

e. from the examples presented in history, . . . 345 

B. an instance of executive encroachment ac- 

counted for, 348 

C. concluding remarks, 348 

It. Mr. Jefferson's proposition, that, two thirds of the 

members of each of two of the departments 
concurring, an appeal to the People may be 
taken, considered, XL VIII. 349 

A. the People the only source of authority, 349 

B. the propriety of a well-defined mode of ap- 
pealing to the People considered, 350 

C. it does reach the case of an improper com- 

bination of two departments of the govern- 
ment, 350 

D. by frequent applications it might impair the 
respect with which the People would regard 
the government, 350 

E. the public tranquillity might be disturbed by 
a too frequent recurrence to the decision of 
the society, 351 

P. the decisions thus obtained would not answer 
the purpose of maintaining the constitutional 
equilibrium of the government, 352 

a. the legislature will still control the decision, 352 

b. members of the legislature will probably 

be the members of the conventions to re- 
vise the form of government, 353 

C. when such appeals to the People, against 

the legislature, will be useful, 553 

Gr. concluding remarks on occasional appeals to 

the People, 354 

Hi. periodical appeals to the People considered, 

XLIX. 354 
A* the disadvantage of short intervals dismssed, 356 



Contents. xxxi 

Essay. Paga 
U. the disadvantage of long intervals discussed, 

No. XLIX. 355 
C. the example of Pennsylvania referred to,.. . . 355 
M7. the interior structure of the government should 
be so arranged that its several constituent 
departments, by their mutual relations, may 
keep each other in their proper places, L. 358 

A. the members of each should have little to do 

in the appointment of members of the others, 359 

B. the members of each department should be 

as little dependent as possible on those of the 

others for their emoluments, 359 

C« the members of each should possess the con- 
stitutional means and personal motives to 
resist invasions by the members of other 
departments, 360 

a. this policy not unfrequently resorted to,. . . 300 

b. an equal power of self-defence cannot be 

granted to each department, 361 

C-*a division of the power of the legislature 
necessary, in order to guard against its en- 
croachments, 361 

d. an increase of the power of the executive, 
that of the veto, for its protection, neces- 
sary, 361 

9. the advantages afforded by the Foederal system 
of America, in securing the rights of the Peo- 
ple, 362 

A. the division of the delegated powers between 

two distinct governments, and its subse- 
quent subdivision, in each, among distinct 
and separate departments, 362 

B. the multitude of different and distinct inter- 

ests among the People, 362 

, " the House of Representatives," LI. 365 

A. the qualifications of the electors thereof, 365 

a. why not subject to regulation by the Congress, 365 

6. why not subject to regulation by the State legisla- 
tures, 365 

c. why not made uniform throughout the several States, 365 

d. the advantages derived from the constitutional pro- 

vision, 365 

B. the qualifications of the members, 366 

C. the term of office of its members, 366 

a. "whether biennial elections, in this case, will be 

safe," considered, 866 



txxii Contents, 

i. frequent elections the only effectual security for an 
immediate dependence on, and sympathy with, 

the People, No. LI. 360 

ii. the length of terms of service in other govern- 
ments, 367 

t. British House of Commons, at different periods, 367 

ii. Irish Parliament, , 368 

Hi. the American colonies, 3^9 

lii. conclusion, that biennial elections will not be dan- 
gerous, 370 

XV. this conclusion strengthened by other circum- 
stances, 370 

•". the Fcederal Congress \rll possess less power 
than the British or sdsh Parliaments, or the 

colonial Assemblies, 370 

if. it will be restrained by its dependence on the 
People, while it will be watched, also, by the 

several State governments,.. 370 

lit. the other departments of the Fcederal govern- 
ment will possess fewer means to seduce the 
House than are possessed by the governmenfr 

referred to, 370 

V. objection, that " where annual elections end, tyr- 
anny begins," considered, LII. 371 

i. no adequate reason for the opinion, 371 

ii. the practice of different States in the choice of 

their legislators, 371 

m. the practice of the British Parliament, by sim- 
ple statute, to change fundamental principles 
of government not applicable, in this case, as 

a reason, 872 

& «re " biennial elections necessary or useful," t . 373 

i. short terms of office prevent members from ac- 
quiring the practical knowledge requisite to the 

due performance of their duties, 373 

t. greater scope of information necessary in the 

Fcederal than in the State governments, 374 

ii*. the necessity of acquiring a knowledge of for- 
eign affairs, 376 

ii. short terms will be inconvenient to members who 

reside at a distance from the capitol, 376 

iii. short terms will be more dangerous from the 

greater number of inexperienced members, 377 

iv. short terms will prevent the correction of spurious 

elections, 377 

T. conclusion, that " biennial elections will be as use- 



Contents. xxxn 

Essay. Paga 
fill to the public, as they will be safe to the lib- 
erty of the People/' No. LII. 377 

D. "the apportionment of its members to the several 

States," LIII. 378 

a. numbers in each State the proper standard for reg- 

ulating the representation of each State, 378 

i. objection against representation of slaves, consid- 
ered, 378 

i. slaves not merely property, 379 

ii. slaves are also persons, 379 

m. the Constitution recognizes this mixed charac- 
ter in slaves, 379 

it?, the apportionment is governed by the same rule 

as that for the levy of direct taxes, 380 

v. they are not considered as property merely, in 
the laws of the States which possess them, . . . 380 
A. reply, that they do not form a basis of local 

representation, considered, 380 

vi. the right of representation of propeity as well 

as of persons, considered, 381 

vii. the votes in the Congress which are allowed 
to the several States should be proportioned 
to the Comparative wealth of those States, . . . 382 

b. there will be no inducement for falsifying the cen- 

sus, as the measure for representation is also the 

measure for taxation, 383 

£. " the number of which the House is to consist " con- 
sidered, LIV. 384 

a. the importance which is attached to this subject,... 384 

b. the difficulty of determining the proper number, 385 

e. the small States require smaller ratios of representa- 
tion than the large States, 386 

d. with the limited powers which are delegated to the 

Congress the necessity for a numerous representa- 
tion is diminished, 386 

e. objections considered and answered, 387 

i. " so small a number of members cannot be safely 

trusted with so much power," 387 

i. a rapid increase of population may be expect- 
ed, and a corresponding increase of represen- 
tation will ensue, 387 

tV. "whether the smallness of the number, as a tem- 
porary regulation, be dangerous to the public lib- 
erty," considered, 387 

mi. from whence can danger ultimately proceed, 

considered, 888 

c 



txxiv Contents. 

Essay. Pago 

A. from foreign gold, No. LIV. 388 

B. from other branches of the Foederal govern- 

ment, 389 

ii. "it will be too small to possess a due knowledge 
of the interests of its constituents," considered, 

LV. 391 
•'. " the representative ought to be acquainted with 
tbe interests and circumstances of his constitu- 
ents," considered, 39i 

ii. the objects of Foederal legislation considered, . . . 391 

A. " a very few representatives will be very suf- 
ficient vehicles of information concerning 
commerce to the Foederal councils," 392 

B. the same observations will apply to matters 
concerning taxation, 393 

C- they " will apply also with greater force to 

the case of the militia," 393 

!D. nothing in the above reasons will conflict 
with the necessity, before referred to, for 
general information in the representative,. . , 393 
in. the experience of Great Britain referred to, . . . 394 
fii. it will tend to the aggrandizement of the few at 

the expense of the many, LVI. 396 

i. this objection strikes at the root of representa- 
tive government, 396 

ii. the members of the House will be elected by all 

classes and conditions of citizens, 397 

Hi. they will be taken from all classes and condi- 
tions of citizens, 397 

iv. securities to insure their fidelity to their con- 
stituents, 39 n « 

A. their personal character, 397 

B- the honorable position to which they will be 
called, 398 

C. the opportunity which will be afforded to se- 

cure honor and distinction, 398 

D. the frequent election compelling them to 
remember their dependence on the Peo- 
ple, 398 

E. the measures adopted must operate on them- 

selves as well as on the great mass of the 

society, ,. 399 

r. the provisions for electing members, and their 
qualifications for office, similar to those of the 

State constitutions for State officers, 40C 

rt. the relative numbers of the constituencies uo 



Contents. xxxv 

Essay. Page 

justification for approval of the State system 

and disapproval of the Foederal system, 

No. LVI. 400 

A. the doctrine is not reasonable, 400 

B- the doctrine is not admissible in its conse- 
quences, 401 

C. the doctrine is not warranted by facts, 401 

a. the British House of Commons 401 

b. the State senators of New Hampshire, 401 

O. the State senators of Massachusetts, 402 

d- "the State senators of New York, 402 

e. members of Assembly in the cities of New 

York and Albany, 402 

f. State representatives in Pennsylvania, 402 

g. the upper house of the Assembly of Con- 

necticut, 403 

h. the Governor of Connecticut, 403 

i. the Governor of Massachusetts, 403 

j . the Governor of New York, 403 

k. the President of New Hampshire, 403 

r. " the number of its members will not be augment- 
ed from time to time as the progress of popula- 
tion may demand," LVIL 403 

t. the provisions of the State constitutions compared 

with those of the proposed Constitution, 403 

n. the practice of the State governments consid- 
ered, 404 

•ii. the peculiar organization of the Congress will 

induce watchfulness on this subject, 404 

A. the large States, in the House, can control 
the small ones, and compel their acquies- 
cence, 404 

a. objection, that the Senate may object and 

prevent such an augmentation, answered, 405 

1. there is no probability that the House, 

representing the majority of the People, 
could be successfully resisted, 405 

2. the consciousness of the House being sup- 

ported by right, reason, and the Consti- 
tution, will check the Senate, 405 

3. it is not certain that a majority of the 

Senate would oppose such an augmen- 
tation, 406 

4. senators from the new States will, proba- 

bly, favor such an augmentation, 406 

0. " a constitutional and infallible resource " 



txxvi Contents. 

Essay. Pag« 

will be a refusal by the House to vote 

the supplies, No. LVII. 406 

6. the Senate will be more ready to yield, 

in such a contest, than the House, 407 

iv. considerations against a numerous House of 

Representatives, 408 

T. objection that a majority of the members of each 
House shall form quorums, and majorities of 

quorums enact laws, considered, 409 

F. the authority vested in the Congress to regulate, in 
the last resort, the election of the members of the 

House of Representatives, considered, LVIII. 410 

a. introductory remarks, 410 

6. "every government ought to contain in itself the 

means of its own preservation," 41 J 

i. the different depositaries of power to control the 

elections, considered, 411 

ii. the exact character and extent of the delegated 

power considered, 411 

e. " the existence of the Union would be entirely at the 
mercy of the State governments," if the regulation 
of elections for the Fcederal government is left en- 
tirely in their hands, 411 

i. the right of self-preservation in the State govern- 
ments is unimpaired, 412 

ii. objection, that the retention of authority in the 
State governments to control the election of 

senators is equally dangerous, considered, 413 

t. it is necessary from the character of the States, 

as constituent bodies, 413 

ii. it is less hazardous, from the peculiar organiza- 
tion of the Senate, 414 

iii. objection, that the interest of each State to be 
represented in the House will be sufficient secu- 
rity against an abuse of power by its govern- 
ment, considered, 415 

d. objection, the Congress may thereby " promote the 
election of some favorite class of men in exclusion 

of others," considered, t .LIX. 416 

i. the improbability that such a purpose would be 

carried out through this channel, discussed, 416 

ii. the certainty that, if attempted, it would be cor- 
rected by " an immediate revolt of the great 
body of the People, headed and directed by the 

State governments," averred and discussed, 417 

iti. the dissimilarity of the organization of the Senate 



Contents, xxxvi 

Essay Page 
and the House a security against an improper 

exercise of this authority, No. LIX. 417 

ir. there can he no conceivable motive for such an 

attempt on the part of Congress, 418 

T. inquiry concerning the relative weight of influ- 
ence possessed by different classes ot the Peo- 
ple, 419 

vi. the qualifications, both of the electors and the 
elected, being controlled exclusively by the State 
governments, no favor can be extended to any 

particular class by the Congress, 421 

vii. the certainty of a general revolt against such an 
assumption of authority further discussed, and 
the necessity of a military power to insure suc- 
cess to the attempt considered, 422 

s. objection, that this provision should have been ac- 
companied by a provision that all elections shall be 
held within the counties where the electors reside, 

considered, LX. 423 

i. such a provision would be harmless, 423 

ii. it would afford no security from the danger appre- 
hended, 423 

iii. the provision compared with provisions concern- 
ing elections in the State constitutions, 424 

t. those in the constitution of New York partic- 
ularly examined, 424 

ii. defects in the State constitutions no apology for 
defects in the proposed Constitution, consid- 
ered, 425 

f, the probability that such authority in the Congress, 
to fix uniform days of election, may be very im- 
portant to the public welfare, 426 

i. the want of any provision in the proposed Consti- 
tution, fixing a particular day for the election, 

considered, 427 

ri. concluding remarks, 427 

C. the Senate, LXI. 428 

A. " the qualifications of senators " considered 428 

B. "the appointment of senators by the State legisla- 

tures " considered, 42 r 

C. " the equality of representation in the Senate " con- 

sidered, 429 

a. the mixed character of the Foederal government re- 
quires a mixed representation, 429 

6. the equal representation in the Senate a recognition 
of sovereignty in the States, 430 



xxxviii Contents. 

Essay. Paj» 
c. it furnishes a security against improper acts of legis- 
lation, No. LXL 480 

D. " the number of senators, and the term for which they 

are to be elected," considered, , 431 

a. "the inconveniences which a republic must suffer 

from the want of such an institution," 431 

i. the security which it furnishes against improper 

legislation will be wanting, 431 

ii. there will be less security against the " infirmity " 

of faction, 432 

iii. there will be less wisdom in the legislation of such 

a republic, 432 

i. the importance of a knowledge of the proper 

mode of legislation, 433 

ii. the little attention paid thereto in America, 433 

iv. mutability in its councils from frequent changes 

in its members, 433 

t. the mischievous effects of such mutability, 433 

A. it forfeits the respect and confidence of other 
nations, 434 

B. by multiplying laws " it poisons the blessings 

of liberty," 434 

C. by affecting the market-price of property it 

gives the sagacious and the rich an undue 
advantage over the industrious and unin- 
formed poor, 435 

J), it checks extended improvements and enter- 
prise, 4«jo 

E. it diminishes the attachment and reverence 

of the People, 435 

T. " the want of a due sense of National character," 

LXII. 436 
Ti. " the want of a due responsibility in the govern- 
ment to the People," 437 

vii. the want of a defence to the People against their 

own temporary errors and delusions, 438 

i. objection, that a widely spread People is not sub- 
ject to such errors and delusions, answered, . . . 439 
6. " history informs us of no long-lived republic which 

had not a senate," 439 

i. the difference between the ancient republics and 

the United States, 440 

t. Athens referred to, 441 

ii. Carthage referred to, 441 

iii. Sparta referred to, 441 

iv. Rome referred to, 44 1 



Contents. xxxix 

Essay. Pagf 

v. Crete referred to, No. LXII. 442 

C. objection, that the Senate will " gradually acquire a 
dangerous preeminence in the government and 
finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy," 

considered, 442 

L the impossibility of such a result averred and dis 

cussed, 443 

ii. the organization of the Senate of Maryland re- 
ferred to, 443 

iii. the organization of the two Houses of the British 

Parliament, , 444 

iv. the examples of the ancient republics referred to,. 444 

i. Sparta and her Ephori, 444 

it. Rome and her Tribunes, 444 

iii. Carthage and her Senate, 445 

t. the controlling influence bf the House of Repre- 
sentatives, 445 

E. "the powers vested in the Senate," LXIII. 446 

a. the treaty-making power, 446 

i. the great importance of that power, 446 

ii. the authority to exercise it vested in those who 

will be best qualified to exercise it, 446 

iii. a popular assembly does not possess such qualifi- 
cations, 447 

i. an intimate acquaintance with public affairs ne- 
cessary, 447 

ii. secrecy and despatch are often required, 449 

ir. objections to this part of the proposed Constitution 

considered, 450 

»'. that the treaty-making power has not been dele- 
gated to men invested with legislative author- 
ity, 450 

tt. that treaties so entered into are to be of supreme 

authority, 451 

Hi. that treaties so entered into are not repealable 

at pleasure, like Acts of Assembly,. 451 

iv. that they may be made instruments of oppres- 
sion, 451 

v. that proper guards against corruption are wanting, 452 

A. the responsibility of senators considered,.. . . 452 

v. concluding remarks, 453 

b. the app Dinting of public officers, LXIV. 453 

c. its authority as a court for the trial of impeach- 

ments, 453 

t the difficulty in forming such a court, in an elective 
government, 468 



Contents. 

Essay. Pag« 
ii. the subjects of its jurisdiction render the trust a 

delicate one, No. LXIV. 453 

ili. the Senate the most fit depositary of that trust, . . 454 
iy. the propriety of delegating that authority to the 

Supreme Court considered, 455 

i that court will not possess the fortitude, credit, 
and authority requisite to the execution of the 

duties of the trust, 455 

it. the membership of the Supreme Court will be 

too limited, 456 

in. as the punishment inflicted by the Court of Im- 
peachment will not terminate the proceedings, 
it will be improper to bring the offender twice 

before the same court, 456 

T the propriety of a junction of the Supreme Court 
with the Senate in this trust, considered and de- 
nied, 457 

▼i. the propriety of delegating this authority to those 
who are wholly disconnected with other depart- 
ments of the government, considered and denied, 458 
▼ii. the proposed Constitution should not be rejected 
for that cause, even if this feature is not the 

most desirable, 459 

▼iii. objections to this portion of the new Constitu- 
tion considered, LXV. 4G0 

i. it unites legislative and judicial authority in the 

same body, 460 

A. the inconsistency of those who raise the ob- 
jection while they admire the constitution 
of New York, in which similar provisions 

exist 461 

•V. it contributes to an undue accumulation of pow- 
er in the Senate, and tends toward the estab- 
lishment of an aristocracy, 461 

in. as an appointing power, the Senate will be too 
lenient judges of the conduct of those whom 

they shall have appointed to office, 463 

iv. as a treaty-making power, the Senate may be 
called to try themselves for corrupt or perfidi- 
ous action, 465 

d. the Executive department, LXVI. 467 

A. the misrepresentations of this subject considered,. . . 467 

B. the mode of electing the President considered, ... 

LXVil. 472 
a. the only part of the new Constitution which its oppo- 
nents do not condemn, 472 



Contents. \\\ 

Essay Pag« 

b. "it is pretty well guarded," No. LXVII. 473 

C "it was desirable that the sense of the People should 

operate in the choice," 473 

d. it was desirable that the choice should be made by 

competent persons, 473 

e. it was desirable to avoid tumult and disorder, 473 

f. it was desirable to avoid cabal, intrigue, and corrup- 

tion, 474 

g. it was desirable to maintain the independence cf the 

President on all but the People themselves, 475 

h. " all these advantages will happily combine " in the 

proposed Constitution, 475 

t. the choice will seldom fall on one who will not be 

qualified, 475 

C the choice of a Vice-President by the People consid- 
ered and approved, 476 

D. "the real characters of the proposed Executive" con- 
sidered generally, LXVIII. 471 

a. the executive authority is delegated, generally, to 

one person, 477 

i. compared with King of Great Britain 478 

ii. compared with Governor of New York, .... 478 

6. he is elected for four years, and is reeligible, 478 

i. compared with King of Great Britain 478 

ii. compared with Governor of New York, 478 

c. he is liable to impeachment, trial, removal from of- 

fice, and subsequent punishment by the civil 

law, 478 

i. compared with King of Great Britain, 478 

ii. compared with Governor of New York, 478 

iii. compared with the Governors of Maryland and 
Delaware, 478 

d. he has the power of vetoing any measure passed by 

Congress, 479 

i. his authority in this case compared with that of 

the King of Great Britain, 479 

ii. his authority in this case compared with that of 

the Council of Revision in New York, 479 

iii. his authority in this case compared with that of 

the Governor of New York, 479 

iv. his authority in this case compared with that of 

the Governor of Massachusetts, 479 

6. he is commander-in-chief of the militia, when in the 

Foederal service, 480 

i. his authority in this case compared with that of 

the King of Great Britain, 480 



Jtlii Contents. 

Essay. Page 
ii. his authority in this case compared with that of 

the Governor of New York, No. LXVIII. 480 

f. he is commander-in-chief of the army and navy of 

the United States, 480 

i. his authority therein compared with that of the 

King of Great Britain, 480 

ii. his authority therein compared with that of the 

Governor of New York, 480 

iii. his authority therein compared with that of the 
Governors of New Hampshire and Massachu- 
setts, 481 

g. his power to pardon offenders against the laws, 481 

i. his authority therein compared with that of the 

Governor of New York, 481 

h. his power, in one case, to adjourn the Congress, 482 

i. his power therein compared with that of the King 

of Great Britain, 482 

ii. his power therein compared with that of the Gov- 
ernor of New York, 482 

«. his treaty-making power, .... 482 

i. his power therein compared with tkat of the King 

of Great Britain, 482 

j. his power to receive ambassadors and public ministers, 483 
k. his power, in connection with the Senate, to appoint 

ambassadors and other ministers, 483 

i. his power therein compared with that of the King 

of Great Britain, 484 

ii. his power therein compared with that of the Gov- 
ernor of New York, 484 

I. the general authority of the President reviewed, and 
compared with that of the Governor of New 

York, 485 

m. the general authority of the President reviewed, and' 
compared with that of the King of Great Britain,.. 485 
E. the provisions of the new Constitution, concerning the 

Executive, further considered, LXIX. 488 

a. the idea that a vigorous executive is inconsistent 

with the genius of republican government exam- 
ined and refuted, 486 

b. " the ingredients which constitute energy in the Ex- 

ecutive " considered, 487 

i. unity, 488 

t. it has been approved by the soundest political 

writers, 488 

ii. it is indisputably conducive to energy, 488 

•Vt. in what manner it may be destroyed, 488 



Contents. xliii 

Essay. Pagt 

A. by vesting the authority in two or more mag- 

istrates, No. LXIX. 488 

B. by making the authority subject to the coop- 

eration and control of a council 488 

a. plurality of magistrates considered, 489 

b. the controlling authority of a council con- 

sidered, 491 

C> the argument reviewed and concluded, 491 

1. plurality removes responsibility and de- 

stroys the force of popular opinion,. . . . 492 

2. it tends to concealment of wrong-doing,. 492 

3. councils are unnecessary where the mag- 

istrate is personally responsible, 494 

4. plurality in the Executive will be more 

dangerous to liberty, 495 

5. plurality will be more expensive, 496 

& duration in office of the Executive, LXX. 496 

•'. it affects his personal firmness in the employ- 
ment of his constitutional powers, 496 

A. more interest will be felt in that which is 
permanent, 497 

B- subserviency to popular impulses not desira- 
ble in the Executive, 497 

C. subserviency to the humors of the legislature 

equally improper, 498 

D. independence of the several departments of 

government necessary, 499 

E. shortness of the term of office will affect the 
independence of the Executive, 500 

F. a term of four years compared with longer 

and shorter terms, 500 

tt. it affects the stability of his system of adminis- 
tration, LXXI. 502 

A- the term "administration of government" 

defined, 502 

B. the heads of foreign, finance, military, and 

naval departments are only "assistants or 
deputies of the chief magistrate," and ought 
to be appointed by him and be subject to hrs 
superintendence, , 502 

C. changes in the Executive will produce, pri- 

marily, changes in these departments, and, 
ultimately, changes in the system of admin- 
istration, 503 

Hi. the reeligibility of the Executive considered, . . . 503 
A. the opposition thereto considered,. .... ..... 508 



xJiv Contents. 

Essay. Paga 

B. the effects of confining the eligibility to a 
single term, No. LXXI. 504 

a. the inducements to good behavior would be 

diminished, 504 

b. temptations would be offered to selfishness, 

peculation, and usurpation, 504 

C. it would deprive the country of experi-. 

ence in the magistracy, 505 

d.. it would deprive the country of the servi- 
ces of those who can be most useful in 

cases of emergency, 506 

e. it would operate as a constitutional inter- 
diction of stability in the administration,. 506 

C. an examination of the supposed advantages 

of such a limitation of eligibility, 507 

a. greater independence in the magistracy,. . . 507 

b. greater security to the People, 507 

D. conclusions, on the impropriety of confining 
the choice of the People, when incumbents 
are qualified, to other and inexperienced can- 
didates, 508 

Hi. an adequate provision for its support, LXX1I. 508 

i. without such a provision the Executive would 

be at the mercy of the legislature, 509 

it. the independence of the Executive cannot be 

impaired, '. 509 

It. competent powers, 510 

t. the power of returning bills to the legislature 

without approval, 510 

A. the propensity of the legislature to usurp 

authority considered, 510 

33. the propriety of delegating this authority to 

the Executive considered, 510 

a. to defend the Executive from legislative 

aggressions, 510 

b. to defend the People from improper legisla- 

tion, 611 

C. objection, that " one man cannot possess more 

wisdom and virtue than a number of men," 
considered, 511 

D. objection, that " the power of preventing bad 
laws includes that of preventing good ones," 
considered, ; 512 

£. the influence of the legislature will prevent 
the frequent and incautious use of this 
power, 512 



Contents, x\\ 

Essay. Page 
P. the greater danger is that it will not be used at 
all times when it may be employed usefully,. 

No. LXXII. 513 
Gr. the power not being absolute, two thirds of the 

legislature may successfully resist it, 514 

a. a similar power delegated to the " Council 

of Revision " in New York, 515 

b. the Governor of Massachusetts possesses a 

power similar to that which is here dele- 
gated to the Executive, 515 

C. the latter preferable to the former, 515 

«. the command of the military and naval forces of 

the Union, ." LXXIII. 516 

m. to require opinions of heads of the executive 

departments, 516 

•r. the power of pardoning offenders against the 

laws of the Union, 517 

A. the propriety of delegating it to a single per- 
son considered, 517 

£• the propriety of delegating authority to the 

President to pardon traitors considered, 517 

V, in connection with the Senate, to make treaties, 

LXXIV. 519 
A. one of the best digested features of the pro- 
posed Constitution, 519 

3B. objection, that it unites the executive and 

legislative departments, considered, 520 

a* it is a proper combination of the two depart- 
ments, 520 

b. it is not entirely an executive, nor is it en- 
tirely a legislative subject, but combines 

the nature of both, 520 

C- it cannot properly be delegated to an elec- 
tive Executive alone, , 521 

d- it cannot properly be delegated to the Sen- 
ate alone, 522 

e. the House of Representatives cannot prop- 
erly be admitted to share in that power,. . 523 
C. objection, that two thirds of all the Senators 
should be required, instead of two thirds of 

those present, considered, 523 

W*. in connection with the Senate, to appoint certain 

public officers, LXXV. 525 

A- this feature of the proposed Constitution is 

entitled to particular commendation, 526 

B- the People at large cannot exercise this power, 626 



dvi Contents. 



Essay. Page 

C. the President will usually be a man of abil- 

ity, No. LXXV. 527 

D. the delegation of this authority to one vian 

will beget a livelier sense of duty and greater 
regard to reputation than the delegation of it 
to many, 527 

E. objection, that it should have been delegated 

solely to the President, considered, 528 

a. all the advantages desired to be gained 
thereby will be secured by the proposed 

plan, 528 

b« the fact that his choice may be overruled by 

the Senate considered, 529 

C. the necessary concurrence of the Senate 
will afford a check on the favoritism of the 

President, 529 

P. objection, that the President thereby may se- 
cure the complaisance of the Senate to his 
views, considered, 530 

a. the integrity of the whole body of the Sen- 

ate will check such a result, 531 

b. the proposed Constitution has guarded 

against it, 531 

Gr. the consent of the Senate will be necessary 
to displace as well as to appoint officers of 

the government, LXXVI. 532 

a. further stability will thereby be secured to 

the government, 532 

H. objection, that the Senate will be unduly 

controlled by the President, considered, 533 

I. objection, that the President will be unduly 

controlled by the Senate, considered, 533 

J. this feature of the proposed Constitution com- 
pared with the plan of appointing State offi- 
cers in New York, 534 

K. the impropriety of delegating this authority 

to a council of appointment, 535 

Ii. the impropriety of admitting the House of 
Representatives to share in this authority, . . 536 
pit*, to communicate information to Congress on the 

state of the Union, 536 

viii. to recommend to Congress the adoption of such 

measures as he shall consider expedient,. . ... 637 
Mr. to convene one or both branches of the Con- 
gress on extraordinary occasions, 537 

s, to adjourn the Congress when there is a dia- 



Contents. xivii 

Essay. Page 
agreement concerning the time of adjourn- 
ment, No. LXXVI. 537 

xi. to receive ambassadors and other public minis- 
ters, 537 

xii. to execute the laws of the Union, 537 

xiii. to commission all the officers of the United 

States, 537 

F. concluding remarks, 537 

, the Judiciary department, LXX VIII. 538 

A. " the mode of appointing the judges," considered, 539 

B. "the tenure by which the judges are to hold their 

places " considered, 539 

a. it is similar to that by which the judges in the sev- 

eral States hold office, 539 

b. objection thereto considered, 539 

i. the Judiciary will be least in a capacity to annoy 

the other departments of the government, 539 

ii. it is the weakest of the three departments of gov- 
ernment, 540 

c. the necessity for a complete independence of the Ju- 

diciary, 041 

i. the authority of the courts to pronounce legisla- 
tive acts void because contrary to the Constitu- 
tion, considered, 541 

ii. the exercise of that authority does not indicate 

that the Judiciary is superior to the legislature, . . 541 

iii. that the legislature is the constitutional judge of 

its own powers, considered and denied, 542 

iy. the interpretation of the laws is the peculiar prov- 
ince of the courts, 542 

i. the effect of that interpretation on the action of 

the courts, 542 

▼. that consideration a reason for the permanent ten- 
Tire of the Judiciary, 544 

Ti. independence of the Judiciary also necessary in 
order that it may guard the Constitution and 
the rights of individuals from sudden impulses 
of popular passion and prejudice, 544 

Tii. as well as the private rights of individuals from 

the mischievous effects of unjust and partial laws, 545 

viii. it is necessary, also, to insure an inflexible and 
uniform adherence to the rights of the Consti- 
tution and of individuals, 546 

ix. and from the nature of the qualifications which 

are required for the discharge of its duties, 540 

d. the wisdom of the provision establishing good be- 



xlviii Contents. 

Essay. Pag* 
havior as the tenure of office in the Judiciary de- 
partment considered as conducive to its indepen- 
dence, No. LXXVIII. 547 

0. a fixed provision for the support of the Judiciary 

also contributes to its independence, LXXIX. 548 

i. "a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a 

power over his will," 548 

ii. the provisions of the proposed Constitution on this 

subject stated, 548 

f* the responsibility of the Judiciary considered, 650 

i. it will be liable to impeachments under the proposed 

Constitution, 550 

ii. it is not liable to removal for inability, 650 

i. the impossibility of fixing the limits of ability and 

disability, 550 

m. the provisions of the constitution of New York 

considered, 550 

g, the extent of the authority delegated to the Judi- 
ciary, LXXX. 551 

i. to what cases the judicial authority of the Union 

ought to extend, considered, 551 

t. to all cases arising from the duly enacted laws of 

the Union, 552 

A. the necessity of a constitutional method of 

giving efficacy to constitutional provisions,.. 552 

B. examples referred to, 652 

ii. to all cases which concern the execution of the 

provisions expressly contained in the articles 

of Union, 553 

Hi. to all cases in which the United States are a party, 653 
iv. to all cases which involve the peace of the con- 
federacy, 653 

A. in their foreign relations, 553 

B- wherein two States, or a State and the citi- 
zens of another State, or the citizens of dif- 
ferent States, are parties, 654 

v to all cases which originate on the high seas, 

and are of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, . 555 
0i\ to all cases wherein the State tribunals cannot 

be supposed to be impartial and unbiased, 555 

ii. to what cases it will extend under the proposed 

Constitution, 556 

i. the constitutional provision stated generally, 656 

it. the powers thus delegated * conformable to the 
principles which ought to have governed thr 
structure of the Judiciary," 656 



Contents. xlix 

Essay. Page 
Mi. the propriety of delegating " equity jurisdic- 
tion " discussed, No. LXXX. 557 

iii. concluding remarks, 558 

C. "the partition of the judiciary authority between dif- 
ferent courts, and their relations to each other,". . . . 

LXXXI. 559 

o. the constitutional provision stated, 559 

6. the propriety of establishing " one court of supreme 

and final jurisdiction " considered, 5G0 

i. the propriety of delegating that authority to a dis- 
tinct department, considered, 560 

i. that " the errors and usurpations of such a body 
will be unaccountable and remediless " con- 
sidered, 560 

A- the proposed Constitution does not " directly 
empower the Judiciary to construe the laws 
according to the spirit of the Constitution," 561 
it. it secures more completely the separation of the 

Judiciary from the legislature, 561 

iii. it recognizes more fully the principle of good 

behavior as the tenure of judicial oflice, 562 

iv. it secures greater legal ability in the determina- 
tion of causes, 562 

v. it removes the Judiciary from the arena of party 

strife, 562 

vi. the example of several States considered, 562 

li. no legislature can rectify the exceptionable de- 
cisions of the courts in any other sense than by 

prescribing a rule for future action, 563 

iii. the " supposed danger of judiciary encroachments 

on the legislative authority " considered, 563 

& "the propriety of the power of constituting inferior 

courts " considered, 564 

i. " it obviates the necessity of having recourse to 
the Supreme Court in every case of Fcederal 

cognizance," 564 

ii. why the same purpose may not be accomplished 
by the instrumentality of the State courts con- 
sidered, 565 

iii. the advantage to be gained by dividing the United 

States into judicial districts, 566 

d. "in what manner the judicial authority is to be dis- 
tributed between the Supreme and the inferior 

courts of the Union," 666 

L the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court con- 
sidered, 666 

d 



Contents. 

Essay. Page 
•'. the Foederal courts have no authority to enforce 
the payment of their debts by the individual 

States, No. LXXXI. 567 

ii. the original jurisdiction of the inferior courts 

considered, 668 

ill. the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 

considered, 568 ' 

•*. the meaning of the term "appellate" dis- 
cussed, 568 

«. a review of matters of fact by the Supreme 
Court not to be implied as a necessary conse- 
quence, 569 

Hi. the motives which probably influenced the 
Convention in relation to this particular provi- 
sion, 670 

iv. the Congress will have authority to restrain the 
Supreme Court from reexamining matters of 

fact, 570 

v. concluding remarks, ... 571 

, the jurisdiction of the State courts on Foederal ques- 
tions considered, LXXXIL 571 

i. the individual States " will retain all preexisting au- 
thorities which may not be exclusively delegated 

to the Foederal head," 572 

I. in what that " exclusive delegation " consists, . . . 572 
if. "the State courts will retain the jurisdiction they 
now have, unless it appears to be taken away by 

exclusive delegation," . 572 

i. "the concurrent jurisdiction of the State tribu- 
nals the most natural and defensible construc- 
tion " of the Constitution, 578 

w. this is " only clearly applicable to those descrip- 
tions of causes of which the State courts had 

previous cognizance," 678 

fii. the decision of causes arising upon a particular 

regulation may be committed by the Congress to 

the Foederal courts solely, if it desires to do so, 673 

I. this will not divest the State courts of any part 

of their primitive jurisdiction, further than may 

relate to an appeal, 578 

if. nor, except where expressly excluded, of their 
right to take cognizance of the causes to which 

those particular regulations may give birth, 574 

ir. the relation which will subsist between the State 
and the Foederal courts in instances of concur- 
rent jurisdiction, 674 



Contents. \\ 

Essay. Fage 
i. an appeal will lie from the State courts to the 

Supreme Court of the United States, 

No . LXXXII. 574 
iV. the appellate jurisdiction of the inferior Foeder- 

al courts, in such cases, considered, 575 

D. objection, that no provision has been introduced into 
the proposed Constitution to establish the right of 
trial by jury in civil cases, considered, LXXXIII. 576 

a. the disingenuous form of the objection considered, . . 577 

i. the silence of the Constitution on this subject, 577 

ii. rules of legal interpretation applicable to this case, 

considered, 577 

ill. " a power to constitute courts is a power to pre- 
scribe the mode of trial " therein, 678 

iv. concluding remarks, 578 

b. the proper use and true meaning of the maxims on 

which the objection rests, 579 

• the importance of the right of trial by jury considered, 581 

i. its importance in criminal cases conceded, 581 

ii. its relative unimportance in civil cases maintained, 581 

t. a safeguard against undue taxation, denied, 582 

ii. it affords security against official corruption, . . . 583 
in. it is useful in settling questions of property, . . . 584 
iii. the extent to which juries are employed in differ- 
ent States. 584 

d. " no general rule could have been fixed upon by the 
Convention which would have corresponded with 

the circumstances of all the States," 686 

«. " as much might have been hazarded by taking the 
system of any one State as a standard, as by omit- 
ting it altogether " and leaving it to the Congress,. 586 
f. the difficulty of establishing a general constitutional 

rule, 586 

i. the impropriety of its use in many cases, 587 

t. those in which the foreign relations of the United 

States are concerned, 587 

it. those which belong to the equity jurisdiction,. . 588 
li. " the proposition of Massachusetts " on this sub- 
ject considered, 589 

iii. the provision of the constitution of New York on 

this subject considered, 591 

iv. the proposition that it should be established in all 

cases whatever, 592 

v. concluding remarks, 592 

other objections to the proposed Constitution considered 
and answered, LXXXIV. 694 



Lu Contents. 

Essay. Page 

ft. it contains no Bill of Rights, No. LXXXIV. 595 

A. the constitution of New York contains none, consid- 

ered, 59£ 

a. it contains provisions in the body of the instrument, 

which, in substance, amount to the same thing, . . 595 
6. it adopts, in their full extent, the common and stat- 
ute laws of Great Britain, 595 

B. the proposed Constitution contains, in the body of the 

instrument, similar equivalent provisions, 596 

C. a Bill of Rights will be unnecessary, because the People 

will surrender nothing in the adoption of the proposed 
Constitution, and the government will be administered 
by their immediate representatives and servants, .... 598 

D. a Bill of Rights would be dangerous, as implying the 

grant of all powers not expressly withheld, 599 

E. the liberty of the press considered, 599 

F. the proposed Constitution itself a Bill of Rights, 600 

b. " the seat of government will be too remote from many 

of the States to admit of a proper knowledge, on the 
part of the constituent, of the conduct of the represent- 
ative," 601 

C. there is no provision respecting debts due to the United 
States, 603 

d. the additional expense which will be imposed by the new 

system, 603 

A. the increase of offices under the new government con- 

sidered, 604 

a. in many cases the State officers will be diminished to 

the same extent, 605 

b. the judiciary will furnish the principal additions, 605 

B. the diminished sessions of the Congress will counter- 

balance much of the increased expense, 605 

C. the State legislatures, also, will hold shorter sessions, 

at diminished cost, 606 

D. concluding remarks, 606 

VI. "ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR [the People of the State of New 
York] OWN STATE CONSTITUTION," LXXXV. 607 

VII. " THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOP- 
TION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF 
THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND 
TO PROPERTY/' 608 

\ III. CONCLUDING REMARKS, 609 

1. the manner in which Publius had discussed the subject con- 
sidered, 609 

A. an appeal to the reader to weigh the subject under discussion 
carefully, and to act conscientiously; 609 



Contents. liii 

Essay. Pagt 
B. the entire confidence of Publius in the arguments which 

recommend the proposed system, >o. LXXXV. 610 

2. the conceded imperfections of the system no cause for delay in 

adopting it, 610 

A. the extent of these concessions has been greatly exagger- 

ated, 610 

a. " that it is radically defective " denied, 610 

B. " that without material alterations the rights and interests 

of the community cannot be safely confided to it " denied, 610 

C. although not •perfect, it is upon the whole a good plan, 611 

B. the precarious state of the country forbids delay for the only 

purpose of engaging in the chimerical pursuit of a -perfect 
plan of government, 611 

A. the improbability of assembling a new convention with 

the same success as that which attended the last, 611 

B. more easy to obtain amendments subsequent to the adoption 

of the Constitution than previous thereto, 612 

c. no plan can be proposed which will be satisfactory to all 

the States, in every respect, 612 

J>. supposed obstacles in the way of making subsequent amend- 
ments considered, 612 

E. the ease with which a Fcederal convention may be called 
for the amendment of the Constitution, under the provi- 
sions of the proposed Constitution, 613 

& concluding remarks, 614 



A COMPARATIVE EXHIBIT 

OF THE 

CLAIMS TO THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE FOEDERALISI. 







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ni. 


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IV. 


IV. 


Jay 


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v. 


v. 


Jay 


Jay 


VI. 


VI. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


VII. 


VII. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


VIII. 


VIII. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


IX. 


IX. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


X. 


X. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


XI. 


XI. 


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Jay 
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1 Vide letter published in The Port Folio, Vol. IV. No. 20, ante, page xxviii. 

2 Vide ante, pages xxvi. xxvii. 

3 " I am assured that Numbers 2. 3. 4. 5. & 64 were written by John Jat 
" Numbers 10. 14. 37 to 49 both Inclusive & 53 by James Madison Jun — 
" Numbers 18. 19. 20. by Messrs Madison & Hamilton jointly. 

" All tbe rest by Mr Hamilton 

"((—Mr Hamilton told me that Mr Madison wrote 48 & 49 or from pa. 101 to 112 
"of Vol.2<i=)) 

[In much darker colored ink, and in a different style of the Chancellor" 1 s writing:} " NB — 
' I showed the above Memr to General Hamilton in my office in Albany, & he said it 
' was correct, seeing the correction above made — " Chancellor Kent's MS. notes on the 
first fly-page of his copy of M'Lean's edition of The Foederalist, now owned by his grand- 
son, James Kent, Esq., of Fishkill Landing, N. Y. 

* Copied from the original MS. notes in Mr. Madison's copy of Tiebout's edition of The 
Foederalist, by William Q. Force, for his father, General Peter Force, of Washington, 
D.C. 

5 Tide letter of Benjamin Rdsh, Esq., ante, pages xxxix to xlv. 

« Copied from the original MS. notes in Mr. Ames's copy of M'Lean's edition of The 
Foederalist, now owned by his grandson-in-law, Francis Howland, Esq., of Englewood, 
N. J. 

t a Mew I have no doubt Mr Jat wrote No 64 on the Treaty Power — He made a 
''Speech on that Subject in the N Y Convention, & I am told he says he wrote it — I 
" suspect therefore from internal Ev the above to be the correct List, & not the one on 
" the opposide Page — " Chancellor Kent's MS. notes, appended to this list, and in his 
copy of The Foederalist, before referred to, inserted immediately opposite to the memoran- 
ium approved by General Hamilton and copied into Note 3. 

8 From the original MS. notes in Mr. Jfffsrs'>n's copy of M'Lean's edition of The Feed- 
*ralist, now in the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. 

9 From the understanding in Mr. Jay's family, from Chancellor Kent's MS. notes, and 
from the biographical sketch of Mr. JaVs life in D ^laplaine's Repository of the Lives and 
Fortwits of Distinguished American Characters. 



Authorship of The Federalist. 



lv 



1 

1 

"3 

o 


2 

o 

a 

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a 
o 


Gen. Hamilton in his 
own copy and in the 
Benson manuscript. 


Gen. Hamilton to 
Chancellor Kent. 


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No. 


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xn. 


xn. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




XIII. 


XIII. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




XIV. 


XIV. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 




XV. 


XV. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




XVI. 


XVI. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




XVII. 


XVII. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Mad. 


Mad. 




XVIII. 


XVIII. 


H. &M. 


H. & M. 


Mad. 


H. &M. 


Mad. 


Mad. 




XIX. 


XIX. 


H. & M. 


H. & M. 


Mad. 


H &M. 


Mad. 


Mad. 




XX. 


XX. 


H. &M. 


H. &M. 


Mad. 


H. & M. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




XXI. 


XXI. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Mad. 


Mad. 




XXII. 


XXII. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




xxni. 


XXIII. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




XXIV. 


XXIV. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham 




XXV. 


XXV. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




XXVI. 


XXVI. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




XXVII. 


XXVII. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




XXVIII. 


XXVIII. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




XXIX. 


XXX. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




XXX. 


XXXI. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




XXXI. 


1 XXXII. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




fxxxni. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




XXXII. 


XXXIV. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




xxxin. 


XXXV. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




XXXIV. 


XXXVI. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




XXXV. 


XXIX. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




XXXVI. 


XXXVII. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 




XXXVII. 


XXXYIII. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 




txxvni. 


XXXIX. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 




XXXIX. 


XL. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 




XL. 


XLI. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 




XLI 


XLII. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 




XLIT. 


XLHI. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 




XLni. 


XLIV. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 




XLIV. 


XLV. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 




XLV. 


XLVI. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 




XLVI 


XL VII. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad 


Mad. 




XLVLI. 


XLVIII. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 


Mad. 




XLvm. 


XLIX. 


Ham. 


Mad. 


Mad. 




Mad. 


Mad. 




XLIX. 


L. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Mad. 




Mad. 


Mad. 




L. 


LI. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Mad- 




Mad. 


Mad. 




LI. 


LII. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Mad. 




Mad. 


Mad. 




LTI. 


LIII. 


Ham. 


Mad. 


Mad. 




Mad. 


Mad. 




LIII. 


LIV. 


Jay 


Ham. 


Mad. 


Jay 


Mad. 


Mad. 




LIV. 


LV. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Mad. 




Mad. 


Mad. 




LV. 


LVI. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Mad. 




Mad. 


Mad. 




LVI. 


lvh. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Mad. 




Mad. 


Mad. 




Lvn. 


LVIII. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Mad. 




Mad. 


Mad. 




Lvm. 


LIX. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




LIX. 


LX. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




LX. 


LXI. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




LXI. 


Lxn. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Mad 




Mad. 


Mad. 




LXII. 


LXIII. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Mad. 




Mad. 


Mad. 




LXIII. 


LXIV. 


Ham. 


Jay 


Jay 




J^y 


Jay 


J*J 


LXIV 


LXV. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




LXV. 


LXVI. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




LXVI. 


LXVII. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




Lxvn. 


LXVIII. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




LXVIII. 


LXIX. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham 




Ham. 


Ham. 




LXIX. 


LXX. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 




LXX. 


LXXI. 


Ham 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham 


Ham. • 





Ivi 



Authorship of The Fcederalish 



No. 

LXXI. 

LXXII. 

LXXIII. 

LXXIV. 

LXXV. 

LXXVI. 

LXXVIII. 

LXXIX. 

LXXX. 

LXXXI. 

LXXXII. 

LXXXIII. 

LXXXIV. 

LXXXV. 



No. 

LXXII. 

LXXIII. 

LXXIV. 

LXXV. 

LXXVI. 

LXXVII. 

LXXVIII. 

LXXIX. 

LXXX. 

LXXXI. 

LXXXII. 

LXXXIII. 

LXXXIV. 

LXXXV. 



^a 



d a a 

a> fe a> 



Ham. 

Ham. 

Ham. 

Ham. 

Ham. 

Ham. 

Ham. 

Ham. 

Ham. 

Ham. 

Ham. 

Ham . 
. Ham. 
I Ham. 



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sa 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. | 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 


Ham. 




Ham. 


Ham. 



For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. I. 



To the People of the State of New Yoke: 

AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy 
of the subsisting Fcederal Government, you are 
called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the 
United States of America. The subject speaks its own 
importance ; comprehending in its consequences, noth- 
ing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety 
and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the 
fate of an empire, in many respects, the most interesting 
in the world. It has been frequently remarked, that it 
seems to have been reserved to the people of this coun- 
try, by their conduct and example, to decide the impor- 
tant question, whether societies of men are really capable 
or not, of establishing good government from reflection 
and choice, or whether they are forever destined to de- 
pend, for their political constitutions, on accident and 
force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis, at 
which we are arrived, may with propriety be regarded 
as the aBra in which that decision is to be made ; and a 
wrong election of the part we shall act, may, in this 
view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune 
)f mankind. 

This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy 
to those of patriotism to heighten the solicitude, which 
all considerate and good men must feel for the event. 
Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a 

VOL. I. l 



2 The Federalist. 

judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed 
and unbiased by considerations not connected with the 
public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be 
wished, than seriously to be expected. The plan of- 
fered to our deliberations, affects too many particular 
interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, 
not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects for- 
eign to its merits, and of views, passions and preju- 
dices little favorable to the discovery of truth. 

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which 
the new Constitution will have to encounter, may read- 
ily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain 
class of men in every State to resist all changes which 
may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument and 
consequence of the offices they hold under the State- 
establishments — and the perverted ambition of another 
class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize them- 
selves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter 
themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the 
subdivision of the empire into several partial confeder- 
acies, than from its union under one Government. 

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observa- 
tions of this nature. I am well aware that it would be 
disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition 
of any set of men (merely because their situations might 
subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious 
views : Candor will oblige us to admit, that even such 
men may be actuated by upright intentions ; and it can- 
not be doubted, that much of the opposition which has 
made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appear- 
ance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not 
respectable ; the honest errors of minds led astray by pre- 
conceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed 
and so powerful are the causes, which serve to give a 
false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occa- 
sions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as 



The Federalist. 3 

on the right side of questions, of the first magnitude to 
society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would 
furnish a lesson of moderation to those, who are ever so 
much persuaded of their being in the right, in any con- 
troversy. And a further reason for caution, in this re- 
spect, might be drawn from the reflection, that we are 
not always sure, that those who advocate the truth are 
influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. 
Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, 
and many other motives, not more laudable than these, 
are apt to operate as well upon those who support, as 
upon those who oppose, the right side of a question. 
Were there not even these inducements to moderation, 
nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant 
spirit, which has, at ail times, characterized political 
parties. For, in politics as in religion, it is equally 
absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. 
Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution. 

And yet however just these sentiments will be 
allowed to be, we have already sufficient indications, 
that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great 
national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant 
passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct 
of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude, that 
they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their 
opinions, and to increase the number of their converts 
by the loudness of their declamations, and the bitterness 
of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy 
and efficiency of government will be stigmatized, as the 
offspring of a temper fond of despotic power, and 
hostile to the principles of liberty. An over scrupulous 
jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is 
more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, 
will be represented as mere pretence and artifice ; the 
stale bait for popularity at the expense of public good. 
It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is 



4 The Fcederalist 

the usual concomitant of violent love, and that the 
noble enthusiasm of liberty is too apt to be infected 
with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the 
other hand, it will be equally forgotten, that the vigor 
of Government is essential to the security of liberty; 
that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed 
judgment, their interest can never be separated; and 
that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the 
specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people, than 
under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness 
and efficiency of Government. History will teach us, 
that the former has been found a much more certain 
road to the introduction of despotism, than the latter; 
and that of those men who have overturned the liberties 
of republics the greatest number have begun their career, 
by paying an obsequious court to the people ; commen- 
cing Demagogues, and ending Tyrants. 

In the course of the preceding observations I have 
had an eye, my Fellow-Citizens, to putting you upon 
your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, 
to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost 
moment to your welfare by any impressions other than 
those which may result from the evidence of truth. You 
will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the 
general scope of them that they proceed from a source 
not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my 
Countrymen, I own to you, that, after having given it 
an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion, it is 
your interest to adopt it. I am convinced, that this is 
the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your 
happiness. I affect not reserves, which I do not feel. I 
will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation, 
when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you 
my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the 
reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness 
of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not 



The Federalist. 5 

oowever multiply professions on this head. My motives 
must remain in the depository of my own breast : My 
arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of bj 
all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will 
not disgrace the cause of truth. 

I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the follow- 
ing interesting particulars. — The utility of the UNION 
to your political prosperity — The insufficiency of the 
present Confederation to preserve that Union — The 
necessity of a Government at least equally energetic with 
the one proposed, to the attainment of this object — The 
conformity of the proposed Constitution to the true prin- 
ciples of republican Government — Its analogy to your 
own state constitution — and lastly, Tlie additional se- 
curity, which its adoption will afford to the preservation 
of that species of Government, to liberty, and to property. 

In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to 
give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which 
shall have made their appearance, that may seem to 
have any claim to your attention. 

It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer argu- 
ments to prove the utility of the UNION, a point, no 
doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body 
of the people in every State, and one, which it may be 
imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we 
already hear it whispered in the private circles of those 
who oppose the new Constitution, that the Thirteen 
States are of too great extent for any general system, 
and that we must of necessity, resort to separate con- 
federacies of distinct portions of the whole.* This doc- 
trine will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, 
till it has .votaries enough to countenance an open 
avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, tc 

* The same idea, tracing the ar- lications against the new Const! 
?uraents to their consequences, is tution. — Publius. 
&eld out in several of the late pub- 



6 The Federalist. 

those who are able to take an enlarged view of the 

subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new 

Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It 

will, therefore, be of use to begin by examining the 

advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the 

probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed 

from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute 

the subject of my next address. 

PUBLIUS. 



For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. II. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

WHEN the people of America reflect that they are 
now called upon to decide a question, which, in its 
consequences, must prove one of the most important, 
that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their 
taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, 
view of it, will be evident. 

Nothing is more certain than the indispensable neces- 
sity of Government, and it is equally undeniable, that 
whenever and however it is instituted, the people must 
cede to it some of their natural rights, in order to vest it 
with requisite powers. It is well worthy of considera- 
tion, therefore, whether it would conduce more to the 
interest of the people of America, that they should, to 
all general purposes, be one nation, under one Fcederal 
Government, or that they should divide themselves into 
separate confederacies, and give to the head of each, the 
same kind of powers which they are advised to place in 
one national Government. 



The Federalist. 7 

It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted 
opinion, that the prosperity of the people of America 
depended on their continuing firmly united, and the 
wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest Citi- 
zens have been constantly directed to that object. But 
Politicians now appear, who insist that this opinion is 
erroneous, and that instead of looking for safety and 
happiness in union, we ought to seek it in a division of 
the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties. 
However extraordinary this new doctrine may appear, it 
nevertheless has its advocates ; and certain characters 
who were much opposed to it formerly, are at present 
of the number. "Whatever may be the arguments or 
inducements which have wrought this change in the 
sentiments and declarations of these Gentlemen, it cer- 
tainly would not be wise in the people at large to adopt 
these new political tenets without being fully convinced 
that they are founded in truth and sound Policy. 

It has often given me pleasure to observe, that Inde- 
pendent America was not composed of detached and 
distant territories, but that one connected, fertile, wide- 
spreading country was the portion of our western sons of 
liberty. Providence has in a particular manner blessed 
it with a variety of soils and productions, and watered 
it with innumerable streams, for the delight and accom- 
modation of its inhabitants. A succession of navigable 
waters forms a kind of chain round its borders, as if to 
bind it together ; while the most noble rivers in the 
world, running at convenient distances, present them 
with highways for the easy communication of friendly 
aids, and the mutual transportation and exchange of 
their various commodities. 

With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice, that 
Providence has been pleased to give this one connected 
country, to one united people ; a people descended from 
the same ancestors, speaking the same language, pro- 



3 The Federalist. 

fessing the same religion, attached to the same prin 
ciples of government, very similar in their manners 
and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms 
and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and 
bloody war, have nobly established their general Liberty 
and Independence. 

This country and this people seem to have been made 
for each other, and it appears as if it was the design 
of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and con- 
venient for a band of brethren, united to each other by 
the strongest ties, should never be split into a number 
of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties. 

Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all 
orders and denominations of men among us. To all 
general purposes we have uniformly been one people ; 
each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same 
national rights, privileges, and protection. As a nation 
we have made peace and war : as a nation we have 
vanquished our common enemies : as a nation we have 
formed alliances and made treaties, and entered into 
various compacts and conventions with foreign States. 

A strong sense of the value and blessings of Union 
induced the people, at a very early period, to institute 
a Fcederal Government to preserve and perpetuate it. 
They formed it almost as soon as they had a political 
existence ; nay, at a time, when their habitations were 
in flames, when many of their Citizens were bleeding, 
and when the progress of hostility and desolation left 
little room for those calm and mature inquiries and 
reflections, which must ever precede the formation of a 
wise and well-balanced government for a free people. 
It is not to be wondered at, that a Government insti- 
tuted in times so inauspicious, should on experiment be 
found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it 
Was intended to answer. 

This intelligent people perceived and regretted these 



The Federalist. 9 

defects. Still continuing no less attached to Union, thar 
enamored of Liberty, they observed the danger, which 
immediately threatened the former and more remotely 
the latter ; and being persuaded that ample security foi 
both, could only be found in a national Government 
more wisely framed, they, as with one voice, convened 
the late Convention at Philadelphia, to take that im- 
portant subject under consideration. 

This Convention, composed of men who possessed 
the confidence of the people, and many of whom had 
become highly distinguished by their patriotism, virtue, 
and wisdom, in times which tried the minds and hearts 
of men, undertook the arduous task. In the mild sea- 
son of peace, with minds unoccupied by other subjects, 
they passed many months in cool, uninterrupted, and 
daily consultations ; and finally, without having been 
awed by power, or influenced by any passions except 
love for their Country, they presented and recommended 
to the people the plan produced by their joint and very 
unanimous councils. 

Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only recom- 
mended, not imposed, yet let it be remembered, that it 
is neither recommended to blind approbation, nor to 
blind reprobation ; but to that sedate and candid con- 
sideration, which the magnitude and importance of the 
subject demand, and which it certainly ought to receive. 
But this, (as was remarked in the foregoing number of 
this Paper,) is more to be wished than expected, that it 
may be so considered and examined. Experience on a 
former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine in 
such hopes. It is not yet forgotten, that well grounded 
apprehensions of imminent danger induced the people 
of America to form the Memorable Congress of 1774. 
That Body recommended certain measures to their Con- 
stituents, and the event proved their wisdom ; yet it ia 
fresh in our memories how soon the Press began tc 



10 The Federalist. 

teem with Pamphlets and weekly Papers against those 
very measures. Not only many of the Officers of Gov- 
ernment, who obeyed the dictates of personal interest, 
but others, from a mistaken estimate of consequences, 
or the undue influence of former attachments, or whose 
ambition aimed at objects which did not correspond 
with the public good, were indefatigable in their en- 
deavors to persuade the people to reject the advice of 
that Patriotic Congress. Many indeed were deceived 
and deluded, but the great majority of the people rea- 
soned and decided judiciously ; and happy they are in 
reflecting that they did so. 

They considered that the Congress was composed of 
many wise and experienced men. That being con- 
vened from different parts of the country, they brought 
with them and communicated to each other a variety 
of useful information. That in the course of the time 
they passed together in inquiring into and discussing 
the true interests of their country, they must have ac- 
quired very accurate knowledge on that head. That 
they were individually interested in the public liberty 
and prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their 
inclination than their duty, to recommend only such 
measures as after the most mature deliberation they 
really thought prudent and advisable. 

These and similar considerations then induced the 
people to rely greatly on the judgment and integrity of 
the Congress ; and they took their advice, notwithstand- 
ing the various arts and endeavors used to deter and 
dissuade them from it. But if the people at large had 
reason to confide in the men of that Congress, few of 
whom had then been fully tried or generally known, still 
greater reason have they now to respect the judgment 
and advice of the Convention, for it is well known that 
some of the most distinguished members of that Con- 
gress, who have been since tried and justly approved for 



The Federalist. 11 

patriotism and abilities, and who have grown old in 
acquiring political information, were also members of 
this Convention, and carried into it their accumulated 
knowledge and experience. 

It is worthy of remark, that not only the first, but 
every succeeding Congress, as well as the late Conven- 
tion, have invariably joined with the people in thinking 
that the prosperity of America depended on its Union, 
To preserve and perpetuate it, was the great object of 
the people in forming that Convention, and it is also the 
great object of the plan which the Convention has ad- 
vised them to adopt. With what propriety, therefore, 
or for what good purposes, are attempts at this partic- 
ular period, made by some men, to depreciate the im- 
portance of the Union ? Or why is it suggested that 
three or four confederacies would be better than one ? 
I am persuaded in my own mind, that the people have 
always thought right on this subject, and that their uni- 
versal and uniform attachment to the cause of the Union 
rests on great and weighty reasons, which I shall en- 
deavor to develop and explain in some ensuing papers. 
They who promote the idea of substituting a number 
of distinct confederacies in the room of the plan of the 
Convention, seem clearly to foresee that the rejection of 
it would put the continuance of the Union in the utmost 
jeopardy : that certainly would be the case, and I sin- 
cerely wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every 
good Citizen, that whenever the dissolution of the 
Union arrives, America will have reason to exclaim in 
the words of the Poet, " Farewell ! a long Farewell 

to all my Greatness." 

PUBLIUS. 



12 The Federalist. 

For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. III. 



To the People of the State op New York: 

I T is not a new observation that the people of any 
-* country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and well- 
informed,) seldom adopt, and steadily persevere for 
many years in, an erroneous opinion respecting their 
interests. That consideration naturally tends to create 
great respect for the high opinion which the people of 
America have so long and uniformly entertained of the 
importance of their continuing firmly united under one 
Fcederal Government, vested with sufficient powers for 
all general and national purposes. 

The more attentively I consider and investigate the 
reasons which appear to have given birth to this opin- 
ion, the more I become convinced that they are cogent 
and conclusive. 

Among the many objects to which a wise and free 
people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of 
providing for their safety seems to be the first. The 
safety of the people doubtless has relation to a great 
variety of circumstances and considerations, and con- 
sequently affords great latitude to those who wish to 
define it precisely and comprehensively. 

At present I mean only to consider it as it respects 
security for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, 
as well against dangers from foreign arms and influence, 
as from dangers of the like kind arising from domes- 
tic causes. As the former of these comes first in order, 
it is proper it should be the first discussed. Let us 
therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not 
right in their opinion, that a cordial Union under an 



The Federalist. 13 

efficient national Government, affords them the best 
security that can be devised against hostilities from 
abroad. 

The number of wars which have happened or will 
happen in the world, will always be found to be in pro- 
portion to the number and weight of the causes, whether 
real or pretended, which provoke or invite them. If this 
remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire, whether 
so many just causes of war are likely to be given by 
United America as by disunited America ; for if it 
should turn out that United America will probably give 
the fewest, then it will follow, that in this respect the 
Union tends most to preserve the people in a state of 
peace with other nations. 

The just causes of war for the most part arise either 
from violations of treaties, or from direct violence. 
America has already formed treaties with no less than 
six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are 
maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us : 
She has also extensive commerce with Porrugal, Spain, 
and Britain, and, with respect to the two latter, has, in 
addition, the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to. 

It is of high importance to the peace of America, that 
she observe the laws of nations towards all these Pow- 
ers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more 
perfectly and punctually done by one national Govern- 
ment than it could be either by thirteen separate States, 
or by three or four distinct confederacies. 

Because when once an efficient national Government 
is established, the best men in the country will not only 
consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to 
manage it ; for although town or country, or other con- 
tracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or 
senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments ; 
yet more general and extensive reputation for talents 
and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend 



14 The Federalist 

men to offices under the national Government, — espe- 
cially, as it will have the widest field for choice, and 
never experience that want of proper persons which is 
not uncommon in some of the States. Hence it will 
result, that the administration, the political counsels, and 
the judicial decisions of the national Government, will 
be more wise, systematical, and judicious, than those of 
individual States, and consequently more satisfactory 
with respect to other nations, as well as more safe 
with respect to us. 

Because, under the national Government, treaties and 
articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will 
always be expounded in one sense, and executed in 
the same manner, — whereas adjudications on the same 
points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or 
four confederacies, will not always accord or be con- 
sistent ; and that, as well from the variety of inde- 
pendent courts and judges appointed by different and 
independent Governments, as from the different local 
laws and interests which may affect and influence them. 
The wisdom of the Convention, in committing such 
questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts ap- 
pointed by, and responsible only to, one national Gov- 
ernment, cannot be too much commended. 

Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may 
often tempt the governing party in one or two States to 
swerve from good faith and justice ; but those tempta- 
tions not reaching the other States, and consequently 
having little or no influence on the national Government, 
the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and jus- 
tice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with 
Britain adds great weight to this reasoning. 

Because even if the governing party in a State should 
be disposed to resist such temptations, yet as such temp- 
tations may, and commonly do, result from circum- 
stances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great 



The Federalist. 15 

number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not 
always be able, if willing, to prevent the injustice med- 
itated, or to punish the aggressors. But the national 
Government, not being affected by those local circum- 
stances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong 
themselves, nor want power or inclination to prevent, 
or punish its commission by others. 

So far therefore as either designed or accidental vio- 
lations of treaties and the laws of nations afford just 
causes of war, they are less to be apprehended under 
one general Government, than under several lesser ones, 
and in that respect, the former most favors the safety 
of the people. 

As to those just causes of war which proceed from 
direct and unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to 
me, that one good national Government affords vastly 
more security against dangers of that sort than can be 
derived from any other quarter. 

Because such violences are more frequently caused by 
the passions and interests of a part than of the whole ; 
of one or two States than of the Union. Not a single 
Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of 
the present Foederal Government, feeble as it is; but 
there are several instances of Indian hostilities having 
been provoked by the improper conduct of individual 
States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or 
punish offences, have given occasion to the slaughter of 
many innocent inhabitants. 

The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, 
bordering on some States, and not on others, naturally 
confines the causes of quarrel more immediately to the 
borderers. The bordering States, if any, will be those 
who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick 
sense of apparent interest or injury, will be most likely, 
Dy direct violence, to excite war with those nations ; and 
nothing can so effectually obviate that danger, as a na- 



J 6 The Federalist. 

tional Government, whose wisdom and prudence wiL 
not be diminished by the passions which actuate the 
parties immediately interested. 

But not only fewer just causes of war will be given 
by the national Government, but it will also be more in 
their power to accommodate and settle them amicably. 
They will be more temperate and cool, and in that re- 
spect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to 
act advisedly than the offending State. The pride of 
States, as well as of men, naturally disposes them to 
justify all their actions, and opposes their acknowledg- 
ing, correcting, or repairing their errors and offences. 
The national Government, in such cases, will not be af- 
fected by this pride, but will proceed with moderation 
and candor to consider and decide on the means most 
proper to extricate them from the difficulties which 
threaten them. 

Besides it is well known that acknowledgments, 
explanations, and compensations are often accepted as 
satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would 
be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State or 
Confederacy of little consideration or power. 

In the year 1685, the State of Genoa having offended 
Louis XIV., endeavored to appease him. He demand- 
ed that they should send their Doge, or chief magis- 
trate, accompanied by four of their Senators, to France^ 
to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were 
obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace. Would 
he on any occasion either have demanded, or have re- 
ceived, the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, 01 

any other powerful nation ? 

PUBLIUS. 



The Federalist V7 

For the Independent Journal. 

THE FCEDERALIST. No. IV. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

MY last Paper assigned several reasons why the 
safety of the people would be best secured by 
Union, against the danger it may be exposed to by just 
causes of war given to other nations ; and those rea- 
sons show that such causes would not only be more 
rarely given, but would also be more easily accommo- 
dated by a national Government, than either by the 
State Governments, or the proposed little Confedera- 
cies. 

But the safety of the People of America against dan- 
gers from foreign force, depends not only on their for- 
bearing to give just causes of war to other nations, but 
also on their placing and continuing themselves in such 
a situation as not to invite hostility or insult ; for it need 
not be observed, that there are pretended as well as just 
causes of war. 

It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human 
nature, that nations in general will make war whenever 
they have a prospect of getting anything by it ; nay, 
that absolute monarchs will often make war when their 
nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and 
objects merely personal, such as a thirst for military 
glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private 
compacts to aggrandize or support their particular fam- 
ilies, or partisans. These, and a variety of motives, 
which affect only the mind of the Sovereign, often lead 
him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice, or the 
voice and interests of his people. But, independent of 
these inducements to war, which are more prevalent in 

VOL. i. 2 



18 Tlie Federalist. 

absolute monarchies, but which well deserve our atten 
fcion, there are others which affect nations as often as 
Kings ; and some of them will on examination be found 
to grow out of our relative situation and circumstances. 

With France and with Britain, we are rivals in the 
fisheries, and can supply their markets cheaper than 
they can themselves, notwithstanding any efforts to pre- 
vent it by bounties on their own, or duties on foreign 
fish. 

With them and with most other European nations, 
we are rivals in navigation and the carrying trade ; and 
we shall deceive ourselves, if we suppose that any of 
them will rejoice to see it flourish : for as our carrying 
trade cannot increase, without in some degree diminish- 
ing theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more 
their policy, to restrain, than to promote it. 

In the trade to China and India, we interfere with 
more than one nation, inasmuch as it enables us to 
partake in advantages which they had in a manner 
monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with 
commodities which we used to purchase from them. 

The extension of our own commerce in our own ves- 
sels, cannot give pleasure to any nations who possess 
territories on or near this Continent, because the cheap- 
ness and excellence of our productions, added to the 
circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address 
of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater 
share in the advantages which those territories afford, 
Hi an consists with the wishes or policy of their respec* 
tive Sovereigns. 

Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi 
against us on the one side, and Britain excludes us 
from the Saint Lawrence on the other ; nor will either 
of them permit the other waters, which are between 
them and us, to become the means of mutual inter* 
course and traffic. 



The Federalist. 19 

From these and such like considerations, which might, 
if consistent with prudence, be more amplified and de 
tailed, it is easy to see that jealousies and uneasinesses 
may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other 
nations ; and that we are not to expect they should 
regard our advancement in union, in power and conse- 
juence by land and by sea, with an eye of indifference 
and composure. 

The People of America are aware that inducements 
to war may arise out of these circumstances, as well as 
from others not so obvious at present ; and that when- 
ever such inducements may find fit time and oppor- 
tunity for operation, pretences to color and justify them 
will not be wanting. Wisely therefore do they consider 
Union and a good national Government as necessary to 
put and keep them in such a situation, as, instead of in- 
viting war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That 
situation consists in the best possible state of defence, 
and necessarily depends on the Government, the arms 
and the resources of the country. 

As the safety of the whole is the interest of the 
whole, and cannot be provided for without Government, 
?ither one or more or many, let us inquire whether onp 
good Government is not, relative to the object in ques- 
tion, more competent than any other given number 
whatever. 

One Government can collect and avail itself of the 
talents and experience of the ablest men, in whatever 
part of the Union they may be found. It can move on 
uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimi- 
late, and protect the several parts and members, and ex- 
tend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. 
In the formation of treaties it will regard the interest of 
the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as 
eonnected with that of the whole. It can apply the 
'esources and power of the whole to the defence of any 



20 The Fcecterahst. 

particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously 
than State Governments, or separate confederacies can 
possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. 
It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, 
and, by putting their officers in a proper line of subordi- 
nation to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consoli- 
date them into one corps, and thereby render them more 
efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three 01 
four distinct independent bodies. 

What would the militia of Britain be, if the Eng- 
lish militia obeyed the Government of England, if the 
Scotch militia obeyed the Government of Scotland, and 
if the Welch militia obeyed the Government of Wales ? 
Suppose an invasion : would those three Governments 
(if they agreed at all) be able with all their respective 
forces, to operate against the enemy so effectually as the 
single Government of Great Britain would ? 

We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the 
time may come, if we are wise, when the fleets of 
America may engage attention. But if one national 
Government had not so regulated the navigation of 
Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen — if one na- 
tional Government had not called forth all the national 
means and materials for forming fleets, their prowess 
and their thunder would never have been celebrated. 
Let England have its navigation and fleet — Let Scot- 
land have its navigation and fleet — Let Wales have its 
navigation and fleet — Let Ireland have its navigation 
and fleet — Let those four of the constituent parts of 
the British empire be under four independent Govern- 
ments, and it is easy to perceive how soon they would 
each dwindle into comparative insignificance. 

Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America 
divided into thirteen, or if you please into three or four 
independent Governments, what armies could they raise 
and pay, what fleets could they ever hope *o have ? If 



The Fasderahst. 21 

one was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and 
spend their blood and money in its defence ? Would 
there be no danger of their being flattered into neutral 
ity by specious promises, or seduced by a too great 
fondness for peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity 
and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom 
perhaps they have been jealous, and whose importance 
they are content to see diminished ? Although such 
conduct would not be wise, it would nevertheless be 
natural. The history of the States of Greece, and of 
other Countries, abounds with such instances ; and it is 
not improbable, that what has so often happened would, 
under similar circumstances, happen again. 

But admit that they might be willing to help the 
invaded State or Confederacy. How, and when, and 
in what proportion shall aids of men and money be 
afforded ? Who shall command the allied armies, and 
from which of them shall he receive his orders ? Who 
shall settle the terms of peace, and in case of disputes 
what umpire shall decide between them, and compel 
acquiescence ? Various difficulties and inconveniences 
would be inseparable from such a situation ; whereas 
one Government, watching over the general and com- 
mon interests, and combining and directing the powers 
and resources of the whole, would be free from all these 
embarrassments, and conduce far more to the safety of 
the people. 

But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly 
united under one national Government, or split into a 
number of confederacies, certain it is, that foreign na- 
tions will know and view it exactly as it is ; and they 
will act towards us accordingly. If they see that our 
national Government is efficient and well administered 
— our trade prudently regulated — our militia properly 
organized and disciplined — our resources and finances 
discreetly managed — our credit reestablished — ou? 



22 The Federalist. 

people free, contented, and united, they will be much 
more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke 
our resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either 
destitute of an effectual Government, (each State doing 
right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient,) 
or split into three or four independent and probably 
discordant republics or confederacies, one inclining to 
Britain, another to France, and a third to Spain, and 
perhaps played off against each other by the three, what 
a poor, pitiful figure will America make in their eyes ! 
How liable would she become not only to their con- 
tempt, but to their outrage ; and how soon would dear- 
bought experience proclaim that when a people or family 
so divide, it never fails to be against themselves. 

PUBLIUS. 



For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. V. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, 
to the Scotch Parliament, makes some observations 
on the importance of the Union then forming between 
England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I 
shall present the public with one or two extracts from it. 
" An entire and perfect Union will be the solid found a- 
" tion of lasting peace : It will secure your religion, lib- 
" erty, and property, remove the animosities amongst 
" yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt 
" our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength, 
" riches, and trade ; and by this Union the whole Island, 
'* being joined in affection and free from ail apprehen- 



The Federalist. 23 

u sions of different interest, will be enabled to resist alt 
" its enemies." " We most earnestly recommend to you 
" calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty 
" affair, that the Union may be brought to a happy con- 
u elusion, being the only effectual way to secure our 
" present and future happiness ; and disappoint the de- 
" signs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, ois 
" this occasion, use their utmost endeavors to prevent or 
u delay this Union." 

It was remarked in the preceding Paper, that weak- 
ness and divisions at home would invite dangers from 
abroad ; and that nothing would tend more to secure us 
from them than Union, strength, and good Government 
within ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot 
easily be exhausted. 

The history of Great Britain is the one with which 
we are in general the best acquainted, and it gives us 
many useful lessons. "We may profit by their expe- 
rience, without paying the price which it cost them. 
Although it seems obvious to common sense, that the 
people of such an island should be but one nation, yet 
we find that they were for ages divided into three, and 
that those three were almost constantly embroiled in 
quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding 
their true interest, with respect to the continental na- 
tions, was really the same, yet by the arts and policy 
and practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies 
were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long series 
of years they were far more inconvenient and trouble- 
some, than they were useful and assisting to eaci. 
other. 

Should the People of America divide themselves into 
three or four nations, would not the same thing happen ? 
Would not similar jealousies arise ; and be in like raan- 
ler cherished? Instead of their being "joined in af- 
1 fection, and free from all apprehension of different 



24 T/ie Fcederatist. 

" interests," envy and jealousy would soon extinguish 
confidence and affection, and the partial interests of 
each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all 
America, would be the only objects of their policy and 
pursuits. Hence, like most other bordering nations, 
they would always be either involved in disputes and 
war, or live in the constant apprehension of them. 

The most sanguine advocates for three or four con- 
federacies cannot reasonably suppose that they would 
long remain exactly on an equal footing in point of 
strength, even if it was possible to form them so at first : 
but admitting that to be practicable, yet what human 
contrivance can secure the continuance of such equal- 
ity ? Independent of those local circumstances which 
tend to beget and increase power in one part, and to 
impede its progress in another, we must advert to the 
effects of that superior policy and good management 
which would probably distinguish the Government of 
one above the rest, and by which their relative equality 
in strength and consideration, would be destroyed. For 
it cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound 
policy, prudence, and foresight, would uniformly be 
observed by each of these confederacies, for a long 
succession of years. 

Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might hap- 
pen, and happen it would, that any one of these nations 
or confederacies should rise on the scale of political im- 
portance much above the degree of her neighbors, that 
moment would those neighbors behold her with envy 
and with fear: Both those passions would lead them 
to countenance, if not to promote, whatever might prom- 
ise to diminish her importance ; and would also restrain 
them from measures calculated to advance, or even to 
secure her prosperity. Much time would not be neces- 
sary to enable her to discern these unfriendly disposi- 
tions. She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence 



The Feeder alUi. 25 

in her neighbors, but also to feel a disposition equally 
unfavorable to them : Distrust naturally creates distrustj 
and by nothing is good-will and kind conduct more 
speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and un- 
candid imputations, whether expressed or implied. 

The North is generally the region of strength, and 
many local circumstances render it probable, that the 
most Northern of the proposed confederacies would, 
at a period. not very distant, be unquestionably more 
formidable than any of the others. No sooner would 
this become evident, than the Northern Hive would ex- 
cite the dame ideas and sensations in the more Southern 
parts of America which it formerly did in the Southern 
parts of Europe : Nor does it appear to be a rash con- 
jecture, that its young swarms might often be tempt- 
ed to gather honey in the more blooming fields and 
milder air of their luxurious and more delicate neigh- 
bors. 

They w T ho well consider the history of similar divis- 
ions and confederacies, will find abundant reason to ap- 
prehend, that those in contemplation would in no other 
sense be neighbors than as they would be borderers ; 
that they would neither love nor trust one another, but 
on the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and 
mutual injuries ; in short, that they would place us ex- 
actly in the situations in which some nations doubtless 
wish to see us, viz. formidable only to each other. 

From these considerations it appears that those Gen- 
'lemen are greatly mistakes who suppose that alliances 
'{Tensive and defensive might be formed between these 
confederacies, and would produce that combination and 
union of wills, of arms, and of resources, which would 
oe necessary to put and keep them in a formidable state 
of defence against foreign enemies. 

When did the independent States, into which Britain 
End Spain were formerly divided, combine in such alii- 



26 The Federalist. 

ances, or unite their forces against a foreign enemy ? 
The proposed confederacies will be distinct nations. 
Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners 
to regulate by distinct treaties ; and as their productions 
and commodities are different, and proper for different 
markets, so would those treaties be essentially different. 
Different commercial concerns must create different in- 
terests, and of course different degrees of political attach- 
ment to, and connection with, different foreign nations. 
Hence it might and probably would happen, that the 
foreign nation with whom the Southern confederacy 
might be at war would be the one with whom the 
Northern confederacy would be the most desirous of 
preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so con- 
trary to their immediate interest would not therefore be 
easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and 
fulfilled with perfect good faith. 

Nay it is far more probable that in America, as in 
Europe, neighboring nations, acting under the impulse 
of opposite interests and unfriendly passions, would fre- 
quently be found taking different sides. Considering 
our distance from Europe, it would be more natural for 
these confederacies to apprehend danger from one an- 
other, than from distant nations, and therefore that each 
of them should be more desirous to guard against the 
others, by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard 
against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. 
And here let us not forget how much more easy it is to 
receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies 
into our country, than it is to persuade or compel them 
to depart. How many conquests did the Romans and 
others make in the characters of allies, and what innova- 
tions did they, under the same character, introduce into 
the Governments of those whom they pretended tc 
protect. 

Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of 



The Federalist. 27 

America into any given number of independent sover- 
signties would tend to secure us against the hostilities 
and improper interference of foreign nations. 

PUBLIUS. 



For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. VI. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

rpHE three last numbers of this Paper have been 
-*- dedicated to an enumeration of the dangers to 
which we should be exposed, in a state of disunion, 
from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now 
proceed to delineate dangers of a different, and, perhaps, 
still more alarming kind, those which will in all proba- 
bility flow from dissensions between the States them- 
selves, and from domestic factions and convulsions. 
These have been already in some instances slightly an- 
ticipated ; but they deserve a more particular and more 
full investigation. 

A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations, 
who can seriously doubt that, if these States should 
either be wholly disunited, or only united in partial con- 
federacies, the subdivisions into which they might be 
thrown would have frequent and violent contests with 
each other. To presume a want of motives for such 
contests, as an argument against their existence, would 
be to forget that men* are ambitious, vindictive, and 
rapacious. To look for a continuation of harmony 
between a number of independent, unconnected sov- 
ereignties, situated in the same neighborhood, would 
be to disregard the uniform course of human events, 



28 The Federalist. 

and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of 
ages. 

The causes of hostility among nations are innumera- 
ble. There are some which have a general and almost 
constant operation upon the collective bodies of society. 
Of this description are the love of power, or the desire 
of preeminence and dominion- — the jealousy of power, 
or the desire of equality and safety. There are others 
which have a more circumscribed, though an equally 
operative influence, within their spheres : Such are the 
rivalships and competitions of commerce between com- 
mercial nations. And there are others, not less numer- 
ous than either of the former, which take their origin 
entirely in private passions ; in the attachments, enmi- 
ties, interests, hopes, and fears of leading individuals in 
the communities of which they are members. Men of 
this class, whether the favorites of a king or of a people, 
have in too many instances abused the confidence they 
possessed ; and assuming the pretext of some public 
motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the national tran- 
quillity to personal advantage, or personal gratification. 

The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the re- 
sentment of a prostitute,* at the expense of much of 
the blood and treasure of his countrymen, attacked, 
vanquished, and destroyed the city of the Samnians. 
The same man, stimulated by private pique against the 
Megarensians^ another nation of Greece, or to avoid a 
prosecution with which he was threatened as an accom 
plice in a supposed theft of the statuary Phidias,J or to 
get rid of the accusations prepared to be brought against 
him for dissipating the funds of the State in the pur- 
chase of popularity,§ or from a combination of all these 

* Aspasia, vide Plutarch's Life have stolen some public gold with 

->f Pericles. — Publius. the connivance of Pericles for the 

t Ibid. — Publius. embellishment of the statue cf Mi 

X Ibid. — Publius. nerva. — Publius. 
§ Ibid. Phidias was supposed to 



The Federalist. 23 

causes, was the primitive author of that famous and 
fatal war, distinguished in the Grecian annals by the 
name of the Peloponnesicm war ; which, after various 
vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals, terminated in 
the ruin of the Athenian commonwealth. 

The ambitious Cardinal, who was Prime Minister to 
ILenry VIIL, permitting his vanity to aspire to the 
Triple Crown,* entertained hopes of succeeding in the 
acquisition of that splendid prize by the influence of the 
Emperor Charles V. To secure the favor and inter- 
est of this enterprising and powerful Monarch, he pre- 
cipitated England into a war with France, contrary to 
the plainest dictates of Policy, and at the hazard of the 
safety and independence, as well of the Kingdom over 
which he presided by his counsels, as of Europe in gen- 
eral. For if there ever was a Sovereign who bid fair to 
realize the project of universal monarchy, it was the 
Emperor Charles V., of whose intrigues Wolsey was 
at once the instrument and the dupe. 

The influence which the bigotry of one female,f the 
petulance of another,^ and the cabals of a third, § had in 
the contemporary policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a 
considerable part of Europe, are topics that have been 
too often descanted upon not to be generally known. 

To multiply examples of the agency of personal con- 
siderations in the production of great national events, 
either foreign or domestic, according to their direction, 
would be an unnecessary waste of time. Those who 
have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources 
from which they are to be drawn, will themselves recol- 
lect a variety of instances ; and those who have a tol- 
erable knowledge of human nature, will not stand in 
need of such lights, to form their opinion either of the 

* Worn by the Popes. — Publius. J Duchess of Marlborough 

t Madame de Maintenon. — Pub- Publius. 
tu$. § Madame de Pompadour. — Pub 

lius. 



30 The Federalist 

reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps however a 
reference, tending to illustrate the general principle, may 
with propriety be made to a case which has lately hap- 
pened among ourselves. If Shays had not been a des- 
perate debtor, it is much to be doubted whether Massa- 
chusetts would have been plunged into a civil war. 

But notwithstanding the concurring testimony ot 
experience, in this particular, there are still to be found 
visionary, or designing men, who stand ready to advo- 
cate, the paradox of perpetual peace between the States, 
though dismembered and alienated from each other. 
The genius of republics (say they) is pacific ; the spirit 
of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of 
men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which 
have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, 
like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in 
ruinous contentions with each other. They will be gov- 
erned by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of 
mutual amity and concord. 

Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the 
true interest of all nations to cultivate the same benevo- 
lent and philosophic spirit ? If this be their true inter- 
est, have they in fact pursued it ? Has it not, on the 
contrary, invariably been found that momentary pas- 
sions, and immediate interests, have a more active and 
imperious control over human conduct than general or 
remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice ? Have 
republics in practice been less addicted to war than 
monarchies ? Are not the former administered by men 
as well as the latter ? Are there not aversions, predi- 
lections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions, that 
affect nations as well as kings ? Are not popular assem- 
blies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resent- 
ment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent 
propensities ? Is it not well known that their determi- 
nations are often governed by a few individuals in 



The Federalist 31 

whom they place confidence, and are of course liable to 
be tinctured by the passions and views of those individ- 
uals ? Has comnterce hitherto done anything more than 
change the objects of war ? Is not the love of wealth 
as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of 
power or glory ? Have there not been as many wars 
founded upon commercial motives, since that has be- 
come the prevailing system of nations, as were before 
occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion ? 
Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, ad- 
ministered new incentives to the appetite, both for the 
one and for the other ? Let experience, the least fallible 
guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an answer 
to these inquiries. 

Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage, were all Repub- 
lics ; two of them, Athens and Carthage, of the com- 
mercial kind. Yet were they as often engaged in wars, 
offensive and defensive, as the neighboring Monarchies 
of the same times. Sparta was little better than a well- 
regulated camp ; and Rome was never sated of carnage 
and conquest. 

Carthage, though a commercial Republic, was the 
aggressor in the very war that ended in her destruction. 
Hannibal had earned her arms into the heart of Italy, 
and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn, gave 
him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and 
made a conquest of the Commonwealth. 

Venice, in latter times, figured more than once in wars 
of ambition ; till becoming an object of terror to the 
other Italian States, Pope Julius II. found means to ac 
complish that formidable league,* which gave a deadly 
blow to the power and pride of this haughty Republic. 

The Provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed 
in debts and taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part 

* The League of Cambray, gon, and most of the Italian Prince* 
comprehending the Emperor, the and States. — Publius. 
King of France, the King of Ara- 



32 The Federalist. 

in the wars of Europe. They had furious contests with 
England for the dominion of the sea ; and were among 
the most persevering and most implacable of the oppo- 
nents of Louis XIV. 

In the Government of Britain the representatives of 
the people compose one branch of the national legisla- 
ture. Commerce has been' for ages the predominant 
pursuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, 
have been more frequently engaged in war; and the 
wars in which that kingdom has been engaged have, in 
numerous instances, proceeded from the people. 

There have been, if I may so express it, almost as 
many popular as royal wars. The cries of the nation 
and the importunities of their representatives have, 
upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs into 
war, or continued them in it, contrary to their inclina- 
tions, and, sometimes, contrary to the real interests of 
the State. In that memorable struggle for superiority, 
between the rival Houses of Austria and Bourbon, which 
so long kept Europe in a flame, it is well known that 
the antipathies of the English against the French, sec- 
onding the ambition, or rather the avarice of a favorite 
leader,* protracted the war beyond the limits marked 
out by sound policy, and for a considerable time in op- 
position to the views of the Court. 

The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have 
in a great measure grown out of commercial considera- 
tions, — the desire of supplanting, and the fear of being 
supplanted, either in particular branches of traffic, or in 
the general advantages of trade and navigation. 

From this summary of what has taken place in other 
countries, whose situations have borne the nearest re- 
semblance to our own, what reason can we have to 
confide in those reveries, which would seduce us into 
an expectation of peace and cordiality between the 
members of the present confederacy, in a state of sep- 
* The Duke of Marlborough. — Publius. 



The Federalist. 33 

aration ? Have we not already seen enough of the 
fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which 
have amused us with promises of an exemption from 
the imperfections, weaknesses, and evils incident to 
society in every shape ? Is it not time to awake 
from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt 
is a practical maxim for the direction of our political 
conduct, that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the 
globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect 
wisdom and perfect virtue ? 

Let the point of extreme depression to which our 
national dignity and credit have sunk ; let the incon- 
veniences felt everywhere from a lax and ill administra- 
tion of Government ; let the revolt of a part of the State 
of North Carolina, the late menacing disturbances in 
Pennsylvania, and the actual insurrections and rebel- 
lions in Massachusetts, declare ! 

So far is the general sense of mankind from corre- 
sponding with the tenets of those who endeavor to lull 
asleep our apprehensions of discord and hostility be- 
tween the States, in the event of disunion, that it has 
from long observation of the progress of society become 
a sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity, or nearness of 
situation, constitutes nations natural enemies. An in- 
telligent writer expresses himself on this subject to this 
effect : " Neighboring nations (says he) are naturally 
" enemies of each other, unless their common weakness 
" forces them to league in a confederative republic, 
" and their constitution prevents the differences that 
1 neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jeal- 
" ousy, which disposes all States to aggrandize them- 
" selves at the expense of their neighbors." * This pas- 
sage, at the same time, points out the evil and suggests 

the remedy. 

PUBLIUS. 

* Vide Principes des Negotiations par l'Abbe de Mably. — Publitu. 

TOL. I. 3 



34 The Feeder alls t. 

For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. YII. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

|"T is sometimes asked, with an air of seeming in* 
-*- umph, what inducements could the States have, if 
disunited, to make war upon each other ? It would be 
a full answer to this question to say - - precisely the 
same inducements which have, at different times, del- 
uged in blood all the nations in the world. But unfor- 
tunately for us, the question admits of a more particular 
answer. There are causes of differences within our in> 
mediate contemplation, of the tendency of which, even 
under the restraints of a Fcederal Constitution, we have 
had sufficient experience, to enable us to form a judg- 
ment of what might be expected, if those restraints were 
removed. 

Territorial disputes have at all times been found one 
of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations. 
Perhaps the greatest proportion of the wars that have 
desolated the earth have sprung from this origin. This 
cause would exist, among us, in full force. We have a 
vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries 
of the United States. There still are discordant and 
undecided claims between several of them ; and the 
dissolution of the Union would lay a foundation for 
similar claims between them all. It is well known, 
that they have heretofore had serious and animated 
discussions concerning the right to the lands which were 
ungranted at the time of the Revolution, and which usu- 
ally went under the name of crown-lands. The States 
within the limits of whose colonial Governments thev 
were comprised, have claimed them as their property 



The Feeder alist. 35 

the others have contended that the rights of the crown 
in this article devolved upon the Union ; especially as 
to all that part of the Western territory which, either by 
actual possession, or through the submission of the Ind- 
ian proprietors, was subjected to the jurisdiction of the 
King of Great Britain, till it was relinquished in the 
treaty of peace. This, it has been said, was at ali 
events an acquisition to the Confederacy by compact 
with a foreign power. It has been the prudent policy 
of Congress to appease this controversy, by prevailing 
upon the States to make cessions to the United States 
for the benefit of the whole. This has been so far ac- 
complished, as, under a continuation of the Union, to 
afford a decided prospect of an amicable termination 
of the dispute. A dismemberment of the Confederacy, 
however, would revive this dispute, and would create 
others on the same subject. At present, a large part of 
the vacant Western territory is, by cession at least, if 
not by any anterior right, the common property of the 
Union. If that were at an end, the States which 
made the cession, on a principle of Fcederal compro- 
mise, would be apt, when the motive of the grant had 
ceased, to reclaim the lands as a reversion. The other 
States would no doubt insist on a proportion, by right 
of representation. Their argument would be, that a 
grant, once made, could not be revoked ; and that the 
justice of their participating in territory acquired or 
secured by the joint efforts of the Confederacy, remained 
undiminished. If, contrary to probability, it should be 
admitted by all the States, that each had a right to a 
share of this common stock, there would still be a diffi- 
culty to be surmounted, as to a proper rule of apportion- 
ment. Different principles would be set up by different 
States for this purpose ; and as they would affect the 
opposite interests of the parties, they might not easily 
De susceptible of a pacific adjustment. 



36 The Federalist. 

In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we 
perceive an ample theatre for hostile pretensions, with- 
out any umpire or common judge to interpose between 
the contending parties. T3 reason from the past to the 
future, we shall have good ground to apprehend, that 
the sword would sometimes be appealed to as the arbi» 
ter of their differences. The circumstances of the dis- 
pute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, respecting 
the land at Wyoming, admonish us not to be sanguine 
in expecting an easy accommodation of such differ- 
ences. The Articles of Confederation obliged the par- 
ties to submit the matter to the decision of a Foederal 
Court. The submission was made, and the Court de- 
cided in favor of Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave 
strong indications of dissatisfaction with that determi- 
nation ; nor did she appear to be entirely resigned to it. 
till, by negotiation and management, something like an 
equivalent was found for the loss she supposed herself 
to have sustained. Nothing here said is intended to 
convey the slightest censure on the conduct of that 
State. She no doubt sincerely believed herself to have 
been injured by the decision ; and States, like individ- 
uals, acquiesce with great reluctance in determinations 
to their disadvantage. 

Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside 
of the transactions, which attended the progress of the 
controversy between this State and the district of Ver- 
mont, can vouch the opposition we experienced, as well 
from States not interested, as from those which were 
interested in the claim ; and can attest the danger to 
which the peace of the Confederacy might have been 
exposed, had this State attempted to assert its rights by 
force. Two motives preponderated in that opposition : 
one, a jealousy entertained of our future power ; and 
the other, the interest of certain individuals of influence 
in the neighboring States, who had obtained grants 



The Federalist 37 

of lands under the actual Government of that district 
Even the States which brought forward claims, in con 
fcradiction to ours, seemed more solicitous to dismem 
ber this State, than to establish their own pretensions 
These were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Con- 
necticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island, upon all occa- 
sions, discovered a warm zeal for the independence of 
Vermont ; and Maryland, till alarmed by the appearance 
of a connection between Canada and that place, entered 
deeply into the same views. These being small States, 
saw with an unfriendly eye the perspective of our grow- 
ing greatness. In a review of these transactions we 
may trace some of the causes, which would be likely to 
embroil the States with each other, if it should be their 
unpropitious destiny to become disunited. 

The competitions of commerce would be another 
fruitful source of contention. The States less favorably 
circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the 
disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the 
advantages of their more fortunate neighbors. Each 
State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system 
of commercial polity peculiar to itself. This would oc- 
casion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which 
would beget discontent. The habits of intercourse, on 
the basis of equal privileges, to which we have been ac- 
customed from the earliest settlement of the country, 
would give a keener edge to those causes of discontent, 
than they would naturally have, independent of this cir- 
cumstance. We should be ready to denominate injuries 
those things which were in reality the justifiable acts of in- 
dependent sovereignties consulting a distinct interest. The 
spirit of enterprise, which characterizes the commercial 
part of America, has left no occasion of displaying itself 
unimproved. It is not at all probable that this unbridled 
spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of 
trade, by which particular States might endeavor to 



38 The Fcederalist. 

secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens. The in« 
fractions of these regulations on one side, the efforts to 
prevent and repel them on the other, would naturally 
lead to outrages, and these to reprisals and wars. 

The opportunities which some States would have of 
rendering others tributary to them, by commercial regu- 
lations, would be impatiently submitted to by the tribu- 
tary States. The relative situation of New York, Con 
necticut, and New Jersey, would afford an example of 
this kind. New York, from the necessities of revenue, 
must lay duties on her importations. A great part of 
these duties must be paid by the inhabitants of the two 
other States in the capacity of consumers of what we 
import. New York would neither be willing, nor able 
to forego this advantage. Her citizens would not con- 
sent that a duty paid by them should be remitted in 
favor of the citizens of her neighbors ; nor would it be 
practicable, if there were not this impediment in the 
way, to distinguish the customers in our own markets. 
Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be 
taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit? Should 
we be long permitted to remain in the quiet and undis- 
turbed enjoyment of a metropolis, from the possession 
of which we derived an advantage so odious to our 
neighbors, and, in their opinion, so oppressive ? Should 
we be able to preserve it against the incumbent weight 
of Connecticut on the one side, and the cooperating 
pressure of New Jersey on the other ? These are ques- 
tions that temerity alone will answer in the affirm- 
itive. 

The public debt of the Union would be a further cause 
•>f collision between the separate States or confederacies. 
The apportionment, in the first instance, and the pro- 
gressive extinguishment, afterwards, would be alike pro- 
ductive of ill-humor and animosity. How would it be 
possible to agree upon a rule of apportionment, satisfac- 



The Federalist 39 

tory to all ? There is scarcely any that can be proposed, 
which is entirely free from real objections. These, as 
usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of 
the parties. There are even dissimilar views among the 
States, as to the general principle of discharging the 
public debt. Some of them, either less impressed with 
the importance of national credit, or because their citi- 
zens have little, if any, immediate interest in the ques- 
tion, feel an indifference, if not a repugnance to the pay- 
ment of the domestic debt, at any rate. These would 
be inclined to magnify the difficulties of a distribution. 
Others of them, a numerous body of whose citizens are 
creditors to the public, beyond the proportion of the 
State in the total amount of the national debt, would be 
strenuous for some equitable and effectual provision. 
The procrastinations of the former would excite the 
resentments of the latter. The settlement of a rule 
would in the mean time be postponed, by real differ- 
ences of opinion and affected delays. The citizens of 
the States interested would clamor; foreign powers 
would urge for the satisfaction of their just demands ; 
and the peace of the States would be hazarded to the 
double contingency of external invasion and internal 
contention. 

Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule sur- 
mounted, and the apportionment made. Still there is 
great room to suppose, that the rule agreed upon wouldj 
upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon some 
States than upon others. Those which were sufferers 
by it, would naturally seek for a mitigation of the bur- 
den. The others would as naturally be disinclined to 
a revision, which was likely to end in an increase of 
iheir own incumbrances. Their refusal would be too 
plausible a pretext to the complaining States to with- 
oold their contributions, not to be embraced with avid- 
ity ; and the non-compliance of these States with their 



40 The Federalist. 

engagements would be a ground of bitter dissension and 
altercation. If even the rule adopted should in practice 
justify the equality of its principle, still delinquencies in 
payment, on the part of some of the States, would result 
from a diversity of other causes — the real deficiency of 
resources ; the mismanagement of their finances ; acci- 
dental disorders in the administration of the Government; 
and, in addition to the rest, the reluctance with which 
men commonly part with money for purposes that have 
outlived the exigencies which produced them, and inter- 
fere with the supply of immediate wants. Delinquencies, 
from whatever causes, would be productive of complaints, 
recriminations, and quarrels. There is perhaps nothing 
more likely to disturb the tranquillity of nations, than 
their being bound to mutual contributions for any com- 
mon object which does not yield an equal and coincident 
benefit. For it is an observation as true, as it is trite, 
that there is nothing men differ so readily about as the 
payment of money. 

Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount 
to aggressions on the rights of those States whose citi- 
zens are injured by them, may be considered as another 
probable source of hostility. We are not authorized to 
expect, that a more liberal, or more equitable spirit 
would preside over the legislations of the individual 
States hereafter, if unrestrained by any additional 
checks, than we have heretofore seen, in too many in- 
stances, disgracing their several codes. We have ob- 
served the disposition to retaliation excited in Connecti- 
cut, in consequence of the enormities perpetrated by the 
legislature of Rhode Island ; and we may reasonably 
infer, that in similar cases, under other circumstances, a 
war, not of parchment, but of the sword, would chastise 
such atrocious breaches of moral obligation and social 
justice. 

The probability of incompatible alliances between th 



The Federalist. 41 

different States, or confederacies, and different foreign 
nations, and the effects of this situation upon the peace 
of the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded in some 
preceding papers. From the view they have exhibited 
of this part of the subject, this conclusion is to be drawn, 
that America, if not connected at all, or only by the 
feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive, 
would, by the operation of such opposite and jarring 
alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious 
labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the 
destructive contentions of the parts into which she was 
divided, would be likely to become a prey to the artifices 
and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them 
all. Divide et impera * must be the motto of every na- 
tion that either hates or fears us.f 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, November 20, 1787.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. VIII. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth, that 
the several States, in case of disunion, or such com- 
binations of them as might happen to be formed out of 
the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject 
to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and 
enmity with each other, which have fallen to the lot of 
all neighboring nations not united under one Govern- 

* Divide and command. — Pub- proposed to publish them four times 

Hus. a week, on Tuesday in the New 

t In order that the whole subject York Packet and on Thursday in 

of these Papers may be as soon as the Daily Advertiser. — Putting. 
possible laid before the Public, it is 



42 The Federalist. 

ment, let us enter into a concise detail of some of the 
consequences that would attend such a situation. 

War between the States, in the first periods of their 
separate existence, would be accompanied with much 
greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries 
where regular military establishments have long ob- 
tained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on 
the continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant 
aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, 
been productive of the signal advantage of rendering 
sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that 
rapid desolation, which used to mark the progress of war, 
prior to their introduction. The art of fortification has 
contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe 
are encircled with chains of fortified places, which mu- 
tually obstruct invasion. Campaigns are wasted in 
reducing two or three frontier garrisons, to gain admit- 
tance into an enemy's country. Similar impediments 
occur at every step, to exhaust the strength and delay 
the progress of an invader. Formerly, an invading 
army would penetrate into the heart of a neighboring 
country, almost as soon as intelligence of its approach 
could be received ; but now, a comparatively small force 
of disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the 
aid of posts, is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, 
the enterprises of one much more considerable. The 
history of war, in that quarter of the globe, is no longer 
a history of nations subdued, and empires overturned , 
but of towns taken and retaken, of battles that decide 
nothing, of retreats more beneficial than victories, of 
much effort and little acquisition. 

In this country, the scene would be altogether re- 
versed. The jealousy of military establishments would 
postpone them as long as possible. The want of forti- 
fications, leaving the frontiers of one State open to an- 
other, would facilitate inroads. The populous States 



The Federalist 43 

would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous 
neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made, as 
difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be des 
ultory and predatory. Plunder and devastation ever 
march in the train of irregulars. The calamities of indi- 
viduals would make the principal figure in the events 
which would characterize our military exploits. 

This picture is not too highly wrought ; though I con- 
fess, it would not long remain a just one. Safety from 
external danger is the most powerful director of na- 
tional conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, 
after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent de- 
struction of life and property incident to war, the con- 
tinual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual 
danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty, 
to resort, for repose and security, to institutions which 
have a tendency to destroy their civil and political 
rights. To be more safe, they at length become will- 
ing to run the risk of being less free. 

The institutions chiefly alluded to are standing 
armies, and the correspondent appendages of military 
establishments. Standing armies, it is said, are not 
provided against in the new Constitution ; and it is 
therefore inferred that they may exist under it.* Their 
existence, however, from the very terms of the proposi- 
tion, is, at most, problematical and uncertain. But 
standing armies, it may be replied, must inevitably re- 
sult from a dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent 
war and constant apprehension, which require a state of 
as constant preparation, will infallibly produce them. 
The weaker States or confederacies would first have 



* This objection will be fully ex- is to be found in any Constitution 

fimined in its proper place ; and it that has been heretofore framed 

will be shown that the only nat- in America, most of which contain 

oral precaution which could have no guard at all on this subject.— 

been taken on this subject, has been Publius. 
taken ; and a much better one than 



44 The Federalist. 

recourse to them, to put themselves upon an equal 
ity with their more potent neighbors. They would 
endeavor to supply the inferiority of population and 
resources, by a more regular and effective system of de- 
fence, by disciplined troops, and by fortifications. They 
would, at the same time, be necessitated to strengthen 
the executive arm of Government; in doing which, their 
Constitutions would acquire a progressive direction tow- 
ards monarchy. It is of the nature of war to increase 
the executive at the expense of the legislative authority. 

The expedients which have been mentioned would 
soon give the States or confederacies that made use of 
them, a superiority over their neighbors. Small States, 
or States of less natural strength, under vigorous Gov- 
ernments, and with the assistance of disciplined armies, 
have often triumphed over large States, or States of 
greater natural strength, which have been destitute of 
these advantages. Neither the pride, nor the safety, 
of the more important States, or confederacies, would 
permit them long to submit to this mortifying and ad- 
ventitious superiority. They would quickly resort to 
means similar to those by which it had been effected, to 
reinstate themselves in their lost preeminence. Thus 
we should, in a little time, see established in every part 
of this country the same engines of despotism which 
have been the scourge of the old world. This, at least, 
would be the natural course of things ; and our reason- 
ings will be the more likely to be just, in proportion as 
they are accommodated to this standard. 

These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed 
or speculative defects in a Constitution, the whole power 
of which is lodged in the hands of the people, or their 
representatives and delegates, but they are solid conclu- 
sions, drawn from the natural and necessary progress oi 
human affairs. 

It may perhaps be asked, by way of objection to this 



The Federalist. 43 

why did not standing armies spring up out of the conten 
fcions which so often distracted the ancient republics of 
Greece? Different answers, equally satisfactory, may 
be given to this question. The industrious habits of the 
people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of 
gain, and devoted to the improvements of agriculture 
and commerce, are incompatible with the condition of a 
nation of soldiers, which was the true condition of the 
people of those republics. The means of revenue, which 
have been so greatly multinlied by the increase of gold 
and silver and of the arts o f industry, and the science 
of finance, which is the offspring of modern times, con- 
curring with the habits of nations, have produced an en- 
tire revolution in the system of war, and have rendered 
disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citizens, 
the inseparable companion of frequent hostility. 

There is a wide difference, also, between military es- 
tablishments in a country seldom exposed by its situa- 
tion to internal invasions, and in one which is often 
subject to them, and always apprehensive of them. The 
rulers of the former can have no good pretext, if they 
are even so inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous 
as must of necessity be maintained in the latter. These 
armies being, in the first case, rarely, if at all, called into 
activity for interior defence, the people are in no danger 
of being broken to military subordination. The laws 
are not accustomed to relaxations, in favor of military 
exigencies ; the civil state remains in full vigor, neither 
corrupted, nor confounded with the principles or pro- 
Densities of the other state. The smallness of the army 
fenders the natural strength of the community an over- 
match for it ; and the citizens, not habituated to look 
up to the military power for protection, or to submit to 
its oppressions, neither love nor fear the soldiery : they 
view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a 
necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power which 



46 The Federalist. 

they suppose may be exerted to the prejudice of theii 
rights. The army under such circumstances may use 
fully aid the magistrate to suppress a small faction, 01 
an occasional mob, or insurrection ; but it will be unable 
to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of 
the great body of the people. 

In a country in the predicament last described, the 
contrary of all this happens. The perpetual menacings 
of danger oblige the Government to be always prepared 
to repel it ; its armies must be numerous enough for 
instant defence. The continual necessity for their ser- 
vices enhances the importance of the soldier, and pro- 
portionably degrades the condition of the citizen. The 
military state becomes elevated above the civil. The 
inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are 
unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their 
rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights ; 
and by degrees, the people are brought to consider the 
soldiery not only as their protectors, but as their supe- 
riors. The transition from this disposition to that of 
considering them as masters, is neither remote nor diffi- 
cult : but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people 
under such impressions, to make a bold or effectual 
resistance to usurpations supported by the military 
power. 

The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first 
description. An insular situation, and a powerful ma- 
rine, guarding it in a great measure against the possi- 
bility of foreign invasion, supersede the necessity of a 
numerous army within the kingdom. A sufficient force 
to make head against a sudden descent, till the mili- 
tia could have time to rally and embody, is all thai 
tias been deemed requisite. No motive of national pol- 
cy has demanded, nor would public opinion have tol- 
erated, a larger number of troops upon its domestic 
establishment. There has been, for a long time past, 



The Federalist. 4V 

little room for the operation of the other causes, which 
have been enumerated as the consequences of interna, 
war. This peculiar felicity of situation has, in a great 
degree, contributed to preserve the liberty which that 
country to this day enjoys, in spite of the prevalent 
venality and corruption. If, on the contrary, Britain had 
been situated on the continent, and had been compelled, 
as she would have been, by that situation, to make her 
military establishments at home coextensive with those 
of the other great powers of Europe, she, like them, 
would in all probability be, at this day, a victim to the 
absolute power of a single man. 'Tis possible, though 
not easy, that the people of that island may be enslaved 
from other causes ; but it cannot be by the prowess 
of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been 
usually kept up within that kingdom. 

If we are wise enough to preserve the Union, we may 
for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insu- 
lated situation. Europe is at a great distance from us. 
Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue 
too much disproportioned in strength, to be able to give 
us any dangerous annoyance. Extensive military estab- 
lishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our 
security. But if we should be disunited, and the inte- 
gral parts should either remain separated, or, which is 
most probable, should be thrown together into two or 
three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of 
time, in the predicament of the continental powers of 
Europe — our liberties would be a prey to the means 
of defending ourselves against the ambition and jeal- 
ousy of each other. 

This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and 
veighty. It deserves the most serious and mature con- 
sideration of every prudent and honest man, of what- 
ever party. If such men will make a firm and solemn 
pause, and meditate dispassionately on the importance 



48 The FasderalisL 

of this interesting idea ; if they will contemplate it, in 
all its attitudes, and trace it to all its consequences, they 
will not hesitate to part with trivial objections to a Con 
stitution, the rejection of which would in all probability 
put a final period to the Union. The airy phantoms 
that flit before the distempered imaginations of some ot 
its adversaries, would quickly give place to the more 
substantial forms of dangers, real, certain, and formi- 
dable. 

PUBLIUS. 



For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. IX. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

4 FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the 
-^*- peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against 
domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to 
read the history of the petty Republics of Greece and 
Italy, without feeling sensations of horror and disgust, 
at the distractions with which they were continually 
agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions, by 
which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration, 
between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they 
exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived 
contrasts to the furious storms, that are to succeed. If, 
now and then, intervals of felicity open themselves to 
view, we behold them with a mixture of regret, arising 
from the reflection, that the pleasing scenes before us 
are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves 
of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory 
break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a 



The Federalist. 49 

transient and fleeting brilliancy, they, at the same time, 
admonish us to lament, that the vices of Government 
should pervert the direction, and tarnish the lustre of 
those bright talents and exalted endowments, for which 
the favored soils that produced them have been so justly 
celebrated. 

From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those 
Republics, the advocates of despotism have drawn argu- 
ments, not only against the forms of Republiean Gov- 
ernment, but against the very principles of civil liberty. 
They have decried all free Government as inconsistent 
with the order of society, and have indulged themselves 
in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans. 
Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the 
basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in 
a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms. 
And, I trust, America will be the broad and solid founda- 
tion of other edifices, not less magnificent, which will be 
equally permanent monuments of their errors. 

But it is not to be denied, that the portraits they have 
sketched of Republican Government were too just cop- 
ies of the originals from which they were taken. If it 
had been found impracticable to have devised models 
of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to 
liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause 
of that species of Government as indefensible. The 
science of politics, however, like most other sciences, 
has received great improvement. The efficacy of vari- 
ous principles is now well understood, which were either 
not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. 
The regular distribution of power into distinct depart- 
•nents ; the introduction of legislative balances and 
checks ; the institution of Courts composed of Judges 
holding their offices during good behavior ; the repre- 
sentation of the people in the Legislature, by Deputies 
of their own election ; these are either wholly new dis- 



50 Tlie Federalist 






coveries, or have made their principal progress towards 
perfection in modern times. They are means, and pow- 
erful means, by which the excellences of Republican 
Government may be retained, and its imperfections les- 
sened, or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances, 
that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civi! 
Government, I shall venture, however novel it may ap- 
pear to some, to add one more, on a principle which has 
been made the foundation of an objection to the New 
Constitution ; I mean the enlargement of the orbit 
within which such systems are to revolve, either in 
respect to the dimensions of a single State, or to the 
consolidation of several smaller States into one great 
Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately 
concerns the object under consideration. It will, how- 
ever, be of use to examine the principle, in its appli- 
cation to a single State, which shall be attended to in 
another place. 

The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress fac- 
tion; and to guard the internal tranquillity of States, as 
to increase their external force and security, is in reality 
not a new idea. It has been practised upon, in different 
countries and ages, and has received the sanction of the 
most approved writers on the subjects of politics. The 
opponents of the Plan proposed, have, with great assi- 
duity, cited and circulated the observations of Montes- 
quieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a Re- 
publican Government. But they seem not to have been 
apprised of the sentiments of that great man, expressed 
in another part of his work, nor to have adverted to the 
consequences of the principle, to which they subscribe 
with such ready acquiescence. 

When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for 
Republics, the standards he had in view were of dimen- 
Bions far short of the limits of almost every one of these 
States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania 



Tlie Federalist. 51 

New- York, North Carolina, nor Georgia, can by any 
means be compared with the models from which he 
reasoned, and to which the terms of his description ap- 
p.y. If we therefore take his ideas on this point, as the 
criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative, 
either of taking refuge at once in the arms of Mon- 
archy, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of lit- 
tle, jealous, clashing, tumultuous Commonwealths, the 
wretched nurseries of unceasing discord, and the miser- 
able objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of 
the writers, who have come forward on the other side of 
the question, 'seem to have been aware of the dilemma; 
and have even been bold enough to hint at the division 
of the larger States, as a desirable thing. Such an in- 
fatuated policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by 
the multiplication of petty offices, answer the views of 
men, who possess not qualifications to extend their in- 
fluence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue ; 
but it could never promote the greatness or happiness 
of the people of America. 

Referring the examination of the principle itself to 
another place, as has been already mentioned, it will be 
sufficient to remark here, that in the sense of the author 
who has been most emphatically quoted upon the occa- 
sion, it would only dictate a reduction of the size of 
the more considerable members of the Union ; but would 
not militate against their being all comprehended in one 
Confederate Government. And this is the true ques- 
tion, in the discussion of which we are at present inter- 
ested. 

So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from stand- 
ing in opposition to a general Union of the States, that 
he explicitly treats of a Confederate Republic as the 
expedient for extending the sphere of popular Govern- 
ment, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with 
those of republicanism. 



52 The Federalist. 

" It is very probable," (says he,*) "that mankind would 
4 have been obliged, at length, to live constantly under 
" the Government of a single person, had they not 
" contrived a kind of Constitution, that has all the inter- 
" nal advantages of a Republican, together with the ex- 
" ternal force of a Monarchical Government. I mean a 
" Confederate Republic. ■ 

" This form of Government is a Convention by which 
" several smaller States agree to become members of a 
" larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of 
" assemblage of societies, that constitute a new one, ca- 
" pable of increasing by means of new associations, till 
" they arrive to such a degree of power, as to be able to 
" provide for the security of the united body. 

" A Republic of this kind, able to withstand an exter- 
" nal force, may support itself without any internal 
" corruptions. The form of this society prevents all 
" manner of inconveniences. 

" If a single member should attempt to usurp the su- 
" preme authority, he could not be supposed to have an 
" equal authority and credit in all the Confederate 
" States. Were he to have too great influence over one, 
" this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, 
" that which would still remain free might oppose him 
" with forces, independent of those which he had usurp- 
" ed, and overpower him before he could be settled in his 
" usurpation. 

" Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the 
u Confederate States, the others are able to quell it. 
" Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed 
u by those that remain sound. The State may be de- 
u stroyed on one side, and not on the other ; the Confed- 
1 eracy may be dissolved, and the Confederates preserve 
* their Sovereignty. 

" As this Government is composed of small Repu.b 
* Spirit of Laws, Vol. I. Book IX. Chap. I. — Publius. 



The Feeder alls t 53 

' lies, it enjoys the internal happiness of each ; and with 
u respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by 
" means of the Association, of all the advantages oi 
" large Monarchies." 

I have thought it proper to quote at length these in- 
teresting passages, because they contain a luminoup 
abridgment of the principal arguments in favor of the 
Union, and must effectually remove the false impres- 
sions, which a misapplication of other parts of the work 
was calculated to make. They have, at the same time, 
an intimate connection with the more immediate design 
of this Paper ; which is, to illustrate the tendency of the 
Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection. 

A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been 
raised between a Confederacy and a consolidation of the 
States. The essential characteristic of the first is said 
to be, the restriction of its authority to the members in 
their collective capacities, without reaching to the indi- 
viduals of whom they are composed. It is contended, 
that the National Council ought to have no concern 
with any object of internal administration. An exact 
equality of suffrage between the members has also been 
insisted upon as a leading feature of a Confederate 
Government. These positions are, in the main, arbitra- 
ry ; they are supported neither by principle nor prece- 
dent. It has indeed happened, that Governments of 
this kind have generally operated in the manner which 
the distinction, taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in 
their nature ; but there have been in most of them ex- 
tensive exceptions to the practice, which serve to prove, 
as far as example will go, that there is no absolute rule 
on the subject. And it will be clearly shown, in the 
aourse of this investigation, that as far as the principle 
contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of in- 
surable disorder and imbecility in the Government. 

The definition of a Confederate Republic seems sinv 



54 The Federalist. 

ply to be, "an assemblage of Societies," or an Associa- 
tion of two or more States into one State. The extent, 
modifications, and objects of the Foederal authority, are 
mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate or* 
ganization of the members be not abolished ; so long as 
it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local purposes ; 
though it should be in perfect subordination to the 
general authority of the Union, it would still be, in fact 
and in theory, an Association of States, or a Confederacy. 
The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an ab- 
olition of the State Governments, makes them constit- 
uent parts of the National Sovereignty, by allowing 
them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves 
in their possession certain exclusive and very important 
portions of Sovereign power. This fully corresponds, 
in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a 
Federal Government. 

In the Lycian Confederacy, which consisted of twen- 
ty-three cities, or Republics, the largest were entitled to 
three votes in the common council, those of the middle 
class to two, and the smallest to one. The common 
council had the appointment of all the Judges and 
Magistrates of the respective cities. This was certain- 
ly the most delicate species of interference in their in- 
ternal administration; for if there be anything that 
seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, 
it is the appointment of their own officers. Yet Mon- 
tesquieu, speaking of this Association, says, " "Were I 
" to give a model of an excellent Confederate Republic, 
" it would be that of Lycia." Thus we perceive, that 
the distinctions insisted upon were not within the con- 
templation of this enlightened civilian ; and we shall be 
led to conclude, that they are the novel refinements oi 
an erroneous theory. 

PUBLIUS. 



The Federalist 55 

[From the New Yo~k Packet, Friday, November 23, 1787.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. X. 

To the People op the State of New York : 

A MONG the numerous advantages promised by a 
-*-■*- well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more 
accurately developed than its tendency to break and 
control the violence of faction. The friend of popular 
Governments never finds himself so much alarmed for 
their character and fate, as when he contemplates their 
propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, 
therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without 
violating the principles to which he is attached, provides 
a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and con- 
fusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, 
been the mortal diseases under which popular Govern- 
ments have everywhere perished; as they continue to 
be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adver- 
saries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. 
The valuable improvements made by the American 
Constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and 
modern, cannot certainly be too much admired ; but it 
would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that 
they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, 
as was wished and expected. Complaints are every- 
where heard from our most considerate and virtuous 
citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, 
and of public and personal liberty, that our Governments 
are too unstable ; that the public good is disregarded in 
the conflicts of rival parties ; and tnat measures are too 
often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and 
^he rights of the minor party, but by the superior force 



56 The Federalist. 

of an interested and overbearing majority. Howevei 
anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no 
foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit 
us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be 
found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that 
some of the distresses under which we labor have been 
erroneously charged on the operation of our Govern- 
ments ; but it will be found, at the same time, that other 
causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest 
misfortunes ; and, particularly, for that prevailing and 
increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm 
for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the 
continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not 
wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice, with 
which a factious spirit has tainted our public adminis- 
trations. 

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, 
whether amounting to a majority or minority of the 
whole, who are united and actuated by some common 
impulse of passion* or of interest, adverse to the rights 
of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate in- 
terests of the community. 

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of fac- 
tion : the one, by removing its causes ; the other, by con- 
trolling its effects. 

There are again two methods of removing the causes 
of faction : the one, by destroying the liberty which is 
essential to its existence ; the other, by giving to every 
citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the 
same interests. 

It could never be more truly said than of the first 
remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is 
to faction, what air is to fire, an aliment without which 
it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to 
abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, be- 
cause it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the 



The Federalist. 57 

annihilation of air, which is essential to ajimal life, be- 
cause it imparts to fire its destructive agency. 

The second expedient is as impracticable, as the first 
would be unwise. As long as the reason of man con- 
tinues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, differ- 
ent opinions will be formed. As long as the connection 
subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opin* 
ions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on 
each other ; and the former will be objects to which the 
latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the fac- 
ulties of men, from which the rights of property origi- 
nate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to an uniformity 
of interests. The protection of these faculties is the 
first object of Government. From the protection of 
different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, 
the possession of different degrees and kinds of prop- 
erty immediately results ; and from the influence of 
these on the sentiments and views of the respective pro- 
prietors, ensues a division of the society into different 
interests and parties. 

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the 
nature of man ; and we see them everywhere brought 
into different degrees of activity, according to the dif- 
ferent circumstances of civil society. A zeal for differ- 
ent opinions concerning religion, concerning Government, 
and many other points, as well of speculation as of prac- 
tice ; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously 
contending for preeminence and power ; or to persons 
of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interest- 
ing to the human passions, have, in turn, divided man- 
kind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, 
and rendered them much more disposed to vex and op- 
press each other, than to cooperate for their common 
good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall 
into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occa- 
sion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful dip- 



58 The Federalist. 

tinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriend ' j 
passions, and excite their most violent conflicts. Bui 
the most common and durable source of factions hag 
been the various and unequal distribution of property. 
Those who hold, and those who are without property, 
have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those 
who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under 
a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufactur- 
ing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, 
with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civ- 
ilized nations, and divide them into different classes, ac- 
tuated by different sentiments and views. The regula- 
tion of these various and interfering interests forms the 
principal task of modern Legislation, and involves the 
spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary 
operations of the Government. 

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; 
because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, 
and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, 
nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be 
both judges and parties at the same time ; yet what are 
many of the most important acts of legislation, but so 
many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the 
rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of 
large bodies of citizens ? and what are the different 
classes of Legislators, but advocates and parties to the 
causes which they determine ? Is a law proposed con- 
cerning private debts ? It is a question to which the 
creditors are parties on one side, and the debtors on the 
other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. 
Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges ; 
and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the 
most powerful faction, must be expected to prevail. 
Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in 
what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures ? 
are questions which would be differently decided by the 



The Feeder alist. 59 

landed and the manufacturing classes ; and probably by 
neither, with a sole regard to justice and the public 
good. The apportionment of taxes on the various de- 
scriptions of property is an act which seems to require 
the most exact impartiality ; yet there is. perhaps, no 
legislative act in which greater opportunity and tempta- 
tion are given to a predominant party, to trample on 
the rules of justice. Every shilling, with which they 
overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to 
their own pockets. 

It is in vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will 
be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render 
them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened 
statesmen will not always be at the helm : Nor, in many 
cases, can such an adjustment be made at all, without 
taking into view indirect and remote considerations, 
which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest 
which one party may find in disregarding the rights of 
another, or the good of the whole. 

The inference to which we are brought is, that the 
causes of faction cannot be removed ; and that relief 
is only to be sought in the means of controlling its 
effects. 

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is 
supplied by the republican principle, which enables the 
majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It 
may clog the administration, it may convulse the so- 
ciety ; but it will be unable to execute and mask its 
violence under the forms of the Constitution. When 
a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular 
Government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to 
its ruling passion or interest both the public good and 
the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good, 
ind private rights, against the danger of such a faction, 
and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form 
of popular Government, is then the great object to which 



60 The FcederalisL 

our inquiries are directed : Let me add, that it is the 
great desideratum, by which alone this form of Govern- 
ment can be rescued from the opprobrium under which 
it has so long labored, and be recommended to the es- 
teem and adoption of mankind. 

By what means is this object attainable ? Evidently 
by one of two only. Either the existence of the same 
passion or interest in a majority, at the same time, must 
be prevented ; or the majority, having such coexistent 
passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number 
and local situation, unable to concert and carry into 
effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the 
opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that 
neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as 
an adequate control. They are not found to be such on 
the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their 
efficacy in proportion to the number combined together ; 
that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful. 

From this view of the subject, it may be concluded, 
that a pure Democracy, by which I mean a Society con- 
sisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and 
administer the Government in person, can admit of no 
cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion 
or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a major- 
ity of the whole ; a communication and concert results 
from the form of Government itself ; and there is noth- 
ing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker 
party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that 
such Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbu 
lence and contention ; have ever been found incompati- 
ble with personal security, or the rights of property ; and 
have in general been as short in their lives, as they have 
been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who 
have patronized this species of Government, have erro- 
neously supposed, that by reducing mankind to a per- 
fect equality in their political rights, they would, at the 



The Federalist. 61 

same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in 
their possessions, their opinions, and their passions. 

A Republic, by which I mean a Government in which 
the scheme of representation takes place, opens a differ* 
ent prospect, and promises the cure for which we are 
seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies 
from pure Democracy, and we shall comprehend both 
the nature of the cure, and the efficacy which it must 
derive from the Union. 

The two great points of difference, between a Democ- 
racy and a Republic, are, first, the delegation of the 
Government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens 
elected by the rest : Secondly, the greater number of 
citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the 
latter may be extended. 

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, 
to refine arid enlarge the public views, by passing them 
through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose, 
wisdom may best discern the true interest of their coun- 
try, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be 
least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial consid- 
erations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen, 
that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives 
of the People, will be more consonant to the public 
good, than if pronounced by the People themselves, con- 
vened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect 
may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local 
prejudices, or of sinister designs, may by intrigue, by 
corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, 
and then betray the interests of the people. The ques- 
tion resulting is, whether small or extensive Republics 
are most favorable to the election of proper guardians 
of the public weal ; and it is clearly decided in favor of 
the latter by two ctovious considerations. 

In the first place, it is to be remarked that however 
small the Republic may be, the Representatives must be 



62 The Federalist. 

raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the 
cabals of a few ; and that however large it may be, they 
must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard 
against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the num- 
ber of Representatives in the two cases not being in 
proportion to that of the Constituents, and being pro- 
portionally greatest in the small Republic, it follows, 
that if the proportion of fit characters be not less in 
the large than in the small Republic, the former will 
present a greater option, and consequently a greater 
probability of a fit choice. 

In the next place, as each Representative will be 
chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than 
in the small Republic, it will be more difficult for un- 
worthy candidates to practise with success the vicious 
arts, by which elections are too often carried ; and the 
suffrages of the People, being more free, will be more 
likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive 
merit, and the most diffusive and established characters. 

It must be confessed, that in this, as in most other 
cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which incon- 
veniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much 
the number of electors, you render the representative too 
little acquainted with all their local circumstances and 
lesser interests ; as by reducing it too much, you render 
him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to com- 
prehend and pursue great and National objects. The 
Foederal Constitution forms a happy combination in 
this respect ; the great and aggregate interests being 
referred to the National, the local and particular to the 
State Legislatures. 

The other point of difference is, the greater number 
of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought 
within the compass of Republican, than of Demc cratic 
Government ; and it is this circumstance principally 
which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded 



The Federalist. 63 

in the former, than in the latter. The smaller the so- 
ciety, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and 
interests composing it ; the fewer the distinct parties 
and interests, the more frequently will a majority be 
found of the same party ; and the smaller the number 
of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller 
the compass within which they are placed, the more 
easily will they concert and execute their plans of op- 
pression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater 
variety of parties and interests ; you make it less prob- 
able that a majority of the whole will have a common 
motive to invade the rights of other citizens ; or if such 
a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all 
who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in 
unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it 
may be remarked, that w 7 here there is a consciousness 
of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is 
always checked by distrust, in proportion to the num- 
ber whose concurrence is necessary. 

Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage 
which a Republic has over a Democracy, in controlling 
the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small 
Republic, — is enjoyed by the Union over the States 
composing it. Does the advantage consist in the sub- 
stitution of Representatives, whose enlightened views 
and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local 
prejudices, and to schemes of injustice ? It will not 
be denied, that the Representation of the Union will 
be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. 
Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a 
greater variety of parties, against the event of any one 
party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest ? 
In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties, 
comprised within the Union, increase this security. 
Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed 
to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes 



64 The Federalist. 

of an unjust and interested majority ? Here, again, the 
extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advan- 
tage. 

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame 
within their particular States, but will be unable to 
spread a general conflagration through the other States ; 
A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction 
in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects 
dispersed over the entire face of it, must secure the Na- 
tional Councils against any danger from that source ; 
A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an 
equal division of property, or for any other improper or 
wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole 
body of the Union, than a particular member of it ; in 
the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to 
taint a particular county or district, than an entire State. 

In the extent and proper structure of the Union, there- 
fore, we behold a Republican remedy for the diseases 
most incident to Republican Government. And accord- 
ing to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being 
Republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the 
spirit, and supporting the character, of Foederalists. 

PUBLIUS. 



For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XI. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

THE importance of the Union, in a commercial light 
is one of those points, about which there is least 
room to entertain a difference of opinion, and which has 
in fact commanded the most general assent of men, who 



The Federalist. 65 

have any acquaintance, with the subject. This applies 
as well to our intercourse with foreign countries, as with 
each other. 

There are appearances to authorize a supposition, that 
the adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commer- 
cial character of America, has already excited uneasy 
sensations in several of the maritime powers of Europe. 
They seem to be apprehensive of our too great inter- 
ference in that carrying trade which is the support 
of their navigation and the foundation of their naval 
strength. Those of them, which have colonies in Amer- 
ica, look forward to what this country is capable of 
becoming, with painful solicitude. They foresee the 
dangers, that may threaten their American dominions 
from the neighborhood of States, which have all the dis- 
positions, and would possess all the means, requisite to 
the creation of a powerful marine. Impressions of this 
kind will naturally indicate the policy of fostering divis- 
ions among us, and of depriving us, as far as possible, of 
an active commerce in our own bottoms. This would 
answer the threefold purpose of preventing our inter- 
ference in their navigation, of monopolizing the profits 
of our trade, and of clipping the wings, by which we 
might soar to a dangerous greatness. Did not prudence 
forbid the detail, it would not be difficult to trace, by 
facts, the workings of this policy to the cabinets of 
Ministers. 

If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so 
unfriendly to our prosperity in a variety of ways. By 
prohibitory regulations, extending, at the same time, 
throughout the States, we may oblige foreign coun- 
tries to bid against each other, for the privileges of our 
markets. This assertion will not appear chimerical to 
those who are able to appreciate the importance of the 
markets of three millions of people — increasing in rapid 
progression, for the most part exclusively addicted to 



66 The Federalist. 

agriculture, and likely from local circumstances to 
remain so — to any manufacturing nation ; and the 
immense difference there would be to the trade and 
navigation of such a nation, between a direct communi- 
cation in its own ships, and an indirect conveyance of 
its products and returns, to and from America, in the 
ships of another country. Suppose, for instance, we had 
a government in America, capable of excluding Great 
Britain (with whom we have at present no treaty of 
commerce) from all our ports ; what would be the proba- 
ble operation of this step upon her politics ? Would it 
not enable us to negotiate, with the fairest prospect of 
success, for commercial privileges of the most valuable 
and extensive kind, in the dominions of that kingdom ? 
When these questions have been asked, upon other oc- 
casions, they have received a plausible, but not a solid 
or satisfactory answer. It has been said, that prohibi- 
tions on our part would produce no change in the sys- 
tem of Britain ; because she could prosecute her trade 
with us, through the medium of the Dutch, who would 
be her immediate customers and paymasters for those 
articles which were wanted for the supply of our mar- 
kets. But would not her navigation be materially in- 
jured, by the loss of the important advantage of being 
her own carrier in that trade ? Would not the principal 
part of its profits be intercepted by the Dutch, as a com- 
pensation for their agency and risk ? Would not the 
mere circumstance of freight occasion a considerable 
deduction ? Would not so circuitous an intercom se fa- 
cilitate the competitions of other nations, by enhancing 
the price of British commodities in our markets, and 
by transferring to other hands the management of this 
interesting branch of the British commerce ? 

A mature consideration of the objects suggested by 
these questions will justify a belief, that the real dis- 
advantages to Britain, from such a state of things, con* 



The Federalist 6? 

spiring with the prepossessions of a great part of the 
nation in favor of the American trade, and with the 
importunities of the West India islands, would produce 
a relaxation in her present system, and would let us 
into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets of those 
islands and elsewhere, from which our trade would derive 
(he most substantial benefits. Such a point gained 
from the British Government, and which could not be 
expected without an equivalent in exemptions and 
immunities in our markets, would be likely to have a 
correspondent effect on the conduct of other nations, 
who would not be inclined to see themselves altogether 
supplanted in our trade. 

A further resource for influencing the conduct of Eu- 
ropean nations towards us, in this respect, would arise 
from the establishment of a Foederal navy. There can 
be no doubt, that the continuance of the Union, under 
an efficient Government, would put it in our power, at a 
period not very distant, to create a navy, which, if it 
could not vie with those of the great maritime powers, 
would at least be of respectable weight, if thrown into 
the scale of either of two contending parties. This 
would be more peculiarly the case, in relation to 
operations in the West Indies. A few ships of the line, 
sent opportunely to the reinforcement of either side, 
would often be sufficient to decide the fate of a cam- 
paign, on the event of which interests of the greatest 
magnitude were suspended. Our position is, in this 
respect, a very commanding one. And if, to this con- 
sideration, we add that of the usefulness of supplies 
from this country, in the prosecution of military opera- 
tions in the West Indies, it will readily be perceived, 
that a situation so favorable would enable us to bargain 
with great advantage for commercial privileges. A price 
vould be set, not only upon our friendship, but upon 
our neutrality. By a steady adherence to the Union, 



58 The Federalist. 

we may hope, erelong, to become the Arbiter of Europe 
in America ; and to be able to incline the balance of 
European competitions in this part of the world, as our 
interest may dictate. 

But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall 
discover, that the rivalships of the parts would make 
them checks upon each other and would frustrate all the 
tempting advantages which nature has kindly placed 
within our reach. In a state so insignificant, our com- 
merce would be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of 
all nations at war with each other ; who, having nothing 
to fear from us, would, with little scruple or remorse, 
supply their wants by depredations on our property, as 
often as it fell in their way. The rights of neutrality 
will only be respected, when they are defended by an 
adequate power. A nation, despicable by its weakness, 
forfeits even the privilege of being neutral. 

Under a vigorous National Government, the natural 
strength and resources of the country, directed to a 
common interest, would baffle all the combinations of 
European jealousy to restrain our growth. This situa- 
tion would even take away the motive to such combina- 
tions, by inducing an impracticability of success. An 
active commerce, an extensive navigation, and a flour- 
ishing marine, would then be the inevitable offspring of 
moral and physical necessity. We might defy the little 
arts of little politicians to control, or vary, the irresistible 
and unchangeable course of nature. 

But in a state of disunion, these combinations might 
exist and might operate with success. It would be in 
the power of the maritime nations, availing themselves 
of our universal impotence, to prescribe the conditions 
of our political existence ; and as they have a common 
interest in being our carriers, and still more in prevent- 
ing our becoming theirs, they would, in all probability, 
sombine to embarrass our navigation in such a manner 



The Federalist. 69 

as would in effect destroy it, and confine us to a passive 
commerce. We should thus be compelled to content 
ourselves with the first price of our commodities, and to 
see the profits of our trade snatched from us, to enrich 
our enemies and persecutors. That unequalled spirit of 
enterprise, which signalizes the genius of the American 
Merchants and Navigators, and which is in itself an in- 
exhaustible mine of National wealth, would be stifled 
and lost ; and poverty and disgrace would overspread a 
country, which, with wisdom, might make herself the 
admiration and envy of the world. 

There are rights of great moment to the trade oi 
America, which are rights of the Union — I allude to 
the fisheries, to the navigation of the Western lakes, 
and to that of the Mississippi. The dissolution of the 
Confederacy would give room for delicate questions, con- 
cerning the future existence of these rights ; which the 
interest of more powerful partners would hardly fail to 
solve to our disadvantage. The disposition of Spain, 
with regard to the Mississippi, needs no comment. 
France and Britain are concerned with us in the fish- 
eries ; and view them as of the utmost moment to their 
navigation. They, of course, would hardly remain long 
indifferent to that decided mastery, of which experience 
has shown us to be possessed, in this valuable branch of 
traffic ; and by which we are able to undersell those 
nations in their own markets. What more natural than 
that they should be disposed to exclude from the lists 
such dangerous competitors ? 

This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a 
partial benefit. All the navigating States may, in differ- 
ent degrees, advantageously participate in it, and under 
circumstances of a greater extension of mercantile cap- 
ital would not be unlikely to do it. As a nursery of sea- 
men, it now is, or, when time shall have more nearly 
assimilated the principles of navigation in the several 



70 The F&deralist. 

States, will become an universal resource. To the estab« 
lishment of a navy, it must be indispensable. 

To this great National object, a Navy, Union wih 
contribute in various ways. Every institution will grow 
and flourish in proportion to the quantity and extent of 
the means concentred towards its formation and sup- 
port. A navy of the United States, as it would embrace 
the resources of all, is an object far less remote than a navy 
of any single State, or partial Confederacy, which would 
only embrace the resources of a part. It happens, 
indeed, that different portions of confederated America 
possess each some peculiar advantage for this essential 
establishment. The more Southern States furnish, in 
greater abundance, certain kinds of naval stores — tar, 
pitch, and turpentine. Their wood, for the construction 
of ships, is also of a more solid and lasting texture. 
The difference in the duration of the ships of which the 
navy might be composed, if chiefly constructed of 
Southern wood, would be of signal importance, either 
in the view of naval strength, or of National economy. 
Some of the Southern and of the Middle States yield 
a greater plenty of iron, and of better quality. Seamen 
must chiefly be drawn from the Northern hive. The 
necessity of naval protection to external or maritime 
commerce, does not require a particular elucidation, no 
more than the conduciveness of that species of com- 
merce to the prosperity of a navy. They, by a kind of 
-eaction, mutually beneficial, promote each other. 

An unrestrained intercourse between the States them- 
selves will advance the trade of each, by an interchange 
of their respective productions, not only for the supply 
of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to 
foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every part 
will be replenished, and will acquire additional motion 
and vigor from a free circulation of the commodities of 
every part. Commercial enterprise will have much greater 



The Federalist. 71 

scope, from the diversity in the productions of different 
States. When the staple of one fails, from a bad har- 
vest or unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the staple 
of another. The variety, not less than the value of prod- 
ucts for exportation, contributes to the activity of for- 
eign commerce. It can be conducted upon much better 
terms, with a large number of materials of a given value, 
than with a small number of materials of the same 
value ; arising from the competitions of trade, and from 
the fluctuations of markets. Particular articles may be 
in great demand, at certain periods, and unsalable at 
others ; but if there be a variety of articles, it can 
scarcely happen, that they should all be at one time in 
the latter predicament ; and on this account, the opera- 
tions of the merchant would be less liable to any consid- 
erable obstruction, or stagnation. The speculative trader 
will at once perceive the force of these observations ; 
and will acknowledge, that the aggregate balance of the 
commerce of the United States would bid fair to be 
much more favorable than that of the thirteen States, 
without union, or with partial unions. 

It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the 
States are united, or disunited, there would still be an 
intimate intercourse between them, which would answer 
the same ends : But this intercourse would be fettered, 
interrupted, and narrowed, by a multiplicity of causes; 
which in the course of these Papers have been amply 
Retailed. An unity of commercial, as well as political, 
interests, can only result from an unity of Government. 

There are other points of view, in which this subject 
might be placed, of a striking and animating kind. But 
they would lead us too far into the regions of futurity, 
and would involve topics not proper for a Newspaper 
discussion. — I shall briefly observe, that our situation 
jivites, and our interests prompt us, to aim at an ascend 
>\nt in the system of American affairs. The world may 



72 The Federalist. 

politically, as well as geographically, be divided intc 
four parts, each having a distinct set of interests. 
Unhappily for the other three, Europe, by her arms and 
by her negotiations, by force and by fraud, has, in dif 
ferent degrees, extended her dominion over them all, 
Africa, Asia, and America, have successively felt her 
domination. The superiority she has long maintained 
has tempted her to plume herself as the Mistress of the 
World, and to consider the rest of mankind as created 
for her benefit. Men, admired as profound philosophers, 
have, in direct terms, attributed to her inhabitants a phys- 
ical superiority ; and have gravely asserted, that all ani- 
mals, and with them the human species, degenerate in 
America — that even dogs cease to bark, after having 
breathed awhile in our atmosphere.* Facts have too long 
supported these arrogant pretensions of the European : 
It belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human 
race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation. 
Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will add another 
victim to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be 
the instruments of European greatness! Let the thir- 
teen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble 
Union, concur in erecting one great American system, 
superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influ- 
ence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection 

between the old and the new world ! 

PUBLIUS. 

* Becherches philosophiques sur les Amtiricains. — Publiu$. 



The Federalist. 73 

[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, November 27, 1787.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XII. 



To the People of the State of New Yokk : 

HP HE effects of Union upon the commercial prosper- 
-*■ ity of the States have been sufficiently delineated. 
Its tendency to promote the interests of revenue will be 
the subject of our present inquiry. 

The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and 
acknowledged, by all enlightened statesmen, to be the 
most useful, as well as the most productive source 
of National wealth ; and has accordingly become a 
primary object of their political cares. By multiply- 
ing the means of gratification, by promoting the 
introduction and circulation of the precious metals, 
those darling objects of human avarice and enterprise, 
it serves to vivify and invigorate the channels of 
industry, and to make them flow with greater activity 
and copiousness. The assiduous merchant, the labo- 
rious husbandman, the active mechanic, and the in- 
dustrious manufacturer, all orders of men, look for- 
ward with eager expectation, and growing alacrity, to 
this pleasing reward of their toils. The often agitated 
question between agriculture and commerce, has, from 
indubitable experience, received a decision, which has 
silenced the rivalships that once subsisted between them, 
and has proved, to the satisfaction of their friends, that 
their interests are intimately blended and interwoven. 
It has been found, in various countries, that in propor- 
tion as commerce has flourished, land has risen in value. 
And how could it have happened otherwise ? Could 
that which procures a freer vent for the products of the 



74 The Federalist. 

earth ; which furnishes new incitements to the cultiva 
tors of land ; which is the most powerful instrument in 
increasing the quantity of money in a State — ■ could 
that, in fine, which is the faithful handmaid of labor and 
industry, in every shape, fail to augment the value of 
that article, which is the prolific parent of far the great- 
est part of the objects upon which they are exerted ? 
It is astonishing, that so simple a truth should ever have 
had an adversary ; and it is one, among a multitude of 
proofs, how apt a spirit of ill-informed jealousy, or of 
too great abstraction and refinement, is to lead men 
astray from the plainest paths of reason and conviction. 

The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be 
proportioned, in a great degree, to the quantity of money 
in circulation, and to the celerity with which it circu- 
lates. Commerce, contributing to both these objects, 
must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier, 
and facilitate the requisite supplies to the treasury. 
The hereditary dominions of the Emperor of Germany 
contain a great extent of fertile, cultivated, and populous 
territory, a large proportion of which is situated in mild 
and luxuriant climates. In some parts of this terri- 
tory are to be found the best gold and silver mines in 
Europe. And yet, from the want of the fostering influ- 
ence of commerce, that monarch can boast but slender 
revenues. He has several times been compelled to owe 
obligations to the pecuniary succors of other nations, 
for the preservation of his essential interests ; and is un- 
able, upon the strength of his own resources, to sustain 
a long or continued war. 

But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone, that 
Union will be seen to conduce to the purposes of reve- 
nue. There are other points of view, in which its influ- 
ence will appear more immediate and decisive. It is 
evident from the state of the country, from the habits 
of the people, from the experience we have had on the 



The Federalist. 75 

point itself, that it is impracticable to raise any very 
considerable sums by direct taxation. Tax laws havt 
in vain been multiplied ; new methods to enforce the 
collection have in vain been tried ; the public expecta- 
tion has been uniformly disappointed, and the treasuries 
of the States have remained empty. The popular sys- 
tem of administration, inherent in the nature of popular 
Government, coinciding with the real scarcity of money, 
incident to a languid and mutilated state of trade, has 
hitherto defeated every experiment for extensive collec- 
tions, and has at length taught the different Legislatures 
the folly of attempting them. 

No person, acquainted with what happens in other 
countries, will be surprised at this circumstance. In so 
opulent a nation as that of Britain, where direct taxes, 
from superior wealth, must be much more tolerable, and, 
from the vigor of the Government, much more practica- 
ble, than in America, far the greatest part of the National 
revenue is derived from taxes of the indirect kind, from 
imposts, and from excises. Duties on imported articles 
form a large branch of this latter description. 

In America, it is evident that we must a long time 
depend, for the means of revenue, chiefly on such duties. 
In most parts of it, excises must be confined within a 
narrow compass. The genius of the people will ill 
brook the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise 
laws. The pockets of the farmers, on the other hand, 
will reluctantly yield but scanty supplies, in the unwel- 
come shape of impositions on their houses and lands ; 
and personal property is too precarious and invisible a 
fund to be laid hold of in any other way, than by the 
imperceptible agency of taxes on consumption. 

If these remarks have any foundation, that state of 
things which will best enable us to improve and ex- 
tend so valuable a resource must be best adapted to our 
political welfare. And it cannot admit of a serioua 



76 The Federalist. 

doubt, that this state of things must rest on the basis 
of a general Union. As far as this would be conducive 
to the interests of commerce, so far it must tend to the 
extension of the revenue to be drawn from that source. 
As far as it would contribute to rendering regulations 
for the collection of the duties more simple and effica- 
cious, so far it must serve to answer the purposes of 
making the same rate of duties more productive, and of 
putting it into the power of the Government to increase 
the rate without prejudice to trade. 

The relative situation of these States ; the number of 
rivers with which they are intersected, and of bays that 
wash their shores ; the facility of communication in 
every direction ; the affinity of language and manners ; 
the familiar habits of intercourse ; all these are circum- 
stances that would conspire to render an illicit trade 
between them a matter of little difficulty ; and would 
insure frequent evasions of the commercial regulations 
of each other. The separate States, or Confederacies, 
would be necessitated by mutual jealousy to avoid the 
temptations to that kind of trade, by the lowness of 
their duties. . The temper of our Governments, for a long 
time to come, would not permit those rigorous precau- 
tions, by which the European nations guard the avenues 
into their respective countries, as well by land as by 
water ; and which, even there, are found insufficient 
obstacles to the adventurous stratagems of avarice. 

In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are 
called) constantly employed to secure their fiscal regula- 
tions against the inroads of the dealers in contraband 
trade. Mr. Neckar computes the number of these pa- 
trols at upwards of twenty thousand. This shows the 
immense difficulty in preventing that species of traffic, 
where there is an inland communication, and places ir: 
a strong light the disadvantages, with which the collec- 
tion of duties in this country would be encumbered, if 



The Federalist. 77 

by disunion the States should be placed in a situation, 
with respect to each other, resembling that of France 
with respect to her neighbors. The arbitrary and vexa- 
tious powers with which the patrols are necessarily 
armed, w 7 ould be intolerable in a free country. 

If, on the contrary, there be but one Government per* 
vading all the States, there will be, as to the principal 
part of our commerce, but one side to guard — the 
Atlantic coast. Vessels arriving directly from foreign 
countries, laden with valuable cargoes, would rarely 
choose to hazard themselves to the complicated and 
critical perils which would attend attempts to unlade 
prior to their coming into port. They would have to 
dread both the dangers of the coast, and of detection, 
as well after as before their arrival at the places of their 
final destination. An ordinary degree of vigilance would 
be competent to the prevention of any material infrac- 
tions upon the rights of the revenue. A few armed ves- 
sels, judiciously stationed at the entrances of our ports, 
might at a small expense be made useful sentinels of 
the laws. And the Government having the same inter- 
est to provide against violations everywhere, the coop- 
eration of its measures in each State, would have a 
powerful tendency to render them effectual. Here also 
we should preserve, by Union, an advantage which na- 
ture holds out to us, and which would be relinquished 
by separation. The United States lie at a great dis- 
tance from Europe, and at a considerable distance from 
all other places with which they would have extensive 
connections of foreign trade. The passage from them 
to us, in a few hours, or in a single night, as between 
the coasts of France and Britain, and of other neigh- 
boring nations, would be impracticable. This is a 
prodigious security against a direct contraband with 
foreign countries ; but a circuitous contraband to one 
State, through the medium of another, would be both 



78 The Federalist. 

easy and safe. The difference between a direct itn 
portation from abroad, and an indirect importatior 
through the channel of a neighboring State, in small 
parcels, according to time and opportunity, with the 
additional facilities of inland communication, must be 
palpable to every man of discernment. 

It is, therefore, evident, that one National Government 
would be able, at much less expense, to extend the du- 
ties on imports, beyond comparison, further than would 
be practicable to the States separately, or to any par- 
tial Confederacies. Hitherto, I believe, it may safely be 
asserted, that these duties have not upon an average 
exceeded in any State three per cent. In France they 
are estimated to be about fifteen per cent., and in Brit- 
ain they exceed this proportion.* There seems to be 
nothing to hinder their being increased in this country, 
to at least treble their present amount. The single arti- 
cle of ardent spirits, under Foederal regulation, might 
be made to furnish a considerable revenue. Upon a 
ratio to the importation into this State, the whole quan- 
tity imported into the United States may be estimated 
at four millions of gallons ; which, at a shilling per 
gallon, would produce tw T o hundred thousand pounds. 
That article would well bear this rate of duty ; and if 
it should tend to diminish the consumption of it, such 
an effect would be equally favorable to the agriculture, 
to the economy, to the morals, and to the health of the 
society. There is, perhaps, nothing so much a subject 
of National extravagance as these spirits. 

What will be the consequence, if we are not able to 
avail ourselves of the resource in question in its full 
extent ? A nation cannot long exist without revenues. 
Destitute of this essential support, it must resign its 
independence, and sink into the degraded condition of a 
province. This is an extremity to which no Government 
* If my memory be right they amount to twenty per cent. — Publiu*. 



The Fcederalist. 79 

will of choice accede. Revenue, therefore, must be had 
at all events. In this country, if the principal part be 
not drawn from commerce, it must fall with oppressive 
weight upon land. It has been already intimated that 
excises, in their true signification, are too little in unison 
with the feelings of the people, to admit of great use 
being made of that mode of taxation ; nor, indeed, in 
the States where almost the sole employment is agricul- 
ture, are the objects, proper for excise, sufficiently nu- 
merous to permit very ample collections in that way. 
Personal estate, (as has been before remarked,) from the 
difficulty of tracing it, cannot be subjected to large con- 
tributions, by any other means than by taxes on con- 
sumption. In popular cities, it may be enough the 
subject of conjecture, to occasion the oppression of indi- 
viduals, without much aggregate benefit to the State ; 
but beyond these circles, it must, in a great measure, 
escape the eye and the hand of the tax-gatherer. As 
the necessities of the State, nevertheless, must be satis- 
fied in some mode or other, the defect of other resources 
must throw the principal weight of the public burdens 
on the possessors of land. And as, on the other hand, 
the wants of the Government can never obtain an ade- 
quate supply, unless all the sources of revenue are open 
to its demands, the finances of the community, under 
such embarrassments, cannot be put into a situation 
consistent with its respectability or its security. Thus 
we shall not even have the consolations of a full treas- 
ury, to atone for the oppression of that valuatle class 
of the citizens, who are employed in the cultivation of 
the soil. But public and private distress will keep pace 
with each other in gloomy concert; and unite in de- 
ploring the infatuation of those counsels which led tc 

disunion. 

PUBLIUS 



8o The Federalist. 

For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XIII. 



To the People of the State op New York: 

AS connected with the subject of revenue, we may 
with propriety consider that of economy. The 
money saved from one object may be usefully applied 
to another ; and there will be so much the less to be 
drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States 
are united under one Government, there will be but one 
National civil list to support : if they are divided into 
several Confederacies, there will be as many different 
National civil lists to be provided for ; and each of them, 
as to the principal departments, coextensive with that 
which would be necessary for a Government of the 
whole. The entire separation of the States into thir- 
teen unconnected sovereignties is a project too ex- 
travagant, and too replete with danger, to have many 
advocates. The ideas of men who speculate upon the 
dismemberment of the empire, seem generally turned 
towards three Confederacies ; one consisting of the four 
Northern, another of the four Middle, and a third of the 
five Southern States. There is little probability that 
there would be a greater number. According to this 
distribution, each Confederacy would comprise an extent 
of territory larger than that of the kingdom of Great 
Britain. No well-informed man will suppose that the 
affairs of such a Confederacy can be properly regulated 
by a Government less comprehensive in its organs or 
institutions than that which has been proposed by the 
Convention. When the dimensions of a State attain 
to a certain magnitude, it requires the same energy 



The Federalist. 81 

of Government, and the same forms of administration, 
which are requisite in one of much greater extent. This 
idea admits not of precise demonstration, because there 
is no rule by which we can measure the momentum of 
civil power, necessary to the government of any given 
number of individuals ; but when we consider that the 
island of Britain, nearly commensurate with each of the 
supposed Confederacies, contains about eight millions of 
people, and when we reflect upon the degree of authority 
required to direct the passions of so large a society to 
the public good, we shall see no reason to doubt, that 
the like portion of power would be sufficient to perform 
the same task in a society far more numerous. Civil 
power, properly organized and exerted, is capable of dif- 
fusing its force to a very great extent ; and can, in a 
manner, reproduce itself in every part of a great empire, 
by a judicious arrangement of subordinate institutions. 

The supposition, that each Confederacy into which 
the States would be likely to be divided would re- 
quire a Government not less comprehensive than the 
one proposed, will be strengthened by another supposi- 
tion, more probable than that which presents us with 
three Confederacies, as the alternative to a general Union. 
If we attend carefully to geographical and commercial 
considerations, in conjunction with the habits and prej- 
udices of the different States, we shall be led to con- 
clude, that in case of disunion, they will most naturally 
league themselves under two Governments. The four 
Eastern States, from all the causes that form the links of 
National sympathy and connection, may with certainty 
be expected to unite. New York, situated as she is, 
would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble and 
unsupported flank to the weight of that Confederacy. 
There are obvious reasons, that would facilitate her ac- 
cession to it. New Jersey is too small a State to think 
of being a frontier, in opposition to this still more power- 



S2 The Federalist. 

ful combination ; nor do there appear to be any obstacles 
to her admission into it. Even Pennsylvania would 
have strong inducements to join the Northern league 
An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her own 
navigation, is her true policy, and coincides with the 
opinions and dispositions of her citizens. The more 
Southern States, from various circumstances, may not 
think themselves much interested in the encouragement 
of navigation. They may prefer a system, which would 
give unlimited scope to all nations, to be the carriers, as 
well as the purchasers, of their commodities. Pennsyl- 
vania may not choose to confound her interests in a 
connection so adverse to her policy. As she must, at 
all events, be a frontier, she may deem it most consist- 
ent with her safety, to have her exposed side turned 
towards the weaker power of the Southern, rather than 
towards the stronger power of the Northern Confederacy. 
This would give her the fairest chance to avoid being 
the Flanders of America. Whatever may be the deter- 
mination of Pennsylvania, if the Northern Confederacy 
includes New Jersey, there is no likelihood of more than 
one Confederacy to the south of that State. 

Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen 
States will be able to support a National Government, 
better than one half, or one third, or any number less 
than the whole. This reflection must have great weight 
in obviating that objection to the proposed plan, which 
is founded on the principle of expense; an objection, 
however, which, when we come to take a nearer view 
of it, will appear in every light to stand on mistaken 
ground. 

If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of 
civil lists, we take into view the number of persons who 
must necessarily be employed to guard the inland com- 
munication between the different Confederacies against 
illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly spring up 



Tlie Federalist. 83 

out of the necessities of revenue ; and if we also take 
into view the military establishments which it has been 
shown would unavoidably result from the jealousies and 
conflicts of the several nations into which the States 
would be divided, we shall clearly discover that a sepa- 
ration would be not less injurious to the economy, than 
to the tranquillity, commerce, revenue, and liberty of 
every part. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Friday, November SO, 1787.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XIV. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

"YT^TE have seen the necessity of the Union, as oui 
* * bulwark against foreign danger, as the conserva- 
tor of peace among ourselves, as the guardian of our 
commerce and other common interests, as the only sub- 
stitute for those military establishments which have sub- 
verted the liberties of the old world, and as the proper 
antidote for the diseases of faction, which have proved 
fatal to other popular Governments, and of which alarm- 
ing symptoms have been betrayed by our own. All 
that remains, within this branch of our inquiries, is to 
take notice of an objection, that may be drawn from the 
great extent of country which the Union embraces. A 
few observations on this subject will be the more proper, 
as it is perceived that the adversaries of the New Con- 
stitution are availing themselves of a prevailing preju- 
dice, with regard to the practicable sphere of republican 
administration, in order to supply, by imaginary diffi- 



84 The Federalist. 

culties, the want of those solid objections, which they 
endeavor in vain to find. 

The error which limits Republican Government to a 
narrow district has been unfolded and refuted in pre- 
ceding papers. I remark here only, that it seems to owe 
its rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a 
republic with a democracy ; and applying to the former, 
reasonings drawn from the nature of the latter. The 
true distinction between these forms was also adverted 
to on a former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the 
people meet and exercise the Government in person ; in a 
republic, they assemble and administer it by their rep- 
resentatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, 
will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be 
extended over a large region. 

To this accidental source of the error may be added 
the artifice of some celebrated authors, whose writings 
have had a great share in forming the modern standard 
of political opinions. Being subjects either of an abso- 
lute or limited monarchy, they have endeavored to 
heighten the advantages, or palliate the evils, of those 
forms, by placing in comparison with them, the vices 
and defects of the republican, and by citing as speci- 
mens of the latter, the turbulent democracies of an- 
cient Greece and modern Italy. Under the confusion 
of names, it has been an easy task to transfer to a 
republic, observations applicable to a democracy only ; 
and among others, the observation that it can never be 
established but among a small number of people, living 
within a small compass of territory. 

Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as 
most of the popular Governments of antiquity were of 
the democratic species ; and even in modern Europe, to 
which we owe the great principle of representation, no 
example is seen of a Government wholly popular, and 
founded, at the same time, wholly on that principle. If 



The Federalist. 85 

Europe has the merit of discovering this great mechan- 
ical power in Government, by the simple agency of 
which, the will of the largest political body may be 
concentred, and its force directed to any object which 
the public good requires, America can claim the merit 
of making the discovery the basis of unmixed and ex- 
tensive republics. It is only to be lamented, that any of 
her citizens should wish to deprive her of the additional 
merit of displaying its full efficacy in the establishment 
of the comprehensive system now under her consid- 
eration. 

As the natural limit of a democracy is that distance 
from the central point which will just permit the most 
remote citizens to assemble as often as their public 
functions demand, and will include no greater number 
than can join in those functions ; so the natural limit 
of a republic is that distance from the centre which 
will barely allow the representatives of the people to 
meet as often as may be necessary for the administra- 
tion of public affairs. Can it be said, that the limits of 
the United States exceed this distance ? It will not be 
said by those who recollect that the Atlantic coast is the 
longest side of the Union ; that during the term of thir- 
teen years, the representatives of the States have been 
almost continually assembled ; and that the members 
from the most distant States are not chargeable with 
greater intermissions of attendance, than those from the 
States in the neighborhood of Congress. 

That we may form a juster estimate with regard to 
this interesting subject, let us resort to the actual dimen- 
sions of the Union. The limits, as fixed by the treaty of 
peace, are, on the east the Atlantic, on the south the 
latitude of thirty-one degrees, on the west the Mississip- 
pi, and on the north an irregular line running in some 
instances beyond the forty-fifth degree, in others falling 
is low as the forty-second. The southern shore of Lake 



86 The Fcederalist. 

Erie lies below that latitude. Computing the distance 
between the thirty-first and forty -fifth degrees, it amounts 
to nine hundred and seventy-three common miles ; com* 
puting it from thirty-one to forty-two degrees, to seven 
hundred sixty-four miles and a half. Taking the mean 
for the distance, the amount will be eight hundred sixty- 
eight miles and three fourths. The mean distance from 
the Atlantic to the Mississippi does not probably ex- 
ceed seven hundred and fifty miles. On a comparison 
of this extent with that of several countries in Europe, 
the practicability of rendering our system commensu- 
rate to it appears to be demonstrable. It is not a great 
deal larger than Germany, where a Diet, representing 
the whole empire, is continually assembled ; or than Po- 
land before the late dismemberment, where another 
National Diet was the depositary of the supreme power. 
Passing by France and Spain, we find that in Great 
Britain, inferior as it may be in size, the representatives 
of the northern extremity of the island have as far to 
travel to the National Council, as will be required of 
those of the most remote parts of the Union. 

Favorable as this view of the subject may be, some 
observations remain, which will place it in a light still 
more satisfactory. 

In the first place it is to be remembered, that the gen- 
eral Government is not to be charged with the whole 
power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdic- 
tion is limited to certain enumerated objects, which con- 
cern all the members of the republic, but which are not 
to be attained by the separate provisions of any. The 
subordinate Governments, which can extend their care to 
all those other objects which can be separately provided 
for, will retain their due authority and activity. Were 
it proposed by the plan of the Convention to abolish 
the Governments of the particular States, its adversaries 
would have some ground for their objection ; though it 



The Fmderalist. 8? 

would not be difficult to show, that if they were abol- 
ished, the General Government would be compelled, by 
the principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them in 
their proper jurisdiction. 

A second observation to be made is, that the imme- 
diate objects of the Foederal Constitution is to secure the 
nnion of the Thirteen Primitive States, which we know 
to be practicable ; and to add to them such other States 
as may arise in their own bosoms, or in their neighbor- 
hoods, which we cannot doubt to be equally practicable. 
The arrangements that may be necessary for those 
angles and fractions of our territory which lie on our 
north-western frontier, must be left to those whom fur- 
ther discoveries and experience will render more equal 
to the task. 

Let it be remarked, in the third place, that the inter- 
course throughout the Union will be daily facilitated by 
new improvements. Roads will everywhere be short- 
ened, and kept in better order ; accommodations for 
travellers will be multiplied and meliorated ; an interior 
navigation on our eastern side will be opened through- 
out, or nearly throughout, the whole extent of the Thir- 
teen States. The communication between the western 
and Atlantic districts, and between different parts of 
each, will be rendered more and more easy, by those 
numerous canals with which the beneficence of nature 
has intersected our country, and which art finds it so 
little difficult to connect and complete. 

A fourth, and still more important consideration, is 
that as almost every State will, on one side or other, be 
a frontier, and will thus find, in a regard to its safety, an 
inducement to make some sacrifices for the sake of the 
general protection ; so the States which lie at the great- 
est distance from the heart of the Union, and which 
of course may partake least of the ordinary circulation 
of its benefits, will be at the same time immediately 



68 The Federalist. 

contiguous to foreign nations, and will consequently 
stand, on particular occasions, in greatest need of its 
strength and resources. It may be inconvenient for 
Georgia, or the States forming our western or north- 
eastern borders, to send their representatives to the seat 
of Government ; but they would find it more so to strug- 
gle alone against an invading enemy, or even to support 
alone the whole expense of those precautions which 
may be dictated by the neighborhood of continual dan- 
ger. If they should derive less benefit, therefore, from 
the Union in some respects, than the less distant States, 
they will derive greater benefit from it in other respects, 
and thus the proper equilibrium will be maintained 
throughout. 

I submit to you, my Fellow- Citizens, these considera- 
tions, in full confidence that the good sense which has 
so often marked your decisions will allow them their 
due weight and effect ; and that you will never suffer 
difficulties, however formidable in appearance, or how- 
ever fashionable the error on which they may be founded 
to drive you into the gloomy and perilous scene into 
which the advocates for disunion would conduct you. 
Hearken not to the unnatural voice, which tells you that 
the People of America, knit together as they are by 
so many cords of affection, can no longer live together 
as members of the same family ; can no longer continue 
the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness ; can no 
longer be fellow-citizens of one great, respectable, and 
flourishing empire. Hearken not to the voice which 
petulantly tells you, that the form of Government recom- 
mended for your adoption is a novelty in the political 
world ; that it has never yet had a place in the theories 
of the wildest projectors ; that it rashly attempts what 
it is impossible to accomplish. No, my Countrymen, 
shut your ears against this unhallowed language. Shut 
your hearts against the poison which it conveys ; the 



The Federalist. 89 

kindred blood which flows in the veins of American citi- 
zens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defence 
of their sacred rights, consecrate their Union, and excite 
horror at the idea of their becoming aliens, rivals, ene- 
mies. And if novelties are to be shunned, believe me, 
the most alarming of all novelties, the most wild of all 
projects, the most rash of all attempts, is that of rending 
us in pieces, in order to preserve our liberties, and pro- 
mote our happiness. But why is the experiment of an 
extended republic to be rejected, merely because it may 
comprise what is new ? Is it not the glory of the People 
of America, that whilst they have paid a decent regard 
to the opinions of former times and other nations, they 
have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for 
custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their 
own good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, 
and the lessons of their own experience ? To this manly 
spirit, posterity will be indebted for the possession, and 
the world for the example, of the numerous innovations 
displayed on the American theatre, in favor of private 
rights and public happiness. Had no important step 
been taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which a 
precedent could not be discovered, no Government estab- 
lished of which an exact model did not present itself, 
the People of the United States might, at this moment, 
have been numbered among the melancholy victims 
of misguided councils, must at best have been laboring 
under the weight of some of those forms which have 
crushed the liberties of the rest of mankind. Happily 
for America, happily we trust for the whole human 
race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They 
accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the 
annals of human society. They reared the fabrics of 
Governments which have no model on the face of the 
globe. They formed the design of a great Confederacy 
which it is incumbent on their successors to improve 



90 The Federalist. 

and perpetuate. If their works betray imperfections, 
we wonder at the fewre^s of them. If they erred most 
in the structure of the Union, this was the work most 
difficult to be executed ; this is the work which has been 
new modelled by the act of your Convention, and it is 
that act on which you are now to deliberate and to 
decide. 

PUBL1US. 



For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XV. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

IN the course of the preceding papers, I have endeav- 
ored, my Fellow- Citizens, to place before you, in a 
clear and convincing light, the importance of Union to 
your political safety and happiness. I have unfolded to 
you a complication of dangers to which you would be 
exposed, should you permit that sacred knot which binds 
the people of America together to be severed or dissolved 
by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or by misrepre- 
sentation. In the sequel of the inquiry through which 
I propose to accompany you, the truths intended to be 
inculcated will receive further confirmation from facts 
and arguments hitherto unnoticed. If the road, over 
which you will still have to pass, should in some places 
appear to you tedious or irksome, you will recollect, that 
you are in quest of information on a subject the most 
momentous which can engage the attention of a free 
people : that the field through which you have to travel 
is in itself spacious, and that the difficulties of the jour- 
ney have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes 



The Federalist. 91 

with which sophistry has beset the way. It will be my 
aim to remove the obstacles to your progress, in as com- 
pendious a manner as it can be done, without sacrificing 
utility to despatch. 

In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down, for 
the discussion of the subject, the point next in order to 
be examined is the " insufficiency of the present Confed- 
eration to the preservation of the Union." It may per- 
haps be asked, what need there is of reasoning or proof 
to illustrate a position, which is not either controverted 
or doubted ; to which the understandings and feelings 
of all classes of men assent ; and which in substance is 
admitted by the opponents as well as by the friends of 
the New Constitution ? It must in truth be acknowl- 
edged, that however these may differ in other respects, 
they in general appear to harmonize in this sentiment, 
at least, that there are material imperfections in our 
National system, and that something is necessary to be 
done to rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts 
that support this opinion are no longer objects of specu- 
lation. They have forced themselves upon the sensi- 
bility of the people at large, and have at length extorted 
from those, whose mistaken policy has had the principal 
share in precipitating the extremity at which we are 
arrived, a reluctant confession of the reality of those de- 
fects in the scheme of our Fcederal Government, which 
have been long pointed out and regretted by the intelli- 
gent friends of the Union. 

We may indeed, with propriety, be said to have 
reached almost the last stage of National humiliation. 
There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride, or 
jegrade the character of an independent nation, which 
we do not experience. Are there engagements, to the 
performance of which we are held by every tie respect- 
able among men ? These are the subjects of constant 
and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreigners, 



92 Tht Federalist. 

and 1o our own citizens, contracted in a time of immi- 
nent peril, for the preservation of our political existence? 
These remain without any proper or satisfactory provis- 
ion for their discharge. Have we valuable territories 
and important posts in the possession of a foreign pow- 
er, which, by express stipulations, ought long since to 
have been surrendered ? These are still retained, to the 
prejudice of our interests not less than of our rights. 
Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggres- 
sion ? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor Gov- 
ernment* Are we even in a condition to remonstrate 
with dignity ? The just imputations on our own faith, 
in respect to the same treaty, ought first to be removed. 
Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free partici- 
pation in the navigation of the Mississippi ? Spain 
excludes us from it. Is public credit an indispensable 
resource in time of public danger ? We seem to have 
abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is 
commerce of importance to National wealth ? Ours is 
at the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in 
the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard against foreign 
encroachments ? The imbecility of our Government 
even forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors 
abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is 
a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a 
symptom of National distress ? The price of improved 
and in most parts of the country is much lower than 
can be accounted for by the quantity of waste land at 
market, and can only be fully explained by that want of 
private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly 
prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct ten- 
dency to depreciate property of every kind. Is private 
credit the friend and patron of industry ? That most 
useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is 
reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still more 

* I mean for the Union. — PuUius, 



The Federalist. 93 

from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity 
of money. To shorten an enumeration of particulars 
which can afford neither pleasure nor instruction, it ma} 
in general be demanded what indication is there of Na- 
tional disorder, poverty, and insignificance, that could 
befall a community so peculiarly blessed with natural 
id vantages as we are, which does not form a part of 
the dark catalogue of our public misfortunes ? 

This is the melancholy situation, to which we have 
been brought by those very maxims and councils, which 
would now deter us from adopting the proposed Consti- 
tution ; and which, not content with having conducted 
us to the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to plunge 
us into the abyss, that awaits us below. Here, my 
Countrymen, impelled by every motive that ought to 
influence an enlightened people, let us make a firm 
stand for our safety, our tranquillity, our dignity, our 
reputation. Let us at last break the fatal charm which 
has too long seduced us from the paths of felicity and 
prosperity. 

It is true, as has been before observed, that facts, too 
stubborn to be resisted, have produced a species of gen- 
eral assent to the abstract proposition that there exist 
material defects in our National system ; but the useful- 
ness of the concession, on the part of the old adversaries 
of Fcederal measures, is destroyed by a strenuous oppo- 
sition to a remedy, upon the only principles that can 
give it a chance of success. While they admit that the 
Government of the United States is destitute of energy, 
they contend against conferring upon it those powers 
which are requisite to supply that energy : They seem 
still to aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable ; at 
an augmentation of Foederal authority, without a dimi 
nution of State authority ; at sovereignty in the Union, 
and complete independence in the members. They still, 
in fine, seem to cherish with blind devotion the political 



94 The Federalist. 

monster of an imperium in imperio. This renders a fuD 
display of the principal defects of the Confederation 
necessary, in order to show, that the evils we experience 
do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but 
from fundamental errors in the structure of the building, 
which cannot be amended, otherwise than by an altera- 
tion in the first principles and main pillars of the fabric. 

The great and radical vice in the construction of the 
existing Confederation is in the principle of LEGIS- 
LATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in 
their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACI- 
TIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVID- 
UALS of which they consist. Though this principle 
does not run through all the powers delegated to the 
Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the 
efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule of 
apportionment, the United States have an indefinite 
discretion to make requisitions for men and money ; 
but they have no authority to raise either, by regulations 
extending to the individual citizens of America. The 
consequence of this is, that, though in theory their reso- 
lutions concerning those objects are laws, constitution- 
ally binding on the members of the Union, yet in prac- 
tice they are mere recommendations, which the States 
observe or disregard at their option. 

It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the 
human mind, that after all the admonitions we have had 
from experience on this head, there should still be found 
men, who object to the New Constitution, for deviating 
from a principle which has been found the bane of the 
old ; and which is, in itself, evidently incompatible with 
the idea of government ; a principle, in short, which, if 
it is to be executed at all, must substitute the violent 
find sanguinary agency of the sword to the mild influ- 
ence of the Magistracy. 

There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea 



The Federalist. 95 

of a league or alliance between independent nations 
for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty • 
regulating all the details of time, place, circumstance, 
and quantity ; leaving nothing to future discretion ; and 
depending for its execution on the good faith of the par- 
ties. Compacts of this kind exist among all civilized 
nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and 
war, of observance and non-observance, as the interests 
or passions of the contracting powers dictate. In the 
early part of the present century, there was an epidemi- 
cal rage in Europe for this species of compacts ; from 
which the politicians of the times fondly hoped for 
benefits which were never realized. With a view to 
establishing the equilibrium of power and the peace of 
that part of the world, all the resources of negotiation 
were exhausted, and triple and quadruple alliances were 
formed ; but they were scarcely formed before they were 
broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to 
mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on trea- 
ties which have no other sanction than the obligations 
of good faith ; and which oppose general considerations 
of peace and justice to the impulse of any immediate 
interest or passion. 

If the particular States in this country are disposed 
to stand in a similar relation to each other, and to drop 
the project of a general discretionary superintend- 
ence, the scheme would indeed be pernicious, and 
would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been 
enumerated under the first head ; but it would have 
the merit of being, at least, consistent and practicable. 
Abandoning all views towards a Confederate Govern- 
ment, this would bring us to a simple alliance offensive 
and defensive : and would place us in a situation to be 
alternately friends and enemies of each other, as our 
mutual jealousies and rivalships, nourished by the in- 
trigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us. 



96 The Federalist. 

But if we are unwilling to be placed in th perilous 
situation ; if we still will ixdbere to the design of a 
National Government, or, wto^h is the same thing, of a 
superintending power, under the direction of e> common 
Council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan 
those ingredients which may be considered as forming 
i he characteristic difference between a league and a 
Government ; we must extend the authority of the Union 
to the persons of the citizens, — the only proper objects 
of Government. 

Government implies the power of making laws. It 
is essential to the idea of a law, that it be attended with 
a sanction ; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment 
for disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to 
disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pre- 
tend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more 
than advice or recommendation. This penalty, what- 
ever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways : by 
the agency of the Courts and Ministers of Justice, or by 
military force ; by the coercion of the magistracy, or 
by the coercion of arms. The first kind can evidently 
apply only to men : the last kind must, of necessity, be 
employed against bodies politic, or communities, or 
States. It is evident, that there is no process of a Court 
by which the observance of the laws can, in the last re- 
sort, be enforced. Sentences may be denounced against 
them for violations of their duty ; but these sentences 
can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an 
association where the general authority is confined to 
the collective bodies of the communities that compose 
it, every breach of the laws must involve a state of war ; 
and military execution must become the only instrument 
of civil obedience. Such a state of things can certainly 
not deserve 1he name of Government, nor would an\ 
prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it. 

There was a time when we were told that breaches. 



The Federalist. 97 

by the States, of the regulations of the Foederal author- 
ity were not to be expected ; that a sense of common 
interest would preside over the conduct of the respective 
members, and would beget a full compliance with all 
the constitutional requisitions of the Union. This lan- 
guage, at the present day, would appear as wild as a 
great part of what we now hear from the same quarter 
will be thought, when we shall have received further 
lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, experience. It 
at all times betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by 
which human conduct is actuated, and belied the orig- 
inal inducements to the establishment of civil power. 
Why has Government been instituted at all ? Because 
the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of 
reason and justice, without constraint. Has it been 
found that bodies of men act with more rectitude or 
greater disinterestedness than individuals ? The con- 
trary of this has been inferred by all accurate observers 
of the conduct of mankind ; and the inference is founded 
upon obvious reasons. Regard to reputation has a less 
active influence, when the infamy of a bad action is 
to be divided among a number, than when it is to fall 
singly upon one. A spirit of faction, which is apt to 
mingle its poison in the deliberations of all bodies of 
men, will often hurry the persons of whom they are com- 
posed into improprieties and excesses, for which they 
would blush in a private capacity. 

In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sov- 
ereign power, an impatience of control, that disposes 
those who are invested with the exercise of it, to look 
with an evil eye upon all external attempts to restrain 
or direct its operations. From this spirit it happens, 
that in every political association which is formed upon 
the principle of uniting in a common interest a number 
t>f lesser 'sovereignties, there will be found a kind of 
eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs, 



98 The Federalist. 

by the operation of which there will be a perpetual effort 
in each to fly off from the common centre. This ten- 
dency is not difficult to be accounted for. It has its 
origin in the love of power. Power controlled or abridged 
is almost always the rival and enemy of that power by 
which it is controlled or abridged. This simple proposi- 
tion will teach us, how little reason there is to expect, 
that the persons intrusted with the administration of 
the affairs of the particular members of a Confederacy 
will at all times be ready, with perfect good-humor, and 
an unbiased regard to the public weal, to execute the 
resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The 
reverse of this results from the constitution of human 
nature. 

If therefore the measures of the Confederacy cannot 
be executed, without the intervention of the particular 
administrations, there will be little prospect of their being 
executed at all. The rulers of the respective members, 
whether they have a constitutional right to do it or not, 
will undertake to judge of the propriety of the measures 
themselves. They will consider the conformity of the 
thing proposed or required to their immediate interests 
or aims ; the momentary conveniences or inconveniences 
that would attend its adoption. All this will be done ; 
and in a spirit of interested and suspicious scrutiny, 
without that knowledge of National circumstances and 
reasons of State, which is essential to a right judgment, 
and with that strong predilection in favor of local 
objects, which can hardly fail to mislead the decision. 
The same process must be repeated in every member 
of which the body is constituted ; and the execution of 
the plans, framed by the councils of the whole, will 
always fluctuate on the discretion of the ill-informed 
and prejudiced opinion of every part. Those who have 
been conversant in the proceedings of popular assem- 
blies ; who have seen how difficult it often is, wher 



TJie Federalist '. 9S 

there is no exterior pressure of circumstances, to bring 
them to harmonious resolutions on important points, 
will readily conceive how impossible it must be to in- 
duce a number of such assemblies, deliberating at a 
distance from each other, at different times, and under 
different impressions, long to cooperate in the same 
views and pursuits. 

In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sov- 
ereign wills is requisite, under the Confederation, to the 
complete execution of every important measure that 
proceeds from the Union. It has happened as was to 
have been foreseen. The measures of the Union have 
not been executed ; the delinquencies of the States have, 
step by step, matured themselves to an extreme, which 
has, at length, arrested all the wheels of the National 
Government, and brought them to an awful stand. Con- 
gress at this time scarcely possess the means of keeping 
up the forms of administration, till the States can have 
time to agree upon a more substantial substitute for the 
present shadow of a Foederal Government. Things did 
not come to this desperate extremity at once. The 
causes which have been specified produced at first only 
unequal and disproportionate degrees of compliance 
with the requisitions of the Union. The greater defi- 
ciencies of some States furnished the pretext of example 
and the temptation of interest to the complying, or to 
the least delinquent States. Why should we do more 
in proportion than those who are embarked with us in 
the same political voyage? Why should we consent 
to bear more than our proper share of the common bur- 
den? These were suggestions which human selfish- 
ness could not withstand, and which even speculative 
men, who looked forward to remote consequences, could 
not, without hesitation, combat. Each State, yielding 
to the persuasive voice of immediate interest or con- 
venience, has successively withdrawn its support, till the 



100 The Federalist. 






frail and tottering edifice seems ready to fall upon coi 
heads, and to crush us beneath its ruins. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, December 4, 1787.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XVI. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

THE tendency of the principle of legislation for 
States, or communities, in their political capaci- 
ties, as it has been exemplified by the experiment we 
have made of it, is equally attested by the events which 
have befallen all other Governments of the confederate 
kind, of which we have any account, in exact propor- 
tion to its prevalence in those systems. The confirma- 
tions of this fact will be worthy of a distinct and par- 
ticular examination. I shall content myself with barely 
observing here, that of all the Confederacies of antiquity, 
which history has handed down to us, the Lycian and 
Achaean leagues, as far as there remain vestiges of them, 
appear to have been most free from the fetters of that 
mistaken principle, and were accordingly those which 
have best deserved, and have most liberally received, the 
applauding suffrages of political writers. 

This exceptionable principle may, as truly as emphat- 
ically, be styled the parent of anarchy : It has been seen 
that delinquencies in the members of the Union are 
its natural and necessary offspring ; and that when- 
ever they happen, the only constitutional remedy is 
force, and the immediate effect of the use of it, civil 
war. 

It remains to inquire how far so odious an engine of 



The Federalist. 101 

Government, in its application to us, would e\en be 
capable of answering its end. If there should not be 
a large army, constantly at the disposal of the Nationa 
Government, it would either not be able to employ force 
at all, or, when this could be done, it would amount to a 
war between parts of the Confederacy, concerning the 
infractions of a league ; in which the strongest combi- 
nation would be most likely to prevail, whether it con- 
sisted of those who supported, or of those who resisted, 
the general authority. It would rarely happen that the 
delinquency to be redressed would be confined to a 
single member ; and if there were more than one, who 
had neglected their duty, similarity of situation would 
induce them to unite for common defence. Indepen- 
dent of this motive of sympathy, if a large and influen- 
tial State should happen to be the aggressing member, 
it would commonly have weight enough with its neigh- 
bors, to win over some of them as associates to its 
cause. Specious arguments of danger to the common 
Liberty could easily be contrived ; plausible excuses for 
the deficiencies of the party could, without difficulty, 
be invented, to alarm the apprehensions, inflame the 
passions, and conciliate the good-will, even of those 
States which were not chargeable with any violation or 
omission of duty. This would be the more likely to 
take place, as the delinquencies of the larger members 
might be expected sometimes to proceed from an ambi- 
tious premeditation in their rulers, with a view to get- 
ting rid of all external control upon their designs of 
personal aggrandizement ; the better to effect which, it 
is presumable they would tamper beforehand with lead- 
ing individuals in the adjacent States. If associates 
could not be found at home, recourse would be had to 
the aid of foreign powers, who would seldom be disin- 
clined to encouraging the dissensions of a Confederacy, 
arom the firm Union of w lich they had so much to fear 



102 The Federalist. 

When the sword is once drawn, the passions of men 
observe no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of 
wounded pride, the instigations of irritated resentment, 
would be apt to carry the States, against which the 
arms of the Union were exerted, to any extremes neces- 
sary to avenge the affront, or to avoid the disgrace of 
submission. The first war of this kind would probably 
terminate in a dissolution of the Union. 

This may be considered as the violent death of the 
Confederacy. Its more natural death is what we now 
seem to be on the point of experiencing, if the Foederal 
system be not speedily renovated in a more substantial 
form. It is not probable, considering the genius of this 
country, that the complying States would often be in- 
clined to support the authority of the Union, by engag- 
ing in a war against the non-complying States. They 
would always be more ready to pursue the milder course 
of putting themselves upon an equal footing with the 
delinquent members, by an imitation of their example. 
And the guilt of all would thus become the security of 
all. Our past experience has exhibited the operation of 
this spirit in its full light. There would in fact be an 
insuperable difficulty in ascertaining when force could 
with propriety be employed. In the article of pecuni- 
ary contribution, which would be the most usual source 
of delinquency, it would often be impossible to decide, 
whether it had proceeded from disinclination or inabil- 
ity. The pretence of the latter would always be at 
hand. And the case must be very flagrant in which its 
fallacy could be detected with sufficient certainty to 
justify the harsh expedient of compulsion. It is easy 
to see that this problem alone, as often as it should 
occur, would open a wide field for the exercise of fac- 
tious views, of partiality, and of oppression, in the ma- 
jority that happened to prevail in the National council. 

It seems to require no pains to prove that the Statea 



Tlie Federalist. 103 

ought not to prefer a National Constitution, which could 
only be kept in motion by the instrumentality of a large 
army, continually on foot to execute the ordinary requi- 
sitions or decrees of the Government. And yet this is 
the plain alternative involved by those who wish to 
deny it the power of extending its operations to indi- 
viduals. Such a scheme, if practicable at all, would 
instantly degenerate into a military despotism ; but it 
will be found in every light impracticable. The re- 
sources of the Union would not be equal to the main- 
tenance of an army considerable enough to confine the 
larger States within the limits of their duty ; nor would 
the means ever be furnished of forming such an army 
in the first instance. Whoever considers the populous- 
ness and strength of several of these States singly at 
the present juncture, and looks forward to what the} 
will become, even at the distance of half a century, 
will at once dismiss as idle and visionary any scheme, 
which aims at regulating their movements by laws, to 
operate upon them in their collective capacities, and to 
be executed by a coercion applicable to them in the 
same capacities. A project of this kind is little less 
romantic than the monster-taming spirit, which is at- 
tributed to the fabulous heroes and demi-gods of anti- 
quity. 

Even in those Confederacies which have been com- 
posed of members smaller than many of our counties, 
the principle of legislation for sovereign States, sup- 
ported by military coercion, has never been found effect- 
ual. It has rarely been attempted to be employed, but 
against the weaker members ; and in most instances 
attempts to coerce the refractory and disobedient have 
been the signals of bloody wars, in which one half of 
the Confederacy has displayed its banners against the 
rther half. 

The result of these observations to an intelligent 



L04 The Federalist. 

mind must be clearly this, that if it be possible at an$ 
rate to construct a Foederal Government capable of 
regulating the common concerns and preserving the 
general tranquillity, it must be founded, as to the ob- 
jects committed to its care, upon the reverse of the 
principle contended for by the opponents of the pro- 
posed Constitution. It must carry its agency to the 
persons of the citizens. It must stand in need of no 
intermediate legislations ; but must itself be empow- 
ered to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to 
execute its own resolutions. The majesty of the Na- 
tional authority must be manifested through the me- 
dium of the Courts of Justice. The Government of the 
Union, like that of each State, must be able to address 
itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals ; 
and to attract to its support those passions which have 
the strongest influence upon the human heart. It must, 
in short, possess all the means, and have a right to re- 
sort to all the methods, of executing the powers with 
which it is intrusted, that are possessed and exercised 
by the Governments of the particular States. 

To this reasoning it may perhaps be objected, that if 
any State should be disaffected to the authority of the 
Union, it could at any time obstruct the execution of 
its laws, and bring the matter to the same issue of force, 
with the necessity of which the opposite scheme is re- 
proached. 

The plausibility of this objection will vanish the mo- 
ment we advert to the essential difference between a 
mere non-compliance and a direct and active resist- 
ance. If the interposition of the State Legislatures be 
necessary to give effect to a measure of the Union, they 
have only not to act, or to act evasively, and the 
measure is defeated. This neglect of duty may be dis- 
guised under affected but unsubstantial provisions, so 
as not to appear, and of course not to excite any alarm 



The Federalist. 10c 

in the People for the safety of the Constitution. The 
State leaders may even make a merit of their surrepti- 
tious invasions of it on the ground of some temporary 
convenience, exemption, or advantage. 

But if the execution of the laws of the National Gov- 
ernment should not require the intervention of the State 
Legislatures ; if they were to pass into immediate oper- 
ation upon the citizens themselves, the particular Gov- 
ernments could not interrupt their progress without an 
open and violent exertion of an unconstitutional power. 
No omissions, nor evasions, would answer the end. 
They would be obliged to act, and in such a manner, 
as would leave no doubt that they had encroached on 
the National rights. An experiment of this nature 
would always be hazardous in the face of a Constitu- 
tion in any degree competent to its own defence, and 
of a people enlightened enough to distinguish between 
a legal exercise and an illegal usurpation of authority. 
The success of it would require not merely a factious 
majority in the Legislature, but the concurrence of the 
Courts of Justice, and of the body of the People. If the 
Judges were not embarked in a conspiracy with the 
Legislature, they would pronounce the resolutions of 
such a majority to be contrary to the supreme law of 
the land, unconstitutional, and void. If the People were 
not tainted with the spirit of their State representatives, 
they, as the natural guardians of the Constitution, would 
throw their weight into the National scale, and give it a 
decided preponderancy in the contest. Attempts of this 
land would not often be made with levity or rashness ; 
because they could seldom be made without danger to 
the authors ; unless in cases of a tyrannical exercise of 
the Fcederal authority. 

If opposition to the National Government should arise 
from the disorderly conduct of refractory or seditious 
jidividuals, it could be overcome by the same meana 



106 The Federalist. 

which are daily employed against the same evil, undei 
the State Governments. The Magistracy, being equally 
the Ministers of the law of the land, from whatever 
source it might emanate, would doubtless be as ready 
to guard the National as the local regulations from the 
inroads of private licentiousness. As to those partial 
commotions and insurrections, which sometimes disquiet 
society, from the intrigues of an inconsiderable faction, 
or from sudden or occasional ill-humors, that do not in- 
fect the great body of the community, the General Gov- 
ernment could command more extensive resources, for 
the suppression of disturbances of that kind, than 
would be in the power of any single member. And 
as to those mortal feuds, which, in certain conjunc- 
tures, spread a conflagration through a whole nation, or 
through a very large proportion of it, proceeding either 
from weighty causes of discontent, given by the Gov- 
ernment, or from the contagion of some violent popular 
paroxysm, they do not fall within any ordinary rules 
of calculation. When they happen, they commonly 
amount to revolutions, and dismemberments of empire. 
No form of Government can always either avoid or con- 
trol them. It is in vain to hope to guard against events 
too mighty for human foresight or precaution ; and it 
would be idle to object to a Government, because it 

could not perform impossibilities. 

PUBLIUS. 



Tlie Federalist. 107 

For the Independent Journal. 

THE FQBDERALIST. No. XVII. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

\ N objection, of a nature different from that which 
-*-*- has been stated and answered, in my last address, 
may perhaps be likewise urged against the principle of 
legislation for the individual citizens of America. It 
may be said, that it would tend to render the Govern- 
ment of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to ab- 
sorb those residuary authorities, which it might be judg- 
ed proper to leave with the States for local purposes. 
Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of powei 
which any reasonable man can require, I confess I am 
at a loss to discover what temptation the persons in- 
trusted with the administration of the General Govern- 
ment could ever feel to divest the States of the authori- 
ties of that description. The regulation of the mere 
domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out 
slender allurements to ambition. Commerce, finance, 
negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects 
Which have charms for minds governed by that passion ; 
and all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in 
the first instance, to be lodged in the National depository. 
The administration of private justice between the citi- 
zens of the same State, the supervision of agricultuir 
and of other concerns of a similar nature, all thos; 
things, in short, which are proper to be provided for by 
local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a gen- 
eral jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable, that there 
should exist a disposition in the Foederal councils to usurp 
the powers with which they are connected ; because the 
attempt to exercise those powers would be as trouble* 



108 The Federalist. 

some as it would be nugatory; and the possession of 
them, for that reason, would contribute nothing to the 
dignity, to the importance, or to the splendor of the 
National Government. 

But let it be admitted, for argument' sake, that mere 
wantonness and lust of domination would be sufficient 
io beget that disposition; still it may be safely affirmed, 
chat the sense of the constituent body of the National 
representatives, or, in other words, of the People of the 
feveral States, would control the indulgence of so extrav- 
agant an appetite. It will always be far more easy for 
the State Governments to encroach upon the National au- 
thorities, than for the National Government to encroach 
upon the State authorities. The proof of this proposi- 
tion turns upon the greater degree of influence which 
the State Governments, if they administer their affairs 
with uprightness and prudence, will generally possess 
over the People ; a circumstance which at the same time 
teaches us, that there is an inherent and intrinsic weak- 
ness in all Foederal Constitutions ; and that too much 
pains cannot be taken in their organization, to give 
them all the force which is compatible with the princi- 
ples of liberty. 

The superiority of influence in favor of the particular 
Governments would result partly from the diffusive con- 
struction of the National Government, but chiefly from 
the nature of the objects to which the attention of the 
State administrations would be directed. 

It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections 
are commonly weak in proportion to the distance or 
diffusiveness of the object. Upon the same principle 
that a man is more attached to his family than to his 
neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the commu- 
nity at large, the People of each State would be apt to 
feel a stronger bias towards their local Governments 
than towards the Government of the Union ; unless the 



The Federalist. 109 

force of that principle should be destroyed by a much 
better administration of the latter. 

This strong propensity of the human heart would 
find powerful auxiliaries in the objects of State regu- 
lation. 

The variety of more minute interests, which will 
necessarily fall under the superintendence of the local 
administrations, and which will form so many rivulets 
of influence, running through every part of the society, 
cannot be particularized, without involving a detail too 
tedious and uninteresting to compensate for the instruc- 
tion it might afford. 

There is one transcendent advantage belonging to the 
province of the State Governments, which alone suffices 
to place the matter in a clear and satisfactory light, — I 
mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil 
justice. This, of all others, is the most powerful, most 
universal, and most attractive source of popular - obedi- 
ence and attachment. It is that, which, being the imme- 
diate and visible guardian of life and property ; having 
its benefits and its terrors in constant activity before the 
public eye ; regulating all those personal interests, and 
familiar concerns, to which the sensibility of individuals 
is more immediately awake ; contributes, more than any 
other circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of 
the People, affection, esteem, and reverence towards the 
Government. This great cement of society, which wilJ 
diffuse itself almost wholly through the channels of the 
particular Governments, independent of all other causes 
of influence, would insure them so decided an empire 
over their respective citizens as to render them at all 
times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently, 
dangerous rivals to the power of the Union. 

The operations of the National Government, on the 
other hand, falling less immediately under the observa- 
tion of the mass of the citizens, the benefits derived 



110 The Federalist. 

from it will chiefly be perceived and attended to by 
speculative men. Relating to more general interests, 
they will be less apt to come home to the feelings of the 
People ; and, in proportion, less likely to inspire a habit- 
ual sense of obligation, and an active sentiment of 
attachment. 

The reasoning on this head has been abundantly ex- 
emplified by the experience of all Fcederal Constitutions 
with which we are acquainted, and of all others which 
have borne the least analogy to them. 

Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly 
speaking, Confederacies, yet they partook of the nature 
of that species of association. There was a common 
head, chieftain, or sovereign, whose authority extended 
over the whole Nation ; and a number of subordinate 
vassals, or feudatories, who had large portions of land 
allotted to them, and numerous trains of inferior vassals 
or retainers, who occupied and cultivated that land upon 
the tenure of fealty or obedience to the persons of whom 
they held it. Each principal vassal was a kind of sov- 
ereign within his particular demesnes. The conse- 
quences of this situation were a continual opposition to 
the authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars be- 
tween the great barons, or chief feudatories themselves. 
The power of the head of the Nation was commonly too 
weak, either to preserve the public peace, or to protect 
the People against the oppressions of their immediate 
lords. This period of European affairs is emphatically 
styled by historians, the times of feudal anarchy. 

When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigor- 
ous and warlike temper and of superior abilities, he 
would acquire a personal weight and influence, which 
answered for the time the purposes of a more regular 
authority. But in general, the power of the barons tri- 
umphed over that of the prince ; and in many instances 
his dominion was entirely thrown off, and the great fiefs 



Th* Federalist. Ill 

were erected into independent principalities or States. 
In those instances in which the monarch finally prevail- 
ed over his vassals, his success was chiefly owing to the 
tyranny of those vassals over their dependants. The 
barons, or nobles, equally the enemies of the sovereign 
and the oppressors of the common people, were dreaded 
and detested by both ; till mutual danger and mutual 
interest effected an union between them fatal to the 
power of the aristocracy. Had the nobles, by a conduct 
of clemency and justice, preserved the fidelity and devo- 
tion of their retainers and followers, the contests between 
them and the prince must almost always have ended in 
their favor, and in the abridgment or subversion of the 
royal authority. 

This is not an assertion founded merely in specula- 
tion or conjecture. Among other illustrations of its 
truth which might be cited, Scotland will furnish a 
cogent example. The spirit of clanship which was, at 
an early day, introduced into that kingdom, uniting the 
nobles and their dependants by ties equivalent to those 
of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant over- 
match for the power of the monarch, till the incorpora- 
tion with England subdued its fierce and ungovernable 
spirit, and reduced it within those rules of subordina- 
tion, winch a more rational and more energetic system 
of civil polity had previously established in the latter 
kingdom. 

The separate Governments in a Confederacy may apt* 
be compared with the feudal baronies ; with this advan- 
tage in their favor, that from the reasons already ex- 
plained, they will generally possess the confidence and 
good-will of the People, and with so important a sup- 
port, will be able effectually to oppose all encroachments 
of the National Government. It will be well, if they are 
not able to counteract its legitimate and necessary au- 
thority. The points of similitude consist in the rivalship 



112 The Federalist. 

of power, applicable to both, and in tne concentra- 
tion of large portions of the strength of the community 
into particular deposits, in one case at the disposal of 
individuals, in the other case at the disposal of politica. 
bodies. 

A concise review of the events that have attended 
Confederate Governments will further illustrate this im- 
portant doctrine ; an inattention to which has been the 
great source of our political mistakes, and has given our 
jealousy a direction to the wrong side. This review 
shall form the subject of some ensuing papers. 

PUBLIUS. 



For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XVIII. 



To the People of the State op New York : 

AMONG the Confederacies of antiquity, the most 
considerable was that of the Grecian Republics, 
associated under the Amphictyonie council. From the 
best accounts transmitted of this celebrated institution, 
it bore a very instructive analogy to the present Confed- 
eration of the American States. 

The members retained the character of independent 
and sovereign States, and had equal votes in the Fcederal 
council. This council had a general authority to pro- 
pose and resolve whatever it judged necessary for the 
common welfare of Greece ; to declare and carry on 
war; to decide, in the last resort, all controversies be- 
tween the members ; to fine the aggressing party ; to 
employ the whole force of the Confederacy against the 
disobedient ; to admit new members. The Amphic- 



T/ie Federalist. 113 

tyons were the guardians of religion, and of the immense 
riches belonging to the temple of Delphos, where they 
had the right of jurisdiction in controversies between 
the inhabitants and those who came to consult the 
oracle. As a further provision for the efficacy of the 
Fcederal powers, they took an oath mutually to defend 
and protect the united cities, to punish the violators of 
this oath, and to inflict vengeance on sacrilegious de- 
spoilers of the Temple. 

In theory, and upon paper, this apparatus of powers 
seems amply sufficient for all general purposes. In sev- 
eral material instances, they exceed the powers enumer- 
ated in the Articles of Confederation. The Amphictyons 
had in their hands the superstition of the times, one of 
the principal engines by which Government was then 
maintained ; they had a declared authority to use co- 
ercion against refractory cities, and were bound by oath 
to exert this authority on the necessary occasions. 

Very different, nevertheless, was the experiment from 
the theory. The powers, like those of the present Con- 
gress, were administered by deputies appointed wholly 
by the cities in their political capacities ; and exercised 
over them in the same capacities. Hence the weakness, 
the disorders, and finally the destruction of the Confed- 
eracy. The more powerful members, instead of being 
kept in awe and subordination, tyrannized successively 
over all the rest. Athens, as we learn from Demosthe- 
nes, was the arbiter of Greece seventy-three years. The 
Lacedaemonians next governed it twenty-nine years ; at 
a subsequent period, after the battle of Leuctra, the 
Thebans had their turn of domination. 

It happened but too often, according to Plutarch, 
that the deputies of the strongest cities awed and cor- 
rupted those of the weaker ; and that judgment went in 
favor of the most powerful party. 

Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars 



114 The Federalist. 

with Persia and Macedon, the members never acted in 
concert, and were, more or fewer of them, eternally the 
dupes or the hirelings of the common enemy. The in- 
tervals of foreign war were filled up by domestic vicissi 
hides, convulsions, and carnage. 

After the conclusion of the war with Xerxes, it ap- 
pears that the Lacedaemonians required that a number 
of the cities should be turned out of the Confederacy for 
the unfaithful part they had acted. The Athenians, 
rinding that the Lacedaemonians would lose fewer parti- 
sans by such a measure than themselves, and would 
become masters of the public deliberations, vigorously 
opposed and defeated the attempt. This piece of his- 
tory proves at once the inefficiency of the union, the 
ambition and jealousy of its most powerful members, 
and the dependent and degraded condition of the rest. 
The smaller members, though entitled by the theory of 
their system to revolve in equal pride and majesty 
around the common centre, had become, in fact, satel- 
lites of the orbs of primary magnitude. 

Had the Greeks, says the Abbe* Milot, been as wise 
as they were courageous, they would have been admon- 
ished by experience of the necessity of a closer Union, 
and would have availed themselves of the peace w T hich 
followed their success against the Persian arms, to estab- 
lish such a reformation. Instead of this obvious policy, 
Athens and Sparta, inflated with the victories and the 
glory they had acquired, became first rivals and then 
enemies ; and did each other infinitely more mischief 
than they had suffered from Xerxes. Their mutual jeal- 
ousies, fears, hatreds, and injuries ended in the celebrated 
Peloponnesian war ; which itself ended in the ruin and 
slavery of the Athenians who had begun it. 

As a weak Government, when not at war, is ever agi- 
tated by internal dissensions ; so these never fail to bring 
on fresh calamities from abroad. The Phocians having 



The Federalist. 135 

ploughed up some consecrated ground belonging to the 
temple of Apollo, the Amphictyonic council, according 
to the superstition of the age, imposed a fine on the 
sacrilegious offenders. The Phocians, being abetted by- 
Athens and Sparta, refused to submit to the decree. 
The Thebans, with others of the cities, undertook to 
maintain the authority of the Amphictyons, and to 
avenge the violated God. The latter, being the weaker 
party, invited the assistance of Philip of Macedon, who 
had secretly fostered the contest. Philip gladly seized 
the opportunity of executing the designs he had long 
planned against the liberties of Greece. By his intrigues 
and bribes he won over to his interests the popular lead- 
ers of several cities; by their influence and votes, gained 
admission into the Amphictyonic council ; and by his 
arts and his arms, made himself master of the Confed- 
eracy. 

Such were the consequences of the fallacious princi- 
ple on which this interesting establishment was founded. 
Had Greece, says a judicious observer on her fate, been 
united by a stricter Confederation, and persevered in her 
Union, she would never have worn the chains of Mace- 
don ; and might have proved a barrier to the vast projects 
of Rome. 

The Achaean league, as it is called, was another so- 
ciety of Grecian republics, which supplies us with valu- 
able instruction. 

The Union here was far more intimate, and its organ- 
ization much wiser, than in the preceding instance. It 
will accordingly appear, that though not exempt from a 
similar catastrophe, it by no means equally deserved it. 

The cities composing this league retained their mu- 
nicipal jurisdiction, appointed their own officers, and 
enjoyed a perfect equality. The Senate, in which they 
were represented, had the sole and exclusive right of 
Deace and war ; of sending and receiving Ambassadors ; 



L16 The Federalist. 

of entering into treaties and alliances ; of appointing a 
Chief Magistrate or Praetor, as he was called, who com- 
manded their armies, and who, with the advice and con- 
sent of ten of the senators, not only administered the 
Government in the recess of the senate, but had a great 
share in its deliberations, when assembled. According 
to the primitive Constitution, there were two Praetors 
associated in the administration ; but on trial a single 
one was preferred. 

It appears that the cities had all the same laws and 
customs, the same weights and measures, and the same 
money. But how far this effect proceeded from the 
authority of the Foederal Council is left in uncertainty. 
It is said only that the cities were in a manner com- 
pelled to receive the same laws and usages. When 
Lacedsemon was brought into the league by Philopo3- 
men, it was attended with an abolition of the institu- 
tions and laws of Lycurgus, and an adoption of those 
of the Achseans. The Amphictyonic Confederacy, of 
which she had been a member, left her in the full exer- 
cise of her Government and her legislation. This cir- 
cumstance alone proves a very material difference in 
the genius of the two systems. 

It is much to be regretted that such imperfect monu- 
ments remain of this curious political fabric. Could its 
interior structure and regular operation be ascertained, it 
is probable that more light would be thrown by it on the 
science of Foederal Government, than by any of the like 
experiments with which we are acquainted. 

One important fact seems to be witnessed by all the 
historians who take notice of Achaean affairs. It is, that 
as well after the renovation of the league by Aratus, as 
before its dissolution by the arts of Macedon, there was 
infinitely more of moderati»n and justice in the admin- 
istration of its Government, and less of violence anc* 
sedition in the people, than were to be found in any of 



The Federalist 117 

the cities exercising singly all the prerogatives of sov 
ereignty. The Abbe Mably, in his observations on 
Greece, says, that the popular Government, which was 
bo tempestuous elsewhere, caused no disorders in the 
members of the Achaean republic, because it was there 
tempered by the general authority and laws of the Con- 
federacy. 

We are not to conclude too hastily, however, that fac- 
tion dicf not, in a certain degree, agitate the particular 
cities ; much less, that a due subordination and harmony 
reigned in the general system. The contrary is suffi- 
ciently displayed in the vicissitudes and fate of the 
republic. 

Whilst the Amphictyonic Confederacy remained, that 
of the Achseans, which comprehended the less impor 
tant cities only, made little figure on the theatre oi 
Greece. When the former became a victim to Mace- 
don, the latter was spared by the policy of Philip and 
Alexander. Under the successors of these princes, how- 
ever, a different policy prevailed. The arts of division 
were practised among the Achseans : Each city was se 
duced into a separate interest ; the Union was dissolved. 
Some of the cities fell under the tyranny of Macedonian 
garrisons ; others under that of usurpers springing out 
of their own confusions. Shame and oppression ere- 
long awakened their love of liberty. A few cities re- 
united. Their example was followed by others, as op- 
portunities were found of cutting off their tyrants. The 
eague soon embraced almost the whole Peloponnesus. 
Macedon saw its progress; but was hindered, by internal 
Ussensions, from stopping it. All Greece caught the 
enthusiasm, and seemed ready to unite in one Confed- 
eracy, when the jealousy and envy in Sparta and Athens, 
of the rising glory of the Achseans, threw a fatal damp 
an the enterprise. The drsad of the Macedonian power 
Induced the league to court the alliance of the Kings of 



118 The Federalist 

Egypt and Syria ; who, as successors of Alexander 
were rivals of the King of Macedon. This policy was 
defeated by Cleomens, King of Sparta, who was led 
by his ambition to make an unprovoked attack on his 
neighbors, the Achaeans ; and who, as an enemy to 
Macedon, had interest enough with the Egyptian and 
Syrian Princes, to effect a breach of their engagements 
with the league. The Achseans were now reduced to 
the dilemma of submitting to Cleomens, or o'f suppli- 
cating the aid of Macedon, its former oppressor. The 
latter expedient was adopted. The contest of the 
Greeks always afforded a pleasing opportunity to that 
powerful neighbor, of intermeddling in their affairs. A 
Macedonian army quickly appeared : Cleomens was 
vanquished. The Achseans soon experienced, as often 
happens, that a victorious and powerful ally is but an- 
other name for a master. All that their most abject 
compliances could obtain from him was a toleration of 
the exercise of their laws. Philip, who was now on 
the throne of Macedon, soon provoked, by his tyrannies, 
fresh combinations among the Greeks. The Achseans, 
though weakened by internal dissensions, and by the 
revolt of Messene, one of its members, being joined by 
the ^Etolians and Athenians, erected the standard of 
opposition. Finding themselves, though thus supported, 
unequal to the undertaking, they once more had recourse 
to the dangerous expedient of introducing the succor of 
foreign arms. The Romans, to whom the invitation 
was made, eagerly embraced it. Philip was conquered : 
Macedon subdued. A new crisis ensued to the league 
Dissensions broke out among its members. These the 
Romans fostered. Callicrates, and other popular lead- 
ers, became mercenary instruments for inveigling their 
countrymen. The more effectually to nourish discord 
and disorder, the Romans had, to the astonishment of 
those who confided in their sincerity, already proclaimed 



The Federalist. US 

universal liberty* throughout Greece. "With the same 
insidious views, they now seduced the members from 
the league, by representing to their pride the violation 
it committed on their sovereignty. By these arts, this 
union, the last hope of Greece, the last hope of ancient 
liberty, was torn into pieces ; and such imbecility and 
distraction introduced, that the arms of Rome found lit- 
tle difficulty in completing the ruin which their arts had 
commenced. The Achceans were cut to pieces, and 
Achaia loaded with chains, under which it is groaning 
at this hour. 

I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines 
of this important portion of history ; both because it 
teaches more than one lesson, and because, as a sup- 
plement to the outlines of the Achaean Constitution, it 
emphatically illustrates the tendency of Fcederal bodies 
rather to anarchy among the members, than to tyranny 

in the head. 

PUBLIUS. 



For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XIX. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

THE examples of ancient Confederacies, cited in my 
last paper, have not exhausted the source of experi- 
mental instruction on this subject. There are existing 
institutions, founded on a similar principle, which merit 
particular consideration. The first which presents itself 
is the Germanic Body. 

* This was but another name dence of the members on the Feed- 
«ore specious for the indepen- eral head. — Publius. 



120 The b mder ahsL 

In the early ages of Christianity, Germany was oc 
cupied by seven distinct nations, who had no common 
chief. The Franks, one of the number, having con- 
quered the Gauls, established the kingdom which has 
taken its name from them. In the ninth century, Char- 
lemagne, its warlike monarch, carried his victorious arms 
in every direction ; and Germany became a part of his 
vast dominions. On the dismemberment, which took 
place under his sons, this part was erected into a sepa- 
rate and independent empire. Charlemagne and his 
immediate descendants possessed the reality, as well as 
the ensigns and dignity of imperial power. But the 
principal vassals, whose fiefs had become hereditary, 
and who composed the National Diets, which Charle- 
magne had not abolished, gradually threw off the yoke, 
and advanced to sovereign jurisdiction and indepen- 
dence. The force of imperial sovereignty was insuffi- 
cient to restrain such powerful dependants ; or to pre- 
serve the unity and tranquillity of the empire. The 
most furious private wars, accompanied with every 
species of calamity, were carried on between the dif- 
ferent Princes and States. The imperial authority, un- 
able to maintain the public order, declined by degrees, till 
it was almost extinct in the anarchy, which agitated the 
long interval between the death of the last Emperor of 
the Suabian, and the accession of the first Emperor of 
the Austrian lines. In the eleventh century, the Em- 
perors enjoyed full sovereignty: In the fifteenth, they 
had little more than the symbols and decorations of 
power. 

Out of this feudal system, which has itself many of 
the important features of a Confederacy, has grown the 
Fosderal system, which constitutes the Germanic empire. 
Its powers are vested in a Diet representing the compo- 
nent members of the Confederacy ; in the Emperor, who 
is the executive magistrate, with a negative on the de» 



The Federalist. 121 

srees of the Diet ; and in the Imperial Chamber and 
Aulic Council, two judiciary tribunals having supreme 
jurisdiction in controversies which concern the empire 
or which happen among its members. 

The Diet possesses the general power of legislating 
for the empire ; of making war and peace ; contracting 
alliances ; assessing quotas of troops and money ; con- 
structing fortresses ; regulating coin ; admitting new 
members ; and subjecting disobedient members to the 
ban of the empire, by which the party is degraded from 
his sovereign rights, and his possessions forfeited. The 
members of the Confederacy are expressly restricted from 
entering into compacts, prejudicial to the empire ; from 
imposing tolls and duties on their mutual intercourse, 
without the consent of the Emperor and Diet ; from 
altering the value of money ; from doing injustice to 
one another ; or from affording assistance or retreat to 
disturbers of the public peace. And the ban is de- 
nounced against such as shall violate any of these re- 
strictions. The members of the Diet, as such, are sub- 
ject in all cases to be judged by the Emperor and Diet, 
and in their private capacities by the Aulic Council and 
Imperial Chamber. 

The prerogatives of the Emperor are numerous. The 
most important of them are, his exclusive right to make 
propositions to the Diet ; to negative its resolutions ; to 
name ambassadors ; to confer dignities and titles ; to fill 
racant electorates ; to found universities ; to grant priv- 
. leges not injurious to the States of the empire ; to re- 
reive and apply the public revenues ; and generally to 
watch over the public safety. In certain cases, the Elec- 
tors form a Council to him. In quality of Emperor, he 
possesses no territory within the empire ; nor receives 
^ny revenue for his support. But his revenue and do- 
minions, in other qualities, constitute him one of the 
most powerful princes in Europe. 



122 The Federalist 






From such a parade of constitutional powers, in the 
representatives and head of this Confederacy, the natu- 
ral supposition would be, that it must form an excep- 
tion to the general character which belongs to its kin- 
dred systems. Nothing would be further from the 
reality. The fundamental principle on which it rests, 
that the empire is a community of sovereigns ; that the 
Diet is a representation of sovereigns ; and that the 
laws are addressed to sovereigns ; renders the empire a 
nerveless body, incapable of regulating its own mem- 
bers, insecure against external dangers, and agitated 
with unceasing fermentations in its own bowels. 

The history of Germany is a history of wars be- 
tween the Emperor and the Princes and States ; of 
wars among the Princes and States themselves ; of the 
licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression of the 
weak ; of foreign intrusions, and foreign intrigues ; of 
requisitions of men and money disregarded, or partially 
complied with ; of attempts to enforce them, altogether 
abortive, or attended with slaughter and desolation, in- 
volving the innocent with the guilty ; of general imbe- 
cility, confusion, and misery. 

In the sixteenth century, the Emperor, with one part 
of the empire on his side, was seen engaged against the 
other Princes and States. In one of the conflicts, the 
Emperor himself was put to flight, and very near being 
made prisoner by the Elector of Saxony. The late King 
of Prussia was more than once pitted against his Im- 
perial Sovereign ; and commonly proved an overmatch 
for him. Controversies and wars among the members 
themselves have been so common, that the German 
annals are crowded with the bloody pages which de- 
scribe them. Previous to the peace of Westphalia, 
Germany was desolated by a war of thirty years, in 
which the Emperor, with one half of the empire, was 
an one side, and Sweden, with the other half, on the 



Tlie Federalist. 123 

apposite side. Peace was at length negotiated, and 
dictated by foreign powers; and the articles of it, to 
which foreign powers are parties, made a fundamental 
part of the Germanic Constitution. 

If the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more 
united by the necessity of self-defence, its situatu n is 
still deplorable. Military preparations must be pre- 
ceded by so many tedious discussions, arising from the 
jealousies, pride, separate views, and clashing preten- 
sions, of sovereign bodies, that before the Diet can settle 
the arrangements, the enemy are in the field ; and be- 
fore the Fcederal troops are ready to take it, are retiring 
into winter quarters. 

The small body of National troops, which has been 
judged necessary in time of peace, is defectively kept 
up, badly paid, infected with local prejudices, and sup- 
ported by irregular and disproportionate contributions 
to the treasury. 

The impossibility of maintaining order, and dispens- 
ing justice among these sovereign subjects, produced 
the experiment of dividing the Empire into nine or ten 
circles or districts ; of giving them an interior organiza- 
tion ; and of charging them with the military execution 
of the laws against delinquent and contumacious mem- 
bers. This experiment has only served to demonstrate, 
more fully, the radical vice of the Constitution. Each 
circle is the miniature picture of the deformities of this 
political monster. They either fail to execute their com- 
missions, or they do it with all the devastation and car- 
nage of civil war. Sometimes whole circles are default- 
ers ; and then they increase the mischief which they were 
instituted to remedy. 

We may form some judgment of this scheme of mil- 
itary coercion, from a sample given by Thuanus. In 
Donawerth, a free and imperial city of the circle of Sua- 
oia, the A.bbe de St. Croix enjoyed certain immunities 



124 The Federalist. 

which had been reserved to him. In the exercise oi 
these, on some public occasions, outrages were commit- 
ted on him, by the people of the city. The consequence 
was, that the city was put under the ban of the empire ; 
and the Duke of Bavaria, though Director of another 
circle, obtained an appointment to enforce it. He soon 
appeared before the city, with a corps of ten thousand 
troops; and finding it a fit occasion, as he had secretly 
intended from the beginning, to revive an antiquated 
claim, on the pretext that his ancestors had suffered the 
place to be dismembered from his territory,* he took pos- 
session of it in his own name, disarmed and punished 
the inhabitants, and reannexed the city to his domains. 
It may be asked, perhaps, what has so long kept this 
disjointed machine from falling entirely to pieces? The 
answer is obvious. The weakness of most of the mem- 
bers, who are unwilling to expose themselves to the 
mercy of foreign powers ; the weakness of most of the 
principal members, compared with the formidable pow- 
ers all around them ; the vast weight and influence 
which the Emperor derives from his separate and hered- 
itary dominions ; and the interest he feels, in preserving 
a system with which his family pride is connected, and 
which constitutes him the first Prince in Europe : these 
causes support a feeble and precarious Union ; whilst 
the repellent quality, incident to the nature of sovereign- 
ty, and which time continually strengthens, prevents any 
reform whatever, founded on a proper consolidation. 
Nor is it to be imagined, if this obstacle could be sur- 
mounted, that the neighboring powers would suffer a 
revolution to take place, which would give to the Em- 
pire the force and preeminence to which it is entitled. 
Foreign nations have long considered themselves as in 
terested in the changes made by events in this Constitu- 

* Pfeffel, Nouvel Abrey. Chronol. for the expense of the expedition.— 
ie V Hist, etc., d'AHemagne, says the Pubiius. 
pretext was to indemnify himself 



The Federalist. 125 

fcion; and have, on various occasions, betrayed tlieii 
policy of perpetuating its anarchy and weakness. 

If more direct examples were wanting, Poland, as a 
Government over local sovereigns, might not improperly 
be taken notice of. Nor could any proof more striking 
be given of the calamities flowing from such institu- 
tions. Equally unfit for self-government and self' 
defence, it has long been at the mercy of its powerful 
neighbors ; who have lately had the mercy to disburden 
it of one third of its people and territories. 

The connection among the Swiss Cantons scarcely 
amounts to a Confederacy ; though it is sometimes cited 
as an instance of the stability of such institutions. 

They have no common treasury ; no common troops 
even in war; no common coin; no common judicatory; 
nor any other common mark of sovereignty. 

They are kept together by the peculiarity of their 
topographical position ; by their individual weakness 
and insignificancy ; by the fear of powerful neighbors, 
to one of which they were formerly subject ; by the few 
sources of contention among a People of such simple 
and homogeneous manners; by their joint interest in 
their dependent possessions ; by the mutual aid they 
stand in need of, for suppressing insurrections and re- 
bellions, an aid expressly stipulated, and often required 
and afforded ; and by the necessity of some regular and 
permanent provision for accommodating disputes among 
the Cantons. The provision is, that the parties at vari- 
ance shall each choose four judges out of the neutral 
Cantons, who, in case of disagreement, choose an um- 
pire. This tribunal, under an oath of impartiality, pro- 
nounces definitive sentence, which all the Cantons are 
bound to enforce. The competency of this regulation 
may be estimated by a clause in their treaty of 1683, 
with Victor Amadeus of Savoy ; in which he obliges 
oimself to interpose as mediator in disputes between 



126 Tlie Federalist. 

the Cantons, and to employ force, if necessary, against 
the contumacious party. 

So far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of 
comparison with that of the United States, it serves to 
confirm the principle intended to be established. What- 
ever efficacy the Union may have had in ordinary cases, 
it appears that the moment a cause of difference sprung 
up, capable of trying its strength, it failed. The con- 
troversies on the subject of religion, which in three in- 
stances have kindled violent and bloody contests, may 
be said, in fact, to have severed the league. The Protes- 
tant and Catholic Cantons have since had their separate 
Diets ; where all the most important concerns are ad- 
justed, and which have left the general Diet little other 
business than to take care of the common bailages. 

That separation had another consequence, which 
merits attention. It produced opposite alliances with 
foreign powers : of Berne, at the head of the Protestant 
association, with the United Provinces ; and of Luzerne 
at the head of the Catholic association, with France. 

PUBL1US. 



[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, December 11, 1787.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XX. 



*o the People of the State of New York : 

/T1HE United Netherlands are a Confederacy of repub- 
J- lies, or rather of aristocracies of a very remarkable 
texture, yet confirming all the lessons derived from those 
svhich we have already reviewed. 

The Union is composed of seven coequal and sover- 
eign States, and each State or province is a composi 



The Federalist. 127 

Hon of equal and independent cities. In all important 
cases, not only the provinces, but the cities must be 
unanimous. 

The sovereignty of the Union is represented by the 
States- General, consisting usually of about fifty depu- 
ties appointed by the provinces. They hold their seats, 
some for life, some for six, three, and one years. From 
two provinces they continue in appointment during 
pleasure. 

The States-General have authority to enter into trea- 
ties and alliances ; to make war and peace ; to raise 
armies and equip fleets ; to ascertain quotas and demand 
contributions. In all these cases, however, unanimity 
and the sanction of their constituents are requisite. 
They have authority to appoint and receive ambassa- 
dors ; to execute treaties and alliances already formed ; 
to provide for the collection of duties on imports and 
exports ; to regulate the mint, with a saving to the. pro- 
vincial rights ; to govern as sovereigns the dependent 
territories. The provinces are restrained, unless with 
the general consent, from entering into foreign treaties ; 
from establishing imposts injurious to others, or charg- 
ing their neighbors with higher duties than their own 
subjects. A Council of State, a chamber of accounts, 
with five colleges of admiralty, aid and fortify the Foed- 
eral administration. 

The executive magistrate of the Union is the Stadr- 
holder, who is now a hereditary Prince. His principal 
weight and influence in the republic are derived from 
this independent title; from his great patrimonial es- 
tates; from his family connections with some of the 
chief potentates of Europe ; and, more than all, per- 
haps, from his being Stadtholder in the several prov- 
inces, as well as for the Union ; in which provincial qual- 
ity, be has the appointment of town magistrates under 
certain regulations, executes provincial decrees, presides 



128 The Federalist. 

when he pleases in the provincial tribunals, and has 
throughout the power of pardon. 

As Stadth older of + he Union, he has however consid- 
erable prerogatives. 

In his political capacity, he has authority to settle 
disputes between the provinces, when other methods 
fail ; to assist at the deliberations of the States- General, 
and at their particular conferences ; to give audiences to 
foreign Ambassadors, and to keep agents for his partic- 
ular affairs at foreign Courts. 

In his military capacity, he commands the Fcederal 
troops ; provides for garrisons, and in general regulates 
military affairs ; disposes of all appointments, from Col- 
onels to Ensigns, and of the Governments and posts of 
fortified towns. 

In his marine capacity, he is Admiral- General, and 
superintends and directs everything relative to naval 
forces, and other naval affairs ; presides in the admiral- 
ties in person or by proxy ; appoints Lieutenant- Admirals 
and other officers ; and establishes Councils of war, 
whose sentences are not executed till he approves them. 

His revenue, exclusive of his private income, amounts 
to three hundred thousand florins. The standing army 
which he commands consists of about forty thousand 
men. 

Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic Confeder- 
acy, as delineated on parchment. What are the char- 
acters which practice has stamped upon it ? Imbecility 
in the Government ; discord among the provinces ; for- 
eign influence and indignities ; a precarious existence in 
peace, and peculiar calamities from war. 

It was long ago remarked by Grotius, that nothing 
but the hatred of his countrymen to the House of Aus- 
tria kept them from being ruined by the vices of their 
Constitution. 

The Union of Utrecht, says another respectable writ* 



The Federalist. 129 

er, reposes an authority in the States- General, seeming- 
ly sufficient to secure harmony ; but the jealousy in each 
province renders the practice very different from the 
theory. 

The same instrument, says another, obliges each prov- 
ince to levy certain contributions ; but this article never 
could, and probably never will, be executed ; because the 
inland provinces, who have little commerce, cannot pay 
an equal quota. 

In matters of contribution, it is the practice to waive 
the articles of the Constitution. The danger of delay 
obliges the consenting provinces to furnish their quotas, 
without waiting for the others ; and then to obtain re- 
imbursement from the others, by deputations, which are 
frequent, or otherwise, as they can. The great wealth 
and influence of the province of Holland enable her to 
effect both these purposes. 

It has more than once happened, that the deficiencies 
have been ultimately to be collected at the point of the 
bayonet ; a thing practicable, though dreadful, in a Con- 
federacy where one of the members exceeds in force all 
the rest, and where several of them are too small to 
meditate resistance ; but utterly impracticable in one 
composed of members, several of which are equal to 
each other in strength and resources, and equal singly 
to a vigorous and persevering defence. 

Foreign Ministers, says Sir William Temple, who 
vvas himself a foreign minister, elude matters taken ad 
referendum, by tampering with the provinces and cities. 
In 1726, the treaty of Hanover was delayed by these 
means a whole year. Instances of a like nature are 
numerous and notorious. 

In critical emergencies, the States- General are often 
compelled to overleap their constitutional bounds. In 
'J588, they concluded a treaty of themselves at the risk 
of their heads. The treaty of Westphalia, in 1648, by 



130 The Federalist. 

which their independence was formally and finally 
recognized, was concluded without the consent of Zea- 
land. Even as recently as the last treaty of peace with 
Great Britain, the constitutional principle of unanimity 
was departed from. A weak Constitution must neces- 
sarily terminate in dissolution, for want of proper pow- 
ers, or the usurpation of powers requisite for the public 
safety. Whether the usurpation, when once begun, 
will stop at the salutary point, or go forward to the 
dangerous extreme, must depend on the contingencies 
of the moment. Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown 
out of the assumptions of power, called for, on pressing 
exigencies, by a defective Constitution, than out of the 
full exercise of the largest constitutional authorities. 

Notwithstanding the calamities produced by the Stadt- 
holdership, it has been supposed, that without his influ- 
ence in the individual provinces, the causes of anarchy 
manifest in the Confederacy would long ago have dis- 
solved it. " Under such a Government," says the Abbe* 
Mably, " the Union could never have subsisted, if the 
" provinces had not a spring within themselves, capable 
" of quickening their tardiness, and compelling them to 
" the same way of thinking. This spring is the Stadt- 
" holder." It is remarked by Sir William Temple, " that 
" in the intermissions of the Stadtholdership, Holland, 
" by her riches and her authority, which drew the others 
" into a sort of dependence, supplied the place." 

These are not the only circumstances which have con- 
trolled the tendency to anarchy and dissolution. The 
surrounding powers impose an absolute necessity of 
Union to a certain degree, at the same time that they 
nourish by their intrigues the constitutional vices, which 
Keep the republic in some degree always at their mercy. 

The true patriots have long bewailed the fatal ten- 
dency of these vices, and have made no less than four 
regular experiments by extraordinary assemblies, con- 



The Federalist. 131 

rened for the special purpose, to apply a remedy. As 
many times has their laudable zeal found it impossible 
to unite the public councils in reforming the known, the 
acknowledged, the fatal evils of the existing Constitu- 
tion. Let us pause, my Fellow- Citizens, for one moment, 
over this melancholy and monitory lesson of history ; 
and with the tear that drops for the calamities brought 
on mankind by their adverse opinions and selfish pas- 
sions, let our gratitude mingle an ejaculation to Heaven, 
for the propitious concord which has distinguished the 
consultations for our political happiness. 

A design was also conceived of establishing a general 
tax to be administered by the Foederal authority. This 
also had its adversaries and failed. 

This unhappy people seem to be now suffering, from 
popular convulsions, from dissensions among the States, 
and from the actual invasion of foreign arms, the crisis 
of their destiny. All nations have their eyes fixed on 
the awful spectacle. The first wish prompted by human- 
ity is, that this severe trial may issue in such a revolu- 
tion of their Government, as will establish their Union, 
and render it the parent of tranquillity, freedom, and 
happiness : The next, that the asylum under which, we 
trust, the enjoyment of these blessings will speedily be 
secured in this country, may receive and console them 
for the catastrophe of their own. 

I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the 
contemplation of these Foederal precedents. Experience 
is the oracle of truth ; and where its responses are une- 
quivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The 
important truth, which it unequivocally pronounces in 
the present case, is that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a 
Government over Governments, a legislation for commu- 
nities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is 
a solecism in theory, so in practice ii is subversive of 
the order and ends of civil polity, by substituting vio 



132 The Federalist. 

lence in place of law, or the destructive coercion of ihe 

sword in place of the mild and salutary coercion of the 

magistracy. 

PUBLIUS. 



For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXI. 



To the People of the State of Few York : 

HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary 
review of the principal circumstances and events, 
which have depicted the genius and fate of other con- 
federate Governments, I shall now proceed in the enu- 
meration of the most important of those defects, which 
have hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system 
established among ourselves. To form a safe and satis- 
factory judgment of the proper remedy, it is absolutely 
necessary that we should be well acquainted with the 
extent and malignity of the disease. 

The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Con- 
federation, is the total want of a sanction to its laws 
The United States, as now composed, have no powers to 
exact obedience, or punish disobedience to their resolu- 
tions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or dives- 
titure of privileges, or by any other constitutional mode. 
There is no express delegation of authority to them to use 
force against delinquent members ; and if such a right 
should be ascribed to the Foederal head, as resulting from 
the nature of the social compact between the States, it 
must be by inference and construction, in the face of that 
part of the second Article, by which it is declared, " that 
u each State shall retain every power, jurisdiction, and 



The tfcederalist. 133 

!i right, not expressly delegated to the United States in 
" Congress assembled." There is, doubtless, a striking 
absurdity in supposing that a right of this kind does not 
exist, but we are reduced to the dilemma either of 
embracing that supposition, preposterous as it may 
seem, or of contravening or explaining away a provision, 
which has been of late a repeated theme of the eulogies 
of those who oppose the new Constitution ; and the 
want of which, in that plan, has been the subject of 
much plausible animadversion, and severe criticism. If 
we are unwilling to impair the force of this applauded 
provision, we shall be obliged to conclude, that the 
United States afford the extraordinary spectacle of a 
Government, destitute even of the shadow of constitu- 
tional power to enforce the execution of its own laws. 
It will appear, from the specimens which have been 
cited, that the American Confederacy, in this particular, 
stands discriminated from every other institution of a 
similar kind, and exhibits a new and unexampled phe- 
nomenon in the political world. 

The want of a mutual guaranty of the State Govern- 
ments is another capital imperfection in the Foederal 
plan. There is nothing of this kind declared in the 
Articles that compose it ; and to imply a tacit guaranty 
from consideration of utility, would be a still more 
flagrant departure from the clause which has been men- 
tioned, than to imply a tacit power of coercion, fiom 
the like considerations. The want of a guaranty, though 
it might in its consequences endanger the Union, does 
not so immediately attack its existence, as the want of 
a constitutional sanction to its laws. 

Without a guaranty, the assistance to be derived from 
the Union in repelling those domestic dangers, which 
may sometimes threaten the existence of the State Con- 
stitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation may rear 
its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties 



134 The Federalist. 

of the people ; while the National Government could 
legally do nothing more than behold its encroachments 
with indignation and regret. A successful faction may 
erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law ; while no 
succor could constitutionally be afforded by the Union 
to the friends and supporters of the Government. The 
tempestuous situation from which Massachusetts has 
scarcely emerged, evinces that dangers of this kind are 
not merely speculative. Who can determine, what 
might have been the issue of her late convulsions, if 
the malcontents had been headed by a C^sar or by a 
Cromwell ? Who can predict, what effect a despotism, 
established in Massachusetts, would have upon the lib- 
erties of New Hampshire or Rhode Island ; of Connect- 
icut or New York ? 

The inordinate pride of State importance has sug- 
gested to some minds an objection to the principle of a 
guaranty in the Fcederal Government, as involving an 
officious interference in the domestic concerns of the 
members. A scruple of this kind would deprive us of 
one of the principal advantages to be expected from 
Union ; and can only flow from a misapprehension of 
the nature of the provision itself. It could be no im- 
pediment to reforms of the State Constitutions by a 
majority of the People, in a legal and peaceable mode. 
This right would remain undiminished. The guaranty 
could only operate against changes to be effected by 
violence. Towards the prevention of calamities of this 
kind, too many checks cannot be provided. The peace 
of society, and the stability of Government, depend abso- 
'utely on the efficacy of the precautions adopted on this 
nead. Where the whole power of the Government is in 
the hands of the People, there is the less pretence for the 
use of violent remedies, in partial or occasional distem- 
pers of the State. The natural cure for an ill-adminis- 
tration, in a popular or representative Constitution, is a 



TJie Federalist. 135 

shange of men. A guaranty by the National authority 
would be as much levelled against the usurpations of 
rulers, as against the ferments and outrages of faction 
and sedition in the community. 

The principle of regulating the contributions of the 
States to the common treasury by quotas is another 
fundamental error in the Confederation. Its repugnancy 
to an adequate supply of the National exigencies has 
been already pointed out, and has sufficiently appeared 
from the trial which has been made of it. I speak of it 
now solely with a view to equality among the States. 
Those who have been accustomed to contemplate the 
circumstances which produce constitutional wealth, 
must be satisfied that there is no common standard or 
barometer, by which the degrees of it can be ascer- 
tained. Neither the value of lands, nor the numbers 
of the People, which have been successively proposed 
as the rule of State contributions, has any pretension to 
being a just representative. If we compare the wealth 
of the United Netherlands with that of Russia or Ger- 
many, or even of France ; and if we at the same time 
compare the total value of the lands and the aggregate 
population of that contracted district with the total 
value of the lands and the aggregate population of the 
immense regions of either of the three last-mentioned 
countries, we shall at once discover, that there is no 
comparison between the proportion of either of these 
two objects, and that of the relative wealth of those 
nations. If the like parallel were to be run between 
several of the American States, it would furnish a like 
result. Let Virginia be contrasted with North Caro- 
lina, Pennsylvania with Connecticut, or Maryland with 
New Jersey, and we shall be convinced that the respec- 
tive abilities of those States, in relation to revenue 
bear little or no analogy to their comparative stock in 
lands or to their comparative population. The position 



1.36 The Federalist. 

may be equally illustrated by a similar process between 
the counties of the same State. No man who ia 
acquainted with the State of New York will doubt 
that the active wealth of King's County bears a much 
greater proportion to that of Montgomery, than it would 
appear to be, if we should take either the total value of 
the lands, or the total numbers of the People, as a cri- 
terion ! 

The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety 
of causes. Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the 
productions, the nature of the Government, the genius 
of the citizens, the degree of information they possess, 
the state of commerce, of arts, of industry, these cir- 
cumstances, and many more, too complex, minute, or 
adventitious, to admit of a particular specification, oc- 
casion differences hardly conceivable in the relative 
opulence and riches of different countries. The conse- 
quence clearly is, that there can be no common measure 
of National wealth ; and, of course, no general or sta- 
tionary rule, by which the ability of a State to pay 
taxes can be determined. The attempt, therefore, to 
regulate the contributions of the members of a Confed- 
eracy by any such rule, cannot fail to be productive of 
glaring inequality and extreme oppression. 

This inequality would of itself be sufficient in Amer- 
ica to work the eventual destruction of the Union, if 
any mode of enforcing a compliance with its requisi- 
tions could be devised. The suffering States would not 
long consent to remain associated upon a principle 
which distributes the public burdens with so unequal 
a hand, and which was calculated to impoverish and 
oppress the citizens of some States, while those of oth- 
ers would scarcely be conscious of the small proportion 
of the weight they were required to sustain. This, how- 
ever, is an evil inseparable from the principle of quotas 
and requisitions. 



The Federalist. 137 

There is no method of steering clear of this incon- 
venience, but by authorizing the National Government 
to raise its own revenues in its own way. Imposts, ex- 
cises, and, in general, all duties upon articles of con- 
sumption, may be compared to a fluid, which will, in 
time, find its level with the means of paying them. The 
amount to be contributed by each citizen will in a de- 
gree be at his own option, and can be regulated by an 
attention to his resources. The rich may be extrava- 
gant, the poor can be frugal; and private oppression 
may always be avoided, by a judicious selection of ob- 
jects proper for such impositions. If inequalities should 
arise in some States from duties on particular objects, 
these will, in all probability, be counterbalanced by pro- 
portional inequalities in other States, from the duties on 
other objects. In the course of time and things, an 
equilibrium, as far as it is attainable in so complicated 
a subject, will be established everywhere. Or, if in- 
equalities should still exist, they would neither be so 
great in their degree, so uniform in their operation, nor 
so odious in their appearance, as those which would 
necessarily spring from quotas, upon any scale that can 
possibly be devised. 

It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of con- 
sumption, that they contain in their own nature a secu- 
rity against excess. They prescribe their own limit ; 
which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end 
proposed, — that is, an extension of the revenue. When 
applied to this object, the saying is as just as it is witty, 
that, " in political arithmetic, two and two do not always 
make four." If duties are too high, they lessen the con- 
sumption ; the collection is eluded ; and the product to 
the treasury is not so great as when they are confined 
within proper and moderate bounds. This forms a 
complete barrier against any material oppression of the 
citizens, by taxes of this class, and is itself a natural 
limitation of the power of imposing them. 



138 The Federalist. 

Impositions of this kind usually fall under the de- 
nomination of indirect taxes, and must for a long time 
constitute the chief part of the revenue raised in this 
country. Those of the direct kind, which principally 
relate to lands and buildings, may admit of a rule of 
apportionment. Either the value of land, or the num 
ber of the people, may serve as a standard. The state 
of agriculture and the populousness of a country have 
been considered as nearly connected with each other. 
And as a rule for the purpose intended, numbers, in the 
view of simplicity and certainty, are entitled to a pref- 
erence. In every country it is a Herculean task to obtain 
a valuation of the land : in a country imperfectly settled 
and progressive in improvement, the difficulties are in- 
creased almost to impracticability. The expense of an 
accurate valuation is, in all situations, a formidable ob- 
jection. In a branch of taxation where no limits to the 
discretion of the Government are to be found in the 
nature of things, the establishment of a fixed rule, not 
incompatible with the end, may be attended with fewer 
inconveniences than to leave that discretion altogether 

at large. 

PUBLIUS. 



\From the New York Packet, Friday, December 14, 1787.] 

THE FEDERALIST, No. XXII. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

IN addition to the defects already enumerated in the 
existing Foederal system, there are others of not 
less importance, which concur in rendering it altogether 
unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union 



The Federalist. 139 

The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all 
parties allowed to be of the number. The utility ol 
such a power has been anticipated under the first head 
of our inquiries ; and for this reason, as well as from the 
universal conviction entertained upon the subject, little 
need be added in this place. It is indeed evident, on 
the most superficial view, that there is no object, either 
as it respects the interests of trade or finance, that more 
strongly demands a Foederal superintendence. The want 
of it has already operated as a bar to the formation of 
beneficial treaties -with foreign powers ; and has given 
occasions of dissatisfaction between the States. No Na- 
tion acquainted with the nature of our political associa- 
tion would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations 
with the United States, by which they conceded privi- 
leges of any importance to them, while they were apprised 
that the engagements on the part of the Union might 
at any moment be violated by its members ; and while 
they found from experience that they might enjoy every 
advantage they desired in our markets, without granting 
us any return, but such as their momentary convenience 
might suggest. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at, 
that Mr. Jenkinson, in ushering into the House of Com- 
mons a bill for regulating the temporary intercourse be- 
tween the two countries, should preface its introduction 
by a declaration, that similar provisions in former bills 
had beer, found to answer every purpose to the com- 
merce of Great Britain, and that it would be prudent to 
persist in the plan until it should appear whether the 
American Government was likely or not to acquire 
greater consistency.* 

Several States have endeavored, by separate prohibi- 
tions, restrictions, and exclusions, to influence the conduct 
of that kingdom in this particular ; but the want of con- 

* This, as nearly as I can recol- on introducing the last bill. — Pub 
lect, was the sense of his speech lius. 



140 The Federalist. 

3ert, arising from the want of a general authority, and 
from clashing and dissimilar views in the States, has hith- 
erto frustrated every experiment of the kind, and will 
continue to do so, as long as the same obstacles to an 
uniformity of measures continue to exist. 

The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some 
States, contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in 
different instances, given just cause of umbrage and 
complaint to others ; and it is to be feared that examples 
of this nature, if not restrained by a National control, 
would be multiplied and extended till they became not 
less serious sources of animosity and discord, than inju- 
rious impediments to the intercourse between the differ- 
ent parts of the Confederacy. " The commerce of the 
" German empire * is in continual trammels, from the 
" multiplicity of the duties which the several Princes 
" and States exact upon the merchandises passing 
" through their territories ; by means of which the fine 
" streams and navigable rivers with which Germany is 
" so happily watered are rendered almost useless." 
Though the genius of the people of this country might 
never permit this description to be strictly applicable to 
us, yet we may reasonably expect from the gradual con- 
flicts of State regulations, that the citizens of each 
would at length come to be considered and treated by 
the others in no better light than that of foreigners and 
aliens. 

The power of raising armies, by the most obvious 
construction of the Articles of the Confederation, is 
merely a power of making requisitions upon the States 
for quotas of men. This practice, in the course of the 
late war, was found replete with obstructions to a vigor- 
ous, and to an economical system of defence. It gave 
oirth to a competition between the States, which created 
a kind of auction for men. In order to furnish the quo- 

* Encyclopaedia, article Empire. — Publius. 



The Federalist. 141 

tas required of them, they outbid each other, till boun- 
ties grew to an enormous and insupportable size. The 
hope of a still further increase afforded an inducement 
to those who were disposed to serve, to procrastinate 
their enlistment; and disinclined them from engaging for 
any considerable periods. Hence, slow and scanty levies 
of men, in the most critical emergencies of our affairs ; 
short enlistments at an unparalleled expense ; continual 
fluctuations in the troops, ruinous to their discipline, and 
subjecting the public safety frequently to the perilous 
crisis of a disbanded army. Hence, also, those oppres- 
sive expedients for raising men, which were upon several 
occasions practised, and which nothing but the enthusi- 
asm of liberty would have induced the people to endure. 

This method of raising troops is not more unfriendly 
to economy and vigor than it is to an equal distribution 
of the burden. The States near the seat of war, influ- 
enced by motives of self-preservation, made efforts to 
furnish their quotas, which even exceeded their abilities ; 
while those at a distance from danger were, for the most 
part, as remiss as the others were diligent, in their exer- 
tions. The immediate pressure of this inequality was 
not in this case, as in that of the contributions of mon- 
ey, alleviated by the hope of a final liquidation. The 
States which did not pay their proportions of money 
might at least be charged with their deficiencies ; but no 
account could be formed of the deficiencies in the sup- 
plies of men. We shall not, however, see much reason 
to regret the want of this hope, when we consider how 
Little prospect there is, that the most delinquent States 
will ever be able to make compensation for their pecuni- 
ary failures. The system of quotas and requisitions, 
whether it be applied to men or money, is, in every 
view, a system of imbecility in the Union, and of in- 
tquality and injustice among the members. 

The right of equal suffrage among the States ia 



L42 The Federalist. 

another exceptionable part of the Confederation. Every 
idea of proportion and every rule of fair representation 
conspire to condemn a principle, which gives to Rhode 
Island an equal weight in the scale of power with Mas- 
sachusetts, or Connecticut, or New York ; and to Dela- 
ware an equal voice in the National deliberations with 
Pennsylvania, or Virginia, or North Carolina. Its oper- 
ation contradicts that fundamental maxim of republican 
Government, which requires that the sense of the ma- 
jority should prevail. Sophistry may reply, that sover- 
eigns are equal, and that a majority of the votes of the 
States will be a majority of confederated America. But 
this kind of logical legerdemain will never counteract 
the plain suggestions of justice and common sense. It 
may happen that this majority of States is a small mi- 
nority of the People of America ; * and two thirds of the 
People of America could not long be persuaded, upon 
the credit of artificial distinctions and syllogistic subtle- 
ties, to submit their interests to the management and 
disposal of one third. The larger States would after a 
while revolt from the idea of receiving the law from the 
smaller. To acquiesce in such a privation of their due 
importance in the political scale, would be not merely to 
be insensible to the love of power, but even to sacrifice 
the desire of equality. It is neither rational to expect 
the first, nor just to require the last. The smaller States, 
considering how peculiarly their safety and Welfare de- 
pend on Union, ought readily to renounce a pretension, 
which, if not relinquished, would prove fatal to its du- 
ration. 

It may be objected to this, that not seven but nine 
States, or two thirds of the whole number, must consent 
to the most important resolutions ; and it may be thence 

* New Hampshire, Rhode Island, a majority of the whole number 01 
New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, the States, but they do not contain 
Sauth Carolina, and Maryland are one third of the people. — Publius. 



Tfie Federalist. 143 

inferred, that nine States would always comprehend a 
majority of the inhabitants of the Union. But this 
does not obviate the impropriety of an equal vote be- 
tween States of the most unequal dimensions and popu- 
lousness : nor is the inference accurate in point of fact ; 
for we can enumerate nine States, which contain less 
than a majority of the people;* and it is constitu- 
tionally possible that these nine may give the vote. 
Besides, there are matters of considerable moment de- 
terminable by a bare majority: and there are others, 
concerning which doubts have been entertained, which, 
if interpreted in favor of the sufficiency of a vote of 
seven States, would extend its operation to interests of 
the first magnitude. In addition to this, it is to be ob- 
served that there is a probability of an increase in the 
number of States, and no provision for a proportional 
augmentation of the ratio of votes. 

But this is not all : what at first sight may seem a 
remedy, is, in reality, a poison. To give a minority a 
negative upon the majority, (which is always the case 
where more than a majority is requisite to a decision,) is, 
in its tendency, to subject the sense of the greater number 
to that of the lesser. Congress, from the non-attendance 
of a few States, have been frequently in the situation of 
a Polish Diet, where a single vote has been sufficient to 
put a stop to all their movements. A sixtieth part of 
the Union, which is about the proportion of Delaware 
and Rhode Island, has several times been able to oppose 
an entire bar to its operations. This is one of those 
refinements which, in practice, has an effect the reverse 
of what is expected from it in theory. The necessity 
of unanimity in public bodies, or of something ap- 
proaching towards it, has been founded upon a supposi- 
tion that it would contribute to security. But its real 

* Add New York and Connecti- will still be less than a majority.— 
:ut to the foregoing seven, and they Publius. 



144 The Federalist. 

operation is to embarrass the administration, to destroy 
the energy of Government, and to substitute the pleas- 
ure, caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or 
corrupt junto, to the regular deliberations and decisions 
of a respectable majority. In those emergencies of a 
nation, in which the goodness or badness, the weakness 
or strength of its Government, is of the greatest impor- 
tance, there is commonly a necessity for action. The 
public business must, in some way or other, go forward 
If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a 
majority, respecting the best mode of conducting it, the 
majority, in order that something may be done, must 
conform to the views of the minority; and thus the 
sense of the smaller number will overrule that of the 
greater, and give a tone to the National proceedings. 
Hence, tedious delays ; continual negotiation and in- 
trigue ; contemptible compromises of the public good. 
And yet, in such a system, it is even happy when 
such compromises can take place : for upon some occa- 
sions things will not admit of accommodation ; and 
then the measures of Government must be injuriously 
suspended, or fatally defeated. It is often, by the im- 
practicability of obtaining the concurrence of the neces- 
sary number of votes, kept in a state of inaction. Its 
situation must always savor of weakness, sometimes 
border upon anarchy. 

It is not difficult to discover, that a principle of this 
kind gives greater scope to foreign corruption, as well as 
to domestic faction, than that which permits the sense 
of the majority to decide ; though the contrary of this 
has been presumed. The mistake has proceeded from 
not attending with due care to the mischiefs that may 
be occasioned, by obstructing the progress of Govern- 
ment at certain critical seasons. When the concurrence 
of a large number is required by the Constitution to the 
doing of any National act, we are apt to rest satisfied 



The Federalist. 145 

that all is safe, because nothing improper will be likely 
to be done ; but we forget how much good may be pre- 
vented, and how much ill may be produced, by the 
power of hindering the doing what may be necessary 
and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable pos- 
ture in which they may happen to stand at particular 
periods. 

Suppose, for instance, we were engaged in a war, in 
conjunction with one foreign nation, against another. 
Suppose the necessity of our situation demanded peace, 
and the interest or ambition of our ally led him to seek 
the prosecution of the war, with views that might justify 
us in making separate terms. In such a state of things, 
this ally of ours would evidently find it much easier, by 
his bribes and intrigues, to tie up the hands of Govern- 
ment from making peace, where two thirds of all the 
votes were requisite to that object, than where a simple 
majority would suffice. In the first case he would have 
to corrupt a smaller number ; in the last, a greater num- 
ber. Upon the same principle, it would be much easier 
for a foreign power with which we were at war, to per- 
plex our councils and embarrass our exertions. And, 
in a commercial view, we may be subjected to similar 
inconveniences. A nation, with which we might have a 
treaty of commerce, could with much greater facility 
prevent our forming a connection with her competitor 
in trade ; though such a connection should be ever so 
beneficial to ourselves. 

Evils of this description ought not to be regarded as 
imaginary. One of the weak sides of republics, among 
their numerous advantages, is, that they afford too easy 
an inlet to foreign corruption. An hereditary monarch, 
though often disposed to sacrifice his subjects to his am- 
bition, has so great a personal interest in the Govern- 
ment, and in the external glory of the Nation, that it is 
\aot easy for a foreign power to give him an equivalent 

VOL. I. 10 



146 The Fcedera/ist. 

for what he would sacrifice by treachery to the State, 
The world has accordingly been witness to few exam 
pies of this species of royal prostitution, though there 
have been abundant specimens of every other kind. 

In republics, persons elevated from the mass of the 
community, by the suffrages of their fellow-citizens, to 
stations of great preeminence and power, may find com- 
pensations for betraying their trust, which, to any but 
minds animated and guided by superior virtue, may ap- 
pear to exceed the proportion of interest they have in 
the common stock, and to overbalance the obligations 
of duty. Hence it is that history furnishes us with so 
many mortifying examples of the prevalency of foreign 
corruption in republican Governments. How much 
this contributed to the ruin of the ancient common- 
wealths has been already delineated. It is well known 
that the deputies of the United Provinces have, in vari- 
ous instances, been purchased by the emissaries of the 
neighboring kingdoms. The Earl of Chesterfield, (if 
my memory serves me right,) in a letter to his court, 
intimates that his success in an important negotiation 
must depend on his obtaining a Major's commission 
for one of those deputies. And in Sweden the parties 
were alternately bought by France and England, in so 
barefaced and notorious a manner that it excited uni- 
versal disgust in the nation, and was a principal cause 
that the most limited monarch in Europe, in a single 
day, without tumult, violence, or opposition, became one 
of the most absolute and uncontrolled. 

A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Con- 
federation remains yet to be mentioned, — the want of a 
judiciary power. Laws are a dead letter, without courts 
to expound and define their true meaning and operation. 
The treaties of the United States, to have any force at 
all, must be considered as part of the law of the land 
Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, 



The Federalist. 147 

ike all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determina- 
tions. To produce uniformity in these determinations, 
they ought to be submitted, in the last resort, to one 
6upreme tribunal. And this tribunal ought to be insti- 
tuted under the same authority which forms the treaties 
themselves. These ingredients are both indispensable. 
If there is in each State a court of final jurisdiction, 
there may be as many different final determinations on 
(he same point, as there are courts. There are endless 
diversities in the opinions of men. We often see not 
only different courts, but the Judges of the same court 
differing from each other. To avoid the confusion 
which would unavoidably result from the contradictory 
decisions of a number of independent judicatories, all 
nations have found it necessary to establish one court 
paramount to the rest, possessing a general superintend- 
ence, and authorized to settle and declare in the last 
resort a uniform rule of civil justice. 

This is the more necessary where the frame of the 
Government is so compounded that the laws of the 
whole are in danger of being contravened by the laws 
of the parts. In this case, if the particular tribunals are 
invested with a right of ultimate jurisdiction, besides 
the contradictions to be expected from difference of 
opinion, there will be much to fear from the bias of 
local views and prejudices, and from the interference 
of local regulations. As often as such an interference 
was to happen, there would be reason to apprehend that 
the provisions of the particular laws might be preferred 
lo those of the general laws;" for nothing is more natural 
to men in office than to look with peculiar deference 
towards that authority to which they owe their official 
existence. The treaties of the United States, under the 
present Constitution, are liable to the infractions of thir- 
teen different Legislatures, and as many different courts 
of final jurisdiction, acting under the authority of those 



148 The Federalist. 

Legislatures. The faith, the reputation, the peace of 
the whole Union, are thus continually at the mere} 7 of 
the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of every 
member of which it is composed. Is it possible that 
foreign nations can either respect or confide in such a 
Government? Is it possible that the People of America 
will longer consent to trust their honor, their happiness, 
their safety, on so precarious a foundation ? 

In this review of the Confederation, I have confined 
myself to the exhibition of its most material defects ; 
passing over those imperfections in its details by which 
even a great part of the power intended to be conferred 
upon it has been in a great measure rendered abortive. 
It must be by this time evident to all men of reflection, 
who can divest themselves of the prepossessions of pre- 
conceived opinions, that it is a system so radically 
vicious and unsound, as to admit not of amendment 
but by an entire change in its leading features and char- 
acters. 

The organization of Congress is itself utterly im- 
proper for the exercise of those powers which are ne- 
cessary to be deposited in the Union. A single Assem- 
bly may be a proper receptacle of those slender, or rather 
fettered, authorities, which have been heretofore dele- 
gated to the Fcederal head ; but it would be inconsistent 
with all the principles of good government, to intrust it 
with those additional powers, which, even the moderate 
and more rational adversaries of the proposed Constitu- 
tion admit, ought to reside in the United States. If 
that plan should not be adopted ; and if the necessity 
of the Union should be able to withstand the ambi- 
tious aims of those men, who may indulge magnificent 
schemes of personal aggrandizement from its dissolu- 
tion ; the probability would be, that we should run into 
the project of conferring supplementary powers upon 
Congress, as they are now constituted ; and either the 



The Federalist. 149 

machine, from the intrinsic feebleness of its structure, 
will moulder into pieces, in spite of our ill-judged efforts 
to prop it ; or, by successive augmentations of its force 
and energy, as necessity might prompt, we shall finally 
accumulate, in a single body, all the most important 
prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus entail upon our 
posterity, one of the most execrable forms of Govern- 
ment that human infatuation ever contrived. Thus we 
should create in reality that very tyranny, which the ad- 
versaries of the new 7 Constitution either are, or affect to 
be, solicitous to avert. 

It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the 
existing Foederal system, that it never had a ratification 
by the People. Resting on no better foundation than 
the consent of the several Legislatures, it has been ex- 
posed to frequent and intricate questions concerning the 
validity of its powers ; and has, in some instances, given 
birth to the enormous doctrine of a right of legislative 
repeal. Owing its ratification to the law of a State, it 
has been contended, that the same authority might re- 
peal the law by wmich it was ratified. However gross 
a heresy it may be to maintain that a party to a com- 
pact has a right to revoke that compact, the doctrine 
itself has had respectable advocates. The possibility of 
a question of this nature, proves the necessity of laying 
the foundations of our National Government deeper than 
in the mere sanction of delegated authority. The fab- 
ric of American Empire ought to rest on the solid basis 
of the consent of the People. The streams of Na- 
tional power ought to flow immediately from that pure 
original fountain of all legitimate authority. 

PUBLIUS. 



150 The Federalist. 

[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, December 18, 1787.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXIII. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

HP HE necessity of a Constitution, at least equally en- 
-*■ ergetic with the one proposed, to the preservation 
of the Union, is the point, at the examination of which 
we are now arrived. 

This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three 
branches, — the objects to be provided for by the Foed- 
eral Government ; the quantity of power necessary to 
the accomplishment of those objects ; the persons upon 
whom that power ought to operate. Its distribution 
and organization will more properly claim our atten- 
tion under the succeeding head. 

The principal purposes to be answered by Union are 
these, — the common defence of the members ; the pres- 
ervation of the public peace, as well against internal 
convulsions as external attacks ; the regulation of com- 
merce with other nations, and between the States ; the 
superintendence of our intercourse, political and com- 
mercial, with foreign countries. 

The authorities essential to the care of the common 
defence are these, — to raise armies ; to build and equip 
fleets ; to prescribe rules for the government of both ; 
to direct their operations ; to provide for their support. 
These powers ought to exist without limitation ; because 
it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety 
of National exigencies, or the correspondent extent and 
variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy 
them. The circumstances that endanger the safety of 
uations are infinite ; and for this reason no constitu- 
tional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to 



The Federalist. 151 

which the care of it is committed. This power ought 
to be coextensive with all the possible combinations of 
such circumstances ; and ought to be under the direc- 
tion of the same councils which are appointed to pre- 
side over the common defence. 

This is one of those truths which, to a correct and 
unprejudiced mind, carries its own evidence along with 
it ; and may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer 
by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms as 
simple as they are universal ; the means ought to be 
proportioned to the end; the persons, from whose agency 
the attainment of any end is expected, ought to possess 
the means by which it is to be attained. 

Whether there ought to be a Foederal Government 
intrusted with the care of the common defence, is a 
question in the first instance, open for discussion ; but 
the moment it is decided in the affirmative, it will fol- 
low, that that Government ought to be clothed with all 
the powers requisite to the complete execution of its 
trust. And unless it can be shown, that the circum- 
stances which may affect the public safety are reducible 
within certain determinate limits ; unless the contrary 
of this position can be fairly and rationally disputed, 
it must be admitted, as a necessary consequence, that 
there can be no limitation of that authority, which is 
to provide for the defence and protection of the com- 
munity, in any matter essential to its efficacy ; that is, 
in any matter essential to the formation, direction, or 
support of the National forces. 

Defective as the present Confederation has been 
proved to be, this principle appears to have been fully 
recognized by the framers of it ; though they have not 
made proper or adequate provision for its exercise. 
Congress have an unlimited discretion to make requi- 
sitions of men and money ; to govern the army and 
yiavy ; to direct their operations. As their requisitions 



152 The Federalist. 

are made constitutionally binding upon the States, who 
are in fact under the most solemn obligations to furnish 
the supplies required of them, the intention evidently 
was, that the United States should command whatever 
resources were by them judged requisite to the " com- 
mon defence and general welfare." It was presumed, 
that a sense of their true interests, and a regard to the 
dictates of good faith, would be found sufficient pledges 
for the punctual performance of the duty of the mem- 
bers to the Fcederal Head. 

The experiment has, however, demonstrated, that this 
expectation was ill-founded and illusory ; and the ob- 
servations, made under the last head, will, I imagine, 
have sufficed to convince the impartial and discerning, 
that there is an absolute necessity for an entire change 
in the first principles of the system ; that if we are in 
earnest about giving the Union energy and duration, 
we must abandon the vain project of legislating upon 
the States in their collective capacities ; we must extend 
the laws of the Fcederal Government to the individual 
citizens of America ; we must discard the fallacious 
scheme of quotas and requisitions, as equally imprac- 
ticable and unjust. The result from all this is that the 
Union ought to be invested with full power to levy 
troops ; to build and equip fleets ; and to raise the rev- 
enues which will be required for the formation and sup- 
port of an army and navy, in the customary and ordi- 
nary modes practised in other Governments. 

If the circumstances of our country are such as to 
demand a compound instead of a simple, a confed- 
erate instead of a sole Government, the essential point 
which will remain to be adjusted will be to discrimi- 
nate the objects, as far as it can be done, which shall 
appertain to the different provinces or departments of 
power ; allowing to each the most ample authority for 
fulfilling the objects committed to its charge. Shall 



The Federalist 153 

the Union be constituted the guardian of the common 
safety ? Are fleets and armies, and revenues, necessary 
to this purpose ? The Government of the Union must 
be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all regula- 
tions which have relation to them. The same must be 
the case in respect to commerce, and to every other mat- 
ter to which its jurisdiction is permitted to extend. Is 
the administration of justice between the citizens of the 
same State the proper department of the local Govern- 
ments ? These must possess all the authorities which 
are connected with this object, and with every other 
that may be allotted to their particular cognizance and 
direction. Not to confer in each case a degree of power 
commensurate to the end, would be to violate the most 
obvious rules of prudence and propriety, and improvi- 
dently to trust the great interests of the Nation to hands 
which are disabled from managing them with vigor and 
success. 

Who so likely to make suitable provisions for the 
public defence, as that body to which the guardianship 
of the public safety is confided ; which, as the centre of 
information, will best understand the extent and urgency 
of the dangers that threaten ; as the representative of 
the whole, will feel itself most deeply interested in the 
preservation of every part ; which, from the responsibility 
implied in the duty assigned to it, will be most sensibly 
impressed with the necessity of proper exertions ; and 
which, by the extension of its authority throughout the 
States, can alone establish uniformity and concert in 
the plans and measures, by which the common safety 
is to be secured ? Is there not a manifest inconsistency 
in devolving upon the Foederal Government the care of 
the general defence, and leaving in the State Govern- 
ments the effective powers, by which it is to be provided 
"or ? Is not a want of ccopeiation the infallible conse- 
quence of such a system ? And will not weakness, dis- 



154 The Federalist. 

order, an undue distribution of the burdens and calam 
ities of war, an unnecessary and intolerable increase of 
expense, be its natural and inevitable concomitants ? 
Have we not had unequivocal experience of its effects 
in the course of the revolution, which we have just ac- 
complished ? 

Every view we may take of the subject, as candid 
inquirers after truth, will serve to convince us, that it is 
both unwise and dangerous to deny the Foederal Gov- 
ernment an unconfined authority, as to all those objects 
which are intrusted to its management. It will indeed 
deserve the most vigilant and careful attention of the 
People, to see that it be modelled in such a manner as 
to admit of its being safely vested with the requisite 
powers. If any plan which has been, or may be, of- 
fered to our consideration, should not, upon a dispas- 
sionate inspection, be found to answer this description, 
it ought to be rejected. A Government, the Constitu- 
tion of which renders it unfit to be trusted with all the 
powers which a free People ought to delegate to any Gov- 
ernment, would be an unsafe and improper depositary 
of the National interests. "Wherever these can with 
propriety be confided, the coincident powers may safely 
accompany them. This is the true result of all just rea- 
soning upon the subject. And the adversaries of the 
plan promulgated by the Convention ought to have 
confined themselves to showing, that the internal struct- 
ure of the proposed Government was such as to render 
it unworthy of the confidence of the People. They 
ought not to have wandered into inflammatory decla- 
mations and unmeaning cavils, about the extent of the 
powers. The powers are not too extensive for the ob- 
jects of Foederal administration, or, in other words, for 
the management of our National interests ; nor can 
any satisfactory argument be framed to show that they 
are chargeable with such an excess. If it be true, as 



The Federalist. 155 

has been insinuated by some of the writers on the other 
side, that the difficulty arises from the nature of the 
thing, and that the extent of the country will not per- 
mit us to form a Government in which such ample pow- 
ers can safely be reposed, it would prove that we ought 
to contract our views, and resort to the expedient of 
separate Confederacies, which will move within more 
practicable spheres. For the absurdity must continu- 
ally stare us in the face of confiding to a Government 
the direction of the most essential National interests, 
without daring to trust it with the authorities which are 
indispensable to their proper and efficient management. 
Let us not attempt to reconcile contradictions, but firm" 
ly embrace a rational alternative. 

I trust, however, that the impracticability of one gen- 
eral system cannot be shown. I am greatly mistaken, 
if anything of weight has yet been advanced of this 
tendency ; and I flatter myself, that the observations 
which have been made in the course of these papers 
have served to place the reverse of that position in as 
clear a light as any matter, still in the womb of time 
and experience, can be susceptible of. This, at all 
events, must be evident, that the very difficulty itself, 
drawn from the extent of the country, is the strongest 
argument in favor of an energetic Government ; for any 
other can certainly never preserve the Union of so large 
an empire. If we embrace the tenets of those who op- 
pose the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as the 
standard of our political creed, we cannot fail to verify 
the gloomy doctrines which predict the impracticability 
of a National system, pervading the entire limits of the 

present Confederacy. 

PUBLIUS. 



156 The Federalist. 

For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXIV. 



To the People op the State op New York: 
finO the powers proposed to be conferred upon the 
-*- Foederal Government, in respect to the creation 
and direction of the National forces, I have met with 
but one specific objection ; which, if I understand it 
right, is this, — that proper provision has not been made 
against the existence of standing armies in time of 
peace ; an objection which, I shall now endeavor to 
show, rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations. 

It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague 
and general form, supported only by bold assertions, 
without the appearance of argument ; without even the 
sanction of theoretical opinions ; in contradiction to the 
practice of other free nations, and to the general sense 
of America, as expressed in most of the existing Con- 
stitutions. The propriety of this remark will appear, 
the moment it is recollected that the objection under 
consideration turns upon a supposed necessity of re- 
straining the legislative authority of the Nation, in 
the article of military establishments; a principle un- 
heard of, except in one or two of our State Constitu- 
tions, and rejected in all the rest. 

A stranger to our politics, who was to read our news- 
papers at the present juncture, without having previously 
inspected the plan reported by the Convention, would 
be naturally led to one of two conclusions : either that it 
contained a positive injunction, that standing armies 
should be kept up in time of peace ; or that it vested 
in the Executive the whole power of levying troops, 



The Federalist. i57 

without subjecting his discretion, in any shape, jo the 
control of the Legislature. 

If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he 
would be surprised to discover, that neither the one nor 
the other was the case ; that the whole power of raising 
armies was lodged in the Legislature, not in the Execu- 
tive ; that this Legislature was to be a popular body, con- 
sisting of the representatives of the People periodically 
elected ; and that instead of the provision he had sup- 
posed in favor of standing armies, there was to be 
found, in respect to this object, an important qualifica- 
tion even of the legislative discretion, in that clause 
which forbids the appropriation of money for the sup- 
port of an army for any longer period than two years : 
a precaution which, upon a nearer view of it, will ap- 
pear to be a great and real security against the keeping 
up of troops without evident necessity. 

Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have 
supposed would be apt to pursue his conjectures a little 
further. He would naturally say to himself, it is impos- 
sible that all this vehement and pathetic declamation 
can be without some colorable pretext. It must needs 
be that this people, so jealous of their liberties, have, in 
all the preceding models of the Constitutions which they 
have established, inserted the most precise and rigid pre- 
cautions on this point, the omission of which, in the new 
plan, has given birth to all this apprehension and 
clamor. 

If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in re- 
view the several State Constitutions, how great would 
be his disappointment to find that two only of them * 

* This statement of the matter is "to liberty, they ought not to 

tiken from the printed collections of " be kept up." This is, in truth, 

State Constitutions. Pennsylvania rather a caution than a prohibi- 

and North Carolina are the two tion. New Hampshire, Massachu- 

which contain the interdiction in setts, Delaware, and Maryland have, 

these words : " As standing armies in each of their Bills of Rights, a 

' in time of peace are dangerous clause to this effect : " Standing ar 



158 The Federalist. 

contained an interdiction of standing armies in time of 
peace ; that the other eleven had either observed a pro 
found silence on the subject, or had in express terms ad- 
mitted the right of the Legislature to authorize their ex- 
istence. 

Still, however, he would be persuaded that there must 
be some plausible foundation for the cry raised on this 
head. He would never be able to imagine, while any 
source of information remained unexplored, that it was 
nothing more than an experiment upon the public cre- 
dulity, dictated either by a deliberate intention to de- 
ceive, or by the overflowings of a zeal too intemperate 
to be ingenuous. It would probably occur to him, that 
he would be likely to find the precautions he was in 
search of in the primitive compact between the States. 
Here, at length, he would expect to meet with a solution 
of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe to himself, 
the existing Confederation must contain the most ex- 
plicit provisions against military establishments in time 
of peace ; and a departure from this model, in a favorite 
point, has occasioned the discontent which appears to 
influence these political champions. 

If he should now apply himself to a careful and crit- 
ical survey of the Articles of Confederation, his aston- 
ishment would not only be increased, but would acquire 
a mixture of indignation, at the unexpected discovery, 
that these Articles, instead of containing the prohibition 
he looked for, and though they had, with jealous circum- 
spection, restricted the authority of the State Legisla- 
tures in this particular, had not imposed a single restraint 

" mies are dangerous to liberty, and the Constitutions of the other States, 

" ought not to be raised or kept up except the foregoing, and their Con- 

" without the consent op. the stitutions are equally silent. I am 

"Legislature;" which is a for- told, however, that one or two 

mal admission of the authority of States have Bills of Rights which do 

the Legislature. New York has no not appear in this collection; but 

Bill of Rights, and her Constitution that those also recognize the right 

Bays not a word about the matter, of the legislative authority in this 

No Bills of Rights appear annexed to respect. — Publius. 



TJie Federalist. 159 

on that of the United States. If he happened to be a 
man of quick sensibility, or ardent temper, he could now 
no longer refrain from regarding these clamors as the 
dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled opposi- 
tion to a plan, which ought at least to receive a fair and 
candid examination from all sincere lovers of their coun- 
try ! How else, he would say, could the authors of 
them have been tempted to vent such loud censures 
upon that plan, about a point in which it seems to have 
conformed itself to the general sense of America as de- 
clared in its different forms of Government, and in which 
it has even superadded a new and powerful guard un- 
known to any of them? If, on the contrary, he happen- 
ed to be a man of calm and dispassionate feelings, he 
would indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature, 
and would lament, that in a matter so interesting to the 
happiness of millions, the true merits of the question 
should be perplexed and entangled by expedients so un- 
friendly to an impartial and right determination. Even 
such a man could hardly forbear remarking, that a con- 
duct of this kind has too much the appearance of an 
intention to mislead the People by alarming their pas- 
sions, rather than to convince them by arguments ad- 
dressed to their understandings. 

But however little this objection may be counte- 
nanced, even by precedents among ourselves, it may be 
satisfactory to take a nearer view of its intrinsic merits. 
From a close examination, it will appear, that restraints 
upon the discretion of the Legislature, in respect to mil- 
itary establishments in time of peace, would be improp- 
er to be imposed ; and, if imposed, from the necessities 
of society, would be unlikely to be observed. 

Though a wide ocean separates the United States 
from Europe, yet there are various considerations that 
warn us against an excess of confidence or security. On 
one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are grow- 



160 The Federalist. 

ing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain. On 
the other side, and extending to meet the British settle- 
ments, are colonies and establishments subject to the 
dominion of Spain. This situation, and the vicinity of 
the West India islands, belonging to these two powers, 
create between them, in respect to their American pos- 
sessions, and in relation to us, a common interest. The 
savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be re- 
garded as our natural enemies, their natural allies ; be- 
cause they have most to fear from us, and most to hope 
from them. The improvements in the art of navigation, 
have, as to the facility of communication, rendered dis- 
tant nations, in a great measure, neighbors. Britain and 
Spain are among the principal maritime powers of Eu- 
rope. A future concert of views between these nations 
ought not to be regarded as improbable. The increas- 
ing remoteness of consanguinity is every day diminish- 
ing the force of the family compact between France and 
Spain. And politicians have ever with great reason 
considered the ties of blood as feeble and precarious 
links of political connection. These circumstances, 
combined, admonish us not to be too sanguine in con- 
sidering ourselves as entirely out of the reach of dan- 
ger. 

Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, 
there has been a constant necessity for keeping small 
garrisons on our Western frontier. No person can 
doubt that these will continue to be indispensable, if it 
should only be against the ravages and depredations of 
the Indians. These garrisons must either be furnished 
by occasional detachments from the militia, or by per- 
manent corps in the pay of the Government. The first 
is impracticable ; and if practicable, would be perni- 
cious. The militia would not long, if at all, submit to 
be dragged from their occupations and families, to per- 
form that most disagreeable duty in times of profounc 



The Federalist. 161 

peace. And if they could be prevailed upon, or com- 
pelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent rota- 
tion of service, and the loss of labor, and disconcertion 
of the industrious pursuits of individuals, would form 
conclusive objections to the scheme. It would be as 
burdensome and injurious to the public as ruinous to 
private citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps 
in the pay of Government amounts to a standing army 
in time of peace ; a small one, indeed, but not the less 
real for being small. Here is a simple view of the sub- 
ject, that shows us at once the impropriety of a con- 
stitutional interdiction of such establishments, and the 
necessity of leaving the matter to the discretion and 
prudence of the Legislature. 

In proportion to our increase in strength, it is prob- 
able, nay, it may be said certain, that Britain and Spain 
would augment their military establishments in our 
neighborhood. If we should not be willing to be ex- 
posed, in a naked and defenceless condition, to their 
insults or encroachments, we should find it expedient to 
increase our frontier garrisons, in some ratio to the force 
by which our Western settlements might be annoyed. 
There are, and will be, particular posts, the possession 
of which will include the command of large districts of 
territory, and facilitate future invasions of the remain- 
der. It may be added, that some of those posts will be 
keys to the trade with the Indian nations. Can any 
man think it would be wise to leave such posts in a 
situation to be at any instant seized by one or the other 
of two neighboring and formidable powers? To act 
this part, would be to desert all the usual maxims of 
prudence and policy. 

If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be 
secure on our Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon 
as possible, to have a navy. To this purpose, there 
must be dock-yards and arsenals ; and for the defence of 

VOL. I. 11 



162 The Federalist. 

these, fortifications, and probably garrisons. When a 
nation has become so powerful by sea that it can pro- 
tect its dock-yards by its fleets, this supersedes the ne- 
cessity of garrisons for that purpose ; but where naval 
establishments are in their infancy, moderate garrisons 
will, in all likelihood, be found an indispensable security 
against descents for the destruction of the arsenals and 

dock-yards, and sometimes of the fleet itsel£ 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Friday, December 21, 1787.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXV. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

IT may perhaps be urged, that the objects enumer- 
ated in the preceding number ought to be provided 
for by the State Governments, under the direction of the 
Union. But this would be, in reality, an inversion of 
the primary principle of our political association ; as it 
would in practice transfer the care of the common de- 
fence from the Foederal head to the individual mem- 
bers : a project oppressive to some States, dangerous to 
all, and baneful to the Confederacy. 

The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian 
nations in our neighborhood, do not border on particular 
States, but encircle the Union from Maine to Georgia. 
The danger, though in different degrees, is therefore 
common. And the means of guarding against it ought, 
in like manner, to be the objects of common councils 
and of a common treasury. It happens that some 
States, from local situation, are more directly exposed 
New York is of this class. Upon the plan of separate 



The Federalist. 163 

provisions, New York would have to sustain the whole 
weight of the establishments requisite to her immediate 
safety, and to the mediate or ultimate protection of her 
neighbors. This would neither be equitable as it re- 
spected New York, nor safe as it respected the other 
States. Various inconveniences would attend such a 
system. The States, to whose lot it might fall to sup- 
port the necessary establishments, would be as little able 
as willing, for a considerable time to come, to bear the 
burden of competent provisions. The security of all 
would thus be subjected to the parsimony, improvidence, 
or inability of a part. If the resources of such part becom- 
ing more abundant and extensive, its provisions should be 
proportion ably enlarged, the other States would quickly 
take the alarm at seeing the whole military force of the 
Union in the hands of two or three of its members : 
and those probably amongst the most powerful. They 
would each choose to have some counterpoise ; and pre- 
tences could easily be contrived. In this situation, mili- 
tary establishments, nourished by mutual jealousy, wouid 
be apt to swell beyond their natural or proper size ; and 
being at the separate disposal of the members, they 
would be engines for the abridgment or demolition of 
the National authority. 

Reasons have been already given to induce a supposi- 
tion that the State Governments will too naturally be 
prone to a rivalship with that of the Union, the founda- 
tion of which will be the love of power ; and that in any 
contest between the Foederal head and one of its mem- 
bers, the People will be most apt to unite with their local 
Government. If, in addition to this immense advan- 
tage, the ambition of the members snould be stimulated 
by the separate and independent possession of military 
forces, it would afford too strong a temptation, and too 
great facility to them to make enterprises upon, and 
6nally to subvert, the constitutional authority of the 



164 The Federalist. 

Union. On the other hand, the liberty of the People 
would be less safe in this state of things than in that 
which left the National forces in the hands of the Na- 
tional Government. As far as an army may be consid- 
ered as a dangerous weapon of power, it had better be 
in those hands, of which the People are most likely to be 
jealous, than in those of which they are least likely to 
be jealous. For it is a truth which the experience of all 
ages has attested, that the People are always most in 
danger when the means of injuring their rights are in 
the possession of those of whom they entertain the least 
suspicion. 

The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware 
of the danger to the Union from the separate possession 
of military forces by the States, have, in express terms, 
prohibited them from having either ships or troops, un- 
less with the consent of Congress. The truth is, that 
the existence of a Fcederal Government and military 
establishments, under State authority, are not less at 
variance with each other, than a due supply of the Fced- 
eral treasury and the system of quotas and requisitions. 

There are other lights besides those already taken notice 
of, in which the impropriety of restraints on the discre- 
tion of the National Legislature will be equally manifest. 
The design of the objection, which has been mentioned, 
is to preclude standing armies in time of peace ; though 
we have never been informed how far it is designed the 
prohibition should extend : whether to raising armies, as 
well as to keeping- them up, in a season of tranquillity, 
or not. If it be confined to the latter, it will have no 
precise signification, and it will be ineffectual for the 
purpose intended. When armies are once raised, what 
shall be denominated " keeping them up," contrary to 
the sense of the Constitution ? What time shall be 
requisite to ascertain the violation ? Shall it be a week, 
a month, a year ? Or shall we say, they may be con- 



The Federalist. 165 

fcinued as long as the danger which occasioned their 
being raised continues ? This would be to admit that 
they might be kept up in time of peace, against threat- 
ening or impending danger ; which would be at once to 
deviate from the literal meaning of the prohibition, and 
to introduce an extensive latitude of construction. Who 
shall judge of the continuance of the danger ? This 
must undoubtedly be submitted to the National Gov- 
ernment ; and the matter would then be brought to this 
issue, that the National Government, to provide against 
apprehended danger, might in the first instance raise 
troops, and might afterwards keep them on foot, as long 
as they supposed the peace or safety of the community 
was in any degree of jeopardy. It is easy to perceive, 
that a discretion so latitudinary as this would afford 
ample room for eluding the force of the provision. 

The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can 
only be founded on the supposed probability, or at least 
possibility, of a combination between the Executive and- 
the Legislative, in some scheme of usurpation. Should 
this at any time happen, how easy would it be to fabri- 
cate pretences of approaching danger ! Indian hostili- 
ties, instigated by Spain or Britain, would always be at 
hand. Provocations to produce the desired appearances 
inight even be given to some foreign power, and ap- 
peased again by timely concessions. If we can reason- 
ably presume such a combination to have been formed, 
and that the enterprise is warranted by a sufficient pros- 
pect of success, the army when once raised, from what- 
ever cause, or on whatever pretext, may be applied to 
the execution of the project. 

If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved 
to extend the prohibition to the raising- of armies in 
time of peace, the United States would then exhibit 
the most extraordinary spectacle which the world has 
vet seen, — that of a nation incapacitated by its Consti- 



166 The Federalist. 

tution to prepare for defence, before it was actually in- 
vaded. As the ceremony of a formal denunciation of 
war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an 
enemy within our territories must be waited for, as the 
legal warrant to the Government to begin its levies of 
men for the protection of the State. We must receive 
the blow, before we could even prepare to return it. All 
that kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant 
danger, and meet the gathering storm, must be ab- 
stained from, as contrary to the genuine maxims of a 
free Government. We must expose our property and 
liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders, and invite them 
by our weakness to seize the naked and defenceless 
prey, because we are afraid that rulers, created by our 
choice, dependent on our will, might endanger that 
liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to its 
preservation. 

Here I expect we shall be told that the Militia of the 
country is its natural bulwark, and would be at all times 
equal to the National defence. This doctrine, in sub- 
stance, had like to have lost us our independence. It 
cost millions to the United States that might have been 
saved. The facts, which from our own experience for- 
bid a reliance of this kind, are too recent to permit us 
to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady 
operations of war against a regular and disciplined 
army can only be successfully conducted by a force of 
the same kind. Considerations of economy, not less 
than of stability and vigor, confirm this position. The 
American Militia, in the course of the late war, have, by 
their valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal monu- 
ments to their fame ; but the bravest of them feel and 
know that the liberty of their country could not have 
been established by their efforts alone, however great 
and valuable they were. War, like most other things, 



The Federalist. 167 

is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence 
by perseverance, by time, and by practice. 

All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural 
and experienced course of human affairs, defeats itself. 
Pennsylvania, at this instant, affords an example of 
the truth of this remark. The Bill of Rights of that 
State declares, that standing armies are dangerous to 
liberty, and ought not to be kept up in time of peace. 
Pennsylvania, nevertheless, in a time of profound peace, 
from the existence of partial disorders in one or two of 
her counties, has resolved to raise a body of troops : 
and in all probability, will keep them up as long as 
there is any appearance of danger to the public peace. 
The conduct of Massachusetts affords a lesson on the 
same subject, though on different ground. That State 
(without waiting for the sanction of Congress, as the 
Articles of the Confederation require) was compelled 
to raise troops to quell a domestic insurrection, and 
still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a revival of the 
spirit of revolt. The particular Constitution of Massa- 
chusetts opposed no obstacle to the measure ; but the 
instance is still of use to instruct us, that cases are 
likely to occur under our Governments, as well as under 
those of other nations, which will sometimes render a 
military force in time of peace essential to the security 
of the society ; and that it is therefore improper, in this 
respect, to control the Legislative discretion. It also 
teaches us, in its application to the United States, how 
little the rights of a feeble Government are likely to be 
respected, even by its own constituents. And it teaches 
us, in addition to the rest, how unequal parchment pro- 
visions are to a struggle with public necessity. 

It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian 
commonwealth, that the post of Admiral should not be 
conferred twice on the same person. The Peloponne- 
lian confederates, having suffered a severe defeat at sea 



168 The Federalist. 

from the Athenians, demanded Lysander, who had 
before served with success in that capacity, to com- 
mand the combined fleets. The Lacedaemonians, to 
gratify their allies, and yet preserve the semblance of 
an adherence to their ancient institutions, had recourse 
to the flimsy subterfuge of investing Lysander with the 
real power of Admiral, under the nominal title of Vice- 
Admiral. This instance is selected from among a mul- 
titude that might be cited, to confirm the truth already 
advanced and illustrated by domestic examples ; which 
is, that nations pay little regard to rules and maxims, 
calculated in their very nature to run counter to the 
necessities of society. Wise politicians will be cau- 
tious about fettering the Government with restrictions, 
that cannot be observed ; because they know, that ev- 
ery breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated 
by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence, which ought 
to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the 
Constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for 
other breaches, where the same plea of necessity does 
not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable. 

PUBLIUS. 



For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXVI. 



To the People of the State op New York : 

IT was a thing hardly to be expected that in a pop- 
ular revolution the minds of men should stop at 
that happy mean which marks the salutary boundary 
between Power and Privilege, and combines the 



The Federalist. 169 

energy of Government with the security of private 
rights. A failure in this delicate and important point 
is the great source of the inconveniences we experience ' 
and if we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the 
error, in our future attempts to rectify and ameliorate 
our system, we may travel from one chimerical project 
to another ; we may try change after change ; but we 
shall never be likely to make any material change for 
the better. 

The idea of restraining the Legislative authority, in 
the means of providing for the National defence, is one 
of those refinements, which owe their origin to a zeal 
for liberty more ardent than enlightened. We have 
seen, however, that it has not had thus far an extensive 
prevalency ; that even in this country, where it made 
its first appearance, Pennsylvania and North Carolina 
are the only two States by which it has been in any 
degree patronized ; and that all the others have refused 
to give it the least countenance ; wisely judging that 
confidence must be placed somewhere ; that the neces- 
sity of doing it, is implied in the very act of delegating 
power ; and that it is better to hazard the abuse of that 
confidence, than to embarrass the Government and 
endanger the public safety, by impolitic restrictions on 
the Legislative authority. The opponents of the pro- 
posed Constitution combat, in this respect, the general 
decision of America ; and instead of being taught by 
experience the propriety of correcting any extremes into 
which we may have heretofore run, they appear dis- 
posed to conduct us into others still more dangerous, 
and more extravagant. As if the tone of Government 
had been found too high, or too rigid, the doctrines they 
teach are calculated to induce us to depress or to relax 
't, by expedients which, upon other occasions, have been 
condemned or forborne. It may be affirmed without 
the imputation of invective, that if the principles they 



170 The Federalist. 

inculcate, on various points, could so far obtain as to 
become the popular creed, they would utterly unfit the 
People of this country for any species of Government 
whatever. But a danger of this kind is not to be appre- 
hended. The citizens of America have too much dis- 
cernment to be argued into anarchy. And I am much 
mistaken, if experience has not wrought a deep and 
solemn conviction in the public mind, that greater 
energy of Government is essential to the welfare and 
prosperity of the community. 

It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark 
the origin and progress of the idea, which aims at the 
exclusion of military establishments in time of peace. 
Though in speculative minds it may arise from a con- 
templation of the nature and tendency of such institu- 
tions, fortified by the events that have happened in other 
ages and countries, yet as a National sentiment, it must 
be traced to those habits of thinking, which we derive 
from the nation from whom the inhabitants of these 
States have in general sprung. 

In England, for a long time after the Norman Con- 
quest, the authority of the monarch was almost un- 
\imited. Inroads were gradually made upon the pre- 
logative, in favor of liberty, first by the Barons, and 
afterwards by the People, till the greatest part of its 
most formidable pretensions became extinct. But it 
was not till the revolution in 1688, which elevated the 
Prince of Orange to the throne of Great Britain, that 
English liberty was completely triumphant. As inci- 
dent to the undefined power of making war, an ac- 
knowledged prerogative of the crown, Charles II. had, 
by his own authority, kept on foot in time of peace a 
body of 5,000 regular troops. And this number James 
[I. increased to 30,000 ; who were paid out of his civil 
list, At the revolution, to abolish the exercise of so 
dangerous an authority, it became an article of the Bil! 



The Federalist. 171 

of Rights then framed, that " the raising or keeping a 
" standing army within the kingdom in time of peace^ 
" unless with the consent of Parliament, was against 
« law." 

In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its 
highest pitch, no security against the danger of stand- 
ing armies was thought requisite, beyond a prohibition 
of their being raised or kept up by the mere authority 
of the Executive magistrate. The patriots, who effected 
that memorable revolution, were too temperate, and too 
well-informed, to think of any restraint on the Legisla- 
tive discretion. They were aware, that a certain num- 
ber of troops for guards and garrisons were indispensa- 
ble ; that no precise bounds could be set to the National 
exigencies ; that a power equal to every possible con- 
tingency must exist somewhere in the Government : 
and that when they referred the exercise of that power 
to the judgment of the Legislature, they had arrived at 
the ultimate point of precaution, which was reconcilable 
with the safety of the community. 

From the same source, the People of America may 
be said to have derived a hereditary impression of dan- 
ger to liberty, from standing armies in time of peace. 
The circumstances of a revolution quickened the public 
sensibility on every point connected with the security 
of popular rights ; and in some instances raised the 
warmth of our zeal beyond the degree, which consisted 
with the due temperature of the body politic. The at- 
tempts of two of the States, to restrict the authority of 
the Legislature in the article of military establishments, 
are of the number of these instances. The principles 
which had taught us to be jealous of the power of a 
hereditary monarch, were by an injudicious excess ex- 
tended to the representatives of the People in their pop- 
ular assemblies. Even in some of the States, where this 
error was not adopted, we find unnecessary declarations. 



172 The Federalist. 

that standing armies ought not to be kept up, in time 
of peace, without the consent of the Legislature. 
I call them unnecessary, because the reason which had 
introduced a similar provision into the English Bill of 
Rights is not applicable to any of the State Constitu- 
tions. The power of raising armies at all, under those 
Constitutions, can by no construction be deemed to re- 
side anywhere else, than in the Legislatures themselves ; 
and it was superfluous, if not absurd, to declare, that a 
matter should not be done without the consent of a 
body, which alone had the power of doing it. Accord- 
ingly, in some of those Constitutions, and among oth- 
ers, in that of this State of New York, which has been 
justly celebrated, both in Europe and America, as one 
of the best of the forms of Government established in 
this country, there is a total silence upon the subject. 

It is remarkable, that even in the two States, which 
seem to have meditated an interdiction of military es- 
tablishments in time of peace, the mode of expression 
made use of is rather cautionary than prohibitory. It is 
not said, that standing armies shall not be kept up, but 
that they ought not to be kept up, in time of peace. 
This ambiguity of terms appears to have been the re- 
sult of a conflict between jealousy and conviction ; be- 
tween the desire of excluding such establishments at all 
events, and the persuasion that an absolute exclusion 
would be unwise and unsafe. 

Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever 
the situation of public affairs was understood to require 
a departure from it, would be interpreted by the Legisla- 
ture into a mere admonition, and would be made to yield 
to the necessities or supposed necessities of the State ? 
Let the fact already mentioned, with respect to Penn- 
sylvania, decide. What then (it may be asked) is the 
use of such a provision, if it cease to operate the mo- 
ment there is an inclination to disregard it ? 



The Federalist. 1V3 

Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in 
point of efficacy, between the provision alluded to, and 
that which is contained in the New Constitution, for 
restraining the appropriations of money for military pur- 
poses to the period of two years. The former, by aim- 
ing at too much, is calculated to effect nothing : the lat- 
ter, by steering clear of an imprudent extreme, and by 
being perfectly compatible with a proper provision for 
the exigencies of the Nation, will have a salutary and 
powerful operation. 

The Legislature of the United States will be obliged, 
by this provision, once at least in every two years, to 
deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force 
on foot ; to come to a new resolution on the point ; and 
to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in 
the face of their constituents. They are not at liberty 
to vest in the Executive department permanent funds 
for the support of an army, if they were even incau- 
tious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a 
confidence. As the spirit of party, in different degrees, 
must be expected to infect all political bodies, there will 
be, no doubt, persons in the National Legislature will- 
ing enough to arraign the measures and criminate the 
views of the majority. The provision for the support 
of a military force will always be a favorable topic for 
declamation. As often as the question comes forward, 
the public attention will be roused and attracted to the 
subject, by the party in opposition ; and if the majority 
should be really disposed to exceed the proper limits, 
the community will be warned of the danger, and will 
have an opportunity of taking measures to guard against 
it. Independent of parties in the National Legislature 
itself, as often as the period of discussion arrived, the 
State Legislatures, who will always be not only vigi- 
ant, but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights 
of the citizens, against encroachments from the Fcederal 



L74 The Federalist. 

Government, will constantly have their attention awake 
to the conduct of the National rulers, and will be ready 
enough, if anything improper appears, to sound the 
alarm to the People, and not only to be the voice, but, 
if necessary, the arm of their discontent. 

Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great communi- 
ty require time to mature them for execution. An army, 
so large as seriously to menace those liberties, could 
only be formed by progressive augmentations ; which 
would suppose, not merely a temporary combination be- 
tween the Legislature and Executive, but a continued 
conspiracy for a series of time. Is it probable that such 
a combination would exist at all ? Is it probable that 
it would be persevered in, and transmitted along through 
all the successive variations in a representative body, 
which biennial elections would naturally produce in both 
houses ? Is it presumable, that every man, the instant 
he took his seat in the National Senate or House of 
Representatives, would commence a traitor to his con- 
stituents and to his country ? Can it be supposed, that 
there would not be found one man, discerning enough 
to detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest 
enough to apprise his constituents of their danger ? If 
such presumptions can fairly be made, there ought at 
once to be an end of all delegated authority. The Peo- 
ple should resolve to recall all the powers they have 
heretofore parted with out of their own hands, and to 
divide themselves into as many States as there are 
counties, in order that they may be able to manage their 
own concerns in person. 

If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, 
still the concealment of the design, for any duration, 
would be impracticable. It would be announced, by 
the very circumstance of augmenting the army to so 
great an extent, in time of profound peace. What col- 
orable reason could be assigned, in a country so situ- 



The Federalist. 175 

ated, for such vast augmentations of the military force ? 
It is impossible that the People could be long deceived ; 
and the destruction of the project, and of the projectors, 
would quickly follow the discovery. 

It has been said, that the provision which limits the 
appropriation of money for the support of an army to 
the period of two years would be unavailing ; because 
the Executive, when once possessed of a force large 
enough to awe the People into submission, would find 
resources in that very force, sufficient to enable him to 
dispense with supplies from the acts of the Legislature. 
But the question again recurs : upon what pretence 
could he be put in possession of a force of that magni- 
tude in time of peace ? If we suppose it to have been 
created in consequence of some domestic insurrection or 
foreign war, then it becomes a case not within the prin- 
ciples of the objection ; for this is levelled against the 
power of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few 
persons will be so visionary, as seriously to contend that 
military forces ought not to be raised to quell a rebel- 
lion, or resist an invasion ; and if the defence of the 
community, under such circumstances, should make it 
necessary to have an army so numerous as to hazard its 
liberty, this is one of those calamities for which there is 
neither preventative nor cure. It cannot be provided 
against by any possible form of Government : it might 
even result from a simple league offensive and defen- 
sive, if it should ever be necessary for the confederates 
or allies to form an army for common defence. 

But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in 
an united than in a disunited state : nay, it may be safe- 
ly asserted that it is an evil altogether unlikely to attend 
\is in the latter situation. It is not easy to conceive a 
possibility that dangers so formidable can assail the 
whole Union, as to demand a force considerable enough 
to place our liberties in the least jeopardy, especially if 



176 The Federalist. 

we take into our view the aid to be derived from the 
militia, which ought always to be counted upon as a 
valuable and powerful auxiliary. But in a state of dis- 
union, (as has been fully shown in another place,) the 
contrary of this supposition would become not only 

probable, but almost unavoidable. 

PUBLIUS. 



{From the New York Packet, Tuesday, December 25, 1787.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXVII. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

¥ T has been urged, in different shapes, that a Consti- 
A tution of the kind proposed by the Convention, can- 
not operate without the aid of a military force to execute 
its laws. This, however, like most other things that 
have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general 
assertion, unsupported by any precise or intelligible des- 
ignation of the reasons upon which it is founded. As 
far as I have been able to divine the latent meaning of 
the objectors, it seems to originate in a presupposition, 
that the People will be disinclined to the exercise of 
Fcederal authority in any matter of an internal nature. 
Waiving any exception that might be taken to the inac- 
curacy, or inexplicitness, of the distinction between in- 
ternal and external, let us inquire what ground there is 
to presuppose that disinclination in the People. Unless 
we presume, at the same time, that the powers of the 
general Government will be worse administered than 
tfiose of the State Governments, there seems to be no 
room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or op- 
position in the People. I believe it may be laid down 



The Federalist. 177 

as a general rule, that their confidence in, and obedience 
to a Government, will commonly be proportioned to the 
goodness or badness of its administration. It must be ad- 
mitted, that there are exceptions to this rule ; but these 
exceptions depend so entirely on accidental causes, that 
they cannot be considered as having any relation to the 
intrinsic merits or demerits of a Constitution. These 
can only be judged of by general principles and max- 
ims. 

Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of 
these papers, to induce a probability, that the general 
Government will be better administered than the partic- 
ular Governments ; the principal of which reasons are, 
th&c the extension of the spheres of election will present 
a greater option, or latitude of choice, to the People ; 
that through the medium of the State Legislatures — 
which are select bodies of men, and who are to appoint 
the members of the National Senate — there is reason to 
expect that this branch will generally be composed with 
peculiar care and judgment; that these circumstances 
promise greater knowledge, and more extensive informa- 
tion, in the National councils ; and that they will be less 
apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and more out 
of the reach of those occasional ill-humors, or tempora- 
ry prejudices and propensities, which, in smaller societies, 
frequently contaminate the public councils, beget injus- 
tice and oppression of a part of the community, and 
engender schemes, which, though they gratify a mo- 
mentary inclination or desire, terminate in general dis- 
tress, dissatisfaction, and disgust. Several additional 
reasons of considerable force, to fortify that probability, 
will occur, when we come to survey, with a more critic 
jye, the interior structure of the edifice which we are 
invited to erect. It will be sufficient here to remark, 
that until satisfactory reasons can be assigned to justify 
an opinion, that the Fcederal Government is likely to be 
VOL. i. 12 



178 The Federalist. 

administered in such a manner as to render it odious 01 
contemptible to the People, there can be no reasonable 
foundation for the supposition, that the laws of the 
Union will meet with any greater obstruction from them, 
or will stand in need of any other methods to enforce 
their execution, than the laws of the particular members. 

The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedi- 
tion : the dread of punishment, a proportion ably strong 
discouragement to it. Will not the Government of the 
Union, which, if possessed of a due degree of power, 
can call to its aid the collective resources of the whole 
Confederacy, be more likely to repress the former senti- 
ment and to inspire the latter, than that of a single 
State, which can only command the resources within it- 
self ? A turbulent faction in a State may easily sup- 
pose itself able to contend with the friends to the 
Government in that State ; but it can hardly be so in- 
fatuated as to imagine itself a match for the combined 
efforts of the Union. If this reflection be just, there is 
less danger of resistance from irregular combinations of 
individuals, to the authority of the Confederacy, than to 
that of a single member. 

I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will 
not be the less just, because to some it may appear new \ 
which is, that the more the operations of the National 
authority are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of 
Government ; the more the citizens are accustomed to 
meet with it in the common occurrences of their politi- 
cal life ; the more it is familiarized to their sight and to 
their feelings ; the further it enters into those objects 
which touch the most sensible chords, and put in motion 
the most active springs of the human heart ; the greater 
will be the probability, thai it will conciliate the respect 
and attachment of the community. Man is very much a 
Dreature of habit. A thing that rarely strikes his senses, 
will generally have but little influence upon his mind. A 



The Federalist. 179 

Government continually at a distance and out of sight 
can hardly be expected to interest the sensations of the 
People. The inference is, that the authority of the 
Union, and the affections of the citizens towards it, will 
be strengthened, rather than weakened, by its extension 
to what are called matters of internal concern ; and will 
have less occasion to recur to force, in proportion to the 
familiarity and comprehensiveness of its agency. The 
more it circulates through those channels and currents, 
in which the passions of mankind naturally flow, the 
less will it require the aid of the violent and perilous 
expedients of compulsion. 

One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a Gov- 
ernment like the one proposed would bid much fairer 
to avoid the necessity of using force, than that species 
of league contended for by most of its opponents ; the 
authority of which should only operate upon the States 
in their political or collective capacities. It has been 
shown, that in such a Confederacy there can be no 
sanction for the laws but force; that frequent delin- 
quencies in the members are the natural offspring of 
the very frame of the Government ; and that as often as 
these happen, they can only be redressed, if at all, by 
war and violence. 

The plan reported by the Convention, by extending 
the authority of the Fcederal head to the individual cit- 
izens of the several States, will enable the Government 
to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the exe- 
cution of its laws. It is easy to perceive that this will 
tend to destroy, in the common apprehension, all dis- 
tinction between the sources from which they might 
proceed ; and will give the Fcederal Government the 
same advantage for securing a due obedience to its 
authority, which is enjoyed by the Government of each 
State, in addition to the influence on public opinion, 
tfhich will result from the important consideration of 



180 The Federalist. 

its having power to call to its assistance and support 
the resources of the whole Union. It merits particular 
attention in this place, that the laws of the Confeder- 
acy, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its 
jurisdiction, will become the supreme law of the land ; 
to the observance of which, all officers, Legislative, Ex- 
ecutive, and Judicial, in each State, will be bound by 
the sanctity of an oath. Thus the Legislatures, Courts, 
and Magistrates, of the respective members, will be in- 
corporated into the operations of the National Gov- 
ernment as far as its just and constitutional authority 
extends ; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforce- 
ment of its laws.* Any man, who will pursue, by 
his own reflections, the consequences of this situation, 
will perceive, that there is good ground to calculate 
upon a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of 
the Union ; if its powers are administered with a com- 
mon share of prudence. If we will arbitrarily suppose 
the contrary, we may deduce any inferences we please 
from the supposition ; for it is certainly possible, by an 
injudicious exercise of the authorities of the best Gov- 
ernment that ever was, or ever can be instituted, to pro- 
voke and precipitate the People into the wildest excesses. 
But though the adversaries of the proposed Constitution 
should presume, that the National rulers would be in- 
sensible to the motives of public good, or to the obli- 
gations of duty, I would still ask them, how the interests 
of ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be pro- 
moted by such a conduct ? 

PUBLIUS. 

* The sophistry which has been Governments will, in its propel 
employed, to show that this will place, be fully detected. — Publius. 
tend to the destruction of the State 



The Federalist. 181 

For the Independent Journal. 

THE FCEDERALIST. No. XXVIII. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

^l^HAT there may happen cases in which the National 
-*- Government may be necessitated to resort to force, 
cannot be denied. Our own experience has corroborated 
the lessons taught by the examples of other nations ; that 
emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all so- 
cieties, however constituted ; that seditions and insur- 
rections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from 
the body politic, as tumors and eruptions from the natu- 
ral body ; that the idea of governing at all times by the 
simple force of law (which we have been told is the 
only admissible principle of republican Government) 
has no place but in the reveries of those political doc- 
tors, whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experi- 
mental instruction. 

Should such emergencies at any time happen under 
the National Government, there could be no remedy but 
force. The means to be employed must be propor- 
tioned to the extent of the mischief. If it should be a 
slight commotion in a small part of a State, the militia 
of the residue would be adequate to its suppression ; and 
the natural presumption is, that they would be ready to 
do their duty. An insurrection, whatever may be its 
immediate cause, eventually endangers all Government. 
Regard to the public peace, if not to the rights of the 
Union, would engage the citizens, to whom the conta- 
gion had not communicated itself, to oppose the insur- 
gents : and if the general Government should be found 
in practice conducive to the prosperity and felicity of 



182 The Federalist. 

the People, it were irrational to believe that they would 
be disinclined to its support. 

If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a 
whole State, or a principal part of it, the employment 
of a different kind of force might become unavoidable. 
It appears that Massachusetts found it necessary to 
raise troops for repressing the disorders within that 
State : that Pennsylvania, from the mere apprehension 
of commotions among a part of her citizens, has thought 
proper to have recourse to the same measure. Suppose 
the State of New York had been inclined to reestablish 
her lost jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Vermont ; 
could she have hoped for success in such an enterprise 
from the efforts of the militia alone ? Would she not 
have been compelled to raise and to maintain a more 
regular force for the execution of her design ? If it must 
then be admitted, that the necessity of recurring to a 
force different from the militia, in cases of this extraor- 
dinary nature, is applicable to the State Governments 
themselves, why should the possibility, that the National 
Government might be under a like necessity, in similar 
extremities, be made an objection to its existence ? Is 
it not surprising that men who declare an attachment 
to the Union in the abstract, should urge, as an objec- 
tion to the proposed Constitution, what applies with 
tenfold weight to the plan for which they contend ; and 
what, as far as it has any foundation in truth, is an in- 
evitable consequence of civil society upon an enlarged 
scale ? Who would not prefer that possibility, to the 
unceasing agitations, and frequent revolutions, which 
are the c@ntinual scourges of petty republics ? 

Let us pursue this examination in another light. 
Suppose, in lieu of one general system, two or three, 
or even four Confederacies were to be formed, would 
not the same difficulty oppose itself to the operations 
of either of these Confederacies ? Would not each of 



The Federalist. 183 

them be exposed to the same casualties ; and when 
these happened, be obliged to have recourse to the same 
expedients for upholding its authority, which are ob- 
jected to a Government for all the States ? Would the 
militia, in this supposition, be more ready or more able 
to support the Fcederal authority, than in the case of a 
general Union ? All candid and intelligent men must, 
upon due consideration, acknowledge that the principle 
of the objection is equally applicable to either of the 
two cases ; and that whether we have one Government 
for all the States, or different Governments for different 
parcels of them, or even if there should be an entire 
separation of the States, there might sometimes be a 
necessity to make use of a force constituted differently 
from the militia, to preserve the peace of the commu- 
nity, and to maintain the just authority of the laws 
against those violent invasions of them, which amount 
to insurrections and rebellions. 

Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, 
it is a full answer to those who require a more peremp- 
tory provision against military establishments in time 
of peace, to say, that the whole power of the proposed 
Government is to be in the hands of the representatives 
of the People. This is the essential, and after all, only 
efficacious security for the rights and privileges of the 
People, which is attainable in civil society.* 

If the representatives of the People betray their con- 
stituents, there is then no resource left but in the exer- 
tion of that original right of self-defence, which is para- 
mount to all positive forms of Government ; and which, 
against the usurpations of the National rulers, may be 
exerted with infinitely better prospect of success than 
against those of the rulers of an individual State. In 
a single State, if the persons intrusted with supreme 
power become usurpers, the different parcels, subdivis- 
"* Its full efficacy will be examined hereafter.— Publius. 



1.84 The Federalist. 

ions, or districts of which it consists, having no distinct 
Government in each, can take no regular measures for 
defence. The citizens must rush tumultuously to arms, 
without concert, without system, without resource ; ex- 
cept in their courage and despair. The usurpers, clothed 
with the forms of legal authority, can too often crush the 
opposition in embryo. The smaller the extent of terri- 
tory, the more difficult will it be for the People to form a 
regular, or systematic plan of opposition ; and the more 
easy will it be to defeat their early efforts. Intelligence 
can be more speedily obtained of their preparations and 
movements ; and the military force in the possession of 
the usurpers, can be more rapidly directed against the 
part where the opposition has begun. In this situation, 
there must be a peculiar coincidence of circumstances 
to insure success to the popular resistance. 

The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of re- 
sistance increase with the increased extent of the State; 
provided the citizens understand their rights, and are 
disposed to defend them. The natural strength of the 
People in a large community, in proportion to the artifi- 
cial strength of the Government, is greater than in a 
small ; and of course more competent to a struggle with 
the attempts of the Government to establish a tyranny. 
But in a Confederacy, the People, without exaggeration, 
may be said to be entirely the masters of their own fate. 
Power being almost always the rival of power, the gen- 
eral Government will at all times stand ready to check 
the usurpations of the State Governments ; and these 
will have the same disposition towards the general 
Government. The People, by throwing themselves into 
either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. It 
their rights are invaded by either, they can make use 
of the* other, as the instrument of redress. How wise 
will it be in them, by cherishing the Union, to preserve 
to themselves an advantage which can never be too 
highly prized ! 



The Federalist. 185 

It may safely be received as an axiom in our political 
system, that the State Governments will, in all possible 
contingencies, afford complete security against invasions 
of the public liberty by the National authority. Proj- 
ects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretences 
so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of 
men. as of the People at large. The Legislatures will 
have better means of information. They can discover 
the danger at a distance ; and possessing all the organs 
of civil power, and the confidence of the People, they 
can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in which 
they can combine all the resources of the community. 
They can readily communicate with each other in the 
different States ; and unite their common forces, for the 
protection of their common liberty. 

The great extent of the country is a further security. 
We have already experienced its utility against the at- 
tacks of a foreign power. And it would have precisely 
the same effect against the enterprises of ambitious 
rulers in the National councils. If the Foederal army 
should be able to quell the resistance of one State, the 
distant States would have it in their power to make 
head with fresh forces. The advantages obtained in 
one place must be abandoned, to subdue the opposition 
in others ; and the moment the part which had been 
reduced to submission was left to itself, its efforts would 
be renewed, and its resistance revive. 

We should recollect that the extent of the military 
force must, at all events, be regulated by the resources 
of the country. For a long time to come, it will not 
be possible to maintain a large army; and as the means 
of doing this increase, the population and natural strength 
of the community wiL proportionably increase. When 
will the time arrive, that the Foederal Government can 
raise and maintain an army capable of erecting a des- 
potism over the great body of the People of an immense 



186 The Federalist. 

empire, who are in a situation, through the medium of 
their State Governments, to take measures for their own 
defence, with all the celerity, regularity, and system of 
independent nations ? The apprehension may be con- 
sidered as a disease, for which there can be found no 
cure in the resources of argument and reasoning. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Friday, December 28, 1787.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXIX. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

IT has been already observed, that the Foederal Gov- 
ernment ought to possess the power of providing 
for the support of the National forces ; in which prop- 
osition was intended to be included the expense of rais- 
ing troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all 
other expenses in any wise connected with military 
arrangements and operations. But these are not the 
only objects to which the jurisdiction of the Union, in 
respect to revenue, must necessarily be empowered to 
extend. It must embrace a provision for the support of 
the National civil list ; for the payment of the National 
debts contracted, or that may be contracted ; and, in 
general, for all those matters which will call for dis- 
bursements out of the National treasury. The conclu- 
sion is, that there must be interwoven, in the frame of 
the Government, a general power of taxation, in one 
shape or another. 

Money is ; with propriety, considered as the vital prin- 
ciple of the body politic ; as that which sustains its life 
and motion, and enables it to perform its most essential 



The Federalist. 187 

functions. A complete power, therefore, to procure a 
regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources 
of the community will permit, may be regarded as an 
indispensable ingredient in every Constitution. From 
a deficiency in this particular, one of two evils must 
ensue : either the People must be subjected to continual 
plunder, as a substitute for a more eligible mode of sup- 
plying the public wants, or the Government must sink 
into a fatal atrophy, and, in a short course of time, 
perish. 

In the Ottoman or Turkish empire, the sovereign, 
though in other respects absolute master of the lives 
and fortunes of his subjects, has no right to impose a 
new tax. The consequence is, that he permits the 
Bashaws or Governors of provinces to pillage the Peo- 
ple without mercy ; and, in turn, squeezes out of them 
the sums of which he stands in need, to satisfy his. own 
exigencies, and those of the State. In America, from a 
like cause, the Government of the Union has gradually 
dwindled into a state of decay, approaching nearly to 
annihilation. Who can doubt, that the happiness of 
the People in both countries would be promoted by 
competent authorities in the proper hands, to provide 
the revenues which the necessities of the public might 
require ? 

The present Confederation, feeble as it is, intended to 
repose in the United States an unlimited power of pro- 
viding for the pecuniary wants of the Union. But pro- 
ceeding upon an erroneous principle, it has been done 
m such a manner as entirely to have frustrated the 
intention. Congress, by the Articles which compose 
that compact, (as has been already stated,) are author- 
ized to ascertain and call for any sums of money neces- 
sary, in their judgment, to the service of the United 
States ; and their requisitions, if conformable to the 
rule of apportionment are in every constitutional sense 



188 Tlie Federalist. 

obligatory upon the States. These have no right to 
question the propriety of the demand ; no discretion 
beyond that of devising the ways and means of fur- 
nishing the sums demanded. Bat though this be strictly 
and truly the case ; though the assumption of such a 
right would be an infringement of the Articles of Union ; 
though it may seldom or never have been avowedly 
claimed ; yet in practice it has been constantly exer 
cised ; and would continue to be so, as long as the 
revenues of the Confederacy should remain dependent 
on the intermediate agency of its members. What the 
consequences of this system have been, is within the 
knowledge of every man the least conversant in our 
public affairs, and has been amply unfolded in dif- 
ferent parts of these inquiries. It is this which has 
chiefly contributed to reduce us to a situation, which 
affords ample cause both of mortification to ourselves, 
and of triumph to our enemies. 

"What remedy can there be for this situation, but in a 
change of the system which has produced it ? — In a 
change of the fallacious and delusive system of quotas 
and requisitions ? What substitute can there be imag- 
ined for this ignis fatuus in finance, but that of permit- 
ting the National Government to raise its own revenues 
by the ordinary methods of taxation, authorized in 
every well-ordered Constitution of civil Government ? 
Ingenious men may declaim with plausibility on any 
subject ; but no human ingenuity can point out any 
other expedient to rescue us from the inconveniences 
&nd embarrassments naturally resulting from defective 
supplies of the public treasury. 

The more intelligent adversaries of the new Consti- 
tution admit the force of this reasoning; but they qual- 
ify their admission, by a distinction between what they 
call internal and external taxation. The former they 
would reserve to the State Governments ; the lattei 



The Feeder alist. 189 

which they explain into commercial imposts, or rather 
duties on imported articles, they declare themselves 
willing to concede to the Faederal Head. This distinc- 
tion, however, would violate that fundamental maxim 
of good sense and sound policy, which dictates that 
every power ought to be in proportion to its object ; 
and would still leave the General Government in a 
kind of tutelage to the State Governments, inconsistent 
with every idea of vigor or efficiency. Who can pre- 
tend that commercial imposts are, or would be, alone 
equal to the present and future exigencies of the Union ? 
Taking into the account the existing debt, foreign and 
domestic, upon any plan of extinguishment which a 
man moderately impressed with the importance of pub- 
lic justice and public credit could approve, in addition 
to the establishments which all parties will acknowledge 
to be necessary, we could not reasonably flatter our- 
selves, that this resource alone, upon the most improved 
scale, would even suffice for its present necessities. Its 
future necessities admit not of calculation or limitation ; 
and upon the principle, more than once adverted to, the 
power of making provision for them as they arise ought 
to be equally unconfined. I believe it may be regarded 
as a position warranted by the history of mankind, that 
in the usual progress of things, the necessities of a nation, 
in every stage of its existence, will be found at least 
qual to its resources. 

To say that deficiences may be provided for by requi- 
sitions upon the States, is on the one hand to acknowl- 
edge that this system cannot be depended upon ; and 
on the other hand, to depend upon it for everything 
beyond a certain limit. Those who have carefully 
attended to its vices and deformities, as they have been 
exhibited by experience, or delineated in the course of 
/hese papers, must feel invincible repugnancy to trust- 
ing the National interests in any degree to its opera- 



190 The Federalist. 

fcion. Its inevitable tendency, whenever it is brought 
into activity, must be to enfeeble the Union, and sow 
the seeds of discord and contention between the Feed* 
eral Head and its members, and between the members 
themselves. Can it be expected that the deficiencies 
would be better supplied in this mode, than the total 
wants of the Union have heretofore been supplied, in 
the same mode ? It ought to be recollected, that if less 
will be required from the States, they will have propor- 
tionably less means to answer the demand. If the 
opinions of those who contend for the distinction which 
has been mentioned were to be received as evidence of 
truth, one would be led to conclude, that th«re was 
some known point in the economy of National affairs, 
at which it would be safe to stop, and to say : Thus 
far, the ends of public happiness will be promoted by 
supplying the wants of Government, and all beyond this 
is unworthy of our care or anxiety. How is it possible 
that a Government, half supplied and always necessi- 
tous, can fulfil the purposes of its institution ; can pro- 
vide for the security, advance the prosperity, or support 
the reputation of the Commonwealth ? How can it 
ever possess either energy or stability, dignity or credit, 
confidence at home or respectability abroad ? How 
can its administration be anything else than a succes- 
sion of expedients temporizing, impotent, disgraceful? 
How will it be able to avoid a frequent sacrifice of its 
engagements to immediate necessity ? How can it 
indertake or execute any liberal or enlarged plans of 
public good ? 

Let us attend to what would be the effects of this 
situation, in the very first war in which we should hap- 
pen to be engaged. We will presume, for argument 
sake, that the revenue arising from the impost duties 
answers the purposes of a provision for the public debt 
nd of a peace establishment for the Union. Thus cir 



The Federalist. 191 

3umstanced, a war breaks out. "What would be the 
probable conduct of the Government in such an emer- 
gency ? Taught by experience that proper dependence 
could not be placed on the success of requisitions, 
unable by its own authority to lay hold of fresh re- 
sources, and urged by considerations of National danger, 
would it not be driven to the expedient of diverting the 
funds already appropriated, from their proper objects, to 
the defence of the State ? It is not easy to see how a 
step of this kind could be avoided ; and if it should be 
taken, it is evident that it would prove the destruction 
of public credit at the very moment that it was become 
essential to the public safety. To imagine that at such 
a crisis credit might be dispensed with, would be the 
extreme of infatuation. In the modern system of war, 
nations the most wealthy are obliged to have recourse 
to large loans. A country so little opulent as ours 
must feel this necessity in a much stronger degree. 
But who would lend to a Government, that prefaced its 
overtures for borrowing by an act which demonstrated 
that no reliance could be placed on the steadiness of its 
measures for paying? The loans it might be able to 
procure would be as limited in their extent as burden- 
some in their conditions. They would be made upon 
the same principles that usurers commonly lend to 
bankrupt and fraudulent debtors, — with a sparing hand 
and at enormous premiums. 

It may perhaps be imagined, that, from the scantiness 
of the resources of the country, the necessity of divert- 
ing the established funds in the case supposed would 
exist, though the National Government should possess 
an unrestrained power of taxation. But two considera- 
tions will serve to quiet all apprehension on this head : 
pne is, that we are sure the resources of the community, 
in their full extent, will be brought into activity for the 
benefit of the Union ; the other is, that whatever defi- 



192 The Federalist. 

ciencies there may be, can without difficulty be supplied 
by loans. 

The power of creating new funds upon new objects 
of taxation, by its own authority, would enable the 
National Government to borrow, as far as its necessities 
might require. Foreigners, as well as the citizens of 
America, could then reasonably repose confidence in its 
engagements : but to depend upon a Government that 
must itself depend upon thirteen other Governments for 
the means of fulfilling its contracts, when once its situa- 
tion is clearly understood, would require a degree of 
credulity not often to be met with in the pecuniary 
transactions of mankind, and little reconcilable with 
the usual sharp-sightedness of avarice. 

Reflections of this kind may have trifling weight with 

men who hope to see realized in America the halcyon 

scenes of the poetic or fabulous age ; but to those who 

believe we are likely to experience a common portion of 

the vicissitudes and calamities which have fallen to the 

lot of other nations, they must appear entitled to serious 

attention. Such men must behold the actual situation 

of their country with painful solicitude, and deprecate 

the evils which ambition or revenge might, with t«xi 

much facility, inflict upon it. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, January 1, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST, No. XXX. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

IN disquisitions of every kind, there are certain pri 
mary truths, or first principles, upon which all sub 
sequent reasonings must depend. These contain an 



The Federalist. 193 

internal evidence, which, antecedent to all reflection 01 
combination, commands the assent of the mind. Where 
it produces not this effect, it must proceed either from 
some defect or disorder in the organs of perception, or 
from the influence of some strong interest, or passion, or 
prejudice. Of this nature are the maxims in geometry, 
that " The whole is greater than its part ; that things 
equal to the same, are equal to one another ; that two 
straight lines cannot enclose a space ; and that all right 
angles are equal to each other." Of the same nature are 
these other maxims in ethics and politics, that there can- 
not be an effect without a cause ; that the means ought 
to be proportioned to the end ; that every power ought 
to be commensurate with its object ; that there ought to 
be no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose 
which is itself incapable of limitation. And there are 
other truths in the two latter sciences, which, if they 
cannot pretend to rank in the class of axioms, are yet 
such direct inferences from them, and so obvious in 
themselves, and so agreeable to the natural and un- 
sophisticated dictates of common sense, that they chal- 
lenge the assent of a sound and unbiased mind, with a 
degree of force and conviction almost equally irresisti- 
ble. 

The objects of geometrical inquiry are so entirely ab- 
stracted from those pursuits which stir up and put in 
motion the unruly passions of the human heart, that 
mankind, without difficulty, adopt not only the more 
pimple theorems of the science, but even those abstruse 
paradoxes which, however they may appear susceptible 
of demonstration, are at variance with the natural con- 
ceptions which the mind, without the aid of philosophy, 
would be led to entertain upon the subject. The infi- 
vite divisibility of matter, or, in other words, the 
infinite divisibility of a finite thing, extending even 
to the minutest atom, is a point agreed among geome- 

voi,. i 13 



194 The Federalist. 

fcricians, though not less incomprehensible to common 
sense than any of those mysteries in religion, against 
which the batteries of infidelity have been so industri- 
ously levelled. 

But in the sciences of morals and politics, men are 
found far less tractable. To a certain degree, it is right 
and useful that this should be the case. Caution and 
investigation are a necessary armor against error and 
imposition. But this untractableness may be carried 
too far, and may degenerate into obstinacy, perverse- 
ness, or disingenuity. Though it cannot be pretended, 
that the principles of moral and political knowledge 
have, in general, the same degree of certainty with those 
of the mathematics ; yet they have much better claims 
in this respect than, to judge from the conduct of men 
in particular situations, we should be disposed to allow 
them. The obscurity is much oftener in the passions 
and prejudices of the reasoner, than in the subject. 
Men, upon too many occasions, do not give their own 
understandings fair play ; but yielding to some untow- 
ard bias, they entangle themselves in words, and con- 
found themselves in subtleties. 

How else could it happen, (if we admit the objectors 
to be sincere in their opposition,) that positions so clear 
as those which manifest the necessity of a general power 
of taxation in the Government of the Union, should 
have to encounter any adversaries among men of dis- 
cernment ? Though these positions have been else- 
where fully stated, they will perhaps not be improperly 
recapitulated in this place, as introductory to an exami- 
nation of what may have been offered by way of objec- 
tion to them. They are in substance as follows : — 

A Government ought to contain in itself every poweT 
requisite to the full accomplishment of the objects com- 
mitted to its care, and to the complete execution of the 
trusts for which it is responsible, free from every other 



The Federalist. 195 

control, but a regard to the public good and to the sense 
of the People. 

As the duties of superintending the National defence, 
and of securing the public peace against foreign or do- 
mestic violence, involve a provision for casualties and 
dangers, to which no possible limits can be assigned, the 
power of making that provision ought to know no other 
bounds than the exigencies of the nation and the re 
sources of the community. 

As revenue is the essential engine by which the means 
of answering the National exigencies must be procured, 
the power of procuring that article in its full extent must 
necessarily be comprehended in that of providing for 
those exigencies. 

As theory and practice conspire to prove, that the 
power of procuring revenue is unavailing when exer- 
cised over the States in their collective capacities, the 
Fcederal Government must of necessity be invested 
with an unqualified power of taxation in the ordinary 
modes. 

Did not experience evince the contrary, it would be 
natural to conclude that the propriety of a general power 
of taxation in the National Government might safely be 
permitted to rest on the evidence of these propositions, 
unassisted by any additional arguments or illustrations. 
But we find, in fact, that the antagonists of the proposed 
Constitution, so far from acquiescing in their justness or 
truth, seem to make their principal and most zealous 
effort against this part of the plan. It may therefore 
be satisfactory to analyze the arguments with which 
they combat it. 

Those of them which have been most labored with 
that view, seem in substance to amount to this : " It is 
•* not true, because the exigencies of the Union may not 
% be susceptible of limitation, that its power of laying 
4 taxes ought to be unconfined. Revenue is as requisite 



196 The Federalist. 

u to the purposes of the local administrations as to those 

I of the Union ; and the former are at least of equal im- 

II portance with the latter to the happiness of the People. 
" It is, therefore, as necessary that the State Govern- 
" ments should be able to command the means of sup- 
" plying their wants, as that the National Government 
" should possess the like faculty in respect to the wants 
" of the Union. But an indefinite power of taxation in 
" the latter might, and probably would in time, deprive 
" the former of the means of providing for their own 
" necessities ; and would subject them entirely to the 
" mercy of the National Legislature. As the laws of 
" the Union are to become the supreme law of the land ; 
" as it is to have power to pass all laws that may be 
" necessary for carrying into execution the authorities 
" with which it is proposed to vest it ; the National 
" Government might at any time abolish the taxes im- 
" posed for State objects, upon the pretence of an inter- 
" ference with its own. It might allege a necessity of 
" doing this, in order to give efficacy to the National 
" revenues : And thus all the resources of taxation 
" might by degrees become the subjects of Fcederal mo- 
" nopoly, to the entire exclusion and destruction of the 
" State Governments." 

This mode of reasoning appears sometimes to turn 
upon the supposition of usurpation in the National 
Government : at other times, it seems to be designed 
only as a deduction from the constitutional operation of 
its intended powers. It is only in the latter light that 
it can be admitted to have any pretensions to fairness. 
The moment we launch into conjectures about the 
usurpations of the Fcederal Government, we get into an 
unfathomable abyss, and fairly put ourselves out of the 
'each of all reasoning. Imagination may range at pleas- 
ure, till it gets bewildered amidst the labyrinths of an 
enchanted castle, and knows not on which side to turn 



TJie Federalist. 197 

to extricate itself from the perplexities into which it has 
so rashly adventured. Whatever may be the limits 01 
modifications of the powers of the Union, it is easy to 
imagine an endless train of possible dangers ; and by 
indulging an excess of jealousy and timidity, we may 
bring ourselves to a state of absolute skepticism and 
irresolution. I repeat here, what I have observed in sub' 
stance in another place, that all observations founded 
upon the danger of usurpation ought to be referred to 
the composition and structure of the Government, not 
to the nature or extent of its powers. The State Gov- 
ernments, by their original Constitutions, are invested 
with complete sovereignty. In what does our security 
consist against usurpations from that quarter ? Doubt- 
less in the manner of their formation, and in a due de- 
pendence of those who are to administer them upon the 
People. If the proposed construction of the Fcederal 
Government be found, upon an impartial examination 
of it, to be such as to afford, to a proper extent, the 
same species of security, all apprehensions on the score 
of usurpation ought to be discarded. 

It should not be forgotten that a disposition in the 
State Governments to encroach upon the rights of the 
Union is quite as probable as a disposition in the Union 
to encroach upon the rights of the State Governments. 
What side would be likely to prevail in such a conflict, 
must depend on the means which the contending par- 
ties could employ towards insuring success. As in re- 
publics strength is always on the side of the People, and 
as there are weighty reasons to induce a belief that the 
State Governments will commonly possess most influ- 
ence over them, the natural conclusion is, that such con- 
tests will be most apt to end to the disadvantage of the 
Union ; and that there is greater probability of encroach- 
ments by the members upon the Foederal Head, than by 
the Foederal Head upon the members. But it is evi 



198 The Fwderalist. 

dent that all conjectures of this kind must be extremely 
vague and fallible : and that it is by far the safest course 
to lay them altogether aside, and to confine our atten- 
tion wholly to the nature and extent of the powers, as 
they are delineated in the Constitution. Everything 
beyond this must be left to the prudence and firmness 
of the People ; who, as they will hold the scales in their 
own hands, it is to be hoped, will always take care to 
preserve the constitutional equilibrium between the Gen- 
eral and the State Governments. Upon this ground, 
which is evidently the true one, it will not be difficult 
•»o obviate the objections which have been made to an 
indefinite power of taxation in the United States. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the Daily Advertiser, Thursday, January 3, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXI. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

ALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be 
no real danger of the consequences which seem to 
be apprehended to the State Governments from a power 
in the Union to control them in the levies of money, 
because I am persuaded that the sense of the People, 
the extreme hazard of provoking the resentments of the 
State Governments, and a conviction of the utility and 
necessity of local administrations, for local purposes, 
would be a complete barrier against the oppressive use 
of such a power ; yet I am willing here to allow, in its 
full extent, the justness of the reasoning which requires 
that the individual States should possess an independent 



The Federalist. 199 

and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues 
for the supply of their own wants. And making thia 
concession, I affirm that (with the sole exception of du- 
ties on imports and exports) they would, under the plan 
of the Convention, retain that authority in the most ab- 
solute and unqualified sense ; and that an attempt on 
the part of the National Government to abridge them 
in the exercise of it, would be a violent assumption of 
power, unwarranted by any Article or clause of its Con- 
stitution. 

An entire consolidation of the States into one com- 
plete National sovereignty would imply an entire sub- 
ordination of the parts ; and whatever powers might 
remain in them, would be altogether dependent on the 
general will. But as the plan of the Convention aims 
only at a partial union or consolidation, the State Gov- 
ernments would clearly retain all the rights of sover- 
eignty which they before had, and which were not, by 
that act, exclusively delegated to the United States. 
This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of 
State sovereignty, would only exist in three cases : 
where the Constitution in express terms granted an 
exclusive authority to the Union ; where it granted in 
one instance an authority to the Union, and in another 
prohibited the States from exercising the like authority ; 
and where it granted an authority to the Union, to which 
a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and 
totally contradictory and repugnant I use these terms 
to distinguish this last case from another which might 
appear to resemble it, but "which would, in fact, be es- 
sentially different : I mean where the exercise of a con- 
current jurisdiction might be productive of occasional 
interferences in the policy of any branch of administra- 
tion, but would not imply any direct contradiction or 
repugnancy in' point of constitutional authority. These 
ihree cases of exclusive jurisdiction in the Foederal Gov- 



200 The Federalist. 

ernment may be exemplified by the following instances. 
The last clause but one in the eighth Section of the first 
Article provides expressly, that Congress shall exercise 
" exclusive legislation " over the district to be appro- 
priated as the seat of Government. This answers to the 
first case. The first clause of the same Section empow- 
ers Congress " to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, 
" and excises ; " and the second clause of the tenth Sec- 
tion of the same Article declares, that " no State shall, 
" without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or 
" duties on imports or exports, except for the purpose of 
" executing its inspection laws." Hence would result 
an exclusive power in the Union to lay duties on 
imports and exports, with the particular exception 
mentioned ; but this power is abridged by another 
clause, which declares, that no tax or duty shall be laid 
on articles exported from any State ; in consequence of 
which qualification, it now only extends to the duties on 
imports. This answers to the second case. The third 
will be found in that clause which declares that Con- 
gress shall have power " to establish an uniform rule 
" of naturalization throughout the United States." This 
must necessarily be exclusive : because if each State 
had power to prescribe a distinct rule, there could 
not be an uniform rule. 

A case which may perhaps be thought to resemble 
the latter, but which is in fact widely different, affects 
the question immediately under consideration. I mean 
the power of imposing taxes on all articles other than 
exports and imports. This, I contend, is manifestly a 
concurrent and coequal authority in the United States 
and in the individual States. There is plainly no ex- 
pression in the granting clause which makes that power 
exclusive in the Union. There is no independent clause 
or sentence which prohibits the States from exercising it. 
So far is this from being the case, that a plain and con- 



The Federalist. 201 

elusive argument to the contrary is tc be deduced from 
the restraint laid upon the States in relation to duties 
on imports and exports. This restriction implies an ad- 
mission, that if it were not inserted, the States would 
possess the power it excludes ; and it implies a further 
admission, that as to all other taxes the authority of the 
States remains undiminished. In any other view it 
would be both unnecessary and dangerous ; it would be 
unnecessary, because if the grant to the Union of the 
power of laying such duties implied the exclusion of the 
States, or even their subordination in this particular, 
there could be no need of such a restriction ; it would 
be dangerous, because the introduction of it leads di- 
rectly to the conclusion which has been mentioned, and 
which, if the reasoning of the objectors be just, could 
not have been intended ; I mean that the States, in all 
cases to which the restriction did not apply, would have 
a concurrent power of taxation with the Union. The 
restriction in question amounts to what lawyers call a 
negative pregnant ; that is, a negation of one thing, 
and an affirmance of another : a negation of the author- 
ity of the States to impose taxes on imports and ex- 
ports, and an affirmance of their authority to impose 
them on all other articles. It would be mere sophistry 
to argue that it was meant to exclude them absolutely 
from the imposition of taxes of the former kind, and to 
leave them at liberty to lay others subject to the control 
of the National Legislature. The restraining or pro- 
hibitory clause only says, that they shall not, without the 
consent of Congress, lay such duties ; and if we are to 
understand this in the sense last mentioned, the Consti- 
tution would then be made to introduce a formal provis- 
ion for the sake of a very absurd conclusion ; which is, 
that the States, with the consent of the National Legis- 
lature, might tax imports and exports ; and that they 
might tax every other article, unless controlled by the 



202 The Federalist. 

same body. If this was the intention, why not leave it 
in the first instance, to what is alleged to be the natural 
operation of the original clause, conferring a general 
power of taxation upon the Union ? It is evident that 
this could not have been the intention, and that it will 
not bear a construction of the kind. 

As to a supposition of repugnancy between the powei 
of taxation in the States and in the Union, it cannot be 
supported in that sense which would be requisite to work 
an exclusion of the States. It is indeed possible that 
a tax might be laid on a particular article by a State 
which might render it inexpedient that thus a further tax 
should be laid on the same article by the Union ; but it 
would not imply a constitutional inability to impose a 
further tax. The quantity of the imposition, the expe- 
diency or inexpediency of an increase on either side, 
would be mutually questions of prudence ; but there 
would be involved no direct contradiction of power. 
The particular policy of the National and of the State 
systems of finance might now and then not exactly co- 
incide, and might require reciprocal forbearances. It is 
not, however, a mere possibility of inconvenience in the 
exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional re- 
pugnancy, that can by implication alienate and extin- 
guish a preexisting right of sovereignty. 

The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain 
cases results from the division of the sovereign power ; 
and the rule that all authorities, of which the States are 
not explicitly divested in favor of the Union, remain 
with them in full vigor, is not a theoretical consequence 
of that division, but is clearly admitted by the whole 
tenor of the instrument which contains the Articles of 
the proposed Constitution. We there find, that, not- 
withstanding the affirmative grants of general author- 
ities, there has been the most pointed care in those cases 
where it was deemed improper that the like authorities 



The Federalist. 20S 

should reside in the States, to insert negative clauses 
prohibiting the exercise of them by the States. The 
tenth Section of the first Article consists altogether of 
such provisions. This circumstance is a clear indica- 
tion of the sense of the Convention, and furnishes a 
rule of interpretation out of the body of the Act, which 
justifies the position 1 have advanced, and refutes every 
hypothesis to the contrary. 

The last clause of the eighth Section of the first 
Article of the plan under consideration authorizes the 
National Legislature " to make all laws which shall be 
"necessary and proper for carrying into execution the 
"powers by that Constitution vested in the Government 
" of the United States, or in any department or officer 
"thereof;" and the second clause of the sixth Article 
declares, " that the Constitution and the laws of the 
" United States made in pursuance thereof, and the 
" treaties made by their authority} shall be the supreme 
" law of the land ; anything in the constitution or laws 
"of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." 

These two clauses have been the source of much vir- 
ulent invective, and petulant declamation, against the 
proposed Constitution. They have been held up to the 
people in all the exaggerated colors of misrepresenta- 
tion ; as the pernicious engines by which their local 
Governments were to be destroyed, and their liberties 
exterminated ; as the hideous monster whose devouring 
jaws would spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, 
nor sacred nor profane ; and yet, strange as it may ap- 
pear, after all this clamor, to those who may not have 
happened to contemplate them in the same light, it may 
be affirmed with perfect confidence, that the constitu- 
tional operation of the intended Government would be 
precisely the same, if these clauses were entirely oblit- 
erated, as if they were repeated in every Article. They 
are only declaratory of a truth, which would have re- 



204 The Federalist. 

suited by necessary and unavoidable implication from 
the very act of constituting a Foederal Government, and 
vesting it with certain specified powers. This is so 
clear a proposition, that moderation itself can scarcely 
listen to the railings which have been so copiously vented 
against this part of the Plan, without emotions that dis- 
turb its equanimity. 

What is a power but the ability or faculty of doing 
a thing ? What is the ability to do a thing, but the 
power of employing the means necessary to its execu- 
tion ? What is a legislative power, but a power of 
making laws ? What are the means to execute a leg- 
islative power, but laws ? What is the power of lay- 
ing and collecting taxes, but a legislative power, or a 
power of making laws, to lay and collect taxes ? What 
are the proper means of executing such a power, but 
necessary and proper laws ? 

This simple train of inquiry furnishes us at once with 
a test by which to judge of the true nature of the clause 
complained of. It conducts us to this palpable truth, 
that a power to lay and collect taxes must be a power 
to pass all laws necessary and proper for the execution 
of that power : and what does the unfortunate and 
calumniated provision in question do, more than de- 
clare the same truth ; to wit, that the National Legisla- 
ture, to whom the power of laying and collecting taxes 
had been previously given, might, in the execution cf 
that power, pass all laws necessary and proper to carry 
it into effect ? I have applied these observations thus 
particularly to the power of taxation ; because it is the 
immediate subject under consideration, and because it 
is the most important of the authorities proposed to be 
conferred upon the Union. But the same process will 
'ead to the same result, in relation to ail other powers f 
declared in the Constitution. And it is expressly to ex- 
ecute these powers, that the sweeping clause, as it has 



The Federalist. 205 

been affectedly called, authorizes the National Legisla- 
ture to pass all necessary and proper laws. If there ia 
anything exceptionable, it must be sought for in the 
specific powers, upon which this general declaration is 
predicated. The declaration itself, though it may be 
chargeable with tautology or redundancy, is at least 
perfectly harmless. 

But suspicion may ask, Why then was it introduced? 
The answer is, that it could only have been done for 
greater caution, and to guard against all cavilling refine- 
ments in those who might hereafter feel a disposition to 
curtail and evade the legitimate authorities of the Union. 
The Convention probably foresaw, what it has been a 
principal aim of these papers to inculcate, that the dan- 
ger which most threatens our political welfare is, that 
the State Governments will finally sap the foundations 
of the Union ; and might therefore think it necessary, 
in so cardinal a point, to leave nothing to construction. 
Whatever may have been the inducement to it, the wis- 
dom of the precaution is evident from the cry which 
has been raised against it ; as that very cry betrays a 
disposition to question the great and essential truth 
which it is manifestly the object of that provision to 
declare. 

But it may be again asked, who is to judge of the 
necessity and propriety of the laws to be passed for ex- 
ecuting the powers of the Union ? I answer, first, that 
this question arises as well and as fully upon the simple 
grant of those powers, as upon the declaratory clause : 
and I answer in the second place, that the National 
Government, like every other, must judge, in the first 
nstance, of the proper exercise of its powers, and its 
constituents in the last. If the Foederal Government 
should overpass the just bounds of its authority and 
make a tyrannical use of its powers, the People, whose 
creature it is, must appeal to the standard they have 



206 The Federalist. 

formed, and take such measures to redress the injury 
done to the Constitution as the exigency may suggest 
and prudence justify. The propriety of a law, in a 
constitutional light, must always be determined by the 
nature of the powers upon which it is founded. Sup- 
pose, by some forced constructions of its authority, 
(which indeed cannot easily be imagined,) the Foederal 
Legislature should attempt to vary the law of descent 
in any State ) would it not be evident, that in making 
such an attempt, it had exceeded its jurisdiction, and 
infringed upon that of the State ? Suppose, again, 
that upon the pretence of an interference with its reve- 
nues, it should undertake to abrogate a land-tax im- 
posed by the authority of a State ; would it not be 
equally evident, that this was an invasion of that con- 
current jurisdiction in respect to this species of tax, 
which its Constitution plainly supposes to exist in the 
State Governments ? If there ever should be a doubt 
on this head, the credit of it will be entirely due to those 
reasoners, who in the imprudent zeal of their animosity 
to the Plan of the Convention, have labored to envelop 
it in a cloud, calculated to obscure the plainest and sim- 
plest truths. 

But it is said, that the laws of the Union are to be 
the supreme law of the land. But what inference can 
be drawn from this, or what would they amount to, if 
they were not to be supreme ? It is evident they would 
amount to nothing. A law, by the very meaning of 
(he term, includes supremacy. It is a rule, which those 
to whom it is prescribed are bound to observe. This 
results from every political^ association. If individuals 
enter into a state of society, the laws of that society 
must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a 
number of political societies enter into a larger political 
society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant 
to the powers intrusted to it by its Constitution, must 



The Fcederalist. 207 

necessarily be supreme over those societies, and the in- 
dividuals of whom they are composed. It would other- 
wise be a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of 
the parties, and not a Government; which is only an- 
other word for political power and supremacy. But 
it will not follow from this doctrine, that acts of the 
larger society, which are not pursuant to its constitu- 
tional powers, but which are invasions of the residuary 
authorities of the smaller societies, will become the su- 
preme law of the land. These will be merely acts of 
usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such. 
Hence we perceive, that the clause which declares the 
supremacy of the laws of the Union, like the one we 
have just before considered, only declares a truth, which 
flows immediately and necessarily from the institution 
of a Foederal Government. It will not, I presume, have 
escaped observation, that it expressly confines this su- 
premacy to laws made pursuant to the Constitution; 
which I mention merely as an instance of caution in 
the Convention ; since that limitation would have been 
to be understood, though it had not been expressed. 

Though a law, therefore, laying a tax for the use of 
the United States would be supreme in its nature, and 
could not legally be opposed or controlled ; yet a law for 
abrogating or preventing the collection of a tax laid by 
the authority of the State, (unless upon imports and 
exports,) would not be the supreme law of the land, but 
an usurpation of power not granted by the Constitu- 
tion. As far as an improper accumulation of taxes, on 
the same object, might tend to render the collection dif- 
ficult or precarious, this would be a mutual inconven- 
ience, not arising from a superiority or defect of 
power on either side, but from an injudicious exercise 
of power by one or the other, in a manner equally dis- 
advantageous to both. It is to be hoped and presumed, 
however, that mutual interest would dictate a concert 



208 The Federalist. 

in this respect which would avoid any material incon- 
venience. The inference from the whole is — that the 
individual States would, under the proposed Constitu- 
tion, retain an independent and uncontrollable author- 
ity to raise revenue to any extent of which they may 
stand in need, by every kind of taxation, except duties 
on imports and exports. It will be shown in the next 
paper that this concurrent jurisdiction in the Article 
of taxation was the only admissible substitute for an en- 
tire subordination, in respect to this branch of power, 
of the State authority to that of the Union. 

PUBL1US. 



[From the New York Packet, Friday, January 4, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXII. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

I FLATTER myself it has been clearly shown in my 
last number, that the particular States, under the 
proposed Constitution, would have coequal authority 
with the Union in the article of revenue, except as to 
duties on imports. As this leaves open to the States 
far the greatest part of the resources of the community, 
there can be no color for the assertion, that they would 
not possess means as abundant as could be desired, for 
the supply of their own wants,' independent of all ex- 
ternal control. That the field is sufficiently wide, will 
more fully appear, when we come to advert to the in- 
considerable share of the public expenses, for which it 
will fall to the lot of the State Governments to pro- 
vide. 

To argue upon abstract principles, that this coordi 



The Federalist. 209 

nate authority cannot exist, is to set up supposition and 
theory against fact and reality. However proper such 
reasonings might be, to show that a thing ought not to 
exist, they are wholly to be rejected, when they are 
made use of to prove that it does not exist, contrary to 
the evidence of the fact itself. It is well known, t hat- 
in the Roman Republic, the legislative authority, in the 
last resort, resided for ages in two different political bod- 
ies — not as branches of the same Legislature, but as 
distinct and independent Legislatures, in each of which 
an opposite interest prevailed ; in one, the Patrician ; in 
the other, the Plebeian. Many arguments might have 
been adduced, to prove the unfitness of two such seem- 
ingly contradictory authorities, each having power to 
annul or repeal the acts of the other. But a man would 
have been regarded as frantic, who should have attempt- 
ed at Rome to disprove their existence. It will be read- 
ily understood, that I allude to the comitia centuriata 
and the comitia tributa. The former, in which the 
people voted by centuries, was so arranged as to give a 
superiority to the Patrician interest : in the latter, in 
which numbers prevailed, the Plebeian interest had an 
entire predominancy. And yet these two Legislatures 
coexisted for ages, and the Roman Republic attained to 
the utmost height of human greatness. 

In the case particularly under consideration, there is 
no such contradiction as appears in the example cited ; 
there is no power on either side to annul the acts of the 
other. And in practice, there is little reason to appre- 
hend any inconvenience ; because, in a short course of 
time, the wants of the States will naturally reduce them- 
selves within a very narrow compass ; and in the interim, 
the United States will, in all probability, find it con- 
venient to abstain wholly from those objects to which 
the particular States would be inclined to resort. 

To form a more precise judgment of the true merits 

VOL I. 14 



210 The Federalist. 

of this question, it will be well to advent to the propor 
tion between the objects that will require a Foederal pro- 
vision in respect to revenue, and those which will re- 
quire a State provision. We shall discover that the 
former are altogether unlimited : and that the latter are 
circumscribed within very moderate bounds. In pursu- 
ing this inquiry, we must bear in mind that we are not 
to confine our view to the present period, but to look 
forward to remote futurity. Constitutions of civil Gov- 
ernment are not to be framed upon a calculation of ex- 
isting exigencies ; but upon a combination of these with 
the probable exigencies of ages, according to the natural 
and tried course of human affairs. Nothing, therefore, 
can be more fallacious than to infer the extent of any 
power, proper to be lodged in the National Government, 
from an estimate of its immediate necessities. There 
ought to be a capacity to provide for future contin- 
gencies, as they may happen ; and as these are illimita- 
ble in their nature, it is impossible safely to limit that 
capacity. It is true, perhaps, that a computation might 
be made, with sufficient accuracy to answer the purpose, 
of the quantity of revenue requisite to discharge the 
subsisting engagements of the Union, and to maintain 
those establishments which, for some time to come, 
would suffice in time of peace. But would it be wise, 
or would it not rather be the extreme of folly, to stop at 
this point, and to leave the Government, intrusted with 
the care of the National defence, in a state of absolute 
incapacity to provide for the protection of the commu- 
nity against future invasions of the public peace, by 
foreign war or domestic convulsions ? If, on the con- 
trary, we ought to exceed this point, where can we stop, 
short of an indefinite power of providing for emergen- 
3ies as they may arise ? Though it is easy to assert, in 
general terms, the possibility of forming a rational judg- 
ment of a due provision against probable dangers ; yet 



The Federalist. 211 

we may safely challenge those who make the assertion, 
to bring forward their data, and may affirm, that they 
would be found as vague and uncertain as any that 
could be produced to establish the probable duration of 
the world. Observations, confined to the mere prospects 
of internal attacks, can deserve no weight ; though even 
these will admit of no satisfactory calculation : but if 
we mean to be a commercial people, it must form a part 
of our policy to be able one day to defend that com- 
merce. The support of a navy and of naval wars would 
involve contingencies that must baffle all the efforts of 
political arithmetic. 

Admitting that we ought to try the novel and absurd 
experiment in politics, of tying up the hands of Govern- 
ment from offensive war, founded upon reasons of State ; 
yet certainly we ought not to disable it from guarding 
the community against the ambition or enmity of other 
nations. A cloud has been for some time hanging over 
the European world. If it should break forth into a 
storm, who can insure us that in its progress a part of 
its fury would not be spent upon us ? No reasonable 
man would hastily pronounce, that we are entirely out 
of its reach. Or if the combustible materials, that now 
seem to be collecting, should be dissipated without com- 
ing to maturity; or if a flame should be kindled without 
extending to us, what security can we have that our 
tranquillity will long remain undisturbed from some 
other cause, or from some other quarter ? Let us recol- 
lect that peace or war will not always be left to our. op- 
tion ; that however moderate or unambitious we may 
be, we cannot count upon the moderation, or hope to 
extinguish the ambition of others. Who could have 
Imagined at the conclusion of the last war, that France 
and Britain, wearied and exhausted as they both were, 
would so soon have looked with so hostile an aspect 
upon each other? To judge from the history of man- 



212 The Federalist. 

kind, we shall be compelled to conclude, that the iiery 
and destructive passions of war reign in the human 
breast with much more powerful sway than the mild 
and beneficent sentiments of peace ; and that to model 
our political systems upon speculations of lasting tran- 
quillity, is to calculate on the weaker springs of the 
human character. 

What are the chief sources of expense in every Gov- 
ernment ? What has occasioned that enormous accu- 
mulation of debts with which several of the European 
nations are oppressed? The answer plainly is, wars and 
rebellions ; the support of those institutions, which are 
necessary to guard the body politic, against these two 
most mortal diseases of society. The expenses arising 
from those institutions which are relative to the mere 
domestic police of a State ; to the support of its Legis- 
lative, Executive, and Judicial departments, with their 
different appendages ; and to the encouragement of agri- 
culture and manufactures, (which will comprehend al- 
most all the objects of State expenditure,) are insig- 
nificant, in comparison with those which relate to the 
National defence. 

In the kingdom of Great Britain, where all the osten- 
tatious apparatus of Monarchy is to be provided for, not 
above a fifteenth part of the annual income of the na- 
tion is appropriated to the class of expenses last men- 
tioned : the other fourteen fifteenths are absorbed in the 
payment of the interest of debts, contracted for carrying 
on the wars in which that country has been engaged, 
and in the maintenance of fleets and armies. If, on the 
one hand, it should be observed, that the expenses in- 
curred in the prosecution of the ambitious enterprises 
and vainglorious pursuits of a Monarchy, are not a 
proper standard by which to judge of those which might 
be necessary in a Republic ; it ought, on the other hand 
vo be remarked, that there should be as great a dispro* 



The Federalist. 213 

portion between the profusion and extravagance of a 
wealthy kingdom in its domestic administration, and 
the frugality and economy which in that particular be- 
come the modest simplicity of republican Government. 
If we balance a proper deduction from one side, against 
that which it is supposed ought to be made from the 
other, the proportion may still be considered as holding 
good. 

But let us advert to the large debt which we have 
ourselves contracted in a single war, and let us only cal- 
culate on a common share of the events which disturb 
the peace of nations, and we shall instantly perceive, 
without the aid of any elaborate illustration, that there 
must always be an immense disproportion between the 
objects of Foederal and State expenditures. It is true, 
that several of the States, separately, are encumbered 
with considerable debts, which are an excrescence of the 
late war. But this cannot happen again, if the pro- 
posed system be adopted ; and when these debts are 
discharged, the only call for revenue of any consequence, 
which the State Governments will continue to experience, 
will be for the mere support of their respective civil lists ; 
to which, if we add all contingencies, the total amount 
in every State ought to fall considerably short of two 
hundred thousand pounds. 

In framing a Government for posterity as well as our- 
selves, we ought, in those provisions which are designed 
to be permanent, to calculate, not on temporary, but on 
permanent causes of expense. If this principle be a just 
one, our attention would be directed to a provision in 
favor of the State Governments for an annual sum of 
about two hundred thousand pounds; while the exi- 
gencies of the Union could be susceptible of no limits, 
even in imagination. In this view of the subject, b^ 
arhat logic can it be maintained that the local Govern- 
ments ought to command, in perpetuity, an exclusive 



214 The Federalist 

source of revenue for any sum beyond the extent of two 
hundred thousand pounds ? To extend its power fur- 
ther, in exclusion of the authority of the Union, would 
be to take the resources of the community out of those 
hands which stood in need of them for the public wel- 
fare, in order to put them into other hands which could 
have no just or proper occasion for them. 

Suppose, then, the Convention had been inclined to 
proceed upon the principle of a repartition of the objects 
of revenue, between the Union and its members, in pro- 
portion to their comparative necessities ; what particular 
fund could have been selected for the use of the States, 
that would not either have been too much or too lit- 
tle ; too little for their present, too much for their future 
wants ? As to the line of separation between external 
and internal taxes, this would leave to the States, at a 
rough computation, the command of two thirds of the 
resources of the community, to defray from a tenth to a 
twentieth part of its expenses ; and to the Union, one 
third of the resources of the community, to defray from 
nine tenths to nineteen twentieths of its expenses. If we 
desert this boundary, and content ourselves with leaving 
to the States an exclusive power of taxing houses and 
lands, there would still be a great disproportion between 
the means and the end; the possession of one third of 
the resources of the community to supply, at most, one 
tenth of its wants. If any fund could have been se- 
lected and appropriated, equal to and not greater than 
the object, it would have been inadequate to the dis- 
charge of the existing debts of the particular States, 
and would have left them dependent on the Union for 
a provision for this purpose. 

The preceding train of observations will justify the 
position which has been elsewhere laid down, that " a 
M concurrent jurisdiction in the article of taxation was 
" the only admissible substitute for an entire subordina* 



The Federalist. 215 

u tion, hi respect to this branch of power, of State au- 
" thority to that of the Union." Any separation of the 
objects of revenue that could have been fallen upon, 
would have amounted to a sacrifice of the great in- 
terests of the Union to the power of the individual 
States. The Convention thought the concurrent juris- 
diction preferable to that subordination ; and it is evi- 
dent that it has at least the merit of reconciling an 
indefinite constitutional power of taxation in the Foed- 
eral Government with an adequate and independent 
power in the States to provide for their own necessities. 
There remain a few other lights, in which this important 
subject of taxation will claim a further consideration. 

PUBLIUS. 



For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXIII. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

BEFORE we proceed to examine any other objec- 
tions to an indefinite power of taxation in the 
Union, I shall make one general remark ; which is, that 
if the jurisdiction of the National Government, in the 
article of revenue, should be restricted to particular ob- 
jects, it would naturally occasion an undue proportion 
of the public burdens to fall upon those objects. Two 
evils would spring from this source : the oppression of 
particular branches of industry, and an unequal distri- 
oution of the taxes, as well among the several States, as 
among the citizens of the same State. 

Suppose, as has been contended for, the Fcederal power 



216 The Federalist. 

of taxation were to be confined to duties on imports , 
it is evident that the Government, for want of being 
able to command other resources, would frequently be 
tempted to extend these duties to an injurious excess. 
There are persons who imagine that they can never be 
carried to too great a length ; since the higher they are, 
the more it is alleged they will tend to discourage an ex- 
travagant consumption, to produce a favorable balance 
of trade, and to promote domestic manufactures. But 
all extremes are pernicious in various ways. Exorbi- 
tant duties on imported articles would beget a general 
spirit of smuggling; which is always prejudicial to the 
fair trader, and eventually to the revenue itself: they 
tend to render other classes of the community tributary, 
in an improper degree, to the manufacturing classes, to 
whom they give a premature monopoly of the markets : 
they sometimes force industry out of its more natural 
channels into others in which it flows with less advan- 
tage : and in the last place, they oppress the merchant, 
who is often obliged to pay them himself without any 
retribution from the consumer. When the demand is 
equal to the quantity of goods at market, the consumer 
generally pays the duty ;- but when the markets happen 
to be overstocked, a great proportion falls upon the mer- 
chant, and sometimes not only exhausts his profits, but 
breaks in upon his capital. I am apt to think, that a 
division of the duty, between the seller and the buyer, 
more often happens than is commonly imagined. It is 
not always possible to raise the price of a commodity, 
in exact proportion to every additional imposition laid 
upon it. The merchant, especially in a country of small 
commercial capital, is often under a necessity of keep- 
ing prices down in order to a more expeditious sale. 

The maxim that the consumer is the payer, is so much 
oftener true than the reverse of the proposition, that it 
is far more equitable that the duties on imports should 



The Federalist. 211 

go into a common stock, than that they should redound 
to the exclusive benefit of the importing States. But 
it is not so generally true, as to render it equitable, 
that those duties should form the only National fund. 
When they are paid by the merchant, they operate as 
an additional tax upon the importing State, whose cit- 
izens pay their proportion of them in the character of 
consumers. In this view, they are productive of in- 
equality among the States ; which inequality would be 
increased with the increased extent of the duties. The 
confinement of the National revenues to this species of 
imposts would be attended with inequality, from a dif- 
ferent cause, between the manufacturing and the non- 
manufacturing States. The States which can go far- 
thest towards the supply of their own wants, by their 
own manufactures, will not, according to their numbers 
or wealth, consume so great a proportion of imported arti- 
cles as those States which are not in the same favorable 
situation. They would not, therefore, in this mode alone 
contribute to the public treasury in a ratio to their abili- 
ties. To make them do this, it is necessary that re- 
course be had to excises ; the proper objects of which 
are particular kinds of manufactures. New York is 
more deeply interested in these considerations, than 
such of her citizens as contend for limiting the power 
of the Union to external taxation, may be aware of. 
New York is an importing State, and is not likely speed- 
ily to be, to any great extent, a manufacturing State. 
She would of course suffer in a double light, from re- 
straining the jurisdiction of the Union to commercial 
imposts. 

So far as these observations tend to inculcate a dan-' 
ger of the import duties being extended to an injurious 
extreme, it may be observed, conformably to a remark 
made in another part of these papers, that the interest 
of the revenue itself would be a sufficient guard against 



218 The Federalist. 

such an extreme. I readily admit that this would be 
the case, as long as other resources were open ; but if 
the .avenues to them were closed, hope, stimulated by 
necessity, would beget experiments, fortified by rigorous 
precautions and additional penalties ; which, for a time, 
would have the intended effect, till there had been lei- 
sure to contrive expedients to elude these new precau- 
tions. The first success would be apt to inspire false 
opinions ; which it might require a long course of sub- 
sequent experience to correct. Necessity, especially in 
politics, often occasions false hopes, false reasonings, 
and a system of measures, correspondently erroneous. 
But even if this supposed excess should not be a conse- 
quence of the limitation of the Foederal power of taxa- 
tion, the inequalities spoken of would still ensue, though 
not in the same degree, from the other causes that have 
been noticed. Let us now return to the examination 
of objections. 

One which, if we may judge from the frequency of 
its repetition, seems most to be relied on, is, that the 
House of Representatives is not sufficiently numerous 
for the reception of all the different classes of citizens, 
in order to combine the interests and feelings of every 
part of the community, and to produce a due sympathy 
between the representative body and its constituents. 
This argument presents itself under a very specious and 
seducing form ; and is well calculated to lay hold of the 
prejudices of those to whom it is addressed. But when 
we come to dissect it with attention, it will appear to 
be made up of nothing but fair-sounding words. The 
object it seems to aim at, is in the first place impracti- 
cable, and in the sense in which it is contended for, is 
unnecessary. I reserve for another place, the discussion 
of the question which relates to the sufficiency of the 
representative body in respect to numbers ; and shall 
content myself with examining here the particular use 



The Federalist. 219 

which has been made of a contrary supposition, in ref 
erence to the immediate subject of our inquiries. 

The idea of an actual representation of all classes of 
the people, by persons of each class, is altogether vision- 
ary. Unless it were expressly provided in the Constitu- 
tion, that each different occupation should send one or 
more members, the thing would never take place in prac- 
tice. Mechanics and manufacturers will always be in- 
clined, with few exceptions, to give their votes to mer- 
chants, in preference to persons of their own professions 
or trades. Those discerning citizens are well aware, 
that the mechanic and manufacturing arts furnish the 
materials of mercantile enterprise and industry. Many 
of them, indeed, are immediately connected with the 
operations of commerce. They know that the mer- 
chant is their natural patron and friend ; and they are 
aware, that however great the confidence they may 
justly feel in their own good sense, their interests can 
be more effectually promoted by the merchant than by 
themselves. They are sensible that their habits in life 
have not been such as to give them those acquired en- 
dowments, without which, in a deliberative assembly, 
the greatest natural abilities are for the most part use- 
less ; and that the influence and weight, and superior 
acquirements of the merchanl s render them more equal 
to a contest with any spirit which might happen to in- 
fuse itself into the public councils, unfriendly to the 
manufacturing and trading interests. These considera- 
tions, and many others that might be mentioned, prove, 
and experience confirms it, that artisans and manufact- 
urers will commonly be disposed to bestow their votes 
upon merchants and those whom they recommend. We 
must therefore consider merchants as the natural repre- 
sentatives of all these classes of the community. 

With regard to the learned professions, little need be 
observed ; they truly form no distinct interest in society 



220 The Federalist. 

and* according to their situation and talents, will be in- 
discriminately the objects of the confidence and choice 
of each other, and of other parts of the community. 

Nothing remains but the landed interest : and this, in 
a political view, and particularly in relation to taxes, I 
take to be perfectly united, from the wealthiest landlord 
down to the poorest tenant. No tax can be laid on land 
which will not affect the proprietor of millions of acres 
as well as the proprietor of a single acre. Every land- 
holder will therefore have a common interest to keep the 
taxes on land as low as possible ; and common interest 
may always be reckoned upon as the surest bond of 
sympathy. But if we even could suppose a distinction 
of interest between the opulent landholder and the mid- 
dling farmer, what reason is there to conclude, that the 
first would stand a better chance of being deputed to 
the National Legislature than the last ? If we take fact 
as our guide, and look into our own Senate and As- 
sembly, we shall find that moderate proprietors of land 
prevail in both ; nor is this less the case in the Senate, 
which consists of a smaller number, than in the Assem- 
bly, which is composed of a greater number. Where 
the qualifications of the electors are the same, whether 
they have to choose a small or a large number, their 
votes will fall upon those in whom they have most 
confidence ; whether these happen to be men of large 
fortunes, or of moderate property, or of no property at 
all. 

It is said to be necessary, that all classes of citizens 
should have some of their own number in the represent- 
ative body, in order that their feelings and interests may 
be the better understood and attended to. But we have 
seen that this will never happen under any arrangement 
that leaves the votes of the People free. Where this is 
the case, the representative body, with too few excep* 
tions to have any influence on the spirit of the Govern 



The Federalist. 221 

ment, will be composed of landholders, merchants, ana 
men of the learned professions. But where is the dan- 
ger that the interests and feelings of the different classes 
of citizens will not be understood or attended to by 
these three descriptions of men ? Will not the land- 
holder know and feel whatever will promote or injure 
the interest of landed property ? And will he not, from 
his own interest in that species of property, be suffi- 
ciently prone to resist every attempt to prejudice or en- 
cumber it ? Will not the merchant understand and be 
disposed to cultivate, as far as may be proper, the in- 
terests of the. mechanic and manufacturing arts, to 
which his commerce is so nearly allied ? Will not the 
man of the learned profession, who will feel a neutral- 
ity to the rivalships between the different branches of 
industry, be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between 
them, ready to promote either, so far as it shall appear 
to him conducive to the general interests of the so- 
ciety ? 

If we take into the account the momentary humors 
or dispositions which may happen to prevail in particu- 
lar parts of the society, and to which a wise administra- 
tion will never be inattentive, is the man whose situation 
leads to extensive inquiry and information less likely to 
be a competent judge of then nature, extent, and foun- 
dation, than one whose observation does not travel be- 
yond the circle of his neighbors and acquaintances ? Is 
it not natural that a man, who is a candidate for the fa- 
vor of the People and who is dependent on the suffrages 
of his fellow-citizens for the continuance of his public 
honors, should take care to inform himself of their dis- 
positions and inclinations, and should be willing to al- 
low them their proper degree of influence upon his con- 
iuct ? This dependence, and the necessity of being 
bound himself, and his posterity, by the laws to which 
he gives his assent, are the true, and they are the strong 



222 The Federalist. 

chords of sympathy, between the representative and the 
constituent. 

There is no part of the administration of Government 
that requires extensive information, and a thorough 
knowledge of the principles of political economy, so 
much as the business of taxation. The man who un- 
derstands those principles best, will be least likely to 
resort to oppressive expedients, or to sacrifice any par 
ticular class of citizens to the procurement of revenue 
It might be demonstrated that the most productive sys- 
tem of finance will always be the least burdensome. 
There can be no doubt that in order to a judicious ex- 
ercise of the power of taxation, it is necessary that the 
person in whose hands it is should be acquainted with 
the general genius, habits, and modes of thinking of the 
People at large, and with the resources of the country. 
And this is all that can be reasonably meant by a 
knowledge of the interests and feelings of the People. 
In any other sense, the proposition has either no mean- 
ing, or an absurd one. And in that sense, let every con- 
siderate citizen judge for himself, where the requisite 
qualification is most likely to be found. 

PUBLIUS. 



{From the New York Packet, Tuesday, January 8, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXIV. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

WE have seen that the result of the observations, to 
which the foregoing number has been principally 
devoted, is, that from the natural operation of the differ- 
ent interests and views of the various classes of the 



The Federalist. 223 

community, whether the representation of the People be 
more or less numerous, it will consist almost entirely of 
proprietors of land, of merchants, and of members of the 
learned professions, who will truly represent all those 
different interests and views. If it should be objected, 
that we have seen other descriptions of men in the local 
Legislatures, I answer, that it is admitted there are ex- 
ceptions to the rule, but not in sufficient number to 
influence the general complexion or character of the 
Government. There are strong minds in every walk of 
life, that will rise superior to the disadvantages of situa- 
tion, and will command the tribute due to then* merit, 
not only from the classes to which they particularly be- 
long, but from the society in general. The door ought 
to be equally open to all ; and I trust, for the credit of 
human nature, that we shall see examples of such vigor- 
ous plants flourishing in the soil of Foederal, as well as 
of State legislation ; but occasional instances of this 
sort will not render the reasoning, founded upon the 
general course of things, less conclusive. 

The subject might be placed in several other lights, 
that would all lead to the same result ; and in particular 
it might be asked, What greater affinity or relation of in- 
terest can be conceived between the carpenter and black- 
smith, and the linen manufacturer or stocking-weaver 
than between the merchant and either of them ? It i 
notorious, that there are often as great rivalships be 
tween different branches of the mechanic or manufact- 
uring arts, as there are between any of the departments 
of labor and industry ; so that, unless the representative 
body were to be far more numerous than would be con- 
sistent with any idea of regularity or wisdom in its de- 
Liberations, it is impossible that what seems to be the 
spirit of the objection we have been considering, should 
ever be realized in practice. But I forbear to dwell any 
onger on a matter which has hitherto worn too loose a 



224 The Federalist. 

garb to admit even of an accurate inspection of its reai 
shape or tendency. 

There is another objection of a somewhat more pre- 
cise nature, that claims our attention. It has been as- 
serted that a power of internal taxation in the National 
Legislature could never be exercised with advantage, as 
well from the want of a sufficient knowledge of local 
circumstances, as from an interference between the reve- 
nue laws of the Union and of the particular States. 
The supposition of a want of proper knowledge, seems 
to be entirely destitute of foundation. If any question 
is depending in a State Legislature, respecting one of 
the Counties, which demands a knowledge of local de- 
tails, how is it acquired ? No doubt from the informa- 
tion of the members of the County. Cannot the like 
knowledge be obtained in the National Legislature, from 
the representatives of each State ? And is it not to be 
presumed, that the men who will generally be sent there, 
will be possessed of the necessary degree of intelligence 
to be able to communicate that information ? Is the 
knowledge of local circumstances, as applied to taxa- 
tion, a minute topographical acquaintance with all the 
mountains, rivers, streams, highways, and by-paths in 
each State ; or is it a general acquaintance with its 
situation and resources — with the state of its agricult- 
ure, commerce, manufactures — with the nature of its 
products and consumptions — with the different degrees 
and kinds of its wealth, property, and industry ? 

Nations in general, even under Governments of the 
more popular kind, usually commit the administration 
of their finances to single men, or to Boards composed 
of a few individuals, who digest and prepare, in the first 
instance, the plans of taxation, which are afterwards 
passed into laws by the authority of the sovereign or 
Legislature. 

Inquisitive and enlightened statesmen are deemed 



The Federalist 225 

everywhere best qualified to make a judicious selection 
of the objects proper for revenue ; which is a clear indi- 
cation, as far as the sense of mankind can have weight 
in the question, of the species of knowledge of local 
circumstances, requisite to the purposes of taxation. 

The taxes intended to be comprised under the gen- 
eral denomination of internal taxes, may be subdivided 
into those of the direct and those of the indirect kind. 
Though the objection be made to both, yet the reason- 
ing upon it seems to be confined to the former branch. 
And indeed, as to the latter, by which must be under- 
stood duties and excises on articles of consumption, one 
is at a loss to conceive, what can be the nature of the 
difficulties apprehended. The knowledge relating to 
them must evidently be of a kind that will either be 
suggested by the nature of the article itself, or can 
easily be procured from any well-informed man, espe- 
cially of the mercantile class. The circumstances tha 
may distinguish its situation in one State from its situa- 
tion in another, must be few, simple, and easy to be 
comprehended. The principal thing to be attended to, 
would be to avoid those articles which had been pre- 
viously appropriated to the use of a particular State ; 
and there could be no difficulty in ascertaining the reve- 
nue system of each. This could always be known from 
the respective codes of laws, as well as from the infor- 
mation of the members of the several States. 

The objection, when applied to real property or to 
houses and lands, appears to have, at first sight, more 
foundation ; but even in this view, it will not bear a 
close examination. Land-taxes are commonly laid in 
one of two modes, either by actual valuations, perma- 
nent or periodical, or by occasional assessments, at the 
discretion, or according to the best judgment, of certain 
officers whose duty it is to make them. In either case, 
the execution of the business, which alone requires the 

VOL. I. 15 



226 The Federalist. 

knowledge of local details, must be devolved upon 
discreet persons in the character of Commissioners or 
Assessors, elected by the People, or appointed by the 
Government, for the purpose. All that the law can do, 
must be to name the persons or to prescribe the manner 
of their election or appointment; to fix their numbers 
and qualifications ; and to draw the general outlines of 
their powers and duties. And what is there in all this 
that cannot as well be performed by the National Legis- 
lature as by a State Legislature ? The attention of 
either can only reach to general principles : local details, 
as already observed, must be referred to those who are 
to execute the plan. 

But there is a simple point of view, in which this 
matter may be placed, that must be altogether satisfac- 
tory. The National Legislature can make use of the 
system of each State within that State. The method of 
laying and collecting this species of taxes in each State, 
can, in all its parts, be adopted and employed by the 
Foederal Government. 

Let it be recollected, that the proportion of these taxes 
is not to be left to the discretion of the National Legis- 
lature : but is to be determined by the numbers of each 
State, as described in the second Section of the first 
Article. An actual census, or enumeration of the People 
must furnish the rule ; a circumstance which effectually 
shuts the door to partiality or oppression. The abuse 
of this power of taxation seems to have been provided 
against with guarded circumspection. In addition to 
the precaution just mentioned, there is a provision that 
" all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform 
" throughout the United States." 

It has been very properly observed, by different speak- 
ers and writers on the side of the Constitution, that if 
the exercise of the power of internal taxation by the 
Union should be discovered on experiment to be really 



The Federalist. 227 

inconvenient, the Fcederal Government may then for- 
bear the use of it, and have recourse to requisitions in 
its stead. By way of answer to this, it has been tri- 
umphantly asked, why not in the first instance omit that 
ambiguous power, and rely upon the latter resource ? 
Two solid answers may be given ; the first is, that the 
exercise of that power, if convenient, will be preferable, 
because it will be more effectual ; and it is impossible to 
prove in theory, or otherwise than by the experiment, 
that it cannot be advantageously exercised. The con- 
trary, indeed, appears most probable. The second an- 
swer is, that the existence of such a power in the Con- 
stitution will have a strong influence in giving efficacy 
to requisitions. When the States know that the Union 
can supply itself without their agency, it will be a pow- 
erful motive for exertion on their part. 

As to the interference of the revenue laws of the 
Union, and of its members, we have already seen that 
there can be no clashing or repugnancy of authority. 
The laws cannot, therefore, in a legal sense, interfere 
with each other ; and it is far from impossible to avoid 
an interference even in the policy of their different sys- 
tems. An effectual expedient for this purpose will be, 
mutually to abstain from those objects which either 
side may have first had recourse to. As neither can 
control the other, each will have an obvious and sensible 
interest in this reciprocal forbearance. And where there 
is an immediate common interest, we may safely count 
upon its operation. When the particular debts of the 
States are done away, and their expenses come to be 
limited within their natural compass, the possibility al- 
most of interference will vanish. A small land-tax 
will answer the purpose of the States, and will be their 
most simple and most fit resource. 

Many spectres have been raised out of this power 
*f internal taxation, to excite the apprehensions of the 



228 The Federalist. 

People — double sets of revenue officers — a duplication 
of their burdens by double taxations, and the frightful 
forms of odious and oppressive poll-taxes, have been 
played off with all the ingenious dexterity of political 
legerdemain. 

As to the first point, there are two cases in which 
there can be no room for double sets of officers : one, 
where the right of imposing the tax is exclusively vested 
in the Union, which applies to the duties on imports ; 
the other, where the object has not fallen under any 
State regulation or provision, which may be applicable 
to a variety of objects. In other cases, the probability 
: s, that the United States will either wholly abstain from 
.he objects preoccupied for local purposes, or will make 
use of the State officers and State regulations for col- 
lecting the additional imposition. This will best answer 
the views of revenue, because it will save expense in the 
collection, and will best avoid any occasion of disgust to 
the State Governments and to the People. At all events, 
here is a practicable expedient for avoiding such an in- 
convenience; and nothing more can be required than to 
show, that evils predicted do not necessarily result from 
the plan. 

As to any argument derived from a supposed system 
of influence, it is a sufficient answer to say, that it ought 
not to be presumed ; but the supposition is susceptible 
of a more precise answer. If such a spirit should in- 
fest the councils of the Union, the most certain road to 
the accomplishment of its aim would be, to employ the 
State officers as much as possible, and to attach them 
to the Union by an accumulation of their emoluments. 
This would serve to turn the tide of State influence into 
the channels of the National Government instead of 
making Fcederal influence flow in an opposite and ad- 
verse current. But all suppositions of this kind are in- 
vidious, and ought to be banished from the considera 



The Federalist 22S 

tion of the great question before the People. They can 
answer no other end than to cast a mist over the truth. 

As to the suggestion of double taxation, the answer 
is plain. The wants of the Union are to be supplied in < 
one way or another ; if to be done by the authority of 
the Fcederal Government, it will not be to be done by 
that of the State Government. The quantity of taxes 
to be paid by the community must be the same in either 
case ; with this advantage, if the provision is to be made 
by the Union — that the capital resource of commercial 
imposts, which is the most convenient branch of reve- 
nue, can be prudently improved to a much greater ex- 
tent under Fcederal than under State regulation, and of 
course will render it less necessary to recur to more in- 
convenient methods ; and with this further advantage, 
that as far as there may be any real difficulty in the ex- 
ercise of the power of internal taxation, it will impose 
a disposition to greater care in the choice and arrange- 
ment of the means ; and must naturally tend to make 
it a fixed point of policy in the National administration 
to go as far as may be practicable in making the luxury 
of the rich tributary to the public treasury, in order to 
diminish the necessity of those impositions which might 
create dissatisfaction in the poorer and most numerous 
classes of the society. Happy it is when the interest 
which the Government has in the preservation of its 
own power, coincides with a proper distribution of the 
public burdens, and tends to guard the least wealthy 
part of the community from oppression ! 

As to poll-taxes, I, without scruple, confess my dis- 
approbation of them ; and though they have prevailed 
from an early period in those States,* which have uni- 
"ormly been the most tenacious of their rights, I should 
ament to see them introduced into practice under th 
National Government. But does it follow because there 

* The New England States. — Publius. 



230 The Federalist. 

is a power to lay them, that they will actually be laid ? 
Every State in the Union has power to impose taxes of 
this kind ; and yet in several of them they are unknown 
in practice. Are the State Governments to be stig- 
matized as tyrannies, because they possess this power ? 
If they are not, with what propriety can the like power 
justify such a charge against the National Government, 
or even be urged as an obstacle to its adoption ? As 
little friendly as I am to the species of imposition, I still 
feel a thorough conviction, that the power of having re- 
course to it ought to exist in the Foederal Government. 
There are certain emergencies of nations, in which ex- 
pedients, that in the ordinary state of things ought to 
be forborne, become essential to the public weal. And 
the Government, from the possibility of such emergen- 
cies, ought ever to have the option of making use of 
them. The real scarcity of objects in this country, 
which may be considered as productive sources of rev- 
enue, is a reason peculiar to itself, for not abridging 
the discretion of the National councils in this respect. 
There may exist certain critical and tempestuous con- 
junctures of the State, in which a poll-tax may become 
an inestimable resource. And as I know nothing to 
exempt this portion of the globe from the common 
calamities that have befallen other parts of it, I ac- 
knowledge my aversion to every project that is calcu- 
lated to disarm the Government of a single weapon, 
which in any possible contingency might be usefully 
employed for the general defence and security. 

PUBLIUS. 



The Federalist. 231 

[From the Daily Advertiser, Thursday, January 10, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXV. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

THE power of regulating the militia, and of com- 
manding its services in times of insurrection and 
invasion, are natural incidents to the duties of superin- 
tending the common defence, and of watching over the 
internal peace of the Confederacy. 

It requires no skill in the science of war to discern, 
that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the 
militia would be attended with the most beneficial ef- 
fects, whenever they were called into service for the 
public defence. It would enable them to discharge the 
duties of the camp and of the field, with mutual intel- 
ligence and concert — an advantage of peculiar mo- 
ment in the operations of an army : and it would fi.1 
them much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency 
in military functions, which would be essential to theii 
usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only be ac- 
complished by confiding the regulation of the militia 
to the direction of the National authority. It is, there- 
fore, with the most evident propriety, that the plan of the 
Convention proposes to empower the Union " to provide 
" for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, 
u and for governing such part of them as may be em- 
" ployed in the service of the United States, reserving 
" to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, 
" and the authority of training the militia according to 
u the discipline prescribed by Congress." 

Of the different grounds which have been taken in 
opposition to the plan of the Convention, there is none 



232 The Federalist 

that was so little to have been expected, or is so unten 
able in itself, as the one from which this particular pro- 
vision has been attacked. If a well-regulated militia 
be the most natural defence of a free country, it ought 
certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal 
of that body, which is constituted the guardian of the 
National security. If standing armies are dangerous to 
liberty, an efficacious power over the militia, in the body 
to whose care the protection of the State is committed, 
ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement 
and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions. If the 
Foederal Government can command the aid of the mili- 
tia in those emergencies, which call for the military arm 
in support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dis- 
pense with the employment of a different kind of force. 
If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will be obliged 
to recur to the latter. To render an army unnecessary, 
will be a more certain method of preventing its exist- 
ence, than a thousand prohibitions upon paper. 

In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling 
forth the militia to execute trie laws of the Union, it 
has been remarked that there is nowhere any provision 
in the proposed Constitution for calling out the posse 
comitatus, to assist the magistrate in the execution of 
his duty ; whence it has been inferred, that military 
force was intended to be his only auxiliary. There is 
a striking incoherence in the objections which have ap- 
peared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not 
much calculated to inspire a very favorable opinion of 
the sincerity or fair dealing of their authors. The same 
persons who tell us in one breath, that the powers of 
the Foederal Government will be despotic and unlim- 
ited, inform us in the next, that it has not authority suf- 
ficient even to call out the posse comitatus. The lat- 
ter, fortunately, is as much short of the truth as the 
former exceeds it. It would be as absurd to doubt, that 



The Federalist. 233 

a right to pass all laws necessary and proper to execute 
its declared powers, would include that of requiring the 
assistance of the citizens to the officers who may be in 
trusted with the execution of those laws, as it would 
be to believe, that a right to enact laws necessary and 
nroper for the imposition and collection of taxes, would 
.nvolve that of varying the rules of descent and of the 
alienation of landed property, or of abolishing the trial 
by jury in cases relating to it. It being therefore evi- 
dent, that the supposition of a want of power to require 
the aid of the posse comitatus is entirely destitute of 
color, it will follow, that the conclusion which has been 
drawn from it, in its application to the authority of the 
Fcederal Government over the militia, is as uncandid as 
it is illogical. What reason could there be to infer, that 
force was intended to be the sole instrument of author? 
ity, merely because there is a power to make use of it 
when necessary ? What shall we think of the motives, 
which could induce men of sense to reason in this man- 
ner ? How shall we prevent a conflict between charity 
and judgment ? 

By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican 
jealousy, we are even taught to apprehend danger from 
the militia itself, in the hands of the Fcederal Govern- 
ment. It is observed, that select corps may be formed, 
composed of the young and ardent, who may be 
rendered subservient to the views of arbitrary power. 
What plan for the regulation of the militia may be pur- 
sued by the National Government, is impossible to be 
foreseen. But so far from viewing the matter in the 
same light with those who object to select corps as dan- 
gerous, were the Constitution ratified, and were I to 
deliver my sentiments to a member of the Foederal 
Legislature from this State on the subject of a militia 
establishment, I should hold to him, in substance, the 
following discourse : — 



234 The Federalist. 

" The project of disciplining all the militia of the 

* United States is as futile as it would be injurious, 

* if it were capable of being carried into execution. A 
' tolerable expertness in military movements, is a busi- 
1 ness that requires time and practice. It is not a day, 
"■* or even a week, that will suffice for the attainment of 
" it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry, and 
" of the other classes of the citizens, to be under arms 
" for the purpose of going through military exercises 
" and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to ac- 
" quire the degree of perfection which would entitle 
" them to the character of a well-regulated militia, 
" would be a real grievance to the People, and a seri- 
" ous public inconvenience and loss. It would form an 
" annual deduction from the productive labor of the 
" country, to an amount, which, calculating upon the 
" present numbers of the People, would not fall far short 
" of the whole expense of the civil establishments of all 
"the States. To attempt a thing which would abridge 
"the mass of labor and industry to so considerable an 
" extent, would be unwise : and the experiment, if made, 
" could not succeed, because it would not long be en- 
li dured. Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with 
w< respect to the People at large, than to have them prop- 
" erly armed and equipped ; and in order to see that this 
" be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them 
" once or twice in the course of a year. 

" But though the scheme of disciplining the whole 
" Nation must be abandoned as mischievous or imprac- 
" ticable ; yet it is a matter of the utmost importance, 
" that a well-digested plan should, as soon as possible, 
" be adopted for the proper establishment of the militia. 
" The attention of the Government ought particularly to 
*• be directed to the formation of a select corps of mod- 
" erate extent, upon such principles as will really fit them 

* for service in case of need. By thus circumscribing the 



The Federalist. 235 

plan, it will be possible to have an excellent body of 

* well-trained militia, ready to take the field whenever 
u the defence of the State shall require it. This will 
H not only lessen the call for military establishments, 
u but if circumstances should at any time oblige the 
a Government to form an army of any magnitude, 
" that army can never be formidable to the liberties of 
" the People, while there is a large body of citizens, lit- 
" tie, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use 

* of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights, 
" and those of their fellow-citizens. This appears to 
" me the only substitute that can be devised for a stand- 
" ing army, and the best possible security against it, if 
" it should exist." 

Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed 
Constitution should I reason on the same subject ; de- 
ducing arguments of safety from the very sources which 
they represent as fraught with danger and perdition. 
But how the National Legislature may reason on the 
point, is a thing which neither they nor I can foresee. 

There is something so far fetched, and so extravagant, 
in the idea of danger to liberty from the militia, that 
one is at a loss, whether to treat it with gravity or with 
raillery ; whether to consider it as a mere trial of skill, 
like the paradoxes of rhetoricians ; as a disingenuous 
artifice, to instil prejudices at any price ; or as the se- 
rious offspring of political fanaticism. "Where, in the 
name of common sense, are our fears to end, if we may 
not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fel- 
low-citizens ? What shadow of danger can there be 
from men who are daily mingling with the rest of their 
countrymen ; and who participate with them in the same 
feelings, sentiments, habits, and interests ? What rea- 
sonable cause of apprehension can be* inferred from a 
}ower in the Union to prescribe regulations for the 
rnilitia, and to command its services when necessary. 



236 The Federalist. 

while the particular States are to have the sole and ex- 
clusive appointment of the officers ? If it were possible 
seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia, upon any 
conceivable establishment under the Foederal Govern- 
ment, the circumstance of the officers being in the ap- 
pointment of the States ought at once to extinguish it. 
There can be no doubt, that this circumstance will al- 
ways secure to them a preponderating influence over 
the militia. 

In reading many of the publications against the Con- 
stitution, a man is apt to imagine that he is perusing 
some ill-written tale or romance, which, instead of nat- 
ural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind nothing 
but frightful and distorted shapes — 

" Gorgons, Hydras, and Chimeras dire ; " 

discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and 
transforming everything it touches into a monster. 

A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated 
and improbable suggestions which have taken place re- 
specting the power of calling for the services of the 
militia. That of New Hampshire is to be marched to 
Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to 
Kentucky, and of Kentucky to Lake Champlain. Nay, 
the debts due to the French and Dutch are to be paid in 
nilitia-men instead of Louis d'ors and ducats. At one 
moment, there is to be a large army to lay prostrate the 
liberties of the People ; at another moment, the militia 
of Virginia are to be dragged from their homes, five or 
six hundred miles, to tame the republican contumacy 
»f Massachusetts ; and that of Massachusetts is to be 
transported an equal distance, to subdue the refractory 
haughtiness of the aristocratic Virginians. Do the per- 
sons who rave at this rate, imagine that their art or 
their eloquence can impose any conceits or absurdities 
upon the People of America for infallible truths ? 



The Federalist. 23V 

If there should be an army to be made use of as the 
engine of despotism, what need of the militia ? If there 
should be no army, whither would the militia, irritated 
by being called upon to undertake a distant and hope- 
less expedition, for the purpose of riveting the chains of 
slavery upon a part of their countrymen, direct their 
course, but to the seat of the tyrants, who had medi- 
tated so foolish as well as so wicked a project, to crush 
them in their imagined intrenchments of power, and to 
make them an example of the just vengeance of an 
abused and incensed People ? Is this the way in which 
usurpers stride to dominion over a numerous and en- 
lightened Nation ? Do they begin by exciting the detes- 
tation of the very instruments of their intended usurpa- 
tions ? Do they usually commence their career by wan- 
ton and disgustful acts of power, calculated to answer 
no end, but to draw upon themselves universal hatred 
and execration ? Are suppositions of this sort the sober 
admonitions of discerning patriots to a discerning Peo- 
ple ? Or are they the inflammatory ravings of chagrined 
incendiaries, or distempered enthusiasts ? If we were 
even to suppose the National rulers actuated by the most 
ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to believe that 
they would employ such preposterous means to accom- 
plish their designs. 

In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be 
natural and proper, that the militia of a neighboring 
State should be marched into another, to resist a com- 
mon enemy, or to guard the republic against the vio- 
lence of faction or sedition. This was frequently the 
Ease, in respect to the first object, in the course of the 
late war ; and this mutual succor is, indeed, a principal 
*nd of our political association. If the power of afford- 
ing it be placed under the direction of the Union, there 
will be no danger of a supine and listless inattention to 
Jie dangers of a neighbor, till its near approach had 



238 The Federalist. 

superadded the incitements of self-preservation, to the 
too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy. 

I have now gone through the examination of such of 
the powers proposed to be vested in the United States, 
which may be considered as having an immediate rela- 
tion to the energy of the Government ; and have endeav- 
ored to answer the principal objections which have been 
made to them. I have passed over in silence those 
minor authorities which are either too inconsiderable to 
have been thought worthy of the hostilities of the oppo- 
nents of the Constitution, or of too manifest propriety 
to admit of controversy. The mass of Judiciary power, 
however, might have claimed an investigation under 
this head, had it not been for the consideration that its 
organization and its extent may be more advantageously 
considered in connection. This has determined me to 
refer it to the branch of our inquiries, upon which we 
shall next enter. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the Daily Advertiser, Friday, January 11, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXVI. 



To the People of the State of New York • 

IN reviewing the defects of the existing Confederation, 
and showing that they cannot be supplied by a Gov- 
ernment of less energy than that before the public, several 
of the most important principles of the latter fell of 
course under consideration. But as the ultimate object 
of these papers is, to determine clearly and fully the 
merits of this Constitution, and the expediency of adopt- 
ing it, our plan cannot be completed without taking a 



The Federalist. 239 

more critical and thorough survey of the work of the 
Convention ; without examining it on all its sides ; 
comparing it in all its parts ; and calculating its proba- 
ble effects. 

That this remaining task may be executed under 
impressions conducive to a just and fair result, some 
reflections must in this place be indulged, which candoi 
previously suggests. 

It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs, 
that public measures are rarely investigated with that 
spirit of moderation which is essential to a just estimate 
of their real tendency to advance or obstruct the public 
good ; and that this spirit is more apt to be diminished 
than promoted, by those occasions which require an 
unusual exercise of it. To those who have been led by 
experience to attend to this consideration, it could not 
appear surprising, that the act of the Convention, which 
recommends so many important changes and innova- 
tions, which may be viewed in so many lights and rela- 
tions, and which touches the springs of so many pas- 
sions and interests, should find or excite dispositions 
unfriendly, both on one side and on the other, to a fair 
discussion and accurate judgment of its merits. In 
some, it has been too evident from their own publica- 
tions, that they have scanned the proposed Constitution, 
not only with a predisposition to censure, but with a 
predetermination to condemn ; as the language held by 
others betrays an opposite predetermination or bias, 
which must render their opinions also of little moment 
in the question. In placing, however, these different 
characters on a level, with respect to the weight of their 
opinions, I wish not to insinuate that there may not be 
a material difference in the purity of their intentions. 
It is but just to remark in favor of the latter description, 
that as our situation is universally admitted to be pecu- 
liarly critical, and to require indispensably, that some- 



240 The Federalist. 

thing should be done for our relief, the predetermined 
patron of what has been actually done may have taken 
his bias from the weight of these considerations, as well 
as from considerations of a sinister nature. The prede- 
termined adversary, on the other hand, can have been 
governed by no venial motive whatever. The intentions 
of the first may be upright, as they may on the contrary 
be culpable. The views of the last cannot be upright, 
and must be culpable. But the truth is, that these 
papers are not addressed to persons falling under either 
of these characters. They solicit the attention of those 
only, who add to a sincere zeal for the happiness of their 
country, a temper favorable to a just estimate of the 
means of promoting it. 

Persons of this character will proceed to an examina- 
tion of the Plan submitted by the Convention, not only 
without a disposition to find or to magnify faults ; but 
will see the propriety of reflecting, that a faultless plan 
was not to be expected. Nor will they barely make 
allowances for the errors which may be chargeable on 
the fallibility to which the Convention, as a body of 
men, were liable ; but will keep in mind, that they them- 
selves also are but men, and ought not to assume an 
infallibility in rejudging the fallible opinions of others. 

With equal readiness will it be perceived, that besides 
these inducements to candor, many allowances ought to 
be made, for the difficulties inherent in the very nature 
of the undertaking referred to the Convention. 

The novelty of the undertaking immediately strikes 
us. It has been shown in the course of these papers, 
that the existing Confederation is founded on principles 
which are fallacious ; that we must consequently change 
this first foundation, and with it the superstructure rest- 
ing upon it. It has been shown, that the other Confed- 
eracies which could be consulted as precedents have been 
*itiated by the same erroneous principles, and can there- 



The Federalist. 241 

fore furnish no other light than that of beacons, which 
give warning of the course to be shunned, without 
pointing out that which ought to be pursued. The 
most that the Convention could do in such a situation, 
was to avoid the errors suggested by the past experience 
of other countries, as well as of our own ; and to pro- 
vide a convenient mode of rectifying their own errors, 
as future experience may unfold them. 

Among the difficulties encountered by the Conven- 
tion, a very important one must have lain, in combining 
the requisite stability and energy in Government, with 
the inviolable attention due to liberty, and to the repub- 
lican form. Without substantially accomplishing this 
part of their undertaking, they would have very imper- 
fectly fulfilled the object of their appointment, or the 
expectation of the public; yet that it could not be easily 
accomplished, will be denied by no one who is unwilling 
to betray his ignorance of the subject. Energy in Gov- 
ernment is essential to that security against external and 
internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary execu- 
tion of the laws, which enter into the very definition of 
good Government. Stability in Government is essential 
to National character, and to the advantages annexed to 
it, as well as to that repose and confidence in the minds 
of the People, which are among the chief blessings of 
civil society. An irregular and mutable legislation is 
not more an evil in itself, than it is odious to the Peo- 
ple ; and it may be pronounced with assurance, that the 
People of this country, enlightened as they are, with 
regard to the nature, and interested, as the great body 
til' them are, in the effects of good Government, will 
never be satisfied, till some remedy be applied to the 
vicissitudes and uncertainties, which characterize the 
State administrations. On comparing, however, these 
valuable ingredients with the vital principles of liberty, 
we must perceive at once the difficulty of mingling them 

VOL. I. 16 



242 The Federalist. 

together in their due proportions. The genius of repub- 
lican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only that 
all power should be derived from the People, but that 
those intrusted with it should be kept in dependence on 
the People, by a short duration of their appointments ; 
and that even during this short period, the trust should 
be placed not in a few, but in a number of hands. Sta- 
bility, on the contrary, requires, that the hands in which 
power is lodged should continue for a length of time 
the same. A frequent change of men will result from a 
frequent return of elections ; and a frequent change of 
measures, from a frequent change of men: whilst energy 
in Government requires not only a certain duration of 
power, but the execution of it by a single hand. 

How far the Convention may have succeeded in this 
part of their work, will better appear on a more accurate 
view of it. From the cursory view here taken, it must 
clearly appear to have been an arduous part. 

Not less arduous must have been the task of marking 
the proper line of partition between the authority of the 
General, and that of the State Governments. Every 
man will be sensible of this difficulty, in proportion as 
he has been accustomed to contemplate and discrimi- 
nate objects, extensive and complicated in their nature. 
The faculties of the mind itself have never yet been 
distinguished and defined, with satisfactory precision, by 
all the efforts of the most acute and metaphysical phi- 
losophers. Sense, perception, judgment, desire, volition, 
memory, imagination, are found to be separated, by such 
delicate shades and minute gradations, that their boun- 
daries have eluded the most subtle investigations, and 
remain a pregnant source of ingenious disquisition and 
controversy. The boundaries between the great king- 
doms of nature, and, still more, between the various prov- 
inces, and lesser portions, into which they are subdivided 
afford another illustration of the same important truth 



The Federalist. 243 

The most sagacious and laborious naturalists have never 
yet succeeded in tracing with certainty the line which 
separates the district of vegetable life from the neigh- 
boring region of unorganized matter, or which marks 
the termination of the former, and the commencement 
of the animal empire. A still greater obscurity lies in 
the distinctive characters, by which the objects in each 
of these great departments of nature have been arranged 
and assorted. 

When we pass from the works of nature, in which all 
the delineations are perfectly accurate, and appear to be 
otherwise only from the imperfection of the eye which 
surveys them, to the institutions of man, in which the 
obscurity arises as well from the object itself, as from 
the organ by which it is contemplated; we must per- 
ceive the necessity of moderating still farther our expec- 
tations and hopes from the efforts of human sagacity. 
Experience has instructed us, that no skill in the science 
of Government has yet been able to discriminate and 
define, with sufficient certainty, its three great prov- 
inces, the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary ; or even 
the privileges and powers of the different Legislative 
branches. Questions daily occur in the course of prac- 
tice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in these 
subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in politi- 
cal science. 

The experience of ages, with the continued and com- 
bined labors of the most enlightened legislators and 
jurists, have been equally unsuccessful in delineating the 
several objects and limits of different codes of laws, and 
different tribunals of justice. The precise extent of the 
common law, and the statute law, the maritime law, the 
ecclesiastical law, the law of corporations, and other local 
laws and customs, remains still to be clearly and finally 
established in Great Britain, where accuracy in such 
subjects has been more industriously pursued than in 



244 The Federalist. 

any other part of the world. The jurisdiction of her 
several Courts, general and local, of law, of equity, of 
admiralty, &c, is not less a source of frequent and intri- 
cate discussions, sufficiently denoting the indeterminate 
limits by which they are respectively circumscribed. 
All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical 
skill, and passed on the fullest and most "mature deliber- 
ation, are considered as more or less obscure and equiv- 
ocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained 
by a series of particular discussions and adjudications. 
Besides the obscurity arising from the complexity of 
objects, and the imperfection of the human faculties, the 
medium through which the conceptions of men are con- 
veyed to each other adds a fresh embarrassment. The 
use of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity therefore 
requires, not only that the ideas should be distinctly 
formed, but that they should be expressed by words dis- 
tinctly and exclusively appropriated to them. But no 
language is so copious as to supply words and phrases 
for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include 
many, equivocally denoting different ideas. Hence it 
must happen, that however accurately objects may be 
discriminated in themselves, and however accurately the 
discrimination may be considered, the definition of them 
may be rendered inaccurate, by the inaccuracy of the 
terms in which it is delivered. And this unavoidable 
inaccuracy must be greater or less, according to the 
complexity and novelty of the objects defined. "When 
the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind 
in their own language, his meaning, luminous as it must 
be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium 
through which it is communicated. 

Here, then, are three sources of vague and incorrect 
definitions : indistinctness of the object, imperfection of 
the organ of conception, inadequateness of the vehicle 
of ideas. Any one of these must produce a certain 



The Federalist. 24S 

legree of obscurity. The Convention, in delineating the 
joundary between the Fcederal and State jurisdictions, 
must have experienced the full effect of them all. 

To the difficulties already mentioned, may be added 
the interfering pretensions of the larger and smaller 
States. We cannot err, in supposing that the former 
would contend for a participation in the Government, 
fully proportioned to their superior wealth and impor- 
tance ; and that the latter would not be less tenacious 
of the equality at present enjoyed by them. We may 
well suppose, that neither side would entirely yield to 
the other, and consequently that the struggle could be 
terminated only by compromise. It is extremely proba- 
ble, also, that after the ratio of representation had been 
adjusted, this very compromise must have produced a 
fresh struggle between the same parties, to give such a 
turn to the organization of the Government, and to the 
distribution of its powers, as would increase the impor- 
tance of the branches, in forming which they had respec- 
tively obtained the greatest share of influence. There 
are features in the Constitution which warrant each of 
these suppositions ; and as far as either of them is well 
founded, it shows that the Convention must have been 
compelled to sacrifice theoretical propriety, to the force 
of extraneous considerations. 

Nor could it have been the large and small States 
only, which would marshal themselves in opposition to 
each other on various points. Other combinations, re- 
sulting from a difference of local position and policy, 
must have created additional difficulties. As every 
State may be divided into different districts, and its citi- 
zens into different classes, which give birth to contending 
interests and local jealousies ; so the different parts of 
che United States are distinguished from each other, by 
a variety of circumstances, which produce a like effect 
on a larger scale. And although this variety of inter- 



24G The Federalist. 

ests, for reasons sufficiently explained in a former paper, 
may have a salutary influence on the administration of 
the Government when formed ; yet every one must be 
sensible of the contrary influence, which must have been 
experienced in the task of forming it. 

Would it be wonderful, if, under the pressure of all 
these difficulties, the Convention should have been forced 
into some deviations from that artificial structure and 
regular symmetry, which an abstract view of the subject 
might lead an ingenious theorist to bestow on a Consti- 
tution planned in his closet, or in his imagination ? The 
real wonder is, that so many difficulties should have 
been surmounted ; and surmounted, with an unanimity 
almost as unprecedented, as it must have been unex- 
pected. It is impossible for any man of candor to reflect 
on this circumstance, without partaking of the astonish- 
ment. It is impossible for the man of pious reflection, 
not to perceive in it a finger of that Almighty hand, 
which has been so frequently and signally extended to 
our relief in the critical stages of the Revolution. 

We had occasion, in a former paper, to take notice of 
the repeated trials which have been unsuccessfully made 
in the United Netherlands, for reforming the baneful and 
notorious vices of their Constitution. The history of 
almost all the great councils and consultations held 
among mankind for reconciling their discordant opin- 
ions, assuaging their mutual jealousies, and adjusting 
their respective interests, is a history of factions, conten- 
tions, and disappointments ; and may be classed among 
the most dark and degraded pictures, which display the 
infirmities and depravities of the human character. If, 
in a few scattered instances, a brighter aspect is pre- 
sented, they serve only as exceptions to admonish us of 
he general truth ; and by their lustre to darken the 
gloom of the adverse prospect, to which they are con» 
trasted. In revolving the causes from which these ex 



The Federalist 247 

septions result, and applying them to the particular 
instance before us, we are necessarily led to two impor' 
tant conclusions. The first is, that the Convention must 
have enjoyed, in a very singular degree, an exemption 
from the pestilential influence of party animosities — 
the diseases most incident to deliberative bodies, and 
most apt to contaminate their proceedings. The second 
conclusion is, that all the deputations composing the 
Convention were either satisfactorily accommodated by 
the final act, or were induced to accede to it by a deep 
conviction of the necessity of sacrificing private opin- 
ions and partial interests to the public good, and by a 
despair of seeing this necessity diminished by delays, or 
by new experiments. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, January 15, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXVII. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

I T is not a little remarkable, that in every case reported 
■*■ by ancient history, in which Government has been 
established with deliberation and consent, the task of 
framing it has not been committed to an assembly of 
men, but has been performed by some individual citi- 
zen, of preeminent wisdom and approved integrity. 

Minos, we learn, was the primitive founder of the 
Government of Crete ; as Zaleucus was of that of the 
Locrians. Theseus first, and after him Draco and 
Solon, instituted the Government of Athens. Lycurgus 
was the lawgiver of Sparta. The foundation of the 
original Government of Rome was laid by Romulus; 



248 The Federalist. 

and the work completed by two of his elective succes- 
sors, Numa, and Tullius Hostilius. On the abolition 
of royalty, the Consular administration was substituted 
by Brutus, who stepped forward with a project for such 
a reform, which, he alleged, had been prepared by Tul- 
lius Hostilius, and to which his address obtained the 
assent and ratification of the Senate and People. This 
remark is applicable to Confederate Governments also. 
Amphictyon, we are told, was the author of that which 
bore his name. The Achaean league received its first 
birth from Acjleus, and its second from Aratus. 

What degree of agency these reputed lawgivers might 
have in their respective establishments, or how far they 
might be clothed with the legitimate authority of the 
People, cannot, in every instance, be ascertained. In 
some, however, the proceeding was strictly regular. Dra- 
co appears to have been intrusted by the People of 
Athens with indefinite powers to reform its Government 
and laws. And Solon, according to Plutarch, was in 
a manner compelled, by the universal suffrage of his 
fellow-citizens, to take upon him the sole and absolute 
power of new-modelling the Constitution. The proceed- 
ings under Lycurgus were less regular; but as far as 
the advocates for a regular reform could prevail, they all 
turned their eyes towards the single efforts of that cele- 
brated patriot and sage, instead of seeking to bring 
about a revolution, by the intervention of a deliberative 
body of citizens. 

Whence could it have proceeded, that a People, jeal- 
ous as the Greeks were of their liberty, should so far 
abandon the rules of caution as to place their destiny in 
the hands of a single citizen ? Whence could it have 
proceeded, that the Athenians, a People who would not 
suffer an army to be commanded by fewer than ten Gen- 
erals, and who required no other proof of danger to their 
liberties than the illustrious merit of a fellow-citizen 



The Federalist. 249 

should consider one illustrious citizen jls a more eligible 
depositary of the fortunes of themselves and their pos- 
terity, than a select body of citizens, from whose com- 
mon deliberations more wisdom, as well as more safety, 
might have been expected ? These questions cannot be 
fully answered, without supposing that the fears of dis- 
cord and disunion among a number of Counsellors, 
exceeded the apprehension of treachery or incapacity in 
a single individual. History informs us, likewise, of the 
difficulties with which these celebrated reformers had to 
contend ; as well as of the expedients which they were 
obliged to employ, in order to carry their reforms into 
effect. Solon, who seems to have indulged a more 
temporizing policy, confessed that he had not given to 
his countrymen the Government best suited to their hap- 
piness, but most tolerable to their prejudices. And Ly- 
curgus, more true to his object, was under the necessity 
of mixing a portion of violence with the authority of 
superstition ; and of securing his final success, by a vol- 
untary renunciation, first of his country, and then of his 
life. If these lessons teach us, on one hand, to admire 
the improvement made by America on the ancient mode 
of preparing and establishing regular plans of Govern- 
ment : they serve not less on the other, to admonish us 
of the hazards and difficulties incident to such experi- 
ments, and of the great imprudence of unnecessarily 
multiplying them. 

Is it an unreasonable conjecture, that the errors which 
may be contained in the plan of the Convention are 
such as have resulted rather from the defect of antece- 
dent experience on this complicated and difficult subject, 
than from a want of accuracy or care in the inves- 
tigation of it ; and, consequently, such as will not be 
ascertained until an actual trial shall have pointed them 
out? This conjecture is rendered probable, not only by 
many considerations of a general nature, but by the 



250 The Federalist. 

particular case of the Articles of Confederation. It ia 
observable that among the numerous objections and 
amendments suggested by the several States, when these 
Articles were submitted for their ratification, not one is 
found, which alludes to the great and radical error, 
which on actual trial has discovered itself. And if we 
except the observations which New Jersey was led to 
make, rather by her local situation, than by her peculiar 
foresight, it may be questioned whether a single sugges- 
tion was of sufficient moment to justify a revision of 
the system. There is abundant reason, nevertheless, to 
suppose that immaterial as these objections were, they 
would have been adhered to with a very dangeious 
inflexibility, in some States, had not a zeal for their 
opinions and supposed interests been stifled by the more 
powerful sentiment of self-preservation. One State, we 
may remember, persisted for several years in refusing 
her concurrence, although the enemy remained the whole 
period at our gates, or rather in the very bowels of our 
country. Nor was her pliancy in the end effected by a 
less motive, than the fear of being chargeable with pro- 
tracting the public calamities, and endangering the event 
of the contest. Every candid reader will make the 
proper reflections on these important facts. 

A patient who finds his disorder daily growing worse, 
and that an efficacious remedy can no longer be delayed 
without extreme danger, after coolly revolving his situ- 
ation, and the characters of different physicians, selects 
and calls in such of them as he judges most capable of 
administering relief, and best entitled to his confidence. 
The physicians attend : the case of the patient is care- 
fully examined : a consultation is held : they are unani- 
mously agreed that the symptoms are critical; but that 
the case, with proper and timely relief, is so far from 
oeing desperate, that it may be made to issue in an im- 
provement of his constitution. They are equally unan- 



The Federalist. 251 

imous in prescribing the remedy, by which this happy 
effect is to be produced. The prescription is no soon- 
er made known, however, than a number of persons in- 
terpose, and, without denying the reality or danger of 
the disorder, assure the patient that the prescription 
will be poison to his constitution, and forbid him, under 
pain of certain death, to make use of it. Might not 
the patient reasonably demand, before he ventured to 
follow this advice, that the authors of it should at 
least agree among themselves on some other remedy 
to be substituted ? And if he found them differing as 
much from one another as from his first counsellor, 
would he not act prudently in trying the experiment 
unanimously recommended by the latter, rather than 
be hearkening to those who could neither deny the 
necessity of a speedy remedy, nor agree in proposing 
one ? 

Such a patient, and in such a situation, is America at 
this moment. She has been sensible of her malady. 
She has obtained a regular and unanimous advice from 
men of her own deliberate choice. And she is warned 
by others against following this advice, under pain of 
the most fatal consequences. Do the monitors deny the 
reality of her danger ? No. Do they deny the necessity 
of some speedy and powerful remedy? No. Are they 
agreed, are any two of them agreed, in their objections 
to the remedy proposed, or in the proper one to be sub- 
stituted? Let them speak for themselves. This one 
tells us, that the proposed Constitution ought to be re- 
jected, because it is not a confederation of the States, 
but a Government over individuals. Another admits, 
that it ought to be a Government over individuals, to 
a certain extent, but by no means to the extent pro- 
posed. A third does not object to the Government over 
individuals, or to the extent proposed, but to the want 
of a Bill of Rights. A fourth concurs in the absolute 



252 The Federalist. 

necessity of a Bill of Rights, bat contends, that it ought 
to be declaratory not of the personal rights of individ 
uals, but of the rights reserved to the States in their 
political capacity. A fifth is of opinion, that a Bill of 
Rights of any sort would be superfluous and misplaced, 
and that the plan would be unexceptionable, but for the 
fatal power of regulating the times and places of elec- 
tion. An objector in a large State exclaims loudly 
against the unreasonable equality of representation in 
the Senate. An objector in a small State is equally 
loud against the dangerous inequality in the House of 
Representatives. From this quarter, we are alarmed 
with the amazing expense, from the number of persons 
who are to administer the new Government. From 
another quarter, and sometimes from the same quarter, 
on another occasion, the cry is, that the Congress will 
be but a shadow of a representation, and that the Gov- 
ernment would be far less objectionable, if the number 
and the expense were doubled. A patriot in a State 
that does not import or export, discerns insuperable 
objections against the power of direct taxation. The 
patriotic adversary in a State of great exports and im- 
ports is not less dissatisfied that the whole burden of 
taxes may be thrown on consumption. This politician 
discovers in the Constitution a direct and irresistible ten- 
dency to monarchy : that is equally sure it will end in 
aristocracy. Another is puzzled to say which of these 
shapes it will ultimately assume, but sees clearly it must 
be one or other of them; whilst a fourth is not wanting, 
who with no less confidence affirms that the Constitu- 
tion is so far from having a bias towards either of these 
dangers, that the weight on that side will not be suffi- 
cient to keep it upright and firm against its opposite 
propensities. With another class of adversaries to the 
Constitution, the language is, that the Legislative, Ex- 
ecutive, and Judiciary departments are intermixed iu 



The Federalist 253 

such a manner, as to contradict all the ideas of regular 
Government, and all the requisite precautions in favor 
of liberty. Whilst this objection circulates in vague and 
general expressions, there are not a few who lend their 
sanction to it. Let each one come forward with his 
particular explanation, and scarce any two are exactly 
agreed on the subject. In the eyes of one, the junction 
of the Senate with the President, in the responsible func- 
tion of appointing to offices, instead of vesting this Exec- 
utive power in the Executive alone, is the vicious part of 
the organization. To another, the exclusion of the House 
of Representatives, whose numbers alone could be a due 
security against corruption and partiality in the exercise 
of such a power, is equally obnoxious. With another, 
the admission of the President into any share of a power, 
which must ever be a dangerous engine in the hands of 
the Executive magistrate, is an unpardonable violation 
of the maxims of republican jealousy. No part of the 
arrangement, according to some, is more inadmissible 
than the trial of impeachments by the Senate, which 
is alternately a member both of the Legislative and 
Executive departments, when this power so evidently 
belonged to the Judiciary department. " We concur 
u fully," reply others, " in the objection to this part of the 
" plan, but we can never agree that a reference of im- 
" peach ments to the Judiciary authority would be an 
" amendment of the error. Our principal dislike to the 
' organization arises from the extensive powers already 
' lodged in that department." Even among the zealous 
patrons of a Council of State the most irreconcilable 
variance is discovered, concerning the mode in which it 
ought to be constituted. The demand of one gentle- 
man is, that the Council should consist of a small num- 
ber to be appointed by the most numerous branch of 
the Legislature. Another would prefer a larger number, 
xid considers it as a fundamental condition, that the 



254 The Federalist. 

appointment should be made by the President him- 
self. 

As it can give no umbrage to the writers against the 
plan of the Fcederal Constitution, let us suppose, that 
as they are the most zealous, so they are also the most 
sagacious, of those who think the late Convention were 
unequal to the task assigned them, and that a wiser and 
better plan might and ought to be substituted. Let us 
further suppose, that their country should concur, both 
in this favorable opinion of their merits, and in their 
unfavorable opinion of the Convention ; and should 
accordingly proceed to form them into a second Con- 
vention, with full powers, and for the express purpose 
of revising and remoulding the work of the first. Were 
the experiment to be seriously made, though it required 
some effort to view it seriously even in fiction, I leave it 
to be decided by the sample of opinions just exhibited, 
whether, with all their enmity to their predecessors, they 
would, in any one point, depart so widely from their 
example, as in the discord and ferment that would mark 
their own deliberations ; and whether the Constitution, 
now before the public, would not stand as fair a chance 
for immortality, as Lycurgus gave to that of Sparta, by 
making its change to depend on his own return from 
exile and death, if it were to be immediately adopted, 
and were to continue in force, not until a better, but 
until another should be agreed upon by this new 
assembly of Lawgivers. 

It is a matter, both of wonder and regret, that those 
who raise so many objections against the new Constitu- 
tion should never call to mind the defects of that which 
is to be exchanged for it. It is not necessary that the 
former should be perfect : it is sufficient that the lattei 
is more imperfect. No man would refuse to give brass 
for silver or gold, because the latter had some alloy in 
it. No man would refuse to quit a shattered and tot- 



The Federalist. 255 

tering habitation for a firm and commodious building, 
because the latter had not a porch to it, or because 
some of the rooms might be a little larger or smaller, or 
the ceiling a little higher or lower than his fancy would 
have planned them. But waiving illustrations of this 
sort, is it not manifest that most of the capital objec- 
tions urged against the new system lie with tenfold 
weight against the existing Confederation ? Is an indef- 
inite power to raise money dangerous in the hands of 
the Fcederal Government? The present Congress can 
make requisitions to any amount they please ; and the 
States are constitutionally bound to furnish them ; they 
can emit bills of credit as long as they will pay for the 
paper; they can borrow, both abroad and at home, as 
long as a shilling will be lent. Is an indefinite power to 
raise troops dangerous ? The Confederation gives to 
Congress that power also ; and they have already begun 
to make use of it. Is it improper and unsafe to intermix 
the different powers of Government in the same body 
of men? Congress, a single body of men, are the sole 
depositary of all the Fcederal powers. Is it particularly 
dangerous to give the keys of the treasury, and the com- 
mand of the army, into the same hands? The Confed- 
eration places them both in the hands of Congress. Is 
a Bill of Rights essential to liberty ? The Confedera- 
tion has no Bill of Rights. Is it an objection against 
the new Constitution, that it empowers the Senate, with 
the concurrence of the Executive, to make treaties which 
are to be the laws of the land ? The existing Congress, 
without any such control, can make treaties which they 
themselves have declared, and most of the States have 
recognized, to be the supreme law of the land. Is the 
importation of Slaves permitted by the new Constitu- 
tion for twenty years ? By the old it is permitted for- 
ever. 

I shall be told, that however dangerous this mixture 



256 The Federalist. 

of powers may be in theory, it is rendered harmless by 
the dependence of Congress on the States for the means 
of carrying them into practice : That however large the 
mass of powers may be, it is in fact a lifeless mass. 
Then, say I, in the first place, that the Confederation is 
chargeable with the still greater folly, of declaring cer- 
tain powers in the Fcederal Government to be abso- 
lutely necessary, and at the same time rendering them 
absolutely nugatory ; and, in the next place, that if the 
Union is to continue, and no better government be sub- 
stituted, effective powers must either be granted to, or 
assumed by, the existing Congress; in either of which 
events, the contrast just stated will hold good. But this 
is not all. Out of this lifeless mass has already grown 
an excrescent power, which tends to realize all the dan- 
gers that can be apprehended from a defective construc- 
tion of the supreme Government of the Union. It is 
now no longer a point of speculation and hope, that the 
Western territory is a mine of vast wealth to the United 
States; and although it is not of such a nature as to 
extricate them from their present distresses, or, for some 
time to come, to yield any regular supplies for the public 
expenses, yet must it hereafter be able, under proper 
management, both to effect a gradual discharge of the 
domestic debt, and to furnish, for a certain period, liberal 
tributes to the Fcederal treasury. A very large propor- 
tion of this fund has been already surrendered by indi- 
vidual States ; and it may with reason be expected, that 
the remaining States will not persist in withholding 
similar proofs of their equity and generosity. We may 
calculate, therefore, that a rich and fertile country, of an 
area equal to the inhabited extent of the United States, 
will soon become a National stock. Congress have as 
sumed the administration of this stock. They have 
begun to render it productive. Congress have under- 
taken to do more : — they have proceeded to form new 



The Federalist. 257 

States ; to erect temporary Governments ; to appoint 
officers for them ; and to prescribe the conditions on 
which such States shall be admitted into the Confed- 
eracy. All this has been done : and done without the 
least color of Constitutional authority. Yet no blame 
has been whispered; no alarm has been sounded. A 
great and independent fund of revenue is passing into 
the hands of a single body of men, who can raise 
troops to an indefinite number, and appropriate money 
to their support for an indefinite period of time. And 
yet there are men, who have not only been silent spec- 
tators of this prospect, but who are advocates for the 
system which exhibits it ; and, at the same time, urge 
against the new system the objections which we have 
heard. Would they not act with more consistency, in 
urging the establishment of the latter, as no less neces- 
sary to guard the Union against the future powers and 
resources of a body constructed like the existing Con- 
gress, than to save it from the dangers threatened by the 
present impotency of that Assembly ? 

I mean not, by anything here said, to throw censure 
on the measures which have been pursued by Congress. 
I am sensible they could not have done otherwise. The 
public interest, the necessity of the case, imposed upon 
them the task of overleaping their Constitutional limits. 
But is not the fact an alarming proof of the danger 
resulting from a Government, which does not possess 
regular powers commensurate to its objects? A dissolu- 
tion or usurpation is the dreadful dilemma to which it is 
continually exposed. 

PUBLIUS. 



tol. i. 17 



258 The Federalist. 

For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXVI 



To the People of the State of New York: 

npHE last paper having concluded the observations, 
-*- which were meant to introduce a candid survey of 
the plan of Government reported by the Convention, 
we now proceed to the execution of that part of our 
undertaking. 

The first question that offers itself is, whether the 
general form and aspect of the Government be strictly 
republican. It is evident that no other form would be 
reconcilable with the genius of the People of America ; 
with the fundamental principles of the Revolution ; or 
with that honorable determination which animates every 
votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments 
on the capacity of mankind for self-government. If the 
plan of the Convention, therefore, be found to depart 
from the republican character, its advocates must aban- 
don it as no longer defensible. 

What then are the distinctive characters of the repub- 
lican form ? "Were an answer to this question to be 
sought, not by recurring to principles, but in the applica- 
tion of the term by political writers, to the Constitutions 
of different States, no satisfactory one would ever be 
found. Holland, in which no particle of the supreme 
authority is derived from the People, has passed almost 
universally under the denomination of a republic. The 
same title has been bestowed on Venice, where absolute 
power over the great body of the People is exercised, in 
the most absolute manner, by a -small body of hereditary 
nobles. Poland, which is a mixture of aristocracy and 
of monarchy in their worst forms, has been dignified 



The Federalist 259 

with the same appellation. The Government of Eng- 
land, which has one republican branch only, combined 
with an hereditary aristocracy and monarchy, has, with 
equal impropriety, been frequently placed on the list of 
republics. These examples, which are nearly as dissim- 
ilar to each other as to a genuine republic, show the 
extreme inaccuracy with which the term has been used 
in political disquisitions. 

If we resort, for a criterion, to the different principles 
on which different forms of Government are established, 
we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow 
that name on, a Government which derives all its powers 
directly or indirectly from the great body of the People, 
and is administered by persons holding their offices dur- 
ing pleasure, for a limited period, or during good be- 
havior. It is essential to such a Government, that it be 
derived from the great body of the society, not from an 
inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it ; other- 
wise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their op- 
pressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire 
to the rank of republicans, and claim for their Govern- 
ment the honorable title of republic. It is sufficient for 
such a Government, that the persons administering it be 
appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the People; 
and that they hold their appointments by either of the 
tenures just specified ; otherwise every Government in 
the United States, as well as every other popular Gov- 
ernment that has been or can be well organized or well 
executed, would be degraded from the republican char- 
acter. According to the Constitution of every State in 
the Union, some or other of the officers of Government 
are appointed indirectly only by the People. According 
to most of them, the chief magistrate himself is so ap- 
oointed. And according to one, this mode of appoint- 
ment is extended to one of the coordinate branches of 
the Legislature. According to all the Constitutions, also, 



260 The Federalist. 

the tenure of the highest offices is extended to a definite 
period, and in many instances, both within the Legisla- 
tive and Executive departments, to a period of year?. 
According to the provisions of most of the Constitutions, 
again, as well as according to the most respectable and 
received opinions on the subject, the members of the 
Judiciary department are to retain their offices by the 
firm tenure of good behavior. 

On comparing the Constitution planned by the Con- 
vention with the standard here fixed, we perceive at 
once that it is, in the most rigid sense, conformable to 
it. The House of Representatives, like that of one 
branch at least of all the State Legislatures, is elected 
immediately by the great body of the People. The 
Senate, like the present Congress, and the Senate of 
Maryland, derives its appointment indirectly from the 
People. The President is indirectly derived from the 
choice of the People, according to the example in most 
of the States. Even the Judges, with all other officers 
of the Union, will, as in the several States, be the 
choice, though a remote choice, of the People them- 
selves. The duration of the appointments is equally 
conformable to the Republican standard, and to the 
model of the State Constitutions. The House of Rep- 
resentatives is periodically elective, as in all the States ; 
and for the period of two years, as in the State of South 
Carolina. The Senate is elective, for the period of six 
years ; which is but one year more than the period of 
the Senate of Maryland ; and but two more than that 
of the Senates of New York and Virginia. The Presi- 
lent is to continue in office for the period of four years ; 
as in New York and Delaware the chief magistrate is 
elected for three years, and in South Carolina for two 
vears. In the other States the election is annual. In 
everal of the States, however, no constitutional pro- 
vision is made for the impeachment of the Chief Magis- 



The Federalist. 261 

tiKve. And in Delaware and Virginia, he is not im- 
peachable till out of office. The President of the United 
States is impeachable at any time during his continu- 
ance in office. The tenure by which the Judges are to 
hold their places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, 
that of good behavior. The tenure of the ministerial 
offices generally, will be a subject of legal regulation, 
conformably to the reason of the case, and the example 
of the State Constitutions. 

Could any further proof be required of the republican 
complexion of this system, the most decisive one might 
be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, 
both under the Foederal and the State Governments ; 
and in its express guaranty of the republican form to 
each of the latter. 

" But it was not sufficient," say the adversaries of the 
proposed Constitution, " for the Convention to adhere 
" to the republican form. They ought, with equal care, 
" to have preserved the Federal form, which regards the 
" Union as a Confederacy of sovereign States ; instead 
" of which, they have framed a National Government, 
u which regards the Union as a consolidation of the 
" States." And it is asked by what authority this bold 
and radical innovation was undertaken ? The handle 
which has been made of this objection requires, that it 
should be examined with some precision. 

Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinc- 
tion on which the objection is founded, it will be neces- 
sary to a just estimate of its force, First, to ascertain 
the real character of the Government in question ; Sec- 
ondly, to inquire how far the Convention were author- 
ized to propose such a Government ; and Thirdly, how 
far the duty they owed to their country could supply 
any defect of regular authority. 

First. In order to ascertain the real character of the 
Government, it may be considered in relation to the 



262 The Federalist. 

foundation on which it is to be established ; to the 
sources from which its ordinary powers are to be 
drawn ; to the operation of those powers ; to the ex- 
tent of them ; and to the authority by which future 
changes in the Government are to be introduced. 

On examining the first relation, it appears, on one 
hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the as- 
sent and ratification of the People of America, given 
by deputies elected for the special purpose ; but on the 
other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by 
the People, not as individuals composing one entire Na- 
tion, but as composing the distinct and independent 
States to which they respectively belong. It is to be 
the assent and ratification of the several States, derived 
from the supreme authority in each State, — the author- 
ity of the People themselves. The act, therefore, estab- 
lishing the Constitution, will not be a National, but a 
Fcederal act. 

That it will be a Fcederal, and not a National act, as 
these terms are understood by the objectors, the act of 
the People, as forming so many independent States, not 
as forming one aggregate Nation, is obvious from this 
single consideration, that it is to result neither from the 
decision of a majority of the People of the Union, nor 
from that of a majority of the States. It must result 
from the unanimous assent of the several States that are 
parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary 
assent than in its being expressed, not by the Legisla- 
tive authority, but by that of the People themselves. 
Were the People regarded in this transaction as form 
ing one Nation, the will of the majority of the whole 
People of the United States would bind the minority, 
in the same manner as the majority in each State must 
bind the minority ; and the will of the majority must 
be determined either by a comparison of the individual 
'ores, or by considering the will of the majority of the 



The Federalist. 263 

States as evidence of the will of a majority of the Peo 
pie of the United States. Neither of these rules has 
been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitu- 
tion, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of 
all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary 
act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, 
if established, be a Federal, and not a National Con- 
stitution. 

The next relation is, to the sources from which the 
ordinary powers of Government are to be derived. The 
House of Representatives will derive its powers from the 
People of America ; and the People will be represented 
in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as 
they are in the Legislature of a particular State. So 
far the Government is National, not Feeder aL The 
Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from 
the States, as political and coequal societies ; and these 
will be represented on the principle of equality in the 
Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So 
far the Government is Federal, not National. The Ex- 
ecutive power will be derived from a very compound 
source. The immediate election of the President is to 
be made by the States in their political characters. The 
votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which 
considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, 
partly as unequal members of the same society. The 
eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch 
of the Legislature which consists of the National rep- 
resentatives ; but in this particular act, they are to be 
thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so 
many distinct and coequal bodies politic. From this 
aspect of the Government, it appears to be of a mixed 
character, presenting at least as many Federal as Na- 
tional features. 

The difference between a Fcederal and National Gov- 
ernment, as it relates to the operation of the Government, 



264 TJie Federalist. 

is supposed to consist in this, that in the former, the pow- 
ers operate on the political bodies composing the Con- 
federacy, in their political capacities ; in the latter, on 
the individual citizens composing the Nation, in theii 
individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by 
this criterion, it falls under the National, not the Fed- 
eral character ; though perhaps not so completely as has 
been understood. In several cases, and particularly in 
the trial of controversies to which States maybe par- 
ties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in their 
collective and political capacities only. So far the Na- 
tional countenance of the Government on this side seems 
to be disfigured by a few Fcederal features. But this 
blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan ; and the 
operation of the Government on the People, in their in- 
dividual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential 
proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it, in this re- 
lation, a National Government. 

But if the Government be National with regard to 
the operation of its powers, it changes its aspect again 
when we contemplate it in relation to the extent of its 
powers. The idea of a National Government involves 
in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens, 
but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, 
so far as they are objects of lawful Government. Among 
a People consolidated into one Nation, this supremacy 
is completely vested in the National Legislature. Among 
communities united for particular purposes, it is vested 
partly in the general, and partly in the municipal Legis- 
latures. In the former case, all local authorities are 
subordinate to the supreme ; and may be controlled, 
directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, 
the local or municipal authorities form distinct and in- 
dependent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, 
within their respective spheres, to the general authority 
than the general authority is subject to them, within 



The Federalist. 265 

its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed 
Government cannot be deemed a National one; since 
its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects 
only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and 
inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true, 
that in controversies relating to the boundary between 
the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to 
decide, is to be established under the General Govern- 
ment. But this does not change the principle of the case. 
The decision is to be impartially made, according to the 
rules of the Constitution ; and all the usual and most 
effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartial- 
ity. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent 
an appeal to the sword, and a dissolution of the com- 
pact ; and that it ought to be established under the Gen- 
eral, rather than under the local Governments, or, to 
speak more properly, that it could be safely estab- 
lished under the first alone, is a position not likely to 
be combated. 

If we try the Constitution by its last relation, to the 
authority by which amendments are to be made, we 
find it neither wholly National, nor wholly Faederal. 
Were it wholly National, the supreme and ultimate 
authority would reside in the majority of the People of 
the Union ; and this authority would be competent at 
all times, like that of a majority of every National so- 
ciety, to alter or abolish its established Government. 
Were it wholly Foederal, on the other hand, the concur- 
rence of each State in the Union would be essential to 
every alteration that would be binding on all. The 
mode provided by the Plan of the Convention is not 
founded on either of these principles. In requiring 
more than a majority, and particularly, in computing 
the proportion by States, not by citizens, it departs from 
the National, and advances towards the Foederal charac- 
ter : in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole 



266 The Federalist. 

number of States sufficient, it loses again the Federal 
and partakes of the National character. 

The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, 
neither a National nor a Fcederal Constitution, but a 
composition of both. In its foundation it is Fcederal, 
not National : in the sources from which the ordinary 
powers of the Government are drawn, it is partly Fced- 
eral, and partly National : in the operation of these 
powers, it is National, not Fcederal : in the extent of 
them, again, it is Fcederal, not National : and, finally, in 
the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it 
is neither wholly Fcederal nor wholly National. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Friday, January 18, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XXXIX. 



To the People op the State of New York : 

THE second point to be examined is, whether the 
Convention were authorized to frame, and propose 
this mixed Constitution. 

The powers of the Convention ought, in strictness, to 
be determined by an inspection of the commissions 
given to the members by their respective constituents. 
As all of these, however, had reference, either to the 
recommendation from the meeting at Annapolis, in 
September, 1786, or to that from Congress, in Februa 
ry, 1787, it will be sufficient to recur to these particular 
Acts. 

The Act from Annapolis recommends the " appoint- 
M ment of Commissioners to take into consideration the 
* situation of the United States ; to devise such furthet 



The Fcederatist. 267 

''provisions, as shall appear to them necessary to rendei 
" the Constitution of the Foederal Government adequate 
" to the exigencies of the Union ; and to report such an 
* Act for that purpose, to the United States in Congress 
" assembled, as when agreed to by them, and afterwards 
" confirmed by the Legislature of every State, will effect- 
" ually provide for the same." 

The recommendatory Act of Congress is in the words 
following : " Whereas, there is provision in the Articles 
" of Confederation and Perpetual Union, for making 
" alterations therein, by the assent of a Congress of the 
" United States, and of the Legislatures of the several 
" States : And whereas experience hath evinced, that 
u there are defects in the present Confederation ; as a 
" mean to remedy which, several of the States, and par- 
" ticularly the State of New York, by express instructions 
u to their delegates in Congress, have suggested a Con- 
" vention for the purposes expressed in the following 
"resolution; and such Convention appearing to be the 
" most probable mean of establishing in these States a 
"firm National Government : — 

" Resolved, — That in the opinion of Congress it is 
" expedient, that on the 2d Monday of May next a 
" Convention of delegates, who shall have been ap- 
" pointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia, 
" for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles 
"of Confederation, and reporting to Congress and the 
"several Legislatures such alterations and provisions 
" therein, as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and con- 
" firmed by the States, render the Foederal Constitution 
" adequate to the exigencies of Government and the pres- 
" ervation of the Union" 

From these two Acts, it appears, 1st, that the object 
of the Convention was to establish, in these States, a 
Hrm National Government ; 2d, that this Government 
vas to be such as would be adequate to the exigencies 



268 The Federalist 

of Government, and the preservation of the Union , 3d 
that these purposes were to be effected by alterations 
and provisions in the Articles of Confederation, as it is 
expressed in the Act of Congress ; or by such further 
provisions as should appear necessary, as it stands in the 
recommendatory Act from Annapolis ; 4th, that the 
alterations and provisions were to be reported to Con- 
gress, and to the States, in order to be agreed to by the 
former and confirmed by the latter. 

From a comparison and fair construction of these 
several modes of expression, is to be deduced the 
authority under which the Convention acted. They 
were to frame a National Government, adequate to the 
exigencies of Government, and of the Union; and to 
reduce the Articles of Confederation into such form as 
to accomplish these purposes. 

There are two rules of construction, dictated by plain 
reason, as well as founded on legal axioms. The one 
is, that every part of the expression ought, if possible, 
to be allowed some meaning, and be made to conspire 
to some common end. The other is, that where the 
several parts cannot be made to coincide, the less im- 
portant should give way to the more important part : 
the means should be sacrificed to the end, rather than 
the end to the means. 

Suppose, then, that the expressions defining the au- 
thority of the Convention were irreconcilably at vari- 
ance with each other ; that a National and adequate 
Government could not possibly, in the judgment of the 
Convention, be effected by alterations and provisions 
in the Articles of Confederation ; which part of the defi- 
lition ought to have been embraced, and which reject- 
ed ? Which was the more important, which the less 
important part? Which the end; which the means? 
Let the most scrupulous expositors of delegated pow- 
ers; let the most inveterate objectors against those 



The Federalist. 269 

exercised by the Convention, answer these questions. 
Let them declare, whether it was of most importance 
to the happiness of the People of America, that the 
Articles of Confederation should be disregarded, and an 
adequate Government be provided, and the Union pre- 
served ; or that an adequate Government should be 
omitted, and the Articles of Confederation preserved. 
Let them declare, whether the preservation of these 
Articles was the end, for securing which a reform of 
the Government was to be introduced as the means ; 
or whether the establishment of a Government, adequate 
to the National happiness, was the end at which these 
Articles themselves originally aimed, and to which they 
ought, as insufficient means, to have been sacrificed. 

But is it necessary to suppose, that these expressions 
are absolutely irreconcilable to each other ; that no alter- 
ations or provisions in the Articles of the Confederation, 
could possibly mould them into a National and ade- 
quate Government ; into such a Government as has 
been proposed by the Convention ? 

No stress, it is presumed, will, in this case, be laid on 
the title ; a change of that could never be deemed an 
exercise of ungranted power. Alterations in the body 
of the instrument are expressly authorized. New pro- 
visions therein are also expressly authorized. Here then 
is a power to change the Title ; to insert new Articles; 
to alter old ones. Must it of necessity be admitted, 
that this power is infringed, so long as a part of the old 
Articles remain ? Those who maintain the affirmative, 
ought at least to mark the boundary between authorized 
and usurped innovations ; between that degree of change 
which lies within the compass of alterations and further 
provisions, and that which amounts to a transmutation 
of the Government. Will it be said, that the alterations 
ought not to have touched the substance of the Confed- 
eration ? The States would never have appointed a 



270 The Federalist. 

Convention with so much solemnity, nor described it's 
objects with so much latitude, if some substantial reform 
had not been in contemplation. Will it be said that 
the fundamental principles of the Confederation were 
not within the purview of the Convention, and ought 
not to have been varied ? I ask, What are these princi- 
ples ? Do they require, that in the establishment of the 
Constitution the States should be regarded as distinct 
and independent sovereigns ? They are so regarded by 
the Constitution proposed. Do they require, that the 
members of the Government should derive their appoint- 
ment from the Legislatures, not from the People of the 
States? One branch of the new Government is to be 
appointed by these Legislatures ; and under the Confed- 
eration, the delegates to Congress may all be appoint- 
ed immediately by the People, and in two States * are 
actually so appointed. Do they require, that the pow- 
ers of the Government should act on the States, and 
not immediately on individuals? In some instances, 
as has been shown, the powers of the new Govern- 
ment will act on the States in their collective charac- 
ters. In some instances, also, those of the existing Gov- 
ernment act immediately on individuals. In cases of 
capture ; of piracy ; of the post-office ; of coins, weights, 
and measures ; of trade with the Indians ; of claims 
under grants of land, by different States ; and, above all, 
in the case of trials by Courts-martial in the army and 
navy, by which death may be inflicted without the in- 
tervention of a jury, or even of a civil Magistrate; in 
all these cases, the powers of the Confederation operate 
immediately on the persons and interests of individual 
citizens. Do these fundamental principles require, par- 
ticularly, that no tax should be levied, without the inter- 
mediate agency of the States ? The Confederation 
itself authorizes a direct tax, to a certain extent, on the 

* Connecticut and Rhode Island. — Publius. 



The Fcederalist. 271 

post-office. The power of coinage has been so con- 
strued by Congress as to levy a tribute immediately 
from that source also. But pretermitting these in- 
stances, was it not an acknowledged object of the Con- 
vention, and the universal expectation of the People, 
that the regulation of trade should be submitted to the 
General Government, in such a form as would render it 
an immediate source of general revenue ? Had not 
Congress repeatedly recommended this measure, as not 
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Con- 
federation ? Had not every State but one ; had not 
New York herself, so far complied with the plan of 
Congress, as to recognize the principle of the innova- 
tion? Do these principles, in fine, require that the 
powers of the General Government should be limited, 
and that, beyond this limit, the States should be left in 
possession of their sovereignty and independence ? We 
have seen, that in the new Government, as in the old, 
the general powers are limited ; and that the States, in 
all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of 
their sovereign and independent jurisdiction. 

The truth is, that the great principles of the Constitu- 
tion proposed by the Convention may be considered less 
as absolutely new, than as the expansion of principles 
which are found in the Articles of Confederation. The 
misfortune under the latter system has been, that these 
principles are so feeble and confined, as to justify 
all the charges of inefficiency which have been urged 
against it ; and to require a degree of enlargement, 
which gives to the new system the aspect of an entire 
transformation of the old. 

In one particular, it is admitted that the Convention 
have departed from the tenor of their commission. In- 
stead of reporting a plan requiring the confirmation of 
he Legislatures of all the Slates, they have reported a 
plan, which is to be confirmed by the People, and may 



272 The Federalist. 

be carried into effect by nine States only. It is worthy 
of remark, that this objection, though the most plausi- 
ble, has been the least urged in the publications which 
have swarmed against the Convention. The forbear- 
ance can only have proceeded from an irresistible con- 
viction of the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve 
States to the perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth ; 
from the example of inflexible opposition given by a 
majority of one sixtieth of the People of America, to a 
measure approved and called for by the voice of twelve 
States, comprising fifty-nine sixtieths of the People ; an 
example still fresh in the memory and indignation of 
every citizen who has felt for the wounded honor and 
prosperity of his country. As this objection, therefore, 
has been in a manner waived by those who have criti- 
cised the powers of the Convention, I dismiss it without 
further observation. 

The third point to be inquired into is, how far consid- 
erations of duty arising out of the case itself could have 
supplied any defect of regular authority. 

In the preceding inquiries, the powers of the Conven- 
tion have been analyzed and tried with the same rigor, 
and by the same rules, as if they had been real and final 
powers, for the establishment of a Constitution for the 
United States. We have seen, in what manner they 
have borne the trial even on that supposition. It is time 
now to recollect, that the powers were merely advisory 
and recommendatory ; that they were so meant by the 
States, and so understood by the Convention ; and that 
the latter have accordingly planned and proposed a Con- 
stitution, which is to be of no more consequence than 
the paper on which it is written, unless it be stamped 
with the approbation of those to whom it is addressed 
This reflection places the subject in a point of view 
altogether different, and will enable us to judge with 
propriety of the course taken by the Convention. 



The Federalist. 273 

Let us view the ground on which the Convention 
stood. It may be collected from their proceedings, that 
they were deeply and unanimously impressed with the 
crisis, which had led their country almost with one 
voice to make so singular and solemn an experiment 
for correcting the errors of a system by which this crisis 
had been produced ; that they were no less deeply and 
unanimously convinced, that such a reform as they have 
proposed was absolutely necessary to effect the purposes 
of their appointment. It could not be unknown to 
them, that the hopes and expectations of the great body 
of citizens, throughout this great empire, were turned 
with the keenest anxiety to the event of their delibera- 
tions. They had every' reason to believe, that the con- 
trary sentiments agitated the minds and bosoms of 
every external and internal foe to the liberty and pros- 
perity of the United States. They had seen in the 
origin and progress of the experiment, the alacrity with 
which the proposition, made by a single State, (Vir- 
ginia,) towards a partial amendment of the Confedera- 
tion, had been attended to and promoted. They had 
seen the liberty assumed by a very few deputies, from a 
very few States, convened at Annapolis, of recommend- 
ing a great and critical object, wholly foreign to their 
commission, not only justified by the public opinion, but 
actually carried into effect by twelve out of the thirteen 
States. They had seen, in a variety of instances, as- 
sumptions by Congress, not only of recommendatory 
but of operative powers, warranted in the public esti- 
mation, by occasions and objects infinitely less urgent 
than those by which their conduct was to be governed. 
They must have reflected, that in all great changes of 
established Governments, forms ought to give way to 
substance ; that a rigid adherence in such cases to the 
former, would render nominal and nugatory the tran- 
scendent and precious right of the People to " abolish or 

VOL. I. 18 



274 The Federalist. 

1 alter their Governments as to them shall seem most 
u likely to affect their safety and happiness," * since it is 
impossible for the People spontaneously and universally 
to move in concert towards their object ; and it is there- 
fore essential, that such changes be instituted by some 
informal and unauthorized propositions, made by some 
patriotic and respectable citizen, or number of citizens. 
They must have recollected, that it was by this irregular 
and assumed privilege, of proposing to the People plans 
for their safety and happiness, that the States were first 
united against the danger with which they were threat- 
ened by their ancient Government; that Committees 
and Congresses were formed for concentrating their 
efforts, and defending their rights ; and that Conventions 
were elected in the several States, for establishing the 
Constitutions under which they are now governed ; nor 
could it have been forgotten that no little ill-timed scru- 
ples, no zeal for adhering to ordinary forms, were any- 
where seen, except in those who wished to indulge, 
under these masks, their secret enmity to the substance 
contended for. They must have borne in mind, that as 
the plan to be framed and proposed was to be sub- 
mitted to the People themselves, the disapprobation of 
this supreme authority would destroy it forever : its 
approbation blot out all antecedent errors and irregular- 
ities. It might even have occurred to them, that where 
a disposition to cavil prevailed, their neglect to execute 
the degree of power vested in them, and still more their 
recommendation of any measure whatever, not war- 
ranted by their commission, would not less excite ani- 
madversion, than a recommendation at once of a meas- 
ure fully commensurate to the National exigencies. 

Had the Convention, under all these impressions, and 
in the midst of all these considerations, instead of exer- 
cising a manly confidence in their country, by whose 

* Declarator of Independence. — Publius. 



The Federalist. 275 

confidence they had been so peculiarly distinguished 
and of pointing out a system capable in their judgment 
of securing its happiness, taken the cold and sullen res- 
olution of disappointing its ardent hopes, of sacrificing 
substance to forms, of committing the dearest interests 
of their country to the uncertainties of delay and the 
hazard of events, let me ask the man who can raise his 
mind to one elevated conception, who can awaken in 
liis bosom one patriotic emotion, what judgment ought 
to have been pronounced by the impartial world, by the 
friends of mankind, by every virtuous citizen, on the 
conduct and character of this assembly ? Or if there be 
a man whose propensity to condemn is susceptible of 
no control, let me then ask, what sentence he has in 
reserve for the twelve States who usurped the power of 
sending deputies to the Convention, a body utterly un- 
known to their Constitutions ; for Congress, who recom- 
mended the appointment of this body, equally unknown 
to the Confederation ; and for the State of New York, 
in particular, who first urged and then complied with 
this unauthorized interposition ? 

But that the objectors may be disarmed of every pre- 
text, it shall be granted for a moment, that the Conven- 
tion were neither authorized by their commission, nor jus- 
tified by circumstances in proposing a Constitution for 
their country: does it follow that the Constitution ought, 
for that reason alone, to be rejected? If, according to 
the noble precept, it be lawful to accept good advice 
even from an enemy, shall we set the ignoble example 
of refusing such advice even when it is offered by our 
friends ? The prudent inquiry, in all cases, ought surely 
to be, not so much from whom the advice comes, as 
whether the advice be good. 

The sum of what has been here advanced and proved 
is, that the charge against the Convention of exceeding 
*;heir powers, except in one instance little urged by the 



276 The Federalist 

objectors, has no foundation to support it ; that if they 
had exceeded their powers, they were not only warranted, 
but required, as the confidential servants of their coun- 
try, by the circumstances in which they were placed, 
to exercise the liberty which they assumed; and that 
finally, if they had violated both their powers and their 
obligations, in proposing a Constitution, this ought nev 
ertheless to be embraced, if it be calculated to accom- 
plish the views and happiness of the People of America. 
How far this character is due to the Constitution, is the 
subject under investigation. 

PUBLIUS. 



For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XL. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

THE Constitution proposed by the Convention may 
be considered under two general points of view. 
The first relates to the sum or quantity of power 
which it vests in the Government, including the re- 
straints imposed on the States. The second, to the 
particular structure of the Government, and the distri- 
bution of this power among its several branches. 

Under the first view of the subject, two important 
questions arise : 1. Whether any part of the powers 
transferred to the General Government be unnecessary 
or improper? 2. Whether the entire mass of them be 
dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction left in the sev- 
eral States? 

Is the aggregate power of the General Government 



The Federalist. 277 

greater than ought to have been vested in it ? This is 
the first question. 

It cannot have escaped those who have attended with 
candor to the arguments employed against the extensive 
powers of the Government, that the authors of them 
have very little considered how far these powers were 
necessary means of attaining a necessary end. They 
have chosen rather to dwell on the inconveniences which 
must be unavoidably blended with all political advan- 
tages; and on the possible abuses which must be inci- 
dent to every power or trust, of which a beneficial use 
can be made. This method of handling the subject 
cannot impose on the good sense of the People of 
America. It may display the subtlety of the writer ; it 
may open a boundless field for rhetoric and declama- 
tion; it may inflame the passions of the unthinking, and 
may confirm the prejudices of the misthinking: but cool 
and candid people will at once reflect, that the purest of 
human blessings must have a portion of alloy in them ; 
that the choice must always be made, if not of the 
lesser evil, at least of the greater, not the perfect 
good ; and that in every political institution, a power to 
advance the public happiness involves a discretion which 
may be misapplied and abused. They will see, there- 
fore, that in all cases where power is to be conferred, the 
point first to be decided is, whether such a power be 
necessary to the public good ; as the next will be, in 
case of an affirmative decision, to guard as effectually 
as possible against a perversion of the power to the 
public detriment. 

That we may form a correct judgment on this subject, 
t will be proper to review the several powers conferred 
on the Government of the Union ; and that this may be 
the more conveniently done they may be reduced into 
different classes as they relate to the following different 
objects: 1. Security against foreign danger; 2. Regula« 



278 The Federalist. 

tion of the intercourse with foreign nations ; 3. Main 
tenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the 
States ; 4. Certain miscellaneous objects of general util- 
ity; 5. Restraint of the States from certain injurious 
acts ; 6. Provisions for giving due efficacy to all these 
powers. 

The powers falling within the first class are those of 
declaring war and granting letters of marque ; of pro- 
viding armies and fleets ; of regulating and calling forth 
the militia ; of levying and borrowing money. 

Security against foreign danger is one of the prim- 
itive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and 
essential object of the American Union. The powers 
requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to 
the Foederal councils. 

Is the power of declaring war necessary ? No man 
will answer this question in the negative. It would 
be superfluous, therefore, to enter into a proof of the af- 
firmative. The existing Confederation establishes this 
power in the most ample form. 

Is the power of raising armies and equipping fleets 
necessary ? This is involved in the foregoing power. 
It is involved in the power of self-defence. 

But was it necessary to give an indefinite power 
of raising troops, as well as providing fleets ; and of 
maintaining both in peace, as well as in war? 

The answer to these questions has been too far an- 
ticipated in another place, to admit an extensive discus- 
sion of them in this place. The answer indeed seems 
to be so obvious and conclusive, as scarcely to justify 
such a discussion in any place. With what color of 
oropriety could the force necessary for defence be lim- 
ited by those who cannot limit the force of offence ? 
[f a Foederal Constitution could chain the ambition, or 
set bounds to the exertions of all other nations, then 
indeed might it prudently chain the discretion of it» 



The Federalist. 27S 

own Government, and set bounds to the exertions for 
its own safety. 

How could a readiness for war in time of peace be 
safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in like man- 
ner, the preparations and establishments of every hostile 
nation ? The means of security can only be regulated 
by the means and the danger of attack. They will in 
fact be ever determined by these rules, and by no oth 
ers. It is in vain to oppose Constitutional barriers to 
the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in 
vain ; because it plants in the Constitution itself neces- 
sary usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a 
germ of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions. If one 
nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready 
for the service of ambition or revenge, it obliges the 
most pacific nations, who may be within the reach of 
its enterprises, to take corresponding precautions. The 
fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch of military 
establishments in time of peace. They were introduced 
by Charles VII. of France. All Europe has followed, 
or been forced into the example. Had the example not 
been followed by other nations, all Europe must long 
ago have worn the chains of a universal monarch. 
Were every nation, except France, now to disband its 
peace establishments, the same event might follow. 
The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for 
the undisciplined valor of all other nations, and rendered 
ber the mistress of the world. 

Not the less true is it, that the liberties of Rome 
proved the final victim to her military triumphs ; and 
that the liberties of Europe as far as they ever existed, 
have, with few exceptions, been the price of her military 
establishments. A standing force, therefore, is a danger- 
ous, at the same time that it may be a necessary provi- 
sion, On the smallest scale, it has its inconveniences. On 
an extensive scale, its consequences may be fatal. On 



280 The Federalist. 

any scale, it is an object of laudable circumspection and 
precaution. A wise nation will combine all these con- 
siderations; and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself 
from any resource which may become essential to its 
safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing both 
the necessity and the danger of resorting to one, which 
may be inauspicious to its liberties. 

The clearest marks of this prudence are stamped on 
the proposed Constitution. The Union itself, which it 
cements and secures, destroys every pretext for a mili- 
tary establishment which could be dangerous. America 
united, with a handful of troops, or without a single 
soldier, exhibits a more forbidding posture to foreign 
ambition, than America, disunited, with a hundred 
thousand veterans ready for combat. It was remarked, 
on a former occasion, that the want of this pretext had 
saved the liberties of one nation in Europe. Being 
rendered by her insular situation and her maritime 
resources impregnable to the armies of her neighbors, 
the rulers of Great Britain have never been able, by 
real or artificial dangers, to cheat the public into an 
extensive peace establishment. The distance of the 
United States from the powerful nations of the world, 
gives them the same happy security. A dangerous es- 
tablishment can never be necessary or plausible, so long 
as they continue a united People. But let it never, for 
a moment, be forgotten, that they are indebted for this 
advantage to their Union alone. The moment of its 
dissolution will be the date of a new order of things. 
The fears of the weaker, or the ambition of the stronger 
States, or Confederacies, will set the same example in 
the New, as Charles VII. did in the Old World. The 
example will be followed here, from the same motives 
which produced universal imitation there. Instead of 
deriving from our situation the precious advantage 
which Great Britain has derived from hers, the face of 



The Federalist. 281 

America will be but a copy of that of the Continent of 
Europe. It will present liberty everywhere crushed 
between standing armies and perpetual taxes. The 
fortunes of disunited America will be even more disas- 
trous than those of Europe. The sources of evil in the 
latter are confined to her own limits. No superior pow- 
ers of another quarter of the globe intrigue among her 
rival nations, inflame their mutual animosities, and 
render them the instruments of foreign ambition, jeal- 
ousy, and revenge. In America, the miseries springing 
from her internal jealousies, contentions, and wars, 
would form a part only of her lot. A plentiful addition 
of evils would have their source in that relation in 
which Europe stands to this quarter of the earth, and 
which no other quarter of the earth bears to Europe. 

This picture of the consequences of disunion cannot 
be too highly colored, or too often exhibited. Every 
man who loves peace, every man who loves his coun- 
try, every man who loves liberty, ought to have it 
ever before his eyes, that he may cherish in his heart a 
due attachment to the Union of America, and be able 
to set a due value on the means of preserving it. 

Next to the effectual establishment of the Union, the 
best possible precaution against danger from standing 
armies is a limitation of the term for which revenue 
may be appropriated to their support. This precaution 
the Constitution has prudently added. I will not repeat 
here the observations, which I flatter myself have placed 
this subject in a just and satisfactory light. But it may 
not be improper to take notice of an argument against 
this part of the Constitution, which has been drawn 
from the policy and practice of Great Britain. It is said, 
that the continuance of an army in that kingdom re- 
quires an annual vote of the Legislature : whereas the 
American Constitution has lengthened this critical period 
to two years. This is the form in which the comparison 



282 The Federalist. 

is usually stated to the public : but is it a just form '' 
Is it a fair comparison ? Does the British Constitution 
restrain the Parliamentary discretion to one year ? Does 
the American impose on the Congress appropriations 
for two years ? On the contrary, it cannot be unknown 
to the authors of the fallacy themselves, that the British 
Constitution fixes no limit whatever to the discretion 
of the Legislature, and that the American ties down 
the Legislature to two years, as the longest admissible 
term. 

Had the argument from the British example been 
truly stated, it would have stood thus : The term for 
which supplies may be appropriated to the army estab- 
lishment, though unlimited by the British Constitution, 
has nevertheless, in practice, been limited by Parliamen- 
tary discretion to a single year. Now, if in Great Brit- 
ain, where the House of Commons is elected for seven 
years ; where so great a proportion of the members are 
elected by so small a proportion of the people ; where 
the electors are so corrupted by the Representatives, 
and the Representatives so corrupted by the Crown, the 
Representative body can possess a power to make ap- 
propriations to the army for an indefinite term, without 
desiring, or without daring, to extend the term beyond 
a single year, ought not suspicion herself to blush, in 
pretending that the Representatives of the United 
States, elected freely by the whole body of the Peo- 
ple, every second year, cannot be safely intrusted with 
a discretion over such appropriations, expressly limited 
to the short period of two years ? 

A bad cause seldom fails to betray itself. Of this 
truth, the management of the opposition to the Fced- 
eral Government is an unvaried exemplification. But 
among all the blunders which have been committed, 
none is more striking than the attempt to enlist on that 
iide the prudent jealousy entertained by the People, of 



The Federalist. 283 

standing armies. The attempt has awakened fully the 
public attention to that important subject ; and has led 
to investigations which must terminate in a thorough 
and universal conviction, not only that the Constitution 
has provided the most effectual guards against danger 
from that quarter, but that nothing short of a Constitution 
fully adequate to the National defence, and the preser- 
vation of the Union, can save America from as many 
standing armies as it may be split into States or Con- 
federacies, and from such a progressive augmentation 
of these establishments in each, as will render them as 
burdensome to the properties and ominous to the liber- 
ties of the People, as any establishment that can become 
necessary, under a united and efficient Government, 
must be tolerable to the former and safe to the latter. 

The palpable necessity of the power to provide and 
maintain a navy, has protected that part of the Consti- 
tution against a spirit of censure, which has spared few 
other parts. It must indeed be numbered among the 
greatest blessings of America, that as her Union will 
be the only source of her maritime strength, so this will 
be a principal source of her security against danger 
from abroad. In this respect, our situation bears 
another likeness to the insular advantage of Great 
Britain. The batteries most capable of repelling for- 
eign enterprises on our safety, are happily such as can 
never be turned by a perfidious Government against our 
liberties. 

The inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier are all of 
them deeply-interested in this provision for naval pro- 
tection, and if they have hitherto been suffered to sleep 
quietly in their beds ; if their property has remained 
safe against the predatory spirit of licentious adventur- 
ers ; if their maritime towns have not yet been com- 
pelled to ransom themselves from the terrors of a con- 
flagration, by yielding to the exactions of daring and 



284 The Federalist. 

sudden invaders, these instances of good fortune are not 
to be ascribed to the capacity of the existing Govern- 
ment for the protection of those from whom it claims 
allegiance, but to causes that are fugitive and fallacious. 
If we except perhaps Virginia and Maryland, which are 
peculiarly vulnerable on their Eastern frontiers, no part 
of the Union ought to feel more anxiety on this subject 
than New York. Her sea-coast is extensive. A very 
important district of the State is an island. The State 
itself is penetrated by a large navigable river for more 
than fifty leagues. The great emporium of its commerce, 
the great reservoir of its wealth, lies every moment at 
the mercy of events, and may almost be regarded as a 
hostage for ignominious compliances with the dictates 
of a foreign enemy, or even with the rapacious demands 
of pirates and barbarians. Should a war be the result of 
the precarious situation of European affairs, and all the 
unruly passions attending it be let loose on the ocean, 
our escape from insults and depredations, not only on 
that element, but every part of the other bordering on 
it, will be truly miraculous. In the present condition of 
America, the States more immediately exposed to these 
calamities have nothing to hope from the phantom of a 
General Government which now exists ; and if their 
single resources were equal to the task of fortifying 
themselves against the danger, the object to be pro- 
tected would be almost consumed by the means of pro- 
tecting them. 

The power of regulating and calling forth the militia 
has been already sufficiently vindicated and explained. 

The power of levying and borrowing money, being 
the sinew of that which is to be exerted in the National 
defence, is properly thrown into the same class with it. 
This power, also, has been examined already with much 
attention, and has, I trust, been clearly shown to be ne. 
cessary, both in the extent and form given to it by the 



The Federalist. 28* 

Constitution. I will address one additional reflection, 
only, to those who contend that the power ought to 
have been restrained to external taxation — by which 
they mean, taxes on articles imported from other coun- 
tries. It cannot be doubted, that this will always be a 
valuable source of revenue ; that for a considerable time 
it must be a principal source ; that at this moment, it is 
an essential one. But we may form very mistaken ideas 
on this subject, if we do not call to mind in our calcu- 
lations, that the extent of revenue drawn from foreign 
commerce must vary with the variations, both in the ex- 
tent and the kind of imports ; and that these variations 
do not correspond with the progress of population, 
which must be the general measure of the public wants. 
As long as agriculture continues the sole field of labor, 
the importation of manufactures must increase as the 
consumers multiply. As soon as domestic manufactures 
are begun by the hands not called for by agriculture, the 
imported manufactures will decrease as the numbers of 
people increase. In a more remote stage, the imports 
may consist in a considerable part of raw materials, 
which will be wrought into articles for exportation, and 
will, therefore, require rather the encouragement of boun- 
ties, than to be loaded with discouraging duties. A sys- 
tem of Government, meant for duration, ought to con- 
template these revolutions, and be able to accommodate 
Hself to them. 

Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power 
of taxation, have grounded a very fierce attack against 
the Constitution, on the language in which it is defined. 
It has been urged and echoed, that the power " to lay 
" and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay 
'* the debts, and provide for the common defence and 
' general welfare of the United States," amounts to an 
unlimited commission to exercise every power, which 
may be alleged to be necessary for the common defence 



286 The Federalist. 

or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given 
of the distress under which these writers labor for objec- 
tions, than their stooping to such a misconstruction. 

Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers 
of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the 
general expressions just cited, the authors of the objec- 
tion might have had some color for it ; though it would 
have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a 
form of describing an authority to legislate in all possi- 
ble cases. A power to destroy the freedom of the press, 
the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of de- 
scents, or the forms of conveyances, must be very singu- 
larly expressed by the terms " to raise money for the 
u general welfare." 

But what color can the objection have, when a speci- 
fication of the objects alluded to by these general terms 
immediately follows, and is not even separated by a 
longer pause than a semicolon ? If the different parts 
of the same instrument ought to be so expounded, as to 
give meaning to every part which will bear it, shall one 
part of the same sentence be excluded altogether from a 
share in the meaning ; and shall the more doubtful and 
indefinite terms be retained in their full extent, and the 
clear and precise expressions be denied any signification 
whatsoever ? For what purpose could the enumeration 
of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others 
were meant to be included in the preceding general 
power ? Nothing is more natural or common, than first 
to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify 
it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of an enu- 
meration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify 
the general meaning, and can have no other effect than 
to confound and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we 
are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the 
authors of the objection or on the authors of the Consti 



The Federalist. 287 

tution, we must take the liberty of supposing, had not 
its origin with the latter. 

The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it 
appears that the language used by the Convention is a 
copy from the Articles of Confederation. The objects 
of the Union among the States, as described in Article 
third, are, " their common defence, security of their lib- 
" erties, and mutual and general welfare." The terms 
of Article eighth are still more identical : " All charges 
" of war, and all other expenses, that shall be incurred 
" for the common defence or general welfare, and al- 
" lowed by the United States in Congress, shall be 
" defrayed out of a common treasury," &c. A similar 
language again occurs in Article ninth. Construe either 
of these Articles by the rules which would justify the 
construction put on the new Constitution, and they vest 
in the existing Congress a power to legislate in all cases 
whatsoever. But what would have been thought of that 
assembly, if, attaching themselves to these general 
expressions, and disregarding the specifications which 
ascertain and limit their import, they had exercised an 
unlimited power of providing for the common defence 
and general welfare ? I appeal to the objectors them- 
selves, whether they would in that case have employed 
the same reasoning in justification of Congress, as they 
now make use of against the Convention. How difficult 
it is for error to escape its own condemnation ! 

PUBLIUS. 



288 The Federalist. 

[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, January 22, 1788-3 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XLI. 



io the People op the State op New York : 

^I^HE second class of powers, lodged in the General 
•*- Government, consists of those which regulate the 
intercourse with foreign nations, to wit : to make Trea- 
ties ; to send and receive Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers, and Consuls ; to define and punish piracies 
and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences 
against the law of nations ; to regulate foreign com- 
merce, including a power to prohibit, after the year 
1808, the importation of slaves, and to lay an interme- 
diate duty of ten dollars per head, as a discouragement 
to such importations. 

This class of powers forms an obvious and essential 
branch of the Foederal administration. If we are to 
be one Nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in 
respect to other Nations. 

The powers to make Treaties, and to send and receive 
Ambassadors, speak their own propriety. Both of them 
are comprised in the Articles of Confederation ; with 
this difference only, that the former is disembarrassed by 
the plan of the Convention of an exception, under which 
Treaties might be substantially frustrated by regulations 
of the States ; and that a power of appointing and re- 
ceiving " other public Ministers and Consuls," is ex- 
oressly and very properly added to the former provision 
concerning Ambassadors. The term Ambassador, if 
taken strictly, as seems to be required by the second of 
the Articles of Confederation, comprehends the highest 
grade only of public Ministers ; and excludes the grades 



The Federalist. 289 

which the United States will be most likelv +\ prefei 
where foreign embassies may be necessary. AnJ under 
no latitude of construction will the term comprehend 
Consuls. Yet it has been found expedient, and has 
been the practice of Congress, to employ the inferior 
grades of public Ministers ; and to send and receive 
Consuls. 

It is true, that where Treaties of commerce stipulate 
for the mutual appointment of Consuls, whose functions 
are connected with commerce, the admission of foreign 
Consuls may fall within the power of making commer- 
cial Treaties ; and that where no such Treaties exist, 
the mission of American Consuls into foreign countries 
may perhaps be covered under the authority, given by 
the ninth Article of the Confederation, to appoint all 
such civil officers as may be necessary for managing the 
general affairs of the United States. But the admission 
of Consuls into the United States, where no previous 
Treaty has stipulated it, seems to have been nowhere 
provided for. A supply of the omission is one of the 
lesser instances, in which the Convention have improved 
on the model before them. But the most minute provi- 
sions become important when they tend to obviate the 
necessity or the pretext for gradual and unobserved 
usurpations of power. A list of the cases in which 
Congress have been betrayed, or forced by the defects 
of the Confederation, into violations of their chartered 
authorities, would not a little surprise those who have 
f>aid no attention to the subject ; and would be no in- 
considerable argument in favor of the new Constitution, 
which seems to have provided no less studiously for the 
lesser, than the more obvious and striking defects of the 
old. 

The power to define and punish piracies and felonies 
committed on the high seas, and offences against the law 
of nations, belongs with equal propriety to the General 

VOL- T. 19 



290 The Federalist. 

Government, and is a still greater improvement on the 
Articles of Confederation. These Articles contain no 
provision for the case of offences against the law of na- 
tions ; and consequently leave it in the power of any 
indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with for- 
eign nations. The provision of the Fcederal Articles on 
the subject of piracies and felonies extends no further 
than to the establishment of courts for the trial of these 
offences. The definition of piracies might, perhaps, with- 
out inconveniency, be left to the law of nations ; though 
a legislative definition of them is found in most muni- 
cipal codes. A definition of felonies on the high seas 
is evidently requisite. Felony is a term of loose signifi- 
cation, even in the common law of England ; and of 
various import in the statute law of that kingdom. But 
neither the common, nor the statute law of that, or of 
any other nation, ought to be a standard for the pro- 
ceedings of this, unless previously made its own by legis- 
lative adoption. The meaning of the term, as defined 
in the codes of the several States, would be as imprac- 
ticable as the former would be a dishonorable and ille- 
gitimate guide. It is not precisely the same in any two 
of the States ; and varies in each with every revision of 
its criminal laws. For the sake of certainty and uni- 
formity, therefore, the power of defining felonies in this 
case was in every respect necessary and proper. 

The regulation of foreign commerce, having fallen 
within several views which have been taken of this 
subject, has been too fully discussed to need additional 
proofs here of its being properly submitted to the Fced- 
eral administration. 

It were doubtless to be wished, that the power of 
prohibiting the importation of slaves had not been post- 
poned until the year 1808, or rather, that it had been 
suffered to have immediate operation. But it is not 
difficult to account, either for this restriction on the Gen- 



TJie Federalist. 291 

eral Government, or for the manner in which the whole 
clause is expressed. It ought to be considered as a 
great point gained in favor of humanity, that a period of 
twenty years may terminate forever, within these States, 
a traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the 
barbarism of modern policy ; that within that period, it 
will receive a considerable discouragement from the 
Fcederal Government, and may be totally abolished, by 
a concurrence of the few States which continue the un- 
natural traffic, in the prohibitory example which has 
been given by so great a majority of the Union. Happy 
would it be for the unfortunate Africans, if an equai 
prospect lay before them of being redeemed from the 
oppressions of their European brethren ! 

Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into 
an objection against the Constitution, by representing it 
on one side as a criminal toleration of an illicit practice, 
and on another, as calculated to prevent voluntary and 
beneficial emigrations from Europe to America. I men- 
tion these misconstructions, not with a view to give 
them an answer, for they deserve none ; but as speci- 
mens of the manner and spirit, in which some have 
thought fit to conduct their opposition to the proposed 
Government. 

The powers included in the third class are those 
which provide for the harmony and proper intercourse 
among the States. 

Under this head might be included the particular re- 
straints imposed on the authority of the States, and cer- 
tain powers of the Judicial department ; but the former 
are reserved for a distinct class, and the latter will be 
particularly examined, when we arrive at the structure 
and organization of the Government. I shall confine 
myself to a cursory review of the remaining powers 
comprehended under this third description, to wit : to 
-egulate commerce among the several States and the 



292 The Federalist. 

Indian tribes ; to coin money, regulate the value there- 
of, and of foreign coin ; to provide for the punishment 
of counterfeiting the current coin and securities of the 
United States ; to fix the standard of weights and meas- 
ures ; to establish an uniform rule cl naturalization, and 
uniform laws of bankruptcy ; to prescribe the manner in 
which the public Acts, records, and judicial proceedings 
of each State shall be proved, and the effect they shall 
have in other States ; and to establish post-offices and 
post-roads. 

The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to 
regulate the commerce between its several members, is 
in the number of those which have been clearly pointed 
out by experience. To the proofs and remarks which 
former papers have brought into view on this subject, it 
may be added, that without this supplemental provision, 
the great and essential power of regulating foreign com- 
merce would have been incomplete and ineffectual. A 
very material object of this power was the relief of the 
States which import and export through other States, 
from the improper contributions levied on them by the 
latter. Were these at liberty to regulate the trade be- 
tween State and State, it must be foreseen, that ways 
would be found out to load the articles of import and 
export, during the passage through their jurisdiction, 
with duties which would fall on the makers of the lat- 
ter, and the consumers of the former. We may be as- 
sured, by past experience, that such a practice would be 
introduced by future contrivances ; and both by that and 
a common knowledge of human affairs, that it would 
nourish unceasing animosities, and not improbably ter- 
minate in serious interruptions of the public tranquillity. 
To those who do not view the question through the 
medium of passion, or of interest, the desire of the com- 
mercial States to collect, in any form, an indirect rev- 
enue from their uncommercial neighbors, must appear 



The Federalist. 293 

not less impolitic than it is unfair ; since it would stim 
nlate the injured party, by resentment as well as interest 
to resort to less convenient channels for their foreign 
trade. But the mild voice of reason, pleading the cause 
of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often 
drowned before public bodies as well as individuals, by 
the clamors of an impatient avidity for immediate and 
immoderate gain. 

The necessity of a superintending authority over the 
reciprocal trade of Confederated States, has been illus- 
trated by other examplesas well as our own. In Switzer- 
land, where the Union is so very slight, each Canton is 
obliged to allow to merchandises a passage through its 
jurisdiction into other Cantons, without an augmenta 
tion of the tolls. In Germany, it is a law of the Empire, 
that the Princes and States shall not lay tolls or customs 
on bridges, rivers, or passages, without the consent of 
the Emperor and Diet ; though it appears from a quota- 
tion in an antecedent paper, that the practice in this, as 
in many other instances in that Confederacy, has not 
followed the law, and has 'produced there the mischiefs 
which have been foreseen here. Among the restraints 
imposed by the Union of the Netherlands on its mem- 
bers, one is, that they shall not establish imposts disad- 
vantageous to their neighbors, without the general per- 
mission. 

The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is 
very properly unfettered from two limitations in the Ar- 
ticles of Confederation, which render the provision ob- 
scure and contradictory. The power is there restrained 
to Indians, not members of any of the States, and is not 
to violate or infringe the legislative right of any State 
vithin its own limits. What description of Indians are 
to be deemed members of a State, is not yet settled , 
.md has been a question of frequent perplexity and con- 
tention in the Fcederal Councils. And how the trade 



294 The Federalist. 






with Indians, though not members of a State, yet resid- 
ing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated 
by an external authority, without so far intruding on the 
internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehen- 
sible. This is not the only case, in which the Articles 
of Confederation have inconsiderately endeavored to 
accomplish impossibilities ; to reconcile a partial sover- 
eignty in the Union, with complete sovereignty in the 
States ; to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking 
away a part, and letting the whole remain. 

All that need be remarked on the power to coin 
money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, 
is, that by providing for this last case, the Constitution 
has supplied a material omission in the Articles of Con- 
federation. The authority of the existing Congress is 
restrained to the regulation of coin struck by their own 
authority, or that of the respective States. It must be 
seen at once, that the proposed uniformity in the value 
of the current coin might be destroyed by subjecting 
that of foreign coin to the different regulations of the 
different States. 

The punishment of counterfeiting the public securi- 
ties, as well as the current coin, is submitted of course 
to that authority which is to secure the value of both. 

The regulation of weights and measures is transferred 
from the Articles of Confederation, and is founded on 
like considerations with the preceding power of regulat- 
ing coin. 

The dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization has 
long been remarked as a fault in our system, and as lay- 
ing a foundation for intricate and delicate questions. 
In the fourth Article of the Confederation, it is declared, 
" that the free inhabitants of each of these States, pau- 
% pers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted 
% shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of 
'*free citizens in the several States ; and the People of 



The Federalist. 295 

u each State shall, in every other, enjoy all the privileges 
u of trade and commerce," &c. There is a confusion of 
language here, which is remarkable. Why the term? 
free inhabitants are used in one part of the Article, free 
citizens in another, and People in another ; or what was 
meant by superadding to " all privileges and immunities 
"of free citizens,'.' "all the privileges of trade and 
" commerce," cannot easily be determined. It seems to 
be a construction scarcely avoidable, however, that those 
who come under the denomination of free inhabitants of 
a State, although not citizens of such State, are entitled, 
in every other State, to all the privileges of free citizens 
of the latter ; that is, to greater privileges than they may 
be entitled to in their own State : so that it may be in 
the power of a particular State, or rather every State is 
laid under a necessity, not only to confer the rights of 
citizenship in other States upon any whom it may ad- 
mit to such rights within itself, but upon any whom it 
may allow to become inhabitants within its jurisdiction. 
But were an exposition of the term " inhabitants " to 
be admitted which would confine the stipulated privi- 
leges to citizens alone, the difficulty is diminished only, 
not removed. The very improper power would still be 
retained by each State, of naturalizing aliens in every 
other State. In one State, residence for a short term 
confers all the rights of citizenship: in another, qualifica- 
tions of greater importance are required. An alien, 
therefore, legally incapacitated for certain rights in the 
latter, may, by previous residence only in the former, 
elude his incapacity ; and thus the law of one State be 
preposterously rendered paramount to the law of an- 
other, within the jurisdiction of the other. We owe it 
to mere casualty, that very serious embarrassments on 
this subject have been hitherto escaped. By the laws of 
several States, certain descriptions of aliens, who had 
endered themselves obnoxious, were laid under inter- 



296 The Federalist. 

diets inconsistent, not only with the rights of citizenship, 
but with the privilege of residence. What would have 
been the consequence, if such persons, by residence or 
otherwise, had acquired the character of citizens under 
the laws of another State, and then asserted their rights 
as such, both to residence and citizenship, within the 
State prescribing them? Whatever the legal conse- 
quences might have been, other consequences would 
probably have resulted of too serious a nature, not to be 
provided against. The new Constitution has accord- 
ingly, with great propriety, made provision against them, 
and all others proceeding from the defect of the Con- 
federation, on this head, by authorizing the General Gov- 
ernment to establish an uniform rule of naturalization 
throughout the United States. 

The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy 
is so intimately connected with the regulation of com- 
merce, and will prevent so many frauds where the par- 
ties or their property may lie, or be removed into dif- 
ferent States, that the expediency of it seems not likely 
to be drawn into question. 

The power of prescribing, by general laws, the man- 
ner in which the public Acts, records, and judicial pro- 
ceedings of each State, shall be proved, and the effect 
they shall have in other States, is an evident and valu- 
able improvement on the clause relating to this subject 
in the Articles of Confederation. The meaning of the 
latter is extremely indeterminate ; and can be of little 
importance under any interpretation which it will bear. 
The power here established may be rendered a very 
convenient instrument of justice, and be particularly 
beneficial on the borders of contiguous States, where 
the effects liable to justice may be suddenly and secretly 
translated in any stage of the process, within a foreign 
jurisdiction. 

The power of establishing post-roads must, in every 



The Fcedtranst. 297 

view, be a harmless power; and may perhaps, by judi- 
cious management, become productive of great public 
conveniency. Nothing which tends to facilitate the in- 
tercourse between the States can be deemed unworthy 
of the public care. 

PUBLIUS. 



[For the Independent Journal.'] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XLII. 



To the People of the State op New York: 

THE fourth class comprises the following miscella- 
neous powers : 

1. A power " to promote the progress of science and 
" useful arts, by securing, for a limited time, to authors 
" and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective. 
" writings and discoveries." 

The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. 
The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged 
in Great Britain, to be a right at common law. The 
right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to 
belong to the inventors. The public good fully coin- 
cides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The 
States cannot separately make effectual provision for 
either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated 
the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance 
of Congress. 

2. " To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases what- 
" soever, over such district (not exceeding ten milea 
i square) as may, by cession of particular States and 
* the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the 



298 The Federalist. 

" Government of the United States ; and to exercise like 
" authority over all places purchased by the consent of 
" the Legislatures of the States in which the same shall 
" be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock- 
" yards, and other needful buildings." 

The indispensable necessity of complete authority at 
the seat of Government, carries its own evidence with 
it. It is a power exercised by every Legislature of the 
Union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its gen- 
eral supremacy. Without it, not only the public author- 
ity might be insulted and its proceedings be interrupted 
with impunity; but a dependence of the members of 
the General Government on the State comprehending 
the seat of the Government, for protection in the exer- 
cise of their duty, might bring on the National Councils 
an imputation of awe or influence, equally dishonorable 
to the Government and dissatisfactory to the other mem- 
bers of the Confederacy. This consideration has the 
more weight, as the gradual accumulation of public 
improvements at the stationary residence of the Gov- 
ernment, would be both too great a public pledge to be 
left in the hands of a single State, and would create so 
many obstacles to a removal of the Government, as still 
further to abridge its necessary independence. The ex- 
tent of this Fcederal district is sufficiently circumscribed 
to satisfy every jealousy of an opposite nature. And 
as it is to be appropriated to this use with the consent 
of the State ceding it ; as the State will no doubt pro- 
vide in the compact for the rights and the consent of 
the citizens inhabiting it ; as the inhabitants will find 
sufficient inducements of interest to become willing par- 
ties to the cession ; as they will have had their voice in 
the election of the Government, which is to exercise 
authority over them ; as a municipal Legislature for 
local purposes, derived from their own suffrages, will 
of course be allowed thern ; and as the authority of the 



The Federalist. 296 

Legislature of the State, and of the inhabitants of the 
ceded part of it, to concur in the cession, will be derived 
from the whole People of the State, in their adoption 
of the Constitution, every imaginable objection seems 
to be obviated. 

The necessity of a like authority over forts, maga 
zines, &c, established by the General Government, is 
not less evident. The public money expended on such 
places, and the public property deposited in them, re- 
quire, that they should be exempt from the authority of 
the particular State. Nor would it be proper for the 
places on which the security of the entire Union may 
depend, to be in any degree dependent on a particular 
member of it. All objections and scruples are here also 
obviated, by requiring the concurrence of the States con- 
cerned, in every such establishment. 

3. " To declare the punishment of treason, but no 
" attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, 
" or forfeiture, except during the life of the person at- 
" tainted." 

As treason may be committed against the United 
States, the authority of the United States ought to be 
enabled to punish it. But as new-fangled and artificial 
treasons have been the great engines by which violent 
factions, the natural offspring of free Governments, have 
usually wreaked their alternate malignity on each other, 
the Convention have, with great judgment, opposed a 
barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a Constitu- 
tional definition of the crime, fixing the proof necessary 
for conviction of it, and restraining the Congress, even in 
punishing it, from extending the consequences of guilt 
beyond the person of its author. 

4. " To admit new States into the Union : but no 
" new State shall be formed or erected within the juris- 
' diction of any other State ; nor any State be formed 
4 by the junction of two or more States, or parts of 



300 The Federalist 

" States, without the consent of the Legislatures of tho 
" States concerned, as well as of the Congress." 

In the Articles of Confederation, no provision is found 
on this important subject. Canada was to be admitted 
of right, on her joining in the measures of the United 
States ; and the other colonies, by which were evidently 
meant the other British colonies, at the discretion of 
nine States. The eventual establishment of new Stales 
seems to have been overlooked by the compilers of 
that instrument. We have seen the inconvenience of 
this omission, and the assumption of power into which 
Congress have been led by it. With great propriety 
therefore has the new system supplied the defect. The 
general precaution, that no new States shall be formed, 
without the concurrence of the Foederal authority, and 
that of the States concerned, is consonant to the princi- 
ples which ought to govern such transactions. The par- 
ticular precaution against the erection of new States, by 
the partition of a State without its consent, quiets the 
jealousy of the larger States ; as that of the smaller is 
quieted by a like precaution, against a junction of States 
without their consent. 

5. " To dispose of and make all needful rules and 
" regulations respecting the territory or other property 
" belonging to the United States, with a proviso, that 
" nothing in the Constitution shall be so construed as 
" to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any 
" particular State." 

This is a power of very great importance, and required 
by considerations, similar to those which show the pro- 
priety of the former. The proviso annexed is proper in 
itself, and was probably rendered absolutely necessary 
by jealousies and questions concerning the Western ter- 
ritory sufficiently known to the public. 

6. " To guarantee to every State in the Union a re- 
" publican form of Government ; to protect each of them 



The Federalist. 301 

u against invasion ; and on application of the Legislature, 
■' or of the Executive, (when the Legislature cannot be 
" convened,) against domestic violence." 

In a Confederacy founded on republican principles, 
and composed of republican members, the superintend- 
ing Government ought clearly to possess authority to 
defend the system against aristocratic or monarchical 
innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a 
Union may be, the greater interest have the members in 
the political institutions of each other ; and the greater 
right to insist, that the forms of Government under 
which the compact was entered into, should be substan- 
tially maintained. But a right implies a remedy ; and 
where else could the remedy be deposited, than where 
it is deposited by the Constitution ? Governments of 
dissimilar principles and forms have been found less 
adapted to a Fcederal coalition of any sort, than those 
of a kindred nature. "As the Confederate republic of 
" Germany," says Montesquieu," consists of free Cities, 
" and petty States, subject to different Princes, experi- 
" ence shows us that it is more imperfect than that of 
" Holland and Switzerland." " Greece was undone," 
he adds, " as soon as the King of Macedon obtained a 
" seat among the Amphictyons." In the latter case, no 
doubt, the disproportionate force, as well as the mo- 
narchical form of the new Confederate, had its share of 
influence on the events. It may possibly be asked, what 
need there could be of such a precaution, and whether 
it may not become a pretext for alterations in the State 
Governments, without the concurrence of the States 
themselves. These questions admit of ready answers. 
If the interposition of the General Government should 
not be needed, the provision for such an event will be 
a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But 
who can say what experiments may be produced by the 
caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enter- 



302 The Federalist 

prising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of 
foreign powers ? To the second question it may be 
answered, that if the General Government should inter- 
pose by virtue of this Constitutional authority, it will 
be of course bound to pursue the authority. But the 
authority extends no farther than to a guaranty of a 
republican form of Government, which supposes a pre 
existing Government of the form which is to be guar- 
anteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican 
forms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed 
by the Fcederal Constitution. Whenever the States 
may choose to substitute other republican forms, they 
have a right to do so, and to claim the Fcederal guar- 
anty for the latter. The only restriction imposed on 
them is, that they shall not exchange republican for 
anti-republican Constitutions ; a restriction which, it is 
presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance. 

A protection against invasion is due from every soci- 
ety to the parts composing it. The latitude of the ex- 
pression here used, seems to secure each State, not only 
against foreign hostility, but against ambitious or vin- 
dictive enterprises of its more powerful neighbors. The 
history, both of ancient and modern Confederacies, proves 
that the weaker members of the Union ought not to be 
insensible to the policy of this Article. 

Protection against domestic violence is added with 
equal propriety. It has been remarked, that even among 
the Swiss Cantons, which, properly speaking, are not 
under one Government, provision is made for this ob- 
ject ; and the history of that League informs us that 
mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded ; and as 
well by the most democratic, as the other Cantons. A 
recent and well-known event among ourselves has 
warned us to be prepared for emergencies of a like 
nature. 

At first view, it might seem not to square with the 



The Federalist. 303 

republican theory, to suppose, either that a majority 
have not the right, or that a minority will have the 
force, to subvert a Government ; and consequently, that 
the Foederal interposition can never be required, but 
when it would be improper. But theoretic reasoning, 
in this as in most other cases, must be qualified by the 
lessons of practice. Why may not illicit combinations, 
for purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority 
of a State, especially a small State, as by a majority of 
a county, or a district of the same State ; and if the 
authority of the State ought in the latter case to protect 
the local magistracy, ought not the Foederal authority, 
in the former, to support the State authority ? Besides, 
there are certain parts of the State Constitutions, which 
are so interwoven with the Foederal Constitution, that a 
violent blow cannot be given to the one, without com- 
municating the wound to the other. Insurrections in a 
State will rarely induce a Foederal interposition, unless 
the number concerned in them bear some proportion to 
the friends of Government. It will be much better, that 
the violence in such cases should be repressed by the 
superintending power, than that the majority should be 
left to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate 
contest. The existence of a right to interpose, will gen- 
erally prevent the necessity of exerting it. 

Is it true, that force and right are necessarily on the 
same side in republican Governments ? May not the 
minor party possess such a superiority of pecuniary re- 
sources, of military talents and experience, or of secret 
succors from foreign powers, as will render it superior 
also in an appeal to the sword ? May not a more com- 
pact and advantageous position turn the scale on the 
same side, against a superior number so situated as to 
be less capable of a prompt and collected exertion of 
its strength ? Nothing can be more chimerical than to 
imagine, that in a trial of actual force, victory may be 



304 The Fmderahst. 






calculated by the rules which prevail in a census of the 
inhabitants, or which determine the event of an elec- 
tion ! May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of 
citizens may become a majority of persons, by the 
accession of alien residents, of a casual concourse of 
adventurers, or of those whom the Constitution of the 
State has not admitted to the rights of suffrage ? J 
take no notice of an unhappy species of population 
abounding in some of the States, who, during the calm 
of regular Government, are sunk below the level of men; 
but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil violence, 
may emerge into the human character, and give a supe- 
riority of strength to any party with which they may 
associate themselves. 

In cases where it may be doubtful on which side jus- 
tice lies, what better umpires could be desired by two 
violent factions, flying to arms and tearing a State to 
pieces, than the representatives of Confederate States, 
not heated by the local flame ? To the impartiality of 
Judges, they would unite the affection of friends. Happy 
would it be, if such a remedy for its infirmities could be 
enjoyed by all free Governments ; if a project equally 
effectual could be established for the universal peace of 
mankind ! 

Should it be asked, what is to be the redress for an 
insurrection pervading all the States, and comprising a 
superiority of the entire force, though not a Constitu- 
tional right ; the answer must be, that such a case, as it 
would be without the compass of human remedies, so 
it is fortunately not within the compass of human prob- 
ability; and that it is a sufficient recommendation of 
the Fcederal Constitution, that it diminishes the risk of 
a calamity, for which no possible Constitution can pro- 
vide a cure. 

Among the advantages of a Confederate republic, 
Enumerated by Montesquieu, an important one is, "that 



The Federalist. 305 

" should a popular insurrection happen in one of the 
" States, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses 
" creep into one part, they are reformed by those that 
" remain sound." 

7. " To consider all debts contracted, and engage- 
" ments entered into, before the adoption of this Con- 
" stitution, as being no less valid against the United 
" States, under this Constitution, than under the Con- 
" federation." 

This can only be considered as a declaratory proposi- 
tion ; and may have been inserted, among other reasons, 
for the satisfaction of the foreign creditors of the United 
States, who cannot be strangers to the pretended doc- 
trine, that a change in the political form of civil society, 
has the magical effect of dissolving its moral obliga- 
tions. 

Among the lesser criticisms which have been exer- 
cised on the Constitution, it has been remarked, that 
the validity of engagements ought to have been asserted 
in favor of the United States, as well as against them ; 
and in the spirit which usually characterizes little critics, 
the omission has been transformed and magnified into a 
plot against the National rights. The authors of this 
discovery may be told, what few others need to be in- 
formed of, that as engagements are in their nature recip- 
rocal, an assertion of their validity on one side, necessa- 
rily involves a validity on the other side ; and that as 
the Article is merely declaratory, the establishment of 
the principle in one case is sufficient for every case. 
They may be further told, that every Constitution must 
limit its precautions to dangers that are not altogether 
imaginary ; and that no real danger can exist that the 
Government would dare, with, or even without, this 
Constitutional declaration before it, to remit the debts 
justly due to the public, on the pretext here con- 
demned. 

vol. i. 20 



306 The Federalist. 

8. " To provide for amendments to be ratified by 
u three fourths of the States, under two exceptions 
« only." 

That useful alterations will be suggested by experi- 
ence, could not but be foreseen. It was requisite, there- 
fore, that a mode for introducing them should be pro- 
vided. The mode preferred by the Convention seems 
to be stamped with every mark of propriety. It guards 
equally against that extreme facility, which would ren- 
der the Constitution too mutable ; and that extreme- 
difficulty, which might perpetuate its discovered faults. 
It moreover equally enables the General and the State 
Governments to originate the amendment of errors, as 
they may be pointed out by the experience on one side, 
or on the other. The exception in favor of the equality 
of suffrage in the Senate, was probably meant as a pal- 
ladium to the residuary sovereignty of the States, im- 
plied and secured by that principle of representation in 
one branch of the Legislature ; and was probably insisted 
on by the States particularly attached to that equality. 
The other exception must have been admitted on the 
same considerations which produced the privilege de- 
fended by it. 

9. " The ratification of the Conventions of nine States, 
" shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Consti- 
" tution between the States, ratifying the same." 

This Article speaks for itself. The express authority 
of the People alone could give due validity to the Con- 
stitution. To have required the unanimous ratification 
of the thirteen States, would have subjected the essen- 
tial interests of the whole to the caprice or corruption 
of a single member. It would have marked a want of 
foresight in the Convention, which our own experience 
would have rendered inexcusable. 

Two questions of a very delicate nature present them- 
selves on this occasion: — 1. On what principle the Con 



The Fccdemlist. 3(T# 

federation, which stands in the solemn form of a com- 
pact among the States, can be superseded without the 
unanimous consent of the parties to it ? 2. What rela- 
tion is to subsist between the nine or more States rati- 
fying the Constitution, and the remaining few who do 
not become parties to it ? 

The first question is answered at once by recurring to 
the absolute necessity of the case ; to the great principle 
of self-preservation ; to the transcendent law of nature 
and of nature's God, which declares that the safety and 
happiness of society are the objects at which all political 
institutions aim, and to which all such institutions must 
be sacrificed. Perhaps, also, an answer may be found 
without searching beyond the principles of the compact 
itself. It has been heretofore noted among the defects 
of the Confederation, that in many of the States it had 
received no higher sanction than a mere Legislative 
ratification. The principle of reciprocality seems to 
require, that its obligation on the other States should 
be reduced to the same standard. A compact between 
independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of 
Legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity 
than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an 
established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all 
the Articles are mutually conditions of each other ; that 
a breach of any one Article is a breach of the whole 
treaty ; and that a breach, committed by either of the 
parties, absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they 
please, to pronounce the compact violated and void, 
Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these deb 
icate truths for a justification for dispensing with th<* 
consent of particular States to a dissolution of the Fced- 
eral pact, will not the complaining parties find it a 
difficult task to answer the multiplied and important 
infractions with which they may be confronted ? The 
time has been, when it was incumbent on us all to veiJ 



308 The Federalist. 






the ideas which this paragraph exhibits. The scene is 
now changed, and with it the part which the same mo 
tives dictate. 

The second question is not less delicate ; and the flat- 
tering prospect of its being merely hypothetical, forbids 
an over-curious discussion of it. It is one of those cases 
which must be left to provide for itself. In general, it 
may be observed, that although no political relation can 
subsist between the assenting and dissenting States, yet 
the moral relations will remain uncancelled. The claims 
of justice, both on one side and on the other, will be in 
force, and must be fulfilled; the rights of humanity must 
in all cases be duly and mutually respected ; whilst con- 
siderations of a common interest, and above all, the 
remembrance of the endearing scenes which are past, 
and the anticipation of a speedy triumph over the ob- 
stacles to reunion, will, it is hoped, not urge in vain 
moderation on one side, and prudence on the other. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Friday, January 25, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XLIII. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

A FIFTH class of provisions in favor of the Feed 
eral authority consists of the following restrictions 
on the authority of the several States. 

1. " No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or 
u confederation ; grant letters of marque and reprisal ; 
K coin money ; emit bills of credit ; make anything but 
" gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts ; 
'* pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law 



The Federalist. 309 

■ impairing the obligation of contracts ; or grant any 
« title of nobility." 

The prohibition against treaties, alliances, and con- 
federations, makes a part of the existing Articles of 
Union ; and, for reasons which need no explanation, 
is copied into the new Constitution. The prohibition 
of letters of marque is another part of the old system, 
but is somewhat extended in the new. According to 
the former, letters of marque could be granted by the 
States after a declaration of war; according to the lat- 
ter, these licenses must be obtained, as well during 
war, as previous to its declaration, from the Govern 
ment of the United States. This alteration is fully jus- 
tified by the advantage of uniformity in all points which 
relate to foreign powers ; and of immediate responsi- 
bility to the Nation in all those, for whose conduct the 
Nation itself is to be responsible. 

The right of coining money, which is here taken from 
the States, was left in their hands by the Confederation, 
as a concurrent right with that of Congress, under an 
exception in favor of the exclusive right of Congress to 
regulate the alloy and value. In this instance, also, the 
new provision is an improvement on the old. Whilst 
the alloy and value depended on the general authority, 
a right of coinage in the particular States could have 
no other effect than to multiply expensive mints, and 
diversify the forms and weights of the circulating pieces. 
The latter inconveniency defeats one purpose for which 
the power was originally submitted to the Fcederal 
head : and as far as the former might prevent an incon- 
venient remittance of gold and silver to the central mint 
for recoinage, the end can be as well attained by local 
mints established under the general authority. 

The extension of the prohibition to bills of credit 
must give pleasure to every citizen, in proportion to his 
ove of justice and his knowledge of the true springs of 



310 The Federalist. 

public prosperity. The loss which America has sus« 
tained since the Peace, from the pestilent effects of 
paper money on the necessary confidence between man 
and man, on the necessary confidence in the public 
councils, on the industry and morals of the People, and 
on the character of republican Government, constitutes 
an enormous debt against the States chargeable with 
this unadvised measure, which must long remain unsat- 
isfied ; or rather an accumulation of guilt, which can 
be expiated no otherwise than by a voluntary sacrifice 
on the altar of justice, of the power which has been the 
instrument of it. In addition to these persuasive con- 
siderations, it may be observed, that the same reasons 
which show the necessity of denying to the States the 
power of regulating coin, prove with equal force, that 
they ought not to be at liberty to substitute a paper 
medium, in the place of coin. Had every State a right 
to regulate the value of its coin, there might be as many 
different currencies as States, and thus the intercourse 
among them would be impeded; retrospective altera- 
tions in its value might be made, and thus the citizens 
of other States be injured, and animosities be kindled 
among the States themselves. The subjects of foreign 
powers might suffer from the same cause, and hence the 
Union be discredited and embroiled by the indiscretion 
of a single member. No one of these mischiefs is less 
incident to a power in the States to emit paper money, 
than to coin gold or silver. The power to make any- 
thing but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts, 
is withdrawn from the States, on the same principle 
with that of issuing a paper currency. 

Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws im- 
pairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the 
first principles of the social compact, and to every prin- 
ciple of sound legislation. The two former are expressly 
prohibited by the declarations prefixed to some of the 



The Federalist. 313 

State Constitutions, and all of them are prohibited by 
the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. Out 
own experience has taught us, nevertheless, that addi- 
tional fences against these dangers ought not to be 
omitted. Very properly, therefore, have the Convention 
added this Constitutional bulwark in favor of personal 
security and private rights ; and I am much deceived, 
if they have not, in so doing, as faithfully consulted the 
genuine sentiments as the undoubted interests of their 
constituents. The sober People of America are weary 
of the fluctuating policy which has directed the public 
councils. They have seen with regret and with indig- 
nation, that sudden changes, and legislative interfer- 
ences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in 
the hands of enterprising and influential speculators, 
and snares to the more industrious and less informed 
part of the community. They have seen, too, that one 
Legislative interference is but the first link of a long 
chain of repetitions; every subsequent interference be- 
ing naturally produced by the effects of the preceding. 
They very rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough 
reform is wanting, which will banish speculations on 
public measures, inspire a general prudence and indus- 
try, and give a regular course to the business of society. 
The prohibition with respect to titles of nobility is 
copied from the Articles of Confederation, and needs 
no comment. 

2. " No State shall, without the consent of the Con- 
M gress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, 
' except what may be absolutely necessary for executing 
" its inspection laws, and the net produce of all duties 
" and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports, 
" shall be for the use of the treasury of the United 
u States ; and all such laws shall be subject to the re- 
•' vision and control of the Congress. No State shall, 
r< without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on 



312 The Federalist. 

' l tonnage, keep troops or ships of war 
"enter into any agreement or compact with another 
u State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war unless 
" actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will 
" not admit of delay." 

The restraint on the power of the States over imports 
and exports is enforced by all the arguments which 
prove the necessity of submitting the regulation of trade 
to the Foederal councils. It is needless, therefore, to 
remark further on this head, than that the manner in 
which the restraint is qualified seems well calculated at 
once to secure to the States a reasonable discretion in 
providing for the conveniency of their imports and ex- 
ports, and to the United States a reasonable check 
against the abuse of this discretion. The remaining 
particulars of this clause fall within reasonings which 
are either so obvious, or have been so fully developed, 
that they may be passed over without remark. 

The sixth and last class consists of the several powers 
and provisions, by which efficacy is given to all the rest. 

1. " Of these the first is, the power to make all laws 
" which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
" execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers 
" vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
* United States." 

Few parts of the Constitution have been assailed with 
more intemperance than this ; yet on a fair investigation 
of it, no part can appear more completely invulnerable. 
Without the substance of this power, the whole Consti- 
tution would be a dead letter. Those who object to the 
Article, therefore, as a part of the Constitution, can only 
mean that the form of the provision is improper. But 
have they considered, whether a better form could have 
been substituted? 

There are four other possible methods, wfcich the Con- 
vention might have taken on this subject. They might 



The Federalist. 313 

have copied the second Article of the existing Confeder 
ation, which would have prohibited the exercise of any 
power not expressly delegated ; they might have at- 
tempted a positive enumeration of the powers compre- 
hended under the general terms "necessary and proper;" 
they might have attempted a negative enumeration of 
them, by specifying the powers excepted from the gen- 
eral definition ; they might have been altogether silent 
on the subject, leaving these necessary and proper pow- 
ers to construction and inference. 

Had the Convention taken the first method of adopt- 
ing the second Article of Confederation, it is evident 
that the new Congress would be continually exposed, as 
their predecessors have been, to the alternative of con- 
struing the term "expressly" with so much rigor, as 
to disarm the Government of all real authority whatever, 
or with so much latitude as to destroy altogether the 
force of the restriction. It would be easy to show, if it 
were necessary, that no important power, delegated by 
the Articles of Confederation, has been or can be ex- 
ecuted by Congress, without recurring more or less to 
the doctrine of construction or implication. As the pow- 
ers delegated under the new system are more extensive, 
:he Government which is to administer it would find it- 
self still more distressed with the alternative of betray- 
ing the public interest by doing nothing, or of violating 
the Constitution by exercising powers indispensably 
necessary and proper, but, at the same time, not ex- 
pressly granted. 

Had the Convention attempted a positive enumera- 
tion of the powers necessary and proper for carrying 
their other powers into effect, the attempt would have 
involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to 
which the Constitution relates ; accommodated too, not 
only to the existing state of things, but to all the pos- 
sible changes which futurity may produce ; for. in every 



314 The Federalist. 

new application of a general power, the particular pow- 
ers, which are the means of attaining the object of the 
general power, must always necessarily vary with that 
object ; and be often properly varied whilst the object 
remains the same. 

Had they attempted to enumerate the particular pow- 
ers or means not necessary or proper for carrying the 
general powers into execution, the task would have been 
no less chimerical ; and would have been liable to this 
further objection, that every defect in the enumeration 
would have been equivalent to a positive grant of au- 
thority. If, to avoid this consequence, they had at- 
tempted a partial enumeration of the exceptions, and 
described the residue by the general terms, not necessary 
or proper, it must have happened that the enumeration 
would comprehend a few of the excepted powers only ; 
that these would be such as would be least likely to be 
assumed or tolerated, because the enumeration would of 
course select such as would be least necessary or proper; 
and that the unnecessary and improper powers included 
in the residuum, would be less forcibly excepted, than if 
no partial enumeration had been made. 

Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there 
can be no doubt that all the particular powers requisite 
as means of executing the general powers would have 
resulted to the Government, by unavoidable implication. 
No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in rea- 
son, than that wherever the end is required, the means 
are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing 
is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is 
included. Had this last method, therefore, been pursued 
by the Convention, every objection now urged against 
their plan would remain in all its plausibility ; and the 
leal inconveniency would be incurred of not removing a 
pretext which may be seized on critical occasions for 
drawing into question the essential powers of the 
Union. 



The Federalist. 315 

If it be asked what is to be the consequence, in case 
the Congress shall misconstrue this part of the Consti- 
tution, and exercise powers not warranted by its true 
meaning, I answer, the same as if they should miscon- 
strue or enlarge any other power vested in them ; as if 
the general power had been reduced to particulars, and 
any one of these were to be violated ; the same in short, 
as if the State Legislatures should violate their respec- 
tive constitutional authorities. In the first instance, the 
success of the usurpation will depend on the Executive 
and Judiciary departments, which are to expound and 
give effect to the legislative acts ; and in the last resort 
a remedy must be obtained from the People, who can, 
by the election of more faithful representatives, annul 
the acts of the usurpers. The truth is, that this ultimate 
redress may be more confided in against unconstitu- 
tional acts of the Fcederal, than of the State Legisla- 
tures, for this plain reason, that as every such act of the 
former will be an invasion of the rights of the latter, 
these will be ever ready to mark the innovation, to 
sound the alarm to the People, and to exert their local 
influence in effecting a change of Fcederal representa- 
tives. There being no such intermediate body between 
the State Legislatures and the People, interested in 
watching the conduct of the former, violations of the 
State Constitutions are more likely to remain unno- 
ticed and unredressed. 

2. " This Constitution and the laws of the United 
" States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and 
" all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
" authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
" law of the land, and the Judges in every State shall 
* be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or 
" laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." 

The indiscreet zeal of the adversaries to the Constitu- 
tion has betrayed them into an attack on this part of it 



316 The Federalist. 






also, without which it would have been evidently and 
radically defective. To be fully sensible of this, we 
need only suppose for a moment, that the supremacy of 
the State Constitutions had been left complete, by a sav- 
ing clause in their favor. 

In the first place, as these Constitutions invest the 
State Legislatures with absolute sovereignty, in all cases 
not excepted by the existing Articles of Confederation, 
all the authorities contained in the proposed Constitution, 
so far as they exceed those enumerated in the Confed- 
eration, would have been annulled, and the new Con- 
gress would have been reduced to the same impotent 
condition with their predecessors. 

In the next place, as the Constitutions of some of the 
States do not even expressly and fully recognize the 
existing powers of the Confederacy, an express saving 
of the supremacy of the former would, in such States, 
have brought into question every power contained in the 
proposed Constitution. 

In the third place, as the Constitutions of the States 
differ much from each other, it might happen that a 
treaty or National law, of great and equal importance 
to the States, would interfere with some and not with 
other Constitutions, and would consequently be valid 
in some of the States, at the same time that it would 
have no effect in others. 

In fine, the world would have seen, for the first time, 
a system of Government founded on an inversion of the 
fundamental principles of all Government; it would 
have seen the authority of the whole society everywhere 
subordinate to the authority of the parts ; it would have 
seen a monster, in which the head was under the direc- 
tion of the members. 

3. " The Senators and Representatives, and the mem- 
4 bers of the several State Legislatures, and all Exec- 
* utive and Judicial officers, both of the United Statea 



The Federalist. 317 

"and the several States, shall be bound by oath or affir- 
u mation, to support this Constitution." 

It has been asked why it was thought necessary, that 
the State magistracy should be bound to support the 
Foederal Constitution, and unnecessary that a like oath 
should be imposed on the officers of the United States, 
in favor of the State Constitutions ? 

Several reasons might be assigned for the distinction. 
I content myself with one, which is obvious and conclu- 
sive. The members of the Foederal Government will 
have no agency in carrying the State Constitutions into 
effect. The members and officers of the State Govern- 
ments, on the contrary, will have an essential agency 
in giving effect to the Foederal Constitution. The elec- 
tion of the President and Senate will depend, in all 
cases, on the Legislatures of the several States. And 
the election of the House of Representatives will equally 
depend on the same authority in the first instance ; and 
will, probably, forever be conducted by the officers, and 
according to the laws of the States. 

4. Among the provisions for giving efficacy to the 
Foederal powers might be added those which belong to 
the Executive and Judiciary departments : but as these 
are reserved for particular examination in another place, 
I pass them over in this. 

We have now reviewed, in detail, all the Articles 
composing the sum or quantity of power, delegated by 
the proposed Constitution to the Foederal Government; 
and are brought to this undeniable conclusion, that no 
part of the power is unnecessary or improper for accom- 
plishing the necessary objects of the Union. The 
question, therefore, whether this amount of power shall 
oe granted or not, resolves itself into another question, 
whether or not a Government commensurate to the 
exigencies of the Union shall be established ; or, in 
other words, whether the Union itself shall be preserved 

PUBLIUS. 



318 The Federalist. 

For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XLIV. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

TTAVING shown that no one of the powers trans- 
^~"" ferred to the Federal Government is unnecessary 
or improper, the next question to be considered is, 
whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to 
the portion of authority left in the several States. 

The adversaries to the plan of the Convention, instead 
of considering in the first place what degree of power 
was absolutely necessary for the purposes of the Foederal 
Government, have exhausted themselves in a secondary 
inquiry into the possible consequences of the proposed 
degree of power to the Governments of the particular 
States. But if the Union, as has been shown, be essen- 
tial to the security of the People of America against 
foreign danger; if it be essential to their security 
against contentions and wars among the different States ; 
if it be essential to guard them against those violent 
and oppressive factions which embitter the blessings of 
liberty, and against those military establishments which 
must gradually poison its very fountain ; if, in a word, 
the Union be essential to the happiness of the People 
of America, is it not preposterous, to urge as an objec- 
tion to a Government, without which the objects of the 
Union cannot be attained, that such a Government may 
derogate from the importance of the Governments of 
the individual States ? Was then the American Revo- 
lution effected, was the American Confederacy formed, 
,vas the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard- 
earned substance of millions lavished, not that the Peo- 



The Federalist 319 

pie of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety ; 
but that the Governments of the individual States, that 
particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a cer- 
tain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain digni- 
ties and attributes of Sovereignty ? We have heard of 
the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the People 
were made for kings, not kings for the People. Is the 
same doctrine to be revived in the New, in another shape, 
that the solid happiness of the People is to be sacrificed 
to the views of political institutions of a different form? 
It is too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting 
that the public good, the real welfare of the great body 
of the People, is the supreme object to be pursued ; and 
that no form of Government whatever has any other 
value, than as it may be fitted for the attainment of 
this object. Were the plan of the Convention adverse 
to the public happiness, my voice would be, reject the 
plan. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the pub- 
lic happiness, it would be, abolish the Union. In like 
manner, as far as the sovereignty of the States cannot 
be reconciled to the happiness of the People, the voice 
of every good citizen must be, let the former be sacri- 
ficed to the latter. How far the sacrifice is necessary, 
has been shown. How far the unsacrificed residue will 
be endangered, is the question before us. 

Several important considerations have been touched 
in the course of these papers, which discountenance the 
supposition, that the operation of the Fcederal Govern- 
ment will by degrees prove fatal to the State Govern- 
ments. The more I revolve the subject, the more fully 
I am persuaded, that the balance is much more likely 
to be disturbed by the preponderancy of the last than 
of the first scale. 

We have seen, in all the examples of ancient and 
jnodern Confederacies, the strongest tendency continually 
defraying itself in the members, to despoil the Genera! 



320 The Federalist. 

Government of its authorities, with a very ineffectual 
capacity in the latter to defend itself against the 
encroachments. Although, in most of these examples, 
the system has been so dissimilar from that under con- 
sideration as greatly to weaken any inference concerning 
the latter from the fate of the former, yet, as the States 
will retain, under the proposed Constitution, a very 
extensive portion of active sovereignty, the inference 
ought not to be wholly disregarded. In the Achaean 
league it is probable that the Fcederal head had a degree 
and species of power, which gave it a considerable like- 
ness to the Government framed by the Convention. The 
Lycian Confederacy, as far as its principles and form are 
transmitted, must have borne a still greater analogy to it. 
Yet history does not inform us, that either of them ever 
degenerated, or tended to degenerate, into one consol- 
idated Government. On the contrary, we know that 
the ruin of one of them proceeded from the incapacity 
of the Foederal authority to prevent the dissensions, and 
finally the disunion, of the subordinate authorities. 
These cases are the more worthy of our attention, as the 
external causes by which the component parts were 
pressed together were much more numerous and powerful 
than in our case ; and consequently less powerful liga- 
ments within would be sufficient to bind the members 
to the head, and to each other. 

In the feudal system, we have seen a similar propen- 
sity exemplified. Notwithstanding the want of proper 
sympathy in every instance between the local sovereigns 
and the People, and the sympathy in some instances 
between the general sovereign and the latter, it usually 
happened that the local sovereigns prevailed in the rival- 
ship for encroachments. Had no external dangers 
enforced internal harmony and subordination, and par- 
ticularly, had the local sovereigns possessed the affections 
of the People, the great kingdoms in Europe would at 



The Fosderalisl. 321 

this time consist of as many independent princes, as 
there were formerly feudatory barons. 

The State Governments will have the advantage of 
the Foederal Government, whether we compare them in 
respect to the immediate dependence of the one on the 
other ; to the weight of personal influence which each 
side will possess ; to the powers respectively vested in 
them ; to the predilection and probable support of the 
People ; to the disposition and faculty of resisting and 
frustrating the measures of each other. 

The State Governments may be regarded as constit- 
uent and essential parts of the Foederal Government ; 
whilst the latter is nowise essential to the operation 
or organization of the former. Without the intervention 
of the State Legislatures, the President of the United 
States cannot be elected at all. They must in all cases 
have a great share in his appointment, and will perhaps, 
in most cases, of themselves determine it. The Senate 
will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State 
Legislatures. Even the House of Representatives, 
though drawn immediately from the People, will be chos- 
en very much under the influence of that class of men, 
whose influence over the People obtains for themselves 
an election into the State Legislatures. Thus, each 
of the principal branches of the Foederal Government will 
owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State 
Governments, and must consequently feel a dependence, 
which is much more likely to beget a disposition too 
obsequious, than too overbearing towards them. On 
the other side, the component parts of the State Govern- 
ments will in no instance be indebted for their appoint- 
ment to the direct agency of the Foederal Government, 
and very little, if at all, to the local influence of its 
members. 

The number of individuals employed under the Con- 
Btitution of the United States will be much smaller 
VOL. i. 21 



322 The Federalist. 

than the number employed under the particular States 
There will consequently be less of personal influence 
on the side of the former than of the latter. The 
members of the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary 
departments of thirteen and more States, the justices of 
peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers of justice, 
with all the county, corporation, and town officers, 
for three millions and more of people, intermixed, and 
having particular acquaintance with every class and 
circle of people, must exceed, beyond all proportion, 
both in number and influence, those of every description 
who will be employed in the administration of the Foed- 
eral system. Compare the members of the three great 
departments of the thirteen States, excluding from 
the Judiciary department the justices of peace, with 
the members of the corresponding departments of the 
single Government of the Union ; compare the militia 
officers of three millions of people, with the military 
and marine officers of any establishment, which is within 
the compass of probability, or, I may add, of possibility, 
and in this view alone, we may pronounce the advantage 
of the States to be decisive. If the Fcederal Govern- 
ment is to have collectors of revenue, the State Govern- 
ments will have theirs also. And as those of the former 
will be principally on the sea-coast, and not very 
numerous, whilst those of the latter will be spread over 
the face of the country, and will be very numerous, 
the advantage in this view also lies on the same side. 
It is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and may 
exercise, the power of collecting internal as well as 
external taxes throughout the States : but it is probable 
that this power will not be resorted to, except for sup- 
plemental purposes of revenue ; that an option will then 
be given to the States to supply their quotas by previous 
collections of their own ; and that the eventual collec- 
tion, under the immediate authority of the Union 



The Federalist. 328 

will generally be made by the officers, and according 
to the rules, appointed by the several States. Indeed 
it is extremely probable, that in other instances, partic- 
ularly in the organization of the Judicial power, the offi- 
cers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent 
authority of the Union. Should it happen, however, 
that separate collectors of internal revenue should be 
appointed under the Foederal Government, the influence 
of the whole number would not be a comparison with 
that of the multitude of State officers in the opposite 
pcale. Within every district, to which a Foederal col- 
lector would be allotted, there would not be less than 
thirty or forty, or even more, officers, of different descrip- 
tions, and many of them persons of character and weight, 
whose influence would lie on the side of the State. 

The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution 
to the Foederal Government are few and defined. 
Those which are to remain in the State Governments 
are numerous and indefinite. The former will be ex- 
ercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, 
negotiation, and foreign commerce ; with which last the 
power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. 
The powers reserved to the several States will extend to 
all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs 
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the People, 
and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of 
the State. 

The operations of the Foederal Government will be 
most extensive and important in times of war and dan- 
ger ; those of the State Governments, in times of peace 
and security. As the former periods will probably bear 
a small proportion to the latter, the State Governments 
will here enjoy another advantage over the Foederal 
Government. The more adequate, indeed, the Foederal 
powers may be rendered to the National defence, the 
ess frequent will be those scenes of danger which might 



324 The Federalist. 

favor their ascendency over the Governments of the par- 
ticular States. 

If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy 
and candor, it will be found that the change which it 
proposes consists much less in the addition of new 
powers to the Union, than in the invigoration of its 
original powers. The regulation of commerce, it is 
true, is a new power ; but that seems to be an addition 
which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions 
are entertained. The powers relating to war and peace, 
armies and fleets, treaties and finance, with the other 
more considerable powers, are all vested in the existing 
Congress by the Articles of Confederation. The pro- 
posed change does not enlarge these powers ; it only 
substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them. 
The change relating to taxation may be regarded as the 
most important: and yet the present Congress have as 
complete authority to require of the States indefinite 
supplies of money for the common defence and general 
welfare, as the future Congress will have to require them 
of individual citizens ; and the latter will be no more 
bound than the States themselves have been, to pay the 
quotas respectively taxed on them. Had the States 
complied punctually with the Articles of Confederation, 
or could their compliance have been enforced by as 
peaceable means as may be used with success towards 
single persons, our past experience is very far from 
countenancing an opinion, that the State Governments 
would have lost their constitutional powers, and have 
gradually undergone an entire consolidation. To main- 
tain that such an event would have ensued, would be 
to say at once, that the existence of the State Govern- 
ments is incompatible with any system whatever, that 
ccomplishes the essential purposes of the Union. 

PUBLIUS. 



The Federalist. 325 

[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, January 29, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XLV. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

RESUMING the subject of the last paper, I proceed 
to inquire, whether the Fosderal Government or the 
State Governments will have the advantage with regard 
to the predilection and support of the People. Not- 
withstanding the different modes in which they are ap- 
pointed, we must consider both of them as substantially- 
dependent on the great body of the citizens of the 
United States. I assume this position here as it re- 
spects the first, reserving the proofs for another place. 
The Feeder al and State Governments are in fact but 
different agents and trustees of the People, constituted 
with different powers, and designated for different pur- 
poses. The adversaries of the Constitution seem to 
have lost sight of the People altogether, in their reason- 
ings on this subject ; and to have viewed these different 
establishments, not only as mutual rivals and enemies, 
but as uncontrolled by any common superior, in their 
efforts to usurp the authorities of each other. These 
gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They 
must be told, that the ultimate authority, wherever the 
derivative may be found, resides in the People alone, 
and that it will not depend merely on the compara- 
tive ambition or address of the different Governments, 
whether either, or which of them, will be able to en- 
large its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the 
other. Truth, no less than decency, requires, that the 
event in every case should be supposed to depend on 
the sentiments and sanction of their common constitu- 
ents. 



326 The Federalist. 

Many considerations, besides those suggested on a 
former occasion, seem to place it beyond doubt, that the 
first and most natural attachment of the People will be 
to the Governments of their respective States. Into the 
administration of these, a greater number of individuals 
will expect to rise. From the gift of these, a greater 
number of offices and emoluments will flow. By the 
superintending care of these, all the more domestic and 
personal interests of the People will be regulated and 
provided for. With the affairs of these, the People will 
be more familiarly and minutely conversant. And with 
the members of these will a greater proportion of the 
People have the ties of personal acquaintance and 
friendship, and of family and party attachments ; on 
the side of these, therefore, the popular bias may well 
be expected most strongly to incline. 

Experience speaks the same language in this case. 
The Fcederal administration, though hitherto very de- 
fective, in comparison with what may be hoped under 
a better system, had, during the war, and particularly 
whilst the independent fund of paper emissions was in 
credit, an activity and importance as great as it can 
well have, in any future circumstances whatever. It 
was engaged, too, in a course of measures which had for 
their object the protection of everything that was dear, 
and the acquisition of everything that could be desira- 
ble to the People at large. It was, nevertheless, invari- 
ably found, after the transient enthusiasm for the early 
Congresses was over, that the attention and attachment 
of the People were turned anew to their own particular 
Governments ; that the Foederal Council was at no time 
the idol of popular favor; and that opposition to pro- 
posed enlargements of its powers and importance was 
the side usually taken by the men, who wished to build 
their political consequence on the prepossessions of 
their fellow-citizens. 



The Federalist. 327 

If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the Peo 
pie should in future become more partial to the Fcederal 
than to the State Governments, the change can only re- 
sult from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a bet- 
ter administration, as will overcome all their antecedent 
propensities. And in that case, the People ought not 
surely to be precluded from giving most of their confi- 
dence where they may discover it to be most due ; but 
even in that case, the State Governments could have 
little to apprehend, beause it is only within a certain 
sphere, that the Foederal power can, in the nature of 
things, be advantageously administered. 

The remaining points, on which I propose to compare 
the Fcederal and State Governments, are the disposition 
and the faculty they may respectively possess, to resist 
and frustrate the measures of each other. 

It has been already proved, that the members of the 
Fcederal will be more dependent on the members of the 
State Governments, than the latter will be on the for- 
mer. It has appeared also, that the prepossessions of 
the People, on whom both will depend, will be more on 
the side of the State Governments, than of the Foederal 
Government. So far as the disposition of each towards 
the other may be influenced by these causes, the State 
Governments must clearly have the advantage. But 
in a distinct and very important point of view, the 
advantage will lie on the same side. The preposses- 
sions, which the members themselves will carry into the 
Foederal Government, will generally be favorable to the 
States ; whilst it will rarely happen, that the members 
of the State Governments will carry into the public 
councils a bias in favor of the General Government. A 
local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the mem- 
bers of Congress, than a National spirit will prevail in 
the Legislatures of the particular States. Every one 
inows, that a great proportion of the errors committed 



328 The Federalist. 

by the State Legislatures proceeds from the disposition 
of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and per- 
manent interest of the State, to the particular and sep- 
arate views of the counties or districts in which they 
reside. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their 
policy to embrace the collective welfare of their partic- 
ular State, how can it be imagined, that they will make 
the aggregate prosperity of the Union, and the dignity 
and respectability of its Government, the objects of their 
affections and consultations ? For the same reason that 
the members of the State Legislatures will be unlikely 
to attach themselves sufficiently to National objects, the 
members of the Foederal Legislature will be likely to 
attach themselves too much to local objects. The States 
will be to the latter, what counties and towns are to the 
former. Measures will too often be decided according to 
their probable effect, not on the National prosperity and 
happiness, but on the prejudices, interests, and pursuits 
of the Governments and People of the individual States. 
What is the spirit that has in general characterized the 
proceedings of Congress? A perusal of their journals, 
as well as the candid acknowledgments of such as have 
had a seat in that assembly, will inform us, that the 
members have but too frequently displayed the charac- 
ter, rather of partisans of their respective States, than 
of impartial guardians of a common interest; that where 
on one occasion improper sacrifices have been made of 
local considerations to the aggrandizement of the Foed- 
eral Government, the great interests of the Nation have 
suffered on an hundred, from an undue attention to the 
local prejudices, interests, and views of the particular 
States. I mean not by these reflections to insinuate, 
that the new Foederal Government will not embrace a 
more enlarged plan of policy than the existing Govern- 
ment may have pursued ; much less, that its views will 
be as confined as those of the State Legislatures ; but 



The Federalist. 329 

only that it will partake sufficiently of the spirit of both, 
to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual 
States, or the prerogatives of their Governments. The 
motives on the part of the State Governments, to aug- 
ment their prerogatives by defalcations from the Fcederal 
Government, will be overruled by no reciprocal predis- 
positions in the members. 

Were it admitted, however, that the Foederal Govern- 
ment may feel an equal disposition with the State Gov- 
ernments to extend its power beyond the due limits, the 
latter would still have the advantage in the means of 
defeating such encroachments. If an act of a particular 
State, though unfriendly to the National Government, 
be generally popular in that State, and should not too 
grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is exe- 
cuted immediately and of course by means on the spot, 
and depending on the State alone. The opposition of 
the Foederal Government, or the interposition of Foed- 
eral officers, would but inflame the zeal of all parties on 
the side of the State, and the evil could not be prevented 
or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means 
which must always be resorted to with reluctance and 
difficulty. On the other hand, should an unwarrantable 
measure of the Foederal Government be unpopular in 
particular States, which would seldom fail to be the 
case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which may 
sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it are 
powerful and at hand. The disquietude of the People; 
their repugnance, and perhaps refusal, to cooperate with 
the officers of the Union ; the frowns of the Executive 
magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by 
Legislative devices, which would often be added on such 
occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to 
be despised ; would form, in a large State, very serious 
mpediments; and where the sentiments of several ad- 
joining States happened to be in unison, would present 



330 The Federalist. 

obstructions which the Foederal Government would 
hardly be willing to encounter. 

But ambitious encroachments of the Foederal Govern- 
ment, on the authority of the State Governments, would 
not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few 
States only. They would be signals of general alarm. 
Every Government would espouse the common cause 
A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance 
would be concerted. One spirit would animate and 
conduct the whole. The same combination, in short, 
would result from an apprehension of the Foederal, as 
was produced by the dread of a foreign yoke ; and un- 
less the projected innovations should be voluntarily re- 
nounced, the same appeal to a trial of force would be 
made in the one case, as was made in the other. But 
what degree of madness could ever drive the Foederal 
Government to such an extremity ? In the contest with 
Great Britain, one part of the empire was employed 
against the other. The more numerous part invaded 
the rights of the less numerous part. The attempt was 
unjust and unwise ; but it was not in speculation abso- 
*uteiy chimerical. But what would be the contest, in 
the case we are supposing? Who would be the parties? 
A few representatives of the People would be opposed 
to the People themselves; or rather one set of represent- 
atives would be contending against thirteen sets of rep- 
resentatives, with the whole body of their common 
constituents on the side of the latter. 

The only refuge left for those who prophesy the down- 
fall of the State Governments is the visionary suppo- 
sition that the Foederal Government may previously 
accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition. 
The reasonings contained in these papers must have 
been employed to little purpose indeed, if it could be 
necessary now to disprove the reality of this danger. 
That the People and the States should, for a sufficient 



The Federalist. 331 

period of time, elect an uninterrupted succession of mei? 
ready to betray both ; that the traitors should, through 
out this period, uniformly and systematically pursue 
some fixed plan for the extension of the military estab- 
lishment; that the Governments and the People of the 
States should silently and patiently behold the gathering 
storm, and continue to supply the materials, until it 
should be prepared to burst on their own heads, must 
appear to every one more like the incoherent dreams of 
a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged exaggerations of a 
counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions of 
genuine patriotism. Extravagant as the supposition is, 
let it however be made. Let a regular army, fully equal 
to the resources of the country, be formed ; and let it be 
entirely at the devotion of the Fcederal Government; 
still it would not be going too far to say, that the State 
Governments, with the People on their side, would be 
able to repel the danger. The highest number to which, 
according to the best computation, a standing army can 
be carried in any country, does not exceed one hun- 
dredth part of the whole number of souls ; or one twen- 
ty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This 
proportion would not yield, in the United States, an 
army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. 
To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near 
half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, offi- 
cered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting 
for their common liberties, and united and conducted 
by Governments possessing their affections and confi- 
dence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus 
circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a pro- 
portion of regular troops. Those who are best ac- 
quainted with the late successful resistance of this coun- 
try against the British arms, will be most inclined to 
ieny the possibility of it. Besides the advantage of 
being armed, which the Americans possess over the 



332 The Federalist. 

People of almost every other nation, the existence of 
Bubordinate Governments, to which the People are at- 
tached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, 
forms a barrier, against the enterprises of ambition, 
more insurmountable than any which a simple Govern- 
ment of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the 
military establishments in the several kingdoms of Eu- 
rope, which are carried as far as the public resources wil 
bear, the Governments are afraid to trust the People 
with arms. And it is not certain, that with this aid 
alone, they would not be able to shake off their yokes. 
But were the People to possess the additional advan- 
tages of local Governments chosen by themselves, who 
could collect the National will, and direct the National 
force, and of officers appointed out of the militia, by 
these Governments, and attached both to them and to 
the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assur- 
ance, that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would 
be speedily overturned in spite of the legions which 
surround it. Let us not insult the free 1 and gallant 
citizens of America with the suspicion, that they would 
be less able to defend the rights of which they would 
be in actual possession, than the debased subjects of 
arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the 
hands of their oppressors. Let us rather no longer in- 
sult them with the supposition, that they can ever reduce 
themselves to the necessity of making the experiment, 
oy a blind and tame submission to the long train of in- 
sidious measures which must precede and produce it. 

The argument under the present head may be put 
into a very concise form, which appears altogether con- 
clusive. Either the mode in whi»ch the Fcederal Gov- 
ernment is to be constructed will render it sufficiently 
dependent on the People, or it will not. On the first 
supposition, it will be restrained by that dependence 
from forming schemes obnoxious to their constituents 



The Federalist 333 

On the other supposition, it will not possess the confi 
dence of the People, and its schemes of usurpation wiL 
be easily defeated by the State Governments, who wiL 
be supported by the People. 

On summing up the considerations stated in this and 
the last paper, they seem to amount to the most con- 
vincing evidence, that the powers proposed to be lodged 
in the Fcederal Government are as little formidable to 
those reserved to the individual States, as they are in- 
dispensably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the 
Union ; and that all those alarms which have been 
sounded, of a meditated and consequential annihilation 
of the State Governments, must, on the most favorable 
interpretation, be ascribed to the chimerical fears of the 
authors of them. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Friday, February 1, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XLVI. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

HAVING reviewed the general form of the proposed 
Government and the general mass of power al- 
lotted to it, I proceed to examine the particular struct- 
ure of this Government, and the distribution of this 
mass of power among its constituent parts. 

One of the principal objections inculcated by the 
more respectable adversaries to the Constitution is its 
supposed violation of the political maxim, that the Leg- 
islative, Executive, and Judiciary departments ought to 
be separate and distinct. In the structure of the Fced- 
eral Government, no regard, it is said, seems to have 
been paid to this essential precaution in favor of liberty 



334 The Federalist. 

The several departments of power are distributed ana 
blended in such a manner, as at once to destroy all 
symmetry and beauty of form, and to expose some of 
the essential parts of the edifice to the danger of being 
crushed by the disproportionate weight of other parts. 

No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, 
or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened 
patrons of liberty, than that on which the objection is 
founded. The accumulation of all powers, Legislative, 
Executive, and Judiciary, in the same hands, whether 
of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-ap- 
pointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very 
definition of tyranny. Were the Fcederal Constitution, 
therefore, really chargeable w T ith this accumulation of 
power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous 
tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments 
would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of 
the system. I persuade myself, however, that it will be 
made apparent to every one, that the charge cannot be 
supported, and that the maxim on which it relies has 
been totally misconceived and misapplied. In order to 
form correct ideas on this important subject, it will be 
proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation 
of liberty requires, that the three great departments cf 
power should be separate and distinct. 

The oracle who is always consulted and cited on 
this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu. If he be 
not the author of this invaluable precept in the science 
of politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and 
recommending it most effectually to the attention of 
mankind. Let us endeavor, in the first place, to as- 
certain his meaning on this point. 

The British Constitution was to Montesquieu what 
Homer has been to the didactic writers on epic poetry. 
As the latter have considered the work of the immortal 
Bard as the perfect model from which the principles 






The Federalist. 33c 

and rules of the epic art were to be drawn, and by which 
all similar works were to be judged : so this great polit- 
ical critic appears to have viewed the Constitution of 
England as the standard, or to use his own expression, 
as the mirror of political liberty ; and to have delivered 
in the form of elementary truths the several character- 
istic principles of that particular system. That we may 
be sure, then, not to mistake his meaning in this case, 
let us recur to the source from which the maxim was 
drawn. 

On the slightest view of the British Constitution we 
must perceive that the Legislative, Executive, and Ju- 
diciary departments are by no means totally separate 
and distinct from each other. The Executive magis- 
trate forms an integral part of the Legislative authority. 
He alone has the prerogative of making treaties with 
foreign sovereigns, which, when made, have, under certain 
limitations, the force of Legislative acts. All the mem- 
bers of the Judiciary department are appointed by him ; 
can be removed by him on the address of the two 
Houses of Parliament ; and form, when he pleases to 
consult them, one of his constitutional Councils. One 
branch of the Legislative department forms also a 
great constitutional Council to the Executive chief; as, on 
another hand, it is the sole depositary of judicial power 
in cases of impeachment, and is invested with the 
supreme appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The 
judges, again, are so far connected with the Legislative 
department as often to attend and participate in its 
deliberations, though not admitted to a Legislative vote. 

From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, 
it may clearly be inferred, that in saying '' There can 
u be no liberty, where the Legislative and Executive 
% powers are united in the same person, or body of 
" magistrates," or, " if the power of judging be not sep- 
* arated from the Legislative and Executive powers," 



336 The Federalist. 






he did not mean that these departments ought to have 
no partial agency in, or no control over the acts of each 
other. His meaning, as his own words import, and 
still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in 
his eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the 
whole power of one department is exercised by the same 
hands which possess the whole power of another de- 
partment, the fundamental principles of a free Consti- 
tution are subverted. This would have been the case 
in the Constitution examined by him, if the King, who 
is the sole Executive magistrate, had possessed also the 
complete Legislative power, or the supreme administra- 
tion of Justice ; or if the entire Legislative body had pos- 
sessed the supreme Judiciary, or the supreme Executive 
authority. This, however, is not among the vices of that 
Constitution. The magistrate in whom the whole Ex- 
ecutive power resides cannot of himself make a law, 
though he can put a negative on every law ; nor admin- 
ister justice in person, though he has the appointment 
of those who do administer it. The judges can exercise 
no Executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the 
Executive stock ; nor any Legislative function, though 
they may be advised with by the Legislative Councils. 
The entire Legislature can perform no Judiciary act; 
though by the joint act of two of its branches the 
judges may be removed from their offices ; and though 
one of its branches is possessed of the Judicial power 
in the last resort. The entire Legislature again can 
exercise no Executive prerogative, though one of its 
branches constitutes the supreme Executive magistracy, 
and another, on the impeachment of a third, can try and 
condemn all the subordinate officers in the Executive 
department. 

The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his 
maxim are a further demonstration of his meaning. 
•' When the Legislative and Executive powers are united 



The Federalist. 337 

u in the same person or body, " says he, " there can be 
''no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the 
''same monarch or Senate should enact tyrannical laws 
"to execute them in a tyrannical manner." Again, 
" Were the power of judging joined with the Legisla- 
tive, the life and liberty of the subject would be 
" exposed to arbitrary control, for the Judge would then 

be the Legislator. Were it joined to the Executive 
"power, the Judge might behave with all the violence 
" of an oppressor" Some of these reasons are more 
fully explained in other passages ; but briefly stated 
as they are here, they sufficiently establish the meaning 
which we have put on this celebrated maxim of this 
celebrated author. 

If we look into the Constitutions of the several States, 
we find, that, notwithstanding the emphatical, and 
in some instances, the unqualified terms in which this 
axiom has been laid down, there is not a single instance 
in which the several departments of power have been 
kept absolutely separate and distinct. New Hampshire, 
whose Constitution was the last formed, seems to have 
been fully aware of the impossibility and inexpediency 
of avoiding any mixture whatever of these departments ; 
and has qualified the doctrine by declaring, "that the 
" Legislative, Executive and Judiciary powers ought 
H to be kept as separate from, and independent of each 
"other, as the nature of a free Government will admit; 
" or as is consistent with that chain of connection, that 
* binds the whole fabric of the Constitution in one indis- 
' soluble bond of unity and amity" Her Constitution 
accordingly mixes these departments in several respects. 
The Senate, which is a branch of the Legislative depart- 
ment, is also a Judicial tribunal for the trial of impeach- 
ments. The President, who is the head of the Executive 
deoartment, is the presiding member also of the Senate ; 
tnd, besides an equal vote in all cases, has a casting 

vol. i. 22 



338 The Federalist. 

vote in case uf a tie. The Executive head is himself 
eventually elective every year by the Legislative depart- 
ment; and his Council is every year chosen by and from 
the members of the same department. Several of the 
officers of State are also appointed by the Legislature. 
And the members of the Judiciary department are 
appointed by the Executive department. 

The Constitution of Massachusetts has observed 
a sufficient though less pointed caution, in expressing 
this fundamental Article of liberty. It declares, "that 
"the Legislative department shall never exercise the 
" Executive and Judicial powers, or either of them : 
" the Executive shall never exercise the Legislative and 
" Judicial powers, or either of them : the Judicial shall 
" never exercise the Legislative and Executive powers 
" or either of them. " This declaration corresponds pre- 
cisely with the doctrine of Montesquieu, as it has been 
explained, and is not in a single point violated by the 
plan of the Convention. It goes no farther than to 
prohibit any one of the entire departments from exer- 
cising the powers of another department. In the very 
Constitution to which it is prefixed, a partial mixture 
of powers has been admitted. The Executive magis- 
trate has a qualified negative on the Legislative body, 
and the Senate, which is a part of the Legislature, 
.s a court of impeachment for members both of the 
Executive and Judiciary departments. The members 
of the Judiciary department, again, are appointable by 
the Executive department, and removable by the same 
authority on the address of the two Legislative branches. 
Lastly, a number of the officers of Government are 
annually appointed by the Legislative department. As 
the appointment to offices, particularly Executive offices, 
is in its nature an Executive function, the compilers 
of the Constitution have, in this last point at least, 
violated the rule established by themselves. 



The Federalist. 339 

I pass over the Constitutions of Rhode Island and 
Connecticut, because they were formed prior to the 
Revolution, and even before the principle under exam- 
ination had become an object of political attention. 

The Constitution of New York contains no declara- 
tion on this subject ; but appears very clearly to have 
been framed with an eye to the danger of improperly 
blending the different departments. It gives, nevertheless 
to the Executive magistrate, a partial control over the 
Legislative department ; and, what is more, gives a like 
control to the Judiciary department; and even blends 
the Executive and Judiciary departments in the exercise 
of this control. In its Council of Appointment, mem- 
bers of the Legislative are associated with the Executive 
authority, in the appointment of officers, both Executive 
and Judiciary. And its Court for the trial of Impeach- 
ments and Correction of Errors, is to consist of one 
branch of the Legislature and the principal members 
of the Judiciary department. 

The Constitution of New Jersey has blended the 
different powers of Government more than any of the pre- 
ceding. The Governor, who is the Executive magistrate, 
is appointed by the Legislature ; is Chancellor and 
Ordinary, or Surrogate of the State ; is a member of 
the Supreme Court of Appeals, and President, with 
a casting vote, of one of the Legislative branches. 
The same Legislative branch acts again as Executive 
Council of the Governor, and with him constitutes the 
Court of Appeals. The members of the Judiciary 
department are appointed by the Legislative department 
and removable by one branch of it, on the impeachment 
of the other. 

According to the Constitution of Pennsylvania, the 
President, who is the head of the Executive department, 
is annually elected by a vote in which the Legislative 
department predominates. In conjunction with an 



340 The Federalist. 

Executive Council, he appoints the membeis of the 
Judiciary department, and forms a court of impeach- 
ment for trial of all officers, Judiciary as well as Exec- 
utive. The judges of the Supreme Court, and justices 
of the peace seem also to be removable by the Legis- 
lature ; and the Executive power of pardoning in certain 
cases to be referred to the same department. The mem- 
bers of the Executive Council are made ex officio 
justices of peace throughout the State. 

In Delaware, the chief Executive magistrate is 
annually elected by the Legislative department. The 
Speakers of the two Legislative branches are Vice-pres- 
idents in the Executive department. The Executive 
chief, with six others, appointed, three by each of the 
Legislative branches, constitute the Supreme Court of 
Appeals; he is joined with the Legislative department 
in the appointment of the other judges. Throughout 
the States, it appears that the members of the Legisla- 
ture may at the same time be justices of the peace ; in this 
State, the members of one branch of it are ex officio 
justices of the peace ; as are also the members of the 
Executive Council. The principal officers of the Exec- 
utive department are appointed by the Legislative ; and 
one branch of the latter forms a Court of Impeach* 
ments. All officers may be removed on address of the 
Legislature. 

Maryland has adopted the maxim in the most unqual- 
ified terms ; declaring that the Legislative, Executive, 
and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forevei 
separate and distinct from each other. Her Constitu- 
tion, notwithstanding, makes the Executive magistrate 
appointable by the Legislative department; and the 
members of the Judiciary by the Executive depart- 
ment. 

The language of Virginia is still more pointed on this 
Buoject. Her Constitution declares, " that the Legisla- 



The Federalist. 341 

'tive, Executive, and Judiciary departments shall be 
* separate and distinct; so that neither exercise the pow- 
ers properly belonging to the other; nor shall any per 
"son exercise the powers of more than one of them 
"at the same time; except that the justices of county 
"courts shall be eligible to either House of Assembly." 
Yet we find not only this express exception, with re- 
spect to the members of the inferior courts, but that the 
chief magistrate, with his Executive Council, are ap- 
pointable by the Legislature; that two members of the 
latter are triennially displaced at the pleasure of the 
Legislature ; and that all the principal offices, both Ex- 
ecutive and Judiciary, are filled by the same department. 
The Executive prerogative of pardon, also, is in one case 
vested in the Legislative department. 

The Constitution of North Carolina, wmich declares, 
" that the Legislative, Executive, and supreme Judicial 
"powers of Government ought to be forever separate 
" and distinct from each other," refers, at the same time, 
to the Legislative department, the appointment not only 
of the Executive chief, but all the principal officers with- 
in both that and the Judiciary department. 

In South Carolina, the Constitution makes the Ex- 
ecutive magistracy eligible by the Legislative depart- 
ment. It gives to the latter, also, the appointment of 
the members of the Judiciary department, including even 
justices of the peace and sheriffs : and the appointment 
of officers in the Executive department, down to cap- 
tains in the army and navy of the State. 

In the Constitution of Georgia, where it is declared. 
1 that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary depart- 
u ments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither 
' exercise the powers properly belonging to the other," 
we find that the Executive department is to be filled by 
appointments of the Legislature ; and the Executive pre- 
rogative of pardon to be finally exercised by the same 



342 The Fcederalist. 

authority. Even justices of the peace are to be ap- 
pointed by the Legislature. 

In citing these cases in which the Legislative, Exec- 
utive, and Judiciary departments have not been kept to- 
tally separate and distinct, I wish not to be regarded as 
an advocate for the particular organizations of the sev- 
eral State Governments. I am fully aware, that among 
the many excellent principles which they exemplify, they 
carry strong marks of the haste, and still stronger of the 
inexperience, under which they were framed. It is but 
too obvious, that in some instances the fundamental 
principle under consideration has been violated by too 
great a mixture, and even an actual consolidation of the 
different powers ; and that in no instance has a compe- 
tent provision been made for maintaining in practice the 
separation delineated on paper. What I have wished 
to evince is, that the charge brought against the pro- 
posed Constitution, of violating a sacred maxim of free 
Government, is warranted neither by the real meaning 
annexed to that maxim by its author, nor by the sense 
in which it has hitherto been understood in America. 
This interesting subject will be resumed in the ensuing 

paper. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Friday, February 1, 1788.] 

THE FCEDERALIST. No. XLVII. 



To the People of the State op New York : 

IT was shown in the last paper, that the political ap- 
ophthegm there examined does not require that the 
Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments should 



The Federalist. 343 

De wholly unconnected with each other. I shall under- 
take in the next place to show, that unless these depart- 
ments be so far connected and blended, as to give to 
each a constitutional control over the others, the degree 
of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to 
a free Government, can never in practice be duly main- 
tained. 

It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly 
belonging to one of the departments ought not to be 
directly and completely administered by either of the 
other departments. It is equally evident, that neither 
of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an over- 
ruling influence over the others in the administration of 
their respective powers. It will not be denied, that 
power is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to 
be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned 
to it. After discriminating, therefore, in theory, the 
several classes of power as they may in their nature be 
Legislative, Executive, or Judiciary, the next and most 
difficult task is to provide some practical security for 
each, against the invasion of the others. What this 
security ought to be, is the great problem to be solved. 

Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the 
boundaries of these departments, in the constitution 
of the Government, and to trust to these parchment 
barriers against the encroaching spirit of power ? This 
is the security which appears to have been principally 
relied on by the compilers of most of the American 
Constitutions. But experience assures us, that the 
efficacy of the provision has been greatly overrated ; 
and that some more adequate defence is indispensably 
necessary for the more feeble, against the more power- 
ful, members of the Government. The Legislative 
department is everywhere extending the sphere of its 
activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous 
vortex. 



344 The Feeder alist. 

The founders of our republics have so much merit 
for the wisdom which they have displayed, that no task 
can be less pleasing than that of pointing out the errors 
into which they have fallen. A respect for truth, how- 
ever, obliges us to remark, that they seem never for a 
moment to have turned their eyes from the danger to 
liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative 
of an hereditary magistrate, supported and fortified by 
an hereditary branch of the Legislative authority. They 
seem never to have recollected the danger from Legisla- 
tive usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the 
same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threat- 
ened by Executive usurpations. 

In a Government where numerous and extensive pre- 
rogatives are placed in the hands of an hereditary mon- 
arch, the Executive department is very justly regarded 
as the source of danger, and watched with all the jeal- 
ousy which a zeal for liberty ought to inspire. In a 
democracy, where a multitude of people exercise in per- 
son the Legislative functions, and are continually ex- 
posed, by their incapacity for regular deliberation and 
concerted measures, to the ambitious intrigues of their 
Executive magistrates, tyranny may well be appre- 
hended, on some favorable emergency, to start up in 
the same quarter. But in a representative republic, 
where the Executive magistracy is carefully limited, 
both in the extent and the duration of its power ; and 
where the Legislative power is exercised by an assem- 
bly, which is inspired, by a supposed influence over the 
People, with an intrepid confidence in its own strength ; 
which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions 
which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to 
be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by 
means which reason prescribes ; it is against the enter- 
prising ambition of this department, that *the People 
ought to indulge all their jealousy, and exhaust all thei/ 
orecautions. 



The Federalist. 34c 

The Legislative department derives a superiority ia 
our Governments from other circumstances. Its con- 
stitutional powers being at once more extensive, and 
less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater 
facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, 
the encroachments which it makes on the coordinate 
departments. It is not unfrequently a question of real 
nicety in Legislative bodies, whether the operation of a 
particular measure will, or will not extend beyond the 
Legislative sphere. On the other side, the Executive 
power being restrained within a narrower compass, and 
being more simple in its nature, and the Judiciary be- 
ing described by landmarks, still less uncertain, projects 
of usurpation by either of these departments would im- 
mediately betray and defeat themselves. Nor is this 
all : as the Legislative department alone has access to 
the pockets of the People, and has in some Constitu- 
tions full discretion, and in all, a prevailing influence 
over the pecuniary rewards of those who fill the other 
departments, a dependence is thus created in the latter, 
which gives still greater facility to encroachments of the 
former. 

I have appealed to our own experience for the truth 
of what I advance on this subject. Were it necessary 
to verify this experience by particular proofs, they might 
De multiplied without end. I might find a witness in 
every citizen who has shared in, or been attentive to, 
the course of public administrations. I might collect 
vouchers in abundance from the records and archives of 
every State in the Union. But as a more concise, and 
at the same time equally satisfactory evidence, I will 
refer to the example of two States, attested by two un- 
exceptionable authorities. 

The first example is that of Virginia, a State which, as 
we have seen, has expressly declared in its Constitution, 
that the three great departments ought not to be inter- 



346 The Federalist. 

mixed. The authority in support of it is Mr. Jefferson, 
who, besides his other advantages for remarking the op- 
eration of the Government, was himself the chief magis- 
trate of it. In order to convey fully the ideas with which 
his experience had impressed him on this subject, it will 
be necessary to quote a passage of some length from his 
very interesting " Notes on the State of Virginia," p. 195. 
" All the powers of Government, Legislative, Executive, 
"and Judiciary, result to the Legislative body. The 
" concentrating these in the same hands, is precisely the 
" definition, of despotic Government. It will be no al- 
" leviation, that these powers will be exercised by a plu- 
rality of hands, and not by a single one. One hundred 
" and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive 
" as one. Let those who doubt it, turn their eyes on 
" the republic of Venice. As little will it avail us, that 
"they are chosen by ourselves. An elective despotism 
"was not the Government we fought for; but one which 
" should not only be founded on free principles, but in 
" which the powers of Government should be so divided 
" and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as 
" that no one could transcend their legal limits, without 
" being effectually checked and restrained by the others. 
" For this reason, that Convention which passed the or- 
" dinance of Government, laid its foundation on this 
" basis, that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary 
" departments should be separate and distinct, so that 
" no person should exercise the powers of more than one 
" of them at the same time. But no barrier was provided 
" between these several powers. The Judiciary and Exec- 
" utive members were left dependent on the Legislative 
w for their subsistence in office, and some of them for 
" their continuance in it. If, therefore, the Legislature 
" assumes Executive and Judiciary powers, no opposi- 
" tion is likely to be made ; nor, if made, can be efFect- 
* nal ; because in that case they may put their proceed- 



The Federalist. 347 

" ing into the form of an Act of Assembly, which wiL 
"render ihem obligatory on the other branches. They 
" have accordingly, in many instances, decided rights 
"which should have been left to Judiciary controversy , 
" and the direction of the Executive, during 1 the whole 
"time of their session, is becoming habitual and familiar" 

The other State which I shall take for an example is 
Pennsylvania ; and the other authority, the Council 
of Censors which assembled in the years 1783 and 1784. 
A part of the duty of this body, as marked out by the 
Constitution, was " to inquire, whether the Constitution 
" had been preserved inviolate in every part; and whether 
" the Legislative and Executive branches of Government 
" had performed their duty as guardians of the People, 
" or assumed to themselves, or exercised other or greater 
" powers than they are entitled to by the Constitution." 
In the execution of this trust, the Council were neces- 
sarily led to a comparison of both the Legislative and 
Executive proceedings, with the constitutional powers 
of these departments ; and from the facts enumerated, 
and to the truth of most of which both sides in the 
Council subscribed, it appears, that the Constitution 
had been flagrantly violated by the Legislature in a va- 
riety of important instances. 

A great number of laws had been passed, violating, 
without any apparent necessity, the rule requiring that 
all bills of a public nature shall be previously printed 
for the consideration of the People ; although this is 
one of the precautions chiefly relied on by the Constitu- 
tion against improper acts of the Legislature. 

The constitutional trial by jury had been violated ; 
and powers assumed, which had not been delegated 
by the Constitution. 

Executive powers had been usurped. 

The salaries of the Judges, which the Constitution 
expressly requires to be fixed, had been occasionally 



348 The Federalist. 

varied ; and cases belonging to the Judiciary depart- 
ment frequently drawn within Legislative cognizance 
and determination. 

Those who wish to see the several particulars falling 
under each of these heads, may consult the Journals 
of the Council, which are in print. Some of them, 
it will be found, may be imputable to peculiar circum- 
stances connected with the war ; but the greater part 
of them may be considered as the spontaneous shoots 
of an ill-constituted Government. 

It appears, also, that the Executive department had 
not been innocent of frequent breaches of the Constitu- 
tion. There are- three observations, however, which 
ought to be made on this head : First, A great propor- 
tion of the instances were either immediately produced 
by the necessities of the war, or recommended by Con- 
gress, or the Commander-in-chief; Secondly, In most 
of the other instances, they conformed either to the 
declared or the known sentiments of the Legislative de- 
partment ; Thirdly, The Executive department of Penn- 
sylvania is distinguished from that of the other States, 
by the number of members composing it. In this re- 
spect, it has as much affinity to a Legislative assembly, 
as to an Executive Council. And being at once exempt 
from the restraint of an individual responsibility for the 
acts of the body, and deriving confidence from mutual 
example and joint influence, unauthorized measures 
would of course be more freely hazarded, than where 
the Executive department is administered by a single 
hand, or by a few hands. 

The conclusion which I am warranted in drawing 
from these observations is, that a mere demarcation 
on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several 
departments is not a sufficient guard against those en- 
croachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration 
«f all the powers of Government in the same hands. 

PUBLIUS. 



The Federalist. 349 

[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 5, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XLVIII. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

THE author of the " Notes on the State of Virginia," 
quoted in the last paper, has subjoined to that valu- 
able work the draught of a Constitution, which had been 
prepared in order to be laid before a Convention expect- 
ed to be called in 1783, by the Legislature, for the estab- 
lishment of a Constitution for that Commonwealth. 
The plan, like everything from the same pen, marks a 
turn of thinking, original, comprehensive, and accurate ; 
and is the more worthy of attention as it equally dis- 
plays a fervent attachment to republican Government, 
and an enlightened view of the dangerous propensities 
against which it ought to be guarded. One of the 
precautions which he proposes, and on which he appears 
ultimately to rely as a palladium to the weaker depart- 
ments of power, against the invasions of the stronger 
is perhaps altogether his own, and as it immediately 
relates to the subject of our present inquiry, ought not 
to be overlooked. 

His proposition is, "that whenever any two of the 
' three branches of Government shall concur in opin- 
1 ion, each by the voices of two thirds of their whole 
number, that a Convention is necessary for altering 
' the Constitution, or correcting- breaches of it, a Con 
1 vention shall be called for the purpose." 

As the People are the only legitimate fountain of 
power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter 
under which the severa* branches of Government hold 
their power, is derived, it seems strictly consonant to the 



350 The Federalist. 

republican theory, to recur to the same original author- 
ity, not only whenever it may be necessary to enlarge, 
diminish, or new-model the powers of the Government; 
but also whenever any one of the departments may com- 
mit encroachments on the chartered authorities of the 
others. The several departments being perfectly coordi- 
nate by the terms of their common commission, neither 
of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or su- 
perior right of. settling the boundaries between their re- 
spective powers ; and how are the encroachments of the 
stronger to be prevented, or the wrongs of the weaker 
to be redressed, without an appeal to the People them- 
selves, who, as the grantors of the commission, can 
alone declare its true meaning, and enforce its observ- 
ance? 

There is certainly great force in this reasoning, and 
it must be allowed to prove, that a constitutional road 
to the decision of the People ought to be marked out 
and kept open, for certain great and extraordinary occa- 
sions. But there appear to be insuperable objections 
against the proposed recurrence to the People, as a pro- 
vision in all cases for keeping the several departments 
of power within their constitutional limits. 

In the first place, the provision does not reach the 
case of a combination of two of the departments against 
a third. If the Legislative authority, which possesses 
so many means of operating on the motives of the other 
departments, should be able to gain to its interest either 
of the others, or even one third of its members, the 
remaining department could derive no advantage from 
its remedial provision. I do not dwell, however, on 
this objection, because it may be thought to lie rather 
against the modification of the principle, than against 
the principle itself. 

In the next place, it may be considered as an objec- 
tion inherent in the principle, that as every appeal to 



The Federalist. 351 

the People would carry an implication of some defect 
in the Government, frequent appeals would, in a great 
measure, deprive the Government of that veneration 
which time bestows on everything, and without which 
perhaps the wisest and freest Governments would not 
possess the requisite stability. If it be true that all 
Governments rest on opinion, it is no less true, that 
the strength of opinion in each individual, and its prac- 
tical influence on his conduct, depend much on the 
number which he supposes to have entertained the 
same opinion. The reason of man, like man himself, 
is timid and cautious when left alone ; and acquires 
firmness and confidence, in proportion to the number 
with which it is associated. When the examples which 
fortify opinion are ancient, as well as numerous, they 
are known to have a double effect. In a Nation of phi- 
losophers, this consideration ought to be disregarded. 
A reverence for the laws would be sufficiently inculcated 
by the voice of an enlightened reason. But a Nation 
of philosophers is as little to be expected, as the phil- 
osophical race of kings wished for by Plato. And 
in every other Nation, the most rational Government 
will not find it a superfluous advantage to have the 
prejudices of the community on its side. 

The danger of disturbing the public tranquillity by 
interesting too strongly the public passions, is a still more 
serious objection against a frequent reference of consti- 
tutional questions to the decision of the whole society. 
Notwithstanding the success which has attended the 
revisions of our established forms of Government, 
and which does so much honor to the virtue and intelli- 
gence of the People of America, it must be confessed, 
that the experiments are of too ticklish a nature to be 
unnecessarily multiplied. We are to recollect, that all 
the existing Constitutions were formed in the midst of 
a danger which repressed the passions most unfriendly 



352 The Federalist 

to order and concord ; of an enthusiastic confidence 
of the People in their patriotic leaders, which stifled 
the ordinary diversity of opinions on great National 
questions ; of a universal ardor for new and opposite 
forms, produced by a universal resentment and indigna- 
tion against the ancient Government; and whilst no 
spirit of party, connected with the changes to be made, 
or the abuses to be reformed, could mingle its leaven 
in the operation. The future situations in which we 
must expect to be usually placed, do not present any 
equivalent security against the danger which is appre- 
hended. 

But the greatest objection of all is, that the decisions 
which would probably result from such appeals would 
not answer the purpose of maintaining the constitu- 
tional equilibrium of the Government. We have seen 
that the tendency of republican Governments is to 
an aggrandizement of the Legislative, at the expense 
of the other departments. The appeals to the People, 
therefore, would usually be made by the Executive and 
Judiciary departments. But whether made by one side 
or the other, would each side enjoy equal advantages 
on the trial? Let us view their different situations. 
The members of the Executive and Judiciary depart- 
ments are few in number, and can be personally known 
to a small part only of the People. The latter, by the 
mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature 
and permanency of it, are too far removed from the 
People to share much in their prepossessions. The 
former are generally the objects of jealousy ; and their 
administration is always liable to be discolored and 
rendered unpopular. The members of the Legislative 
department, on the other hand, are numerous. They 
are distributed and dwell among the People at large. 
Their connections of blood, of friendship, and of ac- 
quaintance, embrace a great proportion of the most 



The Federalist. 353 

influential part of the society The nature of their 
public trust implies a personal influence among the 
People, and that they are more immediately the confi- 
dential guardians of the rights and liberties of the 
People. With these advantages, it can hardly be sup- 
posed that the adverse party would have an equal 
chance for a favorable issue. 

But the Legislative party would not only be able to 
plead their cause most successfully with the People. 
They would probably be constituted themselves the 
judges. The same influence which had gained them 
an election into the Legislature, would gain them a seat 
in the Convention. If this should not be the case with 
all, it would probably be the case with many, and pretty 
certainly with those leading characters, on whom every 
thing depends in such bodies. The Convention, in short, 
would be composed chiefly of men who had been, who 
actually were, or who expected to be, members of the 
department whose conduct was arraigned. They would 
consequently be parties to the very question to be de- 
cided by them. 

It might, however, sometimes happen, that appeals 
would be made under pircu instances less adverse to the 
Executive and Judiciary departments. The usurpations 
of the Legislature might be so flagrant and so sudden, 
as to admit of no specious coloring. A strong party 
among themselves might take side with the other 
branches. The Executive power might be in the hands 
of a peculiar favorite of the People. In such a posture 
of things, the public decision might be less swayed by 
prepossessions in favor of the Legislative party. But 
still it could never be expected to turn on the true merits 
of the question. It would inevitably be connected with 
the spirit of preexisting parties, or of parties springing 
out of the question itself. It would be connected with 
persons of distinguished character, and extensive influ- 

vol. i. 23 



354 The Federalist. 

ence in the community. It would be pronounced by 
the very men who had been agents in, or opponents of 
the measures, to which the decision would relate. The 
passions, therefore, not the reason, of the public, would 
sit in judgment. But it is the reason of the public 
alone, that ought to control and regulate the Govern- 
ment. The passions ought to be controlled and regu- 
lated by the Government. 

We found in the last paper, that mere declarations in 
the written Constitution are not sufficient to restrain 
the several departments within their legal limits. It 
appears in this, that occasional appeals to the People 
would be neither a proper, nor an effectual provision for 
that purpose. How far the provisions of a different 
nature contained in the plan above quoted might be 
adequate, I do not examine. Some of them are un- 
questionably founded on sound political principles, and 
all of them are framed with singular ingenuity and 
precision. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 5, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. XLIX. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

IT may be contended, perhaps, that instead of occa- 
sional appeals to the People, which are liable to the 
objections urged against them, periodical appeals are the 
proper and adequate means of preventing and correcting 
infractions of the Constitution. 

It will be attended to, that in the examination of 
liese expedients, I confine myself to their aptitude for 



The Federalist. 255 

enforcing the Constitution, by keeping the several de- 
partments of power within their due bounds, without 
particularly considering them as provisions for altering 
the Constitution itself. In the first view, appeals to the 
People at fixed periods appear to be nearly as ineligi- 
ble, as appeals on particular occasions as they emerge. 
If the periods be separated by short intervals, the meas- 
ures to be reviewed and rectified will have been of 
recent date, and will be connected with all the circum 
stances which tend to vitiate and 'pervert the result of 
occasional revisions. If the periods be distant from each 
other, the same remark will be applicable to all recent 
measures; and in proportion as the remoteness of the 
others may favor a dispassionate review of them, this 
advantage is inseparable from inconveniences which 
seem to counterbalance it. In the first place, a distant 
prospect of public censure would be a very feeble re- 
straint on power from those excesses, to which it might 
be urged by the force of present motives. Is it to be 
imagined, that a Legislative assembly, consisting of a 
hundred or two hundred members, eagerly bent on some 
favorite object, and breaking through the restraints of 
the Constitution in pursuit of it, would be arrested in 
their career, by considerations drawn from a censorial 
revision of their conduct at the future distance of ten, 
fifteen, or twenty years ? In the next place, the abuses 
would often have completed their mischievous effects 
before the remedial provision would be applied. And 
in the last place, where this might not be the case, they 
would be of long standing, would have taken deep root, 
and would not easily be extirpated. 

The scheme of revising the Constitution, in order to 
correct recent breaches of it, as well as for other pur- 
poses, has been actually tried in one of the States. One 
of the objects of the Council of Censors which met in 
Pennsylvania, in 1783 and 1784, was, as we have seen, 



356 The Federalist. 

to inquire, "whether the Constitution had been violated 
"and whether the Legislative and Executive departments 
" had encroached on each other." This important and 
novel experiment in politics merits, in several points of 
view, very particular attention. In some of them it may 
perhaps, as a single experiment, made under circum- 
stances somewhat peculiar, be thought to be not abso- 
lutely conclusive. But as applied to the case under 
consideration, it involves some facts, which I venture to 
remark, as a complete and satisfactory illustration of 
the reasoning which I have employed. 

First. It appears, from the names of the gentlemen 
who composed the Council, that some, at least, of its 
most active and leading members had also been active 
and leading characters in the parties which preexisted in 
the State. 

Secondly. It appears, that the same active and lead- 
ing members of the Council had been active and in- 
fluential members of the Legislative and Executive 
branches, within the period to be reviewed; and even 
patrons or opponents of the very measures to be thus 
brought to the test of the Constitution. Two of the 
members had been Vice-presidents of the State, and 
several others members of the Executive Council, with- 
in the seven preceding years. One of them had been 
Speaker, and a number of others distinguished mem- 
bers of the Legislative assembly, within the same 
period. 

Thirdly. Every page of their proceedings witnesses 
the effect of all these circumstances on the temper of 
their deliberations. Throughout the continuance of the 
Council, it was split into two fixed and violent parties. 
The fact is acknowledged and lamented by themselves. 
Had this not been the case, the face of their proceedings 
Exhibits a proof equally satisfactory. In all questions, 
however unimportant in themselves, or unconnected 



Tfie Federalist. 357 

with each other, the same names stand invariably con- 
trasted on the opposite columns. Every unbiased ob- 
server may infer, without danger of mistake, and at the 
same time, without meaning to reflect on either party, or 
any individuals of either party, that, unfortunately, pas- 
sion, not reason, must have presided over their decisions. 
When men exercise their reason coolly and freely, on a 
variety of distinct questions, they inevitably fall into 
different opinions on some of them. When they are 
governed by a common passion, their opinions, if they 
are so to be called, will be the same. 

Fourthly. It is at least problematical, whether the 
decisions of this body do not, in several instances, mis- 
construe the limits prescribed for the Legislative and 
Executive departments, instead of reducing and limiting 
them within their constitutional places. 

Fifthly. I have never understood that the decisions of 
the Council on constitutional questions, whether rightly 
or erroneously formed, have had any effect in varying 
the practice founded on Legislative constructions. It 
even appears, if I mistake not, that in one instance the 
contemporary Legislature denied the constructions of 
the Council, and actually prevailed in the contest. 

This censorial body, therefore, proves at the same 
time, by its researches, the existence of the disease, and 
by its example, the inefficacy of the remedy. 

This conclusion cannot be invalidated by alleging 
that the State in which the experiment was made was 
at that crisis, and had been for a long time before, vio- 
ently heated and distracted by the rage of party. Is it 
to be presumed, that at any future septennial epoch the 
same State will be free from parties ? Is it to be pre- 
sumed that any other State, at the same or any other 
given period, will be exempt from them ? Such an 
ivent ought to be neither presumed nor desired ; be- 
cause an extinction of parties necessarily implies eithei 



358 The Fwdera/ist. 

a universal alarm for the public safety, or an absolute 
extinction of liberty. 

Were the precaution taken of excluding from the 
assemblies elected by the People, to revise the preced- 
ing administration of the Government, all persons who 
should have been concerned in the Government within 
the given period, the difficulties would not be obviated. 
The important task would probably devolve on men, 
who, with inferior capacities, would in other respects be 
little better qualified. Although they might not have 
been personally concerned in the administration, and 
therefore not immediately agents in the measures to be 
examined^ they would probably have been involved in 
the parties connected with these measures, and have 
been elected under their auspices. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Friday, February 8, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. L. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

TO what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for 
maintaining in practice the necessary partition of 
power among the several departments, as laid down in 
the Constitution ? The only answer that can be given 
is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be 
inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriv- 
ing the interior structure of the Government as that its 
several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations 
be the means of keeping each other in their proper 
places. Without presuming to undertake a full devel- 
opment of this important idea, I will hazard a few gen- 



The Federalist. 359 

3ral observations, which may perhaps place it in a 
dearer light, and enable us to forrn a more correct judg- 
ment of the principles and structure of the Government 
planned by the Convention. 

In order to lay a due foundation for that separate 
and distinct exercise of the different powers of Gov- 
ernment, which to a certain extent is admitted on all 
hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it 
is evident that each department should have a will 
of its own ; and consequently should be so constituted, 
that the members of each should have as little agency 
as possible in the appointment of the members of the 
others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it 
would require that all the appointments for the su- 
preme Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary magistra- 
cies should be drawn from the same fountain of author- 
ity, the People, through channels having no communica- 
tion whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan 
of constructing the several departments would be less 
difficult in practice, than it may in contemplation ap- 
pear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional 
expense would attend the execution of it. Some devi- 
ations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted 
In the constitution of the Judiciary department in par- 
ticular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on 
the principle : first, because peculiar qualifications being 
essential in the members, the primary consideration 
ought to be to select that mode of choice which best 
secures these qualifications ; secondly, because the per- 
manent tenure by which the appointments are held 
in that department, must soon destroy all sense of de- 
pendence on the authority conferring them. 

It is equally evident, that the members of each de- 
partment should be as' little dependent as possible on 
chose of the others, for the emoluments annexed to then 
offices. Were the Executive magistrate, or the Judges, 



360 The Federalist. 

not independent of the Legislature in this particular 
their independence ^in every other would be merely 
nominal. 

But the great security against a gradual concentration 
of the several powers in the same department, consists 
in giving to those who administer each department the 
necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, 
to resist encroachments of the others. The provision 
for defence must in this, as in all other cases, be 
made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition 
must be made to counteract ambition. The interest 
of the man must be connected with the constitutional 
rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human 
nature, that such devices should be necessary to control 
the abuses of Government. But what is Government 
itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature ? 
If men were angels, no Government would be necessary. 
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor inter- 
nal controls on Government would be necessary. In 
framing a Government which is to be administered by 
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you 
must first enable the Government to control the 
governed ; and in the next place oblige it to control 
itself. A dependence on the People is, no doubt, the 
primary control on the Government ; but experience 
has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precau- 
tions. 

This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival in- 
terests, the defect of better motives, might be traced 
through the whole system of human affairs, private 
as well as public. We see it particularly displayed 
in all the subordinate distributions of power; where 
the constant aim is, to divide and arrange the several 
offices in such a manner as that each may be a check 
on the other ; that the private interest of every individ- 
ual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These 



Tlie Federalist. 361 

inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the 
distribution of the supreme powers of the State. 

But it is not possible to give to each department an 
equal power of self-defence. In republican Government, 
the Legislative authority necessarily predominates. The 
remedy for this inconveniency is, to divide the Legis- 
lature into different branches; and to render them, by 
different modes of election, and different principles 
of action, as little connected with each other, as the 
nature of their common functions, and their common 
dependence on the society, will admit. It may even 
be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments 
by still further precautions. As the weight of the 
Legislative authority requires that it should be thus 
divided, the weakness of the Executive may require, 
on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An ab- 
solute negative on the Legislature appears, at first view, 
to be the natural defence with which the Executive 
magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would 
be neither altogether safe, nor alone sufficient. On or- 
dinary occasions, it might not be exerted with the 
requisite firmness ; and on extraordinary occasions, it 
might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect 
of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified 
connection between this weaker department and the 
weaker branch of the stronger department, by which 
the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights 
of the former, without being too much detached from 
the rights of its own department? 

If the principles on which these observations are 
founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they 
be applied as a criterion to the several State Constitu- 
tions, and to the Foederal Constitution, it will be found, 
that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with 
ihem, the former are infinitely less able to bear such 
a test. 



362 The Federalist. 

There are moreover two considerations particularly 
applicable to the Foederal system of America, which 
place that system in a very interesting point of view. 

First, In a single republic, all the power surrendered 
by the People is submitted to the administration of 
a single Government ; and the usurpations are guarded 
against, by a division of the Government into distinct 
and separate departments. In the compound republic 
of America, the power surrendered by the People is first 
divided between two distinct Governments, and then 
the portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct 
and separate departments. Hence a double security 
arises to the rights of the People. The different Gov- 
ernments will control each other, at the same time that 
each will be controlled by itself. 

Second. It is of great importance in a republic, not 
only to guard the society against the oppression of its 
rulers, but to guard one part of the society against 
the injustice of the other part. Different interests ne- 
cessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a ma- 
jority be united by a common interest, the rights of the 
minority will be insecure. There are but two methods 
of providing against this evil : the one by creating 
a will in the community independent of the majority, 
that is, of the society itself; the other by comprehending 
in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens 
as will render an unjust combination of a majority of 
the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The 
first method prevails in all Governments possessing 
an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, 
is but a precarious security; because a power indepen- 
dent of the society may as well espouse the unjust 
views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor 
party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. 
The second method will be exemplified in the Foederal 
republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in 



The Federalist. 363 

it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the 
society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, 
and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, 
or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested 
combinations of the majority. In a free Government, 
the security for civil rights must be the same as that for 
religious rights. It consists in the one case in the mul- 
tiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity 
of sects. The degree of security in both cases, will 
depend on the number of interests and sects ; and this 
may be presumed to depend on the extent of country 
and number of People comprehended under the same 
Government. This view of the subject must partic- 
ularly recommend a proper Fcederal system to all the 
sincere and considerate friends of republican Govern- 
ment; since it shows, that in exact proportion as the 
territory of the Union may be formed into more circum- 
scribed Confederacies, or States, oppressive combina- 
tions of a majority will be facilitated ; the best security, 
under the republican forms, for the rights of every class 
of citizens, will be diminished; and consequently, the 
stability and independence of some member of the Gov- 
ernment, the only other security, must be proportionally 
increased. Justice is the end of Government. It is 
the end of civil society. It ever has been, and ever will 
be pursued, until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost 
in the pursuit. In a society, under the forms of which 
'he stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the 
weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign, as in a 
state of nature, where the weaker individual is not se- 
cured against the violence of the stronger; and as in the 
latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, 
by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a 
Government which may protect the weak, as well 
us themselves : so, in the former state, will the more 
oowerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by 



364 The Federalist. 

a like motive, to wish for a Government which will pro- 
tect all parties, the weaker as well as the more power- 
ful. It can be little doubted, that if the State of Rhode 
Island was separated from the Confederacy, and left 
to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form 
of Government within such narrow limits would be 
displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious 
majorities, that some power altogether independent 
of the People would soon be called for by the voice of 
the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity 
of it. In the extended republic of the United States, 
and among the great variety of interests, parties, and 
sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of 
the whole society could seldom take place on any othei 
principles than those of justice and the general good ; 
whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the 
will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, 
to provide for the security of the former, by introducing 
into the Government a will not dependent on the latter: 
or, in other words, a will independent of the society it- 
self. It is no less certain than it is important, notwith- 
standing the contrary opinions which have been enter- 
tained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within 
a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of 
self-government. And happily for the republican cause, 
the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great 
extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the 
Federal principle. 

PUBLIUS. 



The Federalist. 365 

[From the New York Packet, Friday, February 8, 1 788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LI. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

FROM the more general inquiries pursued in the four 
last papers, I pass on to a more particular exam- 
ination of the several parts of the Government. I shall 
begin with the House of Representatives. 

The first view to be taken of this part of the Govern- 
ment relates to the qualifications of the electors and 
the elected. 

Those of the former are to be the same with those of 
the electors of the most numerous branch of the State 
Legislatures. The definition of the right of suffrage is 
very justly regarded as a fundamental article of repub- 
lican Government. It was incumbent on the Conven- 
tion, therefore, to define and establish this right in the 
Constitution. To have left it open for the occasional 
regulation of the Congress, would have been improper 
for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to 
the Legislative discretion of the States, would have 
been improper for the same reason ; and for the addi- 
tional reason that it would have rendered too dependent 
on the State Governments, that branch of the Foederal 
Government which ought to be dependent on the People 
alone. To have reduced the different qualifications in 
the different States to one uniform rule, would prob- 
ably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States, 
as it would have been difficult to the Convention. The 
provision made by the Convention appears, therefore, to 
be the best that lay within their option. It must be 
satisfactory to every State ; because it is conformable 



366 The Federalist. 

to the standard already established, or which may be 
established by the State itself. It will be safe to the 
United States ; because, being fixed by the State Con- 
stitutions, it is not alterable by the State Governments, 
and it cannot be feared that the People of the States 
will alter this part of their Constitutions in such a 
manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the 
Foederal Constitution. 

The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully 
and properly defined by the State Constitutions, and 
being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity, 
have been very properly considered and regulated by the 
Convention. A representative of the United States 
must be of the age of twenty-five years ; must have 
been seven years a citizen of the United States ; must, 
at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of the State 
he is to represent; and, during the time of his service, 
must be in no office under the United States. Under 
these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the 
Foederal Government is open to merit of every descrip- 
tion, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, 
and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any par- 
ticular profession of religious faith. 

The term for which the Representatives are to be 
elected, falls under a second view which may be taken 
of this branch. In order to decide on the propriety of 
this Article, two questions must be considered : First, 
whether biennial elections will, in this case, be safe ; 
Secondly, whether they be necessary or useful. 

First. As it is essential to liberty, that the Govern- 
ment in general should have a common interest with 
the People ; so it is particularly essential, that the 
branch of it under consideration should have an imme- 
diate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with 
the People. Frequent elections are unquestionably the 
only policy by which this dependence and sympathy 



The Federalist. 367 

can be effectually secured. But what particular degree 
of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the pur- 
pose, does not appear to be susceptible of any precise 
calculation, and must depend on a variety of circum 
stances with which it may be connected. Let us con- 
sult experience, the guide that ought always to be 
followed, whenever it can be found. 

The scheme of representation, as a substitute for a 
meeting of the citizens in person, being at most but 
very imperfectly known to ancient polity, it is in more 
modern times only, that we are to expect instructive ex- 
amples. And even here, in order to avoid a research 
too vague and diffusive, it will be proper to confine our- 
selves to the few examples which are best known, and 
which bear the greatest analogy to our particular case. 
The first to which this character ought to be applied, is 
the House of Commons in Great Britain. The history 
of this branch of the English Constitution, anterior to 
the date of Magna Charta, is too obscure to yield in- 
struction. The very existence of it has been made a 
question among political antiquaries. The earliest rec- 
ords of subsequent date prove, that Parliaments were 
to sit only every year; not that they were to be elected 
every year. And even these annual sessions were left 
so much at the discretion of the monarch, that under 
various pretexts, very long and dangerous intermissions 
were often contrived by royal ambition. To remedy 
this grievance, it was provided by a statute in the reign 
of Charles II., that the intermissions should not be 
protracted beyond a period of three years. On the ac- 
cession of William III., when a revolution took place 
in the Government, the subject was still more seriously 
resumed, and it was declared to be among the funda- 
mental rights of the People, that Parliaments ought to 
be held frequently. By another statute, which passed a 
Cew years later in the same reign, the term, "frequently," 



368 The Federalist. 

which had alluded to the triennial period settled in the 
time of Charles II., is reduced to a precise meaning, it 
being expressly enacted, that a new Parliament shall be 
called within three years after the determination of the 
former. The last change, from three to seven years, is 
well known to have been introduced pretty early in the 
present century, under an alarm for the Hanoverian suc- 
cession. From these facts it appears, that the greatest 
frequency of elections which has been deemed necessary 
in that kingdom, for binding the Representatives to their 
constituents, does not exceed a triennial return of them. 
And if we may argue from the degree of liberty retained 
even under septennial elections, and all the other vicious 
ingredients in the Parliamentary Constitution, we can- 
not doubt that a reduction of the period from seven to 
three years, with the other necessary reforms, would so 
far extend the influence of the People over their Repre- 
sentatives as to satisfy us, that biennial elections, under 
the Fcederal system, cannot possibly be dangerous to 
the requisite dependence of the House of Representa- 
tives on their constituents. 

Elections in Ireland, till of late, were regulated en- 
tirely by the discretion of the crown, and were seldom 
repeated, except on the accession of a new Prince, or 
some other contingent event. The Parliament which 
commenced with George II. was continued throughout 
his whole reign, a period of about thirty-five years. The 
only dependence of the Representatives on the People 
consisted in the right of the latter to supply occasional 
vacancies, by the election of new members, and in the 
chance of some event which might produce a general 
new election. The ability also of the Irish Parliament 
to maintain the rights of their constituents, so far as the 
disposition might exist, was extremely shackled by the 
control of the crown over the subjects of their delibera- 
tion. Of late, these shackles, if I mistake not, have 



The Federalist. 369 

been broken ; and octennial Parliaments have besides 
been established. What effect may be produced by this 
partial reform, must be left to further experience. The 
example of Ireland, from this view of it, can throw but 
little light on the subject. As far as we can draw any 
conclusion from it, it must be that if the People of that 
country have been able under all these disadvantages to 
retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of biennial 
elections would secure to them every degree of liberty, 
which might depend on a due connection between their 
Representatives and themselves. 

Let us bring our inquiries nearer home. The exam- 
ple of these States, when British colonies, claims par- 
ticular attention, at the same time that it is so well 
known as to require little to be said on it. The prin- 
ciple of representation, in one branch of the Legislature 
at least, was established in all of them. But the periods 
of election were different. They varied from one to 
seven years. Have we any reason to infer from the 
spirit and conduct of the Representatives of the People, 
prior to the Revolution, that biennial elections would 
have been dangerous to the public liberties ? The spirit 
which everywhere displayed itself, at the commence- 
ment of the struggle, and which vanquished the ob- 
stacles to Independence, is the best of proofs, that a 
sufficient portion of liberty had been everywhere en- 
joyed, to inspire both a sense of its worth and a zeal 
for its proper enlargement. This remark holds good, as 
well with regard to the then colonies whose elections 
were least frequent, as to those whose elections were 
most frequent. Virginia was the colony which stood 
first, in resisting the Parliamentary usurpations of Great 
Britain ; it was the first also in espousing, by public 
Act, the resolution of Independence. In Virginia, never- 
theless, if I have not been misinformed, elections under 
the former Government were septennial. This particu- 

TCI- I. 24 



370 The Federalist. 

lar example is brought into view, not as a proof of any 
peculiar merit, for the priority in those instances was 
probably accidental ; and still less of any advantage in 
septennial elections, for when compared with a greater 
frequency they are inadmissible ; but merely as a proof, 
and I conceive it to be a very substantial proof, that the 
liberties of the People can be in no danger from biennial 
elections. 

The conclusion resulting from these examples will be 
not a little strengthened, by recollecting three circum- 
stances. The first is, that the Foederal Legislature will 
possess a part only of that supreme Legislative author- 
ity which is vested completely in the British Parliament; 
and which, with a few exceptions, was exercised by the 
colonial Assemblies, and the Irish Legislature. It is a 
received and well-founded maxim, that where no other 
circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is, 
the shorter ought to be its duration ; and conversely, the 
smaller the power, the more safely may its duration be 
protracted. In the second place, it has, on another occa- 
sion, been shown, that the Foederal Legislature will not 
only be restrained by its dependence on the People as 
other Legislative bodies are, but that it will be more- 
over watched and controlled by the several collateral 
Legislatures, which other Legislative bodies are not. 
And in the third place, no comparison can be made be- 
tween the means that will be possessed by the more 
permanent branches of the Foederal Government, for 
seducing, if they should be disposed to seduce, the 
House of Representatives from their duty to the People, 
and the means of influence over the popular branch, 
possessed by the other branches of the Government 
above cited. With less power, therefore, to abuse, the 
Foederal Representatives can be less tempted on one 
Bide, and will be doubly watched on the other. 

PUBLIFS 



The Federalist. 371 

[From the New York Packet, Ttiesday, February 12, 1788.] 

THE FOEDERALIST. No. LII. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

I SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current ob- 
servation, " that where annual elections end, tyran- 
" ny begins." If it be true, as has often been remarked, 
that sayings which become proverbial are generally 
founded in reason, it is not less true, that when once 
established, they are often applied to cases to which the 
reason of them does not extend. I need not look for a 
proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason 
on which this proverbial observation is founded? No 
man will subjeet himself to the ridicule of pretending 
that any natural connection subsists between the sun or 
the seasons, and the period within which human virtue 
can bear the temptations of power. Happily for man- 
kind, liberty is not, in this respect, confined to any single 
point of time; but lies within extremes, which afford 
sufficient latitude for all the variations which may be 
required by the various situations and circumstances of 
civil society. The election of magistrates might be, if 
it were found expedient, as in some instances it actually 
has been, daily, weekly, or monthly, as well as annual ; 
and if circumstances may require a deviation from the 
rule on one side, why not also on the other side ? Turn- 
ing our attention to the periods established among our- 
selves, for the election of the most numerous branches 
of the State Legislatures, we find them by no means 
coinciding any more in this instance, than in the elec- 
tions of other civil magistrates. In Connecticut and 
Rhode Island, the periods are half-yearly. In the othei 



372 The Federalist. 

States, South Carolina excepted, they are annual. Ik 
South Carolina they are biennial ; as is proposed in the 
Foederal Government. Here is a difference, as four to 
one, between the longest and shortest periods ; and yet 
it would be not easy to show, that Connecticut or 
Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a greater 
share of rational liberty, than South Carolina ; or that 
either the one or the other of these States are distin- 
guished in these respects, and by these causes, from the 
States whose elections are different from both. 

In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I can 
discover but one, and that is wholly inapplicable to our 
case. The important distinction so well understood in 
America, between a Constitution established by the 
People, and unalterable by the Government, and a law 
established by the Government and alterable by the 
Government, seems to have been little understood, and 
less observed in any other country. Wherever the su- 
preme power of legislation has resided, has been sup- 
posed to reside also a full power to change the form of 
the Government. Even in Great Britain, where the 
principles of political and civil liberty have been most 
discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the 
Constitution, it is maintained, that the authority of the 
Parliament is transcendent, and uncontrollable, as well 
with regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary objects 
of Legislative provision. They have accordingly, in 
several instances, actually changed by Legislative Acts, 
some of the most fundamental Articles of the Govern- 
ment. They have in particular, on several occasions, 
changed the period of election; and, on the last occa- 
sion, not only introduced septennial in place of triennial 
elections, but by the same Act, continued themselves in 
place four years beyond the term for which they were 
elected by the People. An attention to these dangerous 
practices has produced a very natural alarm in the vota- 



The Federalist. 373 

ries of free Government, of which frequency of elections 
is the corner-stone ; and has led them to seek for some 
security to liberty, against the danger to which it is 
exposed. Where no Constitution, paramount to the 
Government, either existed or could be obtained, no 
constitutional security, similar to that established in the 
United States, was to be attempted. Some other secur- 
ity, therefore, was to be sought for; and what better 
security would the case admit, than that of selecting 
and appealing to some simple and familiar portion of 
time, as a standard for measuring the danger of innova- 
tions, for fixing the National sentiment, and for uniting 
the patriotic exertions ? The most simple and familiar 
portion of time, applicable to the subject, was that of a 
year ; and hence the doctrine has been inculcated by a 
laudable zeal, to erect some barrier against the gradual 
innovations of an unlimited Government, that the ad- 
vance towards tyranny was to be calculated by the 
distance of departure from the fixed point of annual 
elections. But what necessity can there be of applying 
this expedient to a Government, limited as the Fcederal 
Government will be, by the authority of a paramount 
Constitution? Or who will pretend that the liberties of 
the People of America will not be more secure under 
biennial elections, unalterably fixed by such a Constitu- 
tion, than those of any other Nation would be, where 
elections were annual, or even more frequent, but sub- 
ject to alterations by the ordinary power of the Govern- 
ment ? 

The second question stated is, whether biennial elec- 
tions be necessary or useful ? The propriety of answer- 
ing this question in the affirmative, will appear from 
several very obvious considerations. 

No man can be a competent Legislator, who does not 
&dd, to an upright intention and a sound judgment, a 
certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which 



374 The Federalist. 

he is to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be ac- 
quired by means of information which lie within the 
compass of men in private, as well as public stations. 
Another part can only be attained, or at least thoroughly 
attained, by actual experience in the station which re- 
quires the use of it. The period of service, ought, there- 
fore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the 
extent of practical knowledge, requisite to the due per- 
formance of the service. The period of Legislative ser- 
vice established in most of the States for the more 
numerous branch is, as we have seen, one year. The 
question then may be put into this simple form : does 
the period of two years bear no greater proportion to 
the knowledge requisite for Foederal Legislation than 
one year does to the knowledge requisite for State 
Legislation ? The very statement of the question, in 
this form, suggests the answer that ought to be given 
to it. 

In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to 
the existing laws, which are uniform throughout the 
State, and with which all the citizens are more or less 
conversant ; and to the general affairs of the State, 
which lie within a small compass, are not very diver- 
sified, and occupy much of the attention and conver- 
sation of every class of people. The great theatre of 
the United States presents a very different scene. The 
laws are so far from being uniform, that they vary in 
every State; whilst the public affairs of the Union are 
spread throughout a very extensive region, and are ex- 
tremely diversified by the local affairs connected with 
them, and can with difficulty be correctly learnt in any 
other place, than in the central councils, to which a 
knowledge of them will be brought by the Representa- 
tives of every part of the empire. Yet some knowledge 
of the affairs, and even of the laws of all the States 
ought to be possessed by the members from each of the 



The Federalist. 375 

States. How can foreign trade be properly regulated 
by uniform laws, without some acquaintance with the 
commerce, the ports, the usages, and the regulations of 
the different States? How can the trade between the 
different States be duly regulated, without some knowl- 
edge of their relative situations in these and other re- 
spects ? How can taxes be judiciously imposed, and 
effectually collected, if they be not accommodated to 
the different laws and local circumstances relating to 
these objects in the different States ? How can uniform 
regulations for the militia be duly provided, without a 
similar knowledge of many internal circumstances by 
which the States are distinguished from each other? 
These are the principal objects of Fcederal Legislation, 
and suggest, most forcibly, the extensive information 
which the Representatives ought to acquire. The other 
interior objects will require a proportional degree of in- 
formation with regard to them. 

It is true, that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be 
very much diminished. The most laborious task will 
De the proper inauguration of the Government, and the 
primeval formation of a Foederal code. Improvements 
on the first draughts will every year become both easier 
and fewer. Past transactions of the Government will 
be a ready and accurate source of information to new 
members. The affairs of the Union will become more 
and more objects of curiosity and conversation among 
the citizens at large. And the increased intercourse 
among those of different States will contribute not a 
little to diffuse a mutual knowledge of their affairs, as 
this again will contribute to a general assimilation of 
their manners and laws. But with all these abatements, 
the business of Foederal Legislation must continue so 
far to exceed, both in novelty and difficulty, the Legis- 
'ative business of a single State, as to justify the longer 
yeriod of service assigned to those who are to trans- 
act it. 



376 The Fcederatist. 

A branch of knowledge, which belongs to the acquire- 
ments of a Foederal Representative, and which has not 
been mentioned, is that of foreign affairs. In regulating 
our own commerce, he ought to be not only acquainted 
with the treaties between the United States and other 
nations, but also with the commercial policy and laws 
of other nations. He ought not to be altogether igno- 
rant of the law of nations ; for that, as far as it is 
a proper object of municipal Legislation, is submitted 
to the Foederal Government. And although the House 
of Representatives is not immediately to participate in 
foreign negotiations and arrangements, yet from the 
necessary connection between the several branches of 
public affairs, those particular branches will frequently 
deserve attention in the ordinary course of Legislation, 
and will sometimes demand particular Legislative sanc- 
tion and cooperation. Some portion of this knowl- 
edge may, no doubt, be acquired in a man's closet ; but 
some of it also can only be derived from the public 
sources of information ; and all of it will be acquired 
to best effect, by a practical attention to the subject, 
during the period of actual service in the Legislature. 

There are other considerations, of less importance, 
perhaps, but which are not unworthy of notice. The 
distance which many of the Representatives will be 
obliged to travel, and the arrangements rendered neces- 
sary by that circumstance, might be much more serious 
objections with fit men to this service, if limited to a 
single year, than if extended to two years. No argu- 
ment can be drawn on this subject, from the case of the 
delegates to the existing Congress. They are elected 
annually, it is true ; but their reelection is considered by 
the Legislative assemblies almost as a matter of course. 
The election of the Representatives by the People would 
not be governed by the same principle. 

A few of the members, as happens in all such assem 



The Federalist. 377 

blies, will possess superior talents ; will, by frequent 
reflections, become members of long standing ; will be 
thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps 
not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages. 
The greater the proportion of new members, and the less 
the information of the bulk of the members, the more 
apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid 
for them. This remark is no less applicable to the re- 
lation which will subsist between the House of Repre- 
sentatives and the Senate. 

It is an inconvenience mingled with the advantages 
of our frequent elections, even in single States, where 
they are large, and hold but one^Legislative session in a 
year, that spurious elections cannot be investigated and 
annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect. 
If a return can be obtained, no matter by what unlaw- 
ful means, the irregular member, who takes his seat of 
course, is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer 
his purposes. Hence, a very pernicious encouragement 
is given to the use of unlawful means, for obtaining 
irregular returns. Were elections for the Foederal Leg- 
islature to be annual, this practice might become a very 
serious abuse, particularly in the more distant States. 
Each House is, as it necessarily must be, the judge of 
the elections, qualifications, and returns of its members ; 
and whatever improvements may be suggested by ex- 
perience, for simplifying and accelerating the process in 
disputed cases, so great a portion of a year would una- 
voidably elapse, before an illegitimate member could be 
dispossessed of his seat, that the prospect of such an 
event would be little check to unfair and illicit means 
of obtaining a seat. 

All these considerations taken together warrant us 
in affirming, that biennial elections will be as useful 
to the affairs of the public, as we have seen that they 
will be safe to the liberty of the People. 

PUBLIUS 



378 The Fcederalisi. 

[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 12, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LIII. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

f PHE next view which I shall take of the House of 
-*■ Representatives, relates to the apportionment of its 
members to the several States, which is to be determined 
by the same rule with that of direct taxes. 

It is not contended, that the number of People in 
each State ought not to be the standard for regulating 
the proportion of those who are to represent the People 
of each State. The establishment of the same rule for 
,the apportionment of taxes will probably be as little 
contested; though the rule itself, in this case, is by no 
means founded on the same principle. In the former 
ease, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights 
of the People, with which it has a natural and universal 
connection. In the latter, it has reference to the propor- 
tion of wealth, of which it is in no case a precise meas- 
ure, and in ordinary cases a very unfit one. But not- 
withstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied 
to the relative wealth and contributions of the States, 
it is evidently the least exceptionable among the prac- 
ticable rules ; and had too recently obtained the gen- 
eral sanction of America, not to have found a ready 
preference with the Convention. 

All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said : but does 
it follow, from an admission of numbers for the measure 
of representation, or of slaves combined with free citi- 
zens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be 
included in the numerical rule of representation ? Slaves 
are considered as property, not as persons. They ought 
therefore, to be comprehended in estimates of taxation 



TJie Federalist. 379 

which are founded )n property, and to be excluded iron- 
representation, which is regulated by a census of per- 
sons. This is the objection, as I understand it, stated 
in its full force. I shall be equally candid in stating 
the reasoning which may be offered on the opposite side. 
" We subscribe to the doctrine," might one of our 
Southern brethren observe, " that representation relates 
" more immediately to persons, and taxation more ira- 
u mediately to property, and we join in the application of 
" this distinction to the case of our slaves. But we must 
" deny the fact, that slaves are considered merely as 
" property, and in no respect whatever as persons. The 
" true state of the case is, that they partake of both 
" these qualities : being considered by our laws, in some 
" respects, as persons, and in other respects as property. 
" In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for 
" a master; in being vendible by one master to another 
"master; and in being subject at all times to be re- 
" strained in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the 
"capricious will of another, — the slave may appear to 
" be degraded from the human rank, and classed with 
" those irrational animals which fall under the legal 
" denomination of property. In being protected, on the 
" other hand, in his life and in his limbs, against the vio- 
" lence of all others, even the master of his labor and 
" his liberty ; and in being punishable himself for all 
"violence committed against others, — the slave is no 
" less evidently regarded by the law as a member of the 
" society, not as a part of the irrational creation ; as a 
•' moral person, not as a mere article of property. The 
u Fcederal Constitution, therefore, decides with great 
4 propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them 
1 in the mixed character of persons and of property. This 
' is in fact their true character. It is the character 
1 bestowed on them by the laws under which they live ; 
and it will not be denied, that these are the proper 



380 The Federalist. 

" criterion ; because it is only under the pretext that the 
M laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of 
u property, that a place is disputed them in the compu- 
" tation of numbers ; and it is admitted, that if the laws 
" were to restore the rights which have been taken away, 
" the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share 
" of Representation with the other inhabitants. 

" This question may be placed in another light. It 
" is agreed on all sides, that numbers are the best scale 
" of wealth and taxation, as they are the only proper 
" scale of Representation. Would the Convention have 
" been impartial or consistent, if they had rejected 
" the slaves from the list of inhabitants, when the shares 
" of Representation were to be calculated, and inserted 
" them on the lists when the tariff of contributions was 
"to be adjusted? Could it be reasonably expected, 
" that the Southern States would concur in a system, 
" which considered their slaves in some degree as men, 
" when burdens were to be imposed, but refused to con- 
" sider them in the same light, when advantages were 
" to be conferred ? Might not some surprise also be 
" expressed, that those who reproach the Southern States 
" with the barbarous policy of considering as property 
" a part of their human brethren, should themselves 
" contend, that the Government to which all the States 
u are to be parties, ought to consider this unfortunate 
" race more completely in the unnatural light of property, 
u than the very laws of which they complain ? 

" It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are not includ- 
<k ed in the estimate of Representatives in any of the 
" States possessing them. They neither vote themselves, 
" nor increase the votes of their masters. Upon what 
" principle, then, ought they to be taken into the Fced- 
M eral estimate of representation ? In rejecting them 
" altogether, the Constitution would, in this respect, 
•' have followed the very laws which have been appealed 
* to, as the proper guide. 



The Federalist. 381 

" This objection is repelled by a single observation, 

* It is a fundamental principle of the proposed Consti- 
tution, that as the aggregate number of Representatives 
allotted to the several States is to be determined by 
a Foederal rule, founded on the aggregate number of 
inhabitants, so the right of choosing this allotted 
number in each State, is to be exercised by such part 
of the inhabitants, as the State itself may designate. 
The qualifications on which the right of suffrage 
depend, are not perhaps the same in any two States, 
In some of the States, the difference is very material. 
In every State, a certain proportion of inhabitants are 
deprived of this right by the Constitution of the State, 
who will be included in the census by which the Foed- 
eral Constitution apportions the Representatives. In 
this point of view, the Southern States might retort 
the complaint, by insisting that the principle laid down 
by the Convention required that no regard should be 
had to the policy of particular States towards their 
own inhabitants ; and consequently, that the slaves, 
as inhabitants, shoald have been admitted into the 
census according to their full number, in like manner 
with other inhabitants, who, by the policy of other 
States, are not admitted to all the rights of citizens. 
A rigorous adherence, however, to this principle, is 
waived by those who would be gainers by it. All 
that they ask is, that equal moderation be shown on 
the other side. Let the case of the slaves be consid- 
ered, as it is in truth, a peculiar one. Let the com- 
promising expedient of the Constitution be mutually 
adopted, which regards them as inhabitants, but as 
debased by servitude below the equal level of free 
inhabitants; which regards the slave as divested of 

* two fifths of the man. 

" After all, may not another ground be taken on which 
H this Article of the Constitution will admit of a stiU 



&82 The Federalist. 

" more ready defence ? We have hitherto proceeded 
" on the idea, that representation related to persons 
" only, and not at all to property. But is it a just idea? 
" Government is instituted no less for protection of 
" the property, than of the persons, of individuals. 
" The one as well as the other, therefore, may be con- 
" sidered as represented by those who are charged with 
" the Government. Upon this principle it is, that in 
" several of the States, and particularly in the State 
" of New York, one branch of the Government is in- 
" tended more especially to be the guardian of property, 
{i and is accordingly elected by that part of the society 
" which is most interested in this object of Government. 
" In the Foederal Constitution, this policy does not pre- 
" vail. The rights of property are committed into the 
" same hands, with the personal rights. Some attention 
" ought, therefore, to be paid to property, in the choice 
" of those hands. 

" For another reason, the votes allowed in the Foed- 
" eral Legislature to the People of each State, ought 
" to bear some proportion to the comparative wealth 
" of the States. States have not, like individuals, an 
" influence over each other, arising from superior advan- 
" tages of fortune. If the law allows an opulent citizen 
" but a single vote in the choice of his Representative, 
M the respect and consequence which he derives from 
" his fortunate situation very frequently guide the votes 
' of others to the objects of his choice ; and through this 
u imperceptible channel, the rights of property are con- 
" veyed into the public representation. A State pos- 
" sesses no such influence over other States. It is not 
" probable, that the richest State in the Confederacy 
" will ever influence the choice of a single Representa- 
'' tive, in any other State. Nor will 'the Representatives 
' of the larger and richer States possess any other 
advantage in the Foederal Legislature, over the Repre- 



The Federalist. 382 

* sentatives of other States, than what may result from 
" their superior number alone. As far, therefore, as theii 
" superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them 
" to any advantage, it ought to be secured to them by 
" a superior share of representation. The new Consti- 
" tution is, in this respect, materially different from the 
" existing Confederation, as well as from that of the 
" United Netherlands, and other similar Confederacies. 
" In each of the latter, the efficacy of the Foederal res- 
" olutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary 
" resolutions of the States composing the Union. Hence 
" the States, though possessing an equal vote in the 
" public councils, have an unequal influence, correspond- 
" ing with the unequal importance of these subsequent 
" and voluntary resolutions. Under the proposed Consti- 
" tution, the Foederal Acts will take effect without the 
" necessary intervention of the individual States. They 
11 will depend merely on the majority of votes in the 
" Foederal Legislature ; and consequently each vote, 
" whether proceeding from a larger or smaller State, 
" or a State more or less wealthy or powerful, will have 
" an equal weight and efficacy ; in the same manner 
" as the votes individually given in a State Legislature, 
" by the Representatives of unequal counties or other dis- 
" tricts, have each a precise equality of value and effect ; 
" or if there be any difference in the case, it proceeds 
K from the difference in the personal character of the 
u individual Representative, rather than from any regard 
a to the extent of the district from which he comes." 

Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the 
Southern interests might employ on this subject; and 
although it may appear to be a little strained in some 
points, yet on the whole, I must confess, that it fully 
reconciles me to the scale of representation which the 
Convention have established. 

In one respect, the establishment of a common meas- 



384 The Federalist. 

ure for representation and taxation will have a very 
Balutary effect. As the accuracy of the census to be 
obtained by the Congress will necessarily depend, in 
a considerable degree, on the disposition, if not on the 
cooperation of the States, it is of great importance that 
the States should feel as little bias as possible, to swell 
or to reduce the amount of their numbers. Were their 
share of representation alone to be governed by this rule, 
they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhab- 
itants. Were the rule to decide their share of taxation 
alone, a contrary temptation would prevail. By extend- 
ing the rule to both objects, the States will have opposite 
interests, which will control and balance each other, and 
produce the requisite impartiality. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Friday, February 15, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LIV. 



To the People of the State of New Y ork : 

THE number of which the House of Representatives 
is to consist, forms another, and a very interesting 
point of view, under which this branch of the Fcederal 
Legislature may be contemplated. Scarce any Article 
indeed in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered 
more worthy of attention, by the weight of character, 
und the apparent force of argument, with which it has 
been assailed. The charges exhibited against it are, 
first, that so small a number of Representatives will be 
an unsafe depositary of the public interests; secondly 
that they will not possess a proper knowledge of the 
local circumstances of their numerous constituents 
thirdly, that they will be taken from that class of citi 



The Federalist. 385 

Bens which will sympathize least with the feelings of 
the mass of the People, and be most likely to aim at a 
permanent elevation of the few, on the depression of the 
many ; fourthly, that defective as the number will be in 
the first instance, it will be more and more dispropor- 
tionate, by the increase of the People, and the obstacles 
which will prevent a correspondent increase of the Rep- 
resentatives. 

In general it may be remarked on this subject, that 
no political problem is less susceptible of a precise solu- 
tion, than that which relates to the number most con- 
venient for a representative Legislature; nor is there any 
point on which the policy of the several States is more 
at variance, whether we compare their Legislative As- 
semblies directly with each other, or consider the pro- 
portions which they respectively bear to the number of 
their constituents. Passing over the difference between 
the smallest and largest States, as Delaware, whose 
most numerous branch consists of twenty-one Repre- 
sentatives, and Massachusetts, where it amounts to 
between three and four hundred, a very considerable 
difference is observable among States nearly equal in 
population. The number of Representatives in Penn- 
sylvania is not more than one fifth of that in the State 
last mentioned. New York, whose population is to 
that of Sooth Carolina as six to five, has little more 
than one third of the number of Representatives. As 
great a disparity prevails between the States of Georgia 
and Delaware or Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, the 
Representatives do not bear a greater proportion to their 
constituents, than of one for every four or five thousand. 
In Rhode Island, they bear a proportion of at least one 
'or every thousand. And according to the Constitution 
of Georgia, the proportion may be carried to one to 
every ten electors ; and must unavoidably far exceed the 
proportion in any of the other States. 

vol. i. 25 



386 The Federalist. 

Another general remark to be made is, that the ratio 
between the Representatives and the People ought not 
to be the same, where the latter are very numerous, as 
where they are very few. Were the Representatives 
in Virginia to be regulated by the standard in Rhode 
Island they would, at this time, amount to between four 
and five hundred ; and twenty or thirty years hence, to 
a thousand. On the other hand, the ratio of Pennsyl- 
vania, if applied to the State of Delaware, would reduce 
the representative Assembly of the latter to seven or 
eight members. Nothing can be more fallacious, than 
to found our political calculations on arithmetical prin- 
ciples. Sixty or seventy men may be more properly 
trusted with a given degree of power, than six or seven. 
But it does not follow, that six or seven hundred would 
be proportionably a better depositary. And if we carry 
on the supposition to six or seven thousand, the whole 
reasoning ought to be reversed. The truth is, that in all 
cases, a certain number at least seems to be necessary 
to secure the benefits of free consultation and discus- 
sion ; and to guard against too easy a combination for 
improper purposes; as on the other hand, the number 
ought at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order 
to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude. 
In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever charac- 
ters composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre 
from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Soc- 
rates, every Athenian Assembly would still have been a 
mob. 

It is necessary also to recollect here the observations 
which were applied to the case of biennial elections. 
For the same reason that the limited powers of the 
Congress, and the control of the State Legislatures, jus- 
tify less frequent elections than the public safety might 
otherwise require, the members of the Congress need 
be less numerous than if they possessed the whole power 



The Federalist. 38*/ 

of legislation, and were under no other than the ordinary 
restraints of other legislative bodies. 

With these general ideas in our minds, let us weigh 
the objections which have been stated against the num- 
ber of members proposed for the House of Representa- 
tives. It is said, in the first place, that so small a num- 
ber cannot be safely trusted with so much power. 

The number of which this branch of the Legislature 
is to consist, at the outset of the Government, will be 
sixty-five. Within three years a census is to be taken, 
when the number may be augmented to one for every 
thirty thousand inhabitants; and within every successive 
period of ten years, the census is to be renewed, and aug- 
mentations may continue to be made under the above 
limitation. It will not be thought an extravagant con- 
jecture, that the first census will, at the rate of one for 
every thirty thousand, raise the number of Representa- 
tives to at least one hundred. Estimating the negroes 
in the proportion of three fifths, it can scarcely be doubt- 
ed, that, the population of the United States will, by 
that time, if it does not already, amount to three mil- 
lions. At the expiration of twenty-five years, according 
to the computed rate of increase, the number of Repre- 
sentatives will amount to two hundred ; and of fifty 
years, to four hundred. This is a number, which I pre- 
sume will put an end to all fears arising from the small- 
ness of the body. I take for granted here, what I shall, 
in answering the fourth objection, hereafter show, that 
the number of Representatives will be augmented, from 
time to time, in the manner provided by the Constitu- 
tion. On a contrary supposition, I should admit the 
objection to have very great weight indeed. 

The true question to be decided then is, whether the 
emallness of the number, as a temporary regulation, be 
dangerous to the public liberty ? Whether sixty- five 
members for a few years, and a hundred, or two hundred, 



388 The Federalist. 

for a few more, be a safe depositary for a limited and 
well-guarded power of legislating for the United States ? 
I must own that I could not give a negative answer to 
this question, without first obliterating every impression 
which I have received, with regard to the present genius 
of the People of America, the spirit which actuates the 
State Legislatures, and the principles which are incor- 
porated with the political character of every class of 
citizens. I am unable to conceive, that the People of 
America, in their present temper, or under any circum- 
stances which can speedily happen, will choose, and 
every second year repeat the choice, of sixty-five or an 
hundred men, who would be disposed to form and pur- 
sue a scheme of tyranny or treachery. I am unable to 
conceive that the State Legislatures, which must feel 
so many motives to watch, and which possess so many 
means of counteracting the Foederal Legislature, would 
fail either to detect or to defeat a conspiracy of the lat- 
ter against the liberties of their common constituents. T 
am equally unable to conceive, that there are at this time, 
or can be in any short time, in the United States, any 
sixty-five or an hundred men capable of recommending 
themselves to the choice of the People at large, who 
would either desire or dare, within the short space of 
two years, to betray the solemn trust committed to 
them. What change of circumstances, time, and a full- 
er population of our country, may produce, requires a 
prophetic spirit to declare, which makes no part of my 
pretensions. But judging from the circumstances now 
before us, and from the probable state of them within a 
moderate period of time, I must pronounce, that the 
liberties of America cannot be unsafe in the number of 
nands proposed by the Fcederal Constitution. 

From what quarter can the danger proceed ? Are we 
afraid of foreign gold? If foreign gold could so easily 
corrupt our Foederal rulers, and enable them to ensnare 



The Federalist. 389 

and betray their constituents, how has it happened that 
we are at this time a free and independent Nation ? 
The Congress which conducted us through the Revolu- 
tion were a less numerous body than their successors 
will be : they were not chosen by, nor responsible to 
their fellow-citizens at large : though appointed from 
year to year, and recallable at pleasure, they were gen- 
erally continued for three years, and, prior to the ratifi- 
cation of the Fcederal Articles, for a still longer term : 
they held their consultations always under the veil of 
secrecy : they had the sole transaction of our affairs 
with foreign nations : through the whole course of the 
war, they had the fate of their country more in their 
hands, than it is to be hoped will ever be the case with 
our future Representatives ; and from the greatness of 
the prize at stake, and the eagerness of the party which 
lost it, it may well be supposed, that the use of other 
means than force would not have been scrupled: yet we 
know by happy experience, that the public trust was not 
betrayed ; nor has the purity of our public councils in 
this particular ever suffered, even from the whispers of 
calumny. 

Is the danger apprehended from the other branches of 
the Fcederal Government? But where are the means 
to be found by the President, or the Senate, or both ? 
Their emoluments of office, it is to be presumed, will 
not, and without a previous corruption of the House of 
Representatives cannot, more than suffice for very differ- 
pnt purposes ; their private fortunes, as they must all be 
American citizens, cannot possibly be sources of danger. 
The only means then which they can possess, will be in 
che dispensation of appointments. Is it here that sus- 
picion rests her charge? Sometimes we are told, that 
this fund of corruption is to be exhausted by the Presi- 
dent, in subduing the virtue of the Senate. Now, the 
fidelity of the other House is to be the victim. The 



390 The Federalist. 

improbability of such a mercenary and perfidious com- 
bination of the several members of Government, stand- 
ing on as different foundations as republican principles 
will well admit, and at the same time accountable to 
the society over which they are placed, ought alone to 
quiet this apprehension. But fortunately, the Constitu- 
tion has provided a still further safeguard. The mem- 
bers of the Congress are rendered ineligible to any civil 
offices, that may be created, or of which the emoluments 
may be increased, during the term of their election. No 
offices therefore can be dealt out to the existing mem- 
bers, but such as may become vacant by ordinary casu- 
alties ; and to suppose that these would be sufficient to 
purchase the guardians of the People, selected by the 
People themselves, is to renounce every rule by which 
events ought to be calculated, and to substitute an in- 
discriminate and unbounded jealousy, with which all 
reasoning must be vain. The sincere friends of liberty, 
who give themselves up to the extravagancies of this 
passion, are not aware of the injury they do their own 
cause. As there is a degree of depravity in mankind, 
which requires a certain degree of circumspection and 
distrust; so there are other qualities in human nature, 
which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence, 
Republican Government presupposes the existence of 
these qualities in a higher degree than any other form. 
Were the pictures which have been drawn by the politi- 
cal jealousy of some among us, faithful likenesses of the 
human character, the inference would be, that there is 
not sufficient virtue among men for self-government ; 
and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can 
restrain them from destroying and devouring one an« 
other. 

PUBLIUS. 



TJie Federalist. 391 

[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 19, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LV. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

^T^HE second charge against the House of Representa- 
-*- tives is, that it will be too small to possess a due 
knowledge of the interests of its constituents. 

As this objection evidently proceeds from a compar- 
ison of the proposed number of Representatives, with 
the great extent of the United States, the number of 
their inhabitants, and the diversity of their interests, 
without taking into view, at the same time, the circum- 
stances which will distinguish the Congress from other 
Legislative bodies, the best answer that can be given 
to it will be a brief explanation of these peculiarities. 

It is a sound and important principle, that the Repre- 
sentative ought to be acquainted with the interests and 
circumstances of his constituents. But this principle 
can extend no further, than to those circumstances and 
interests to which the authority and care of the Repre- 
sentative relate. An ignorance of a variety of minute 
and particular objects, which do not lie within the com- 
pass of legislation, is consistent with every attribute 
necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust. 
In determining the extent of information required in 
the exercise of a particular authority, recourse then must 
be had to the objects within the purview of that author- 
ity. 

What are to be the objects of Foederal Legislation ? 
Those which are of most importance, and which seem 
most to require local knowledge, are commerce, taxa 
tion, and the militia. 



392 The Federalist. 

A proper regulation of commerce requires much in- 
formation, as has been elsewhere remarked ; but as far 
as this information relates to the laws and local situation 
of each individual State, a very few Representatives 
would be very sufficient vehicles of it to the Fcederal 
councils. 

Taxation will consist, in a great measure, of duties 
which will be involved in the regulation of commerce. 
So far the preceding remark is applicable to this object. 
As far as it may consist of internal collections, a more 
diffusive knowledge of the circumstances of the State 
may be necessary. But will not this also be possessed 
in sufficient degree by a very few intelligent men, diffu- 
sively elected within the State? Divide the largest 
State into ten or twelve districts, and it will be found 
that there will be no peculiar local interest in either, 
which will not be within the knowledge of the Represent- 
ative of the district. Besides this source of information, 
the laws of the State, framed by Representatives from 
every part of it, will be almost of themselves a sufficient 
guide. In every State there have been made, and must 
continue to be made, regulations on this subject, which 
will, in many cases, leave little more to be done by the 
Fcederal Legislature, than to review the different laws, 
and reduce them in one general Act. A skilful individ- 
ual in his closet, with all the local codes before him, 
might compile a law on some subjects of taxation for 
the whole Union, without any aid from oral information ; 
and it may be expected, that whenever internal taxes 
may be necessary, and particularly in cases requiring 
uniformity throughout the States, the more simple 
objects will be preferred. To be fully sensible of the 
facility which will be given to this branch of Foederal 
Legislation, by the assistance of the State codes, we 
need only suppose for a moment, that this or any other 
State were divided into a number of parts, each having 



The Federalist. 393 

and exercising within itself a power of local legislation. 
Is it not evident that a degree of local information and 
preparatory labor would be found in the several volumes 
of their proceedings, which would very much shorten 
the labors of the General Legislature, and render a much 
smaller number of members sufficient for it? 

The Foederal councils will derive great advantage 
from another circumstance. The Representatives of each 
State will not only bring with them a considerable 
knowledge of its laws, and a local knowledge of their 
respective districts, but will probably in all cases have 
been members, and may even at the very time be mem- 
bers, of the State Legislature, where all the local infor- 
mation and interests of the State are assembled, and 
from whence they may easily be conveyed by a very few 
hands into the Legislature of the United States. 

The observations made on the subject of taxation 
apply with greater force to the case of the militia. For 
however different the rules of discipline may be in dif- 
ferent States, they are the same throughout each par- 
ticular State ; and depend on circumstances which can 
differ but little in different parts of the same State. 

The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning 
here used, to prove the sufficiency of a moderate num- 
ber of Representatives, does not in any respect contra- 
dict what was urged on another occasion with regard 
to the extensive information which the Representatives 
ought to possess, and the time that might be necessary 
"or acquiring it. This information, so far as it may 
relate to local objects, is rendered necessary and difficult, 
not by a difference of laws and local circumstances 
within a single State, but of those among different 
States. Taking each State by itself, its laws are the 
eame, and its interests but little diversified. A few men, 
therefore, will possess all the knowledge requisite for a 
proper representation of them. Were the interests and 



394 The Federalist. 

affairs of each individual State perfectly simple and 
uniform, a knowledge of them in one part would involve 
a knowledge of them in every other, and the whole 
State might be competently represented by a single 
member taken from any part of it. On a comparison 
of the different States together, we find a great dissim- 
ilarity in their laws, and in many other circumstances 
connected w T ith the objects of Foederal Legislation, with 
all of which the Foederal Representatives ought to have 
some acquaintance. Whilst a few Representatives, 
therefore, from each State, may bring with them a due 
knowledge of their own State, every Representative 
will have much information to acquire concerning all 
the other States. The changes of time, as was formerly 
remarked, on the comparative situation of the different 
States, will have an assimilating effect. The effect 
of time on the internal affairs of the States, taken singly, 
will be just the contrary. At present, some of the 
States are little more than a society of husbandmen. 
Few of them have made much progress in those 
branches of industry, which give a variety and com- 
plexity to the affairs of a Nation. These, however, will 
in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced popu- 
lation ; and will require, on the part of each State, 
a fuller representation. The foresight of the Conven- 
tion has accordingly taken care that the progress of 
population may be accompanied with a proper increase 
of the representative branch of the Government. 

The experience of Great Britain, which presents to 
mankind so many political lessons, both of the monitory 
and exemplary kind, and which has been frequently 
consulted in the course of these inquiries, corroborates 
the result of the reflections which we have just made. 
The number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of 
England and Scotland cannot be stated at less than 
sight millions. The Representatives of these eight mil- 



The Federalist. 395 

lions in the House of Commons, amount to five hundred 
and fifty-eight. Of this number, one ninth are elected 
by three hundred and sixty-four persons, and one half, 
by five thousand seven hundred and twenty-three per- 
sons.* It cannot be supposed that the half thus elected, 
and who do not even reside among the People at large, 
can add anything either to the security of the People 
against the Government, or to the knowledge of theii 
circumstances and interests in the Legislative councils. 
On the contrary, it is notorious, that they are more 
frequently the representatives and instruments of the 
Executive magistrate, than the guardians and advocates 
of the popular rights. They might therefore, with great 
propriety, be considered as something more than a mere 
deduction from the real Representatives of the Nation. 
We will, however, consider them in this light alone, 
and will not extend the deduction to a considerable 
number of others, who do not reside among their con- 
stituents, are very faintly connected with them, and 
have very little particular knowledge of their affairs. 
With all these concessions, two hundred and seventy- 
nine persons only, will be the depository of the safety, 
interest, and happiness of eight millions ; that is to say, 
there will be one Representative only, to maintain the 
rights, and explain the situation, of twenty -eight thousand 
six hundred and seventy constituents, in an Assembly 
exposed to the whole force of Executive influence, and 
extending its authority to every object of Legislation 
within a Nation whose affairs are in the highest degree 
diversified and complicated. Yet it is very certain, not 
only that a valuable portion of freedom has been pre- 
served under all these circumstances, but that the defects 
in the British code are chargeable, in a very small pro- 
portion, on the ignorance of the Legislature concerning 
the circumstances of the People. Allowing to this case 

* Burgh's Political Disquisitions. — Publius. 



396 The Federalist. 

the weight which is due to it, and comparing it with 
that of the House of Representatives as above explained, 
it seems to give the fullest assurance, that a Rep- 
resentative for every thirty thousand inhabitants^ will 
render the latter both a safe and competent guardian of 
the interests which will be confided to it. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 19, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LVI. 



To the People of the State op New York: 

HP HE third charge against the House of Representa- 
-*- tives is, that it will be taken from that class of citi- 
zens which will have least sympathy with the mass of 
the People, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious 
sacrifice of the many, to the aggrandizement of the few. 

Of all the objections which have been framed against 
the Foederal Constitution, this is perhaps the most ex- 
traordinary. Whilst the objection itself is levelled 
against a pretended oligarchy, the principle of it strikes 
at the very root of republican Government. 

The aim of every political Constitution is, or ought 
to be, first, to obtain for rulers men who possess most 
wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the com- 
mon good of the society ; and, in the next place, to take 
the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtu- 
ous, whilst they continue to hold their public trust. The 
elective mode of obtaining rulers, is the characteristic 
oolicy of republican Government. The means reliec 
on in this form of Government for preventing their de 



The Federalist. 397 

generacy, are numerous and various. The most effect- 
ual one, is such a limitation of the term of appoint 
ments, as will maintain a proper responsibility to the 
People. 

Let me now ask, what circumstance there is in the 
Constitution of the House of Representatives, that vio- 
lates the principles of republican Government, or favors 
the elevation of the few, on the ruins of the many ? 
Let me ask, whether every circumstance is not, on the 
contrary, strictly conformable to these principles ; and 
scrupulously impartial to the rights and pretensions of 
every class and description of citizens ? 

Who are to be the electors of the Foederal Represent- 
atives ? Not the rich, more than the poor ; not the 
learned, more than the ignorant ; not the haughty heirs 
of distinguished names, more than the humble sons 
of obscurity and unpropitious fortune The electors 
are to be the great body of the People of the United 
States. They are to be the same who exercise the right in 
every State of electing the correspondent branch of the 
Legislature of the State. 

Who are to be the objects of popular choice ? Every 
citizen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem 
and confidence of his country. No qualification of 
wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession, 
is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the 
inclination of the People. 

If we consider the situation of the men on whom 
the free suffrages of their fellow-citizens may confer the 
representative trust, we shall find it involving every 
security which can be devised or desired for their fidelity 
to their constituents. 

In the first place, as they will have been distinguished 
by the preference of their fellow-citizens, we are to pre- 
sume, that in general they will be somewhat distin- 
guished, also, by those qualities which entitle them to 



398 The Federalist. 

it, and which promise a sincere and scrupulous regard 
to the nature of their engagements. 

In the second place, they will enter into the public ser- 
vice under circumstances which cannot fail to produce a 
temporary affection at least to their constituents. There 
is in every breast a sensibility to marks of honor, of favor, 
of esteem, and of confidence, which, apart from all con- 
siderations of interest, is some pledge for grateful and 
benevolent returns, Ingratitude is a common topic of 
declamation against human nature ; and it must be 
confessed, that instances of it are but too frequent and 
flagrant, both in public and in private life. But the 
universal and extreme indignation which it inspires, is 
itself a proof of the energy and prevalence of the con- 
trary sentiment. 

In the third place, those ties which bind the Represent- 
ative to his constituents, are strengthened by motives of 
a more selfish nature. His pride and vanity attach him 
to a form of Government which favors his pretensions, 
and gives him a share in its honors and distinctions. 
Whatever hopes or projects might be entertained by a 
few aspiring characters, it must generally happen, that 
a great proportion of the men deriving their advance- 
ment from their influence with the People, would have 
more to hope from a preservation of the favor, than from 
innovations in the Government subversive of the au- 
thority of the People. 

All these securities, however, would be found very 
insufficient without the restraint of frequent elections. 
Hence, in the fourth place, the House of Representatives 
is so constituted, as to support in the members an habit- 
ual recollection of their dependence on the People. Be- 
fore the sentiments impressed on their minds by the 
mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise 
of power, they will be compelled to anticipate the 
moment when their power is to cease, when their exer- 



The Federalist. 399 

cise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend 
to the level from which they were raised ; there forevei 
to remain, unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall 
have established their title to a renewal of it. 

I will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation of 
the House of Representatives, restraining them from 
oppressive measures, that they can make no law which 
will not have its full operation on themselves and their 
friends, as well as on the great mass of the society 
This has always been deemed one of the strongest 
bonds by which human policy can connect the rulers and 
the People together. It creates between them that com- 
munion of interests and sympathy of sentiments, of which 
few Governments have furnished examples ; but without 
which every Government degenerates into tyranny. If 
it be asked, what is to restrain the House of Represent- 
atives from making legal discriminations in favor of 
themselves and a particular class of the society, I 
answer, the genius of the whole system ; the nature 
of just and constitutional laws; and above all, the vig- 
ilant and manly spirit which actuates the People of 
America: a spirit which nourishes freedom, and in re- 
turn is nourished by it. 

If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate 
a law not obligatory on the Legislature, as well as on 
the People, the People will be prepared to tolerate any- 
thing but liberty. 

Such will be the relation between the House of Rep- 
resentatives and their constituents. Duty, gratitude, 
interest, ambition itself, are the chords by which they 
will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great 
mass of the People. It is possible that these may all 
be insufficient to control the caprice and wickedness of 
man. But are they not all that Government will admit, 
and that human prudence can devise ? Are they not 
the geuuine and the characteristic means, by which Re- 



400 The Federalist. 

publican Government provides for the liberty and happi- 
ness of the People ? Are they not the identical means 
on which every State Government in the Union relies 
for the attainment of these important ends ? What then 
are we to understand by the objection which this paper 
has combated ? What are we to say to the men who 
profess the most flaming zeal for Republican Govern- 
ment, yet boldly impeach the fundamental principle of 
it ; who pretend to be champions for the right and the 
capacity of the People to choose their own rulers, yet 
maintain that they will prefer those only who will 
immediately and infallibly betray the trust committed 
to them ? 

Were the objection to be read by one who had not 
seen the mode prescribed by the Constitution for the 
choice of Representatives, he could suppose nothing less, 
than that some unreasonable qualification of property 
was annexed to the right of suffrage; or that the right of 
eligibility was limited to persons of particular families 
or fortunes ; or at least that the mode prescribed by the 
State Constitutions was, in some respect or other, very 
grossly departed from. We have seen, how far such a 
supposition would err, as to the two first points. Nor 
would it, in fact, be less erroneous as to the last. The 
only difference discoverable between the two cases is, 
that each Representative of the United States w 7 ill be 
elected by five or six thousand citizens ; whilst in the 
individual States, the election of a Representative is 
left to about as many hundreds. Will it be pretended, 
that this difference is sufficient to justify an attachment 
to the State Governments, and an abhorrence to the 
Fcederal Government? If this be the point on which 
the objection turns, it deserves to be examined. 

Is it supported by reason ? This cannot be said, 
without maintaining that five or six thousand citizens 
are Jess capable of choosing a fit Representative, or 



The Federalist. 401 

more liable to be corrupted by an unfit one,'than five 
or six hundred. Reason, on the contrary, assures us, that 
as in so great a number a fit Representative would be 
most likely to be found, so the choice would be less 
likely to be diverted from him, by the intrigues of the 
ambitious or the bribes of the rich. 

Is the consequence from this doctrine admissible ? If 
we say that five or six hundred citizens are as many as 
can jointly exercise their right of suffrage, must we not 
deprive the People of the immediate choice of their pub- 
lic servants, in every instance, where the administration 
of the Government does not require as many of them 
as will amount to one for that number of citizens? 

Is the doctrine warranted by facts ? It was shown 
in the last paper, that the real representation in the 
British House of Commons very little exceeds the pro- 
portion of one for every thirty thousand inhabitants. 
Besides a variety of powerful causes, not existing here, 
and which favor in that country the pretensions of rank 
and wealth, no person is eligible as a Representative of 
a county, unless he possess real estate of the clear value of 
six hundred pounds sterling per year ; nor of a city or 
borough, unless he possess a like estate of half that an- 
nual value. To this qualification, on the part of the 
county Representatives, is added another on the part of 
the county electors, which restrains the right of suffrage 
to persons having a freehold estate of the annual value 
of more than twenty pounds sterling, according to the 
present rate of money. Notwithstanding these unfa- 
vorable circumstances, and notwithstanding some very 
unequal laws in the British code, it cannot be said, that 
the Representatives of the Nation have elevated the few 
on the ruins of the many. 

But we need not resort to foreign experience on this 
subject. Our own is explicit and decisive. The dis- 
tricts in New Hampshire, in which the Senators are 

vol. i. 26 



402 The Federalist. 

chosen immediately by the People, are nearly as large 
as will be necessary for her Representatives in the Con- 
gress. Those of Massachusetts are larger than will be 
necessary for that purpose ; and those of New York still 
more so. In the last State, the Members of Assembly, 
for the cities and counties of New York and Albany, are 
elected by very nearly as many voters as will be entitled 
to a Representative in the Congress, calculating on the 
number of sixty-five Representatives only. It makes 
no difference, that in these Senatorial districts and 
counties, a number of Representatives are voted for 
by each elector, at the same time. If the same electors, 
at the same time, are capable of choosing four or five 
Representatives, they cannot be incapable of choosing 
one. Pennsylvania is an additional example. Some 
of her counties, which elect her State Representatives, 
are almost as large as her districts will be by which 
her Fcederal Representatives will be elected. The 
city of Philadelphia is supposed to contain between 
fifty and sixty thousand souls. It will, therefore, form 
nearly two districts for the choice of Foederal Repre- 
sentatives. It forms, however, but one county, in which 
every elector votes for each of its Representatives in the 
State Legislature. And what may appear to be still 
more directly to our purpose, the whole city actually 
elects a single member for the Executive Council. This 
is the case in all the other counties of the State. 

Are not these facts the most satisfactory proofs of the 

allacy which has been employed against the branch of 
the Fcederal Government under consideration ? Has it 

ippeared on trial, that the Senators of New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, and New York, or the Executive Council 
of Pennsylvania, or the members of the Assembly in 
the two last States, have betrayed any peculiar disposi- 
tion to sacrifice the many to the few ; or are in any re- 
spect less worthy of their places, than the Representa- 



The Federalist. 403 

lives and magistrates appointed in other States, by very 
small divisions of the People ? 

But there are cases of a stronger complexion than any 
which I have yet quoted. One branch of the Legislature 
of Connecticut is so constituted, that each member of it 
is elected by the whole State. So is the Governor of that 
State, of Massachusetts, and of this State, and the Pres- 
ident of New Hampshire. I leave every man to decide 
whether the result of any one of these experiments can 
be said to countenance a suspicion, that a diffusive mode 
of choosing Representatives of the People tends to ele- 
vate traitors and to undermine the public liberty. 

PUBL1US. 



[From the New York Packet, Friday, February 22, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LVII. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

THE remaining charge against the House of Repre- 
sentatives, which I am to examine, is grounded on 
a supposition that the number of members will not be 
augmented from time to time, as the progress of popu- 
lation may demand. 

It has been admitted, that this objection, if well sup- 
ported, would have great weight. The following obser- 
vations will show, that like most other objections against 
the Constitution, it can only proceed from a partial view 
of the subject ; or from a jealousy which discolors and 
disfigures every object which is beheld. 

1. Those who urge the objection seem not to have rec- 
ollected, that the Fcederal Constitution will not suffer 
by a comparison with the State Constitutions, in the 



404 The Federalist. 

security provided for a gradual augmentation of the 
number of Representatives. The number which is to 
prevail in the first instance, is declared to be temporary. 
Its duration is limited to the short term of three years. 
Within every successive term of ten years, a census of 
inhabitants is to be repeated. The unequivocal objects 
of these regulations are, first, to readjust, from time to 
time, the apportionment of Representatives to the num 
ber of inhabitants ; under the single exception, that each 
State shall have one Representative at least : Secondly, 
to augment the number of Representatives at the same 
periods; under the sole limitation, that the whole num- 
ber shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand inhab- 
itants. If we review the Constitutions of the several 
States, we shall find that some of them contain no de- 
terminate regulations on this subject ; that others cor- 
respond pretty much on this point with the Foederal 
Constitutions ; and that the most effectual security in 
any of them is resolvable into a mere directory pro- 
vision. 

2. As far as experience has taken place on this sub- 
ject, a gradual increase of Representatives under the 
State Constitutions has at least kept pace with that of 
the constituents; and it appears that the former have 
been as ready to concur in such measures as the latter 
have been to call for them. 

3. There is a peculiarity in the Foederal Constitution, 
which insures a watchful attention in a majority both of 
the People and of their Representatives, to a constitu- 
tional augmentation of the latter. The peculiarity lies 
In this, that one branch of the Legislature is a represen- 
tation of citizens ; the other of the States : in the former, 
consequently, the larger States will have most weight; 
in the latter, the advantage will be in favor of the small- 
er States. From this circumstance it may with certainty 
be inferred, that the larger States will be strenuous ad- 



The Federalist. 403 

vocates for increasing the number and weight of thai 
part of the Legislature in which their influence predom- 
inates. And it so happens, that four only of the largest 
will have a majority of the whole votes in the House of 
Representatives. Should the Representatives or People, 
therefore, of the smaller States, oppose at any time a 
reasonable addition of members, a coalition of a very few 
States will be sufficient to overrule the opposition ; a 
coalition, which, notwithstanding the rivalship and local 
prejudices which might prevent it on ordinary occasions, 
would not fail to take place, when not merely prompted 
by common interest, but justified by equity and the 
principles of the Constitution. 

It may be alleged, perhaps, that the Senate would be 
prompted by like motives to an adverse coalition ; and 
as their concurrence would be indispensable, the just 
and constitutional views of the other branch might be 
defeated. This is the difficulty which has probably 
created the most serious apprehensions in the jealous 
friends of a numerous representation. Fortunately it is 
among the difficulties which, existing only in appear- 
ance, vanish on a close and accurate inspection. The 
following reflections will, if I mistake not, be admitted 
to be conclusive and satisfactory on this point. 

Notwithstanding the equal authority which will sub- 
sist between the two Houses on all Legislative subjects, 
except the originating of money bills, it cannot be 
doubted, that the House, composed of the greater 
number of members, when supported by the more pow- 
erful States, and speaking the known and determined 
sense of a majority of the People, will have no small ad- 
vantage in a question depending on the comparative 
firmness of the two Houses. 

This advantage must be increased by the conscious- 
ness, felt by the same side, of being supported in ita 
iemands by right, by reason, and by the Constitution 



406 The Federalist. 

and the consciousness, on the opposite side, of contend 
ing against the force of all these solemn considerations 

It is farther to be considered, that in the gradation be- 
tween the smallest and largest States, there are several, 
which, though most likely in general to arrange them- 
selves among the former, are too little removed in ex- 
tent and population from the latter, to second an oppo- 
sition to their just and legitimate pretensions. Hence, 
it is by no means certain, that a majority of votes, even 
in the Senate, would be unfriendly to proper augmenta- 
tions in the number of Representatives. 

It will not be looking too far to add, that the Senators 
from all the new States may be gained over to the just 
views of the House of Representatives, by an expedient 
too obvious to be overlooked. As these States will, for 
a great length of time, advance in population with pe- 
culiar rapidity, they will be interested in frequent reap- 
portionments of the Representatives to the number of 
inhabitants. The large States, therefore, who will pre- 
vail in the House of Representatives, will have nothing 
to do, but to make reapportionments and augmentations 
mutually conditions of each other; and the Senators 
from all the most growing States will be bound to con- 
tend for the latter, by the interest which their States will 
feel in the former. 

These considerations seem to afford ample security 
on this subject ; and ought alone to satisfy all the doubts 
and fears which have been indulged with regard to it. 
Admitting, however, that they should all be insuffici- 
ent to subdue the unjust policy of the smaller States, 
or their predominant influence in the councils of the 
Senate, a constitutional and infallible resource still re- 
mains with the larger States, by which they will be 
able at all times to accomplish their just purposes. The 
House of Representatives can not only refuse, but they 
alone can propose the supplies requisite for the suppor 



The Federalist. 407 

of Government. They, in a word, hold the purse ; thai 
powerful instrument by which we behold, in the history 
of the British Constitution, an infant and humble repre- 
sentation of the People gradually enlarging the sphere 
of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as 
far as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerog- 
atives of the other branches of the Government. This 
power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the 
most complete and effectual weapon, with which any 
Constitution can arm the immediate Representatives of 
the People, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, 
and for carrying into effect every just and salutary 
measure. 

But will not the House of Representatives be as much 
interested as the Senate, in maintaining the Government 
in its proper functions ; and will they not therefore be 
unwilling to stake its existence or its reputation on the 
pliancy of the Senate ? Or if such a trial of firmness 
between the two branches were hazarded, would not the 
one be as likely first to yield as the other ? These ques- 
tions will create no difficulty with those who reflect that 
in all cases, the smaller the number, and the more per- 
manent and conspicuous the station, of men in power, 
the stronger must be the interest which they will in- 
dividually feel in whatever concerns the Government. 
Those who represent the dignity of their country in the 
eyes of other nations, will be particularly sensible to 
every prospect of public danger, or of a dishonorable 
stagnation in public affairs. To those causes, we are to 
ascribe the continual triumph of the British House of 
Commons over the other branches of the Government, 
whenever the engine of a money bill has been employed. 
An absolute inflexibility on the side of the latter, al- 
though it could not have failed to involve every depart- 
ment of the State in the general confusion, has neither 
>een apprehended, nor experienced. The utmost degree 



408 The Federalist. 

of firmness that can be displayed by the Foederal Sen- 
ate or President, will not be more than equal to a resist- 
ance, in which they will be supported by constitutional 
and patriotic principles. 

In this review of the Constitution of the House of 
Representatives, I have passed over the circumstance of 
economy, which, in the present state of affairs, might 
have had some effect in lessening the temporary number 
of Representatives ; and a disregard of which would 
probably have been as rich a theme of declamation 
against the Constitution, as has been furnished by the 
smallness of the number proposed. I omit also any 
remarks on the difficulty which might be found, under 
present circumstances, in engaging in the Foederal ser- 
vice a large number of such characters as the People 
will probably elect. One observation, however, I must 
be permitted to add on this subject, as claiming, in my 
judgment, a very serious attention. It is, that in all 
Legislative Assemblies, the greater the number compos- 
ing them may be, the fewer will be the men who will 
in fact direct their proceedings. In the first place, the 
more numerous any Assembly may be, of whatever char- 
acters composed, the greater is known to.be the ascend- 
ency of passion over reason. In the next place, the 
larger the number, the greater will be the proportion of 
members of limited information and of weak capacities. 
Now, it is precisely on characters of this description, 
that the eloquence and address of the few are known to 
act with all their force. In the ancient republics, where 
the whole body of the People assembled in person, a 
single orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen 
to rule with as complete a sway, as if a sceptre had been 
placed in his single hand. On the same principle, the 
more multitudinous a representative Assembly may be 
rendered, the more it will partake of the infirmities inci- 
dent to collective meetings of the People. Ignorance 



The Federalist. 409 

will be the dupe of cunning ; and passion the slave of 
sophistry and declamation. The People can never en 
more than in supposing, that by multiplying their Rep- 
resentatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the 
barrier against the Government of a few. Experience 
will forever admonish them, that on the contrary, after 
securing- a sufficient number for the purposes of safety, of 
local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole 
society, they will counteract their own views, by every ad- 
dition to their Representatives. The countenance of the 
Government may become more democratic; but the soul 
that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine 
will be enlarged ; but the fewer, and often the more secret, 
will be the springs by which its motions are directed. 

As connected with the objection against the num- 
ber of Representatives, may properly be here noticed, 
that which has been suggested against the number made 
competent for Legislative business. It has been said, 
that more than a majority ought to have been required 
for a quorum ; and in particular cases, if not in all, more 
than a majority of a quorum for a decision. That 
some advantages might have resulted from such a pre- 
caution, cannot be denied. It might have been an 
additional shield to some particular interests, and an- 
other obstacle generally to hasty and partial measures. 
But these considerations are outweighed by the incon- 
veniences in the opposite scale. In all cases where jus- 
tice or the general good might require new laws to be 
passed, or active measures to be pursued, the funda- 
mental principle of free Government would be reversed. 
It would be no longer the majority that would rule: 
che power would be transferred to the minority. Were 
the defensive privilege limited to particular cases, an 
.nterested minority might take advantage of it to screen 
themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, 
or, in particular emergencies, to extort unreasonable 



410 The Federalist. 

indulgences. Lastly, it would facilitate and foster the 
baneful practice of secessions ; a practice which has 
shown itself even in States where a majority only is 
required ; a practice subversive of all the principles of 
order and regular Government ; a practice which leads 
more directly to public convulsions, and the ruin of pop- 
ular Governments, than any other which has yet been 

displayed among us. 

PUBLIUS. 



{From the New York Packet, Friday, February 22, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LVIII. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

THE natural order of the subject leads us to consider, 
in this place, that provision of the Constitution 
which authorizes the National Legislature to regulate, 
in the last resort, the election of its own members. 

It is in these words : " The times, places, and manner 
" of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, 
" shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
"thereof; but the Congress may, at any time, by law, 
" make or alter such regulations, except as to the places 
u of choosing Senators."* This provision has not only 
been declaimed against by those who condemn the Con- 
stitution in the gross ; but it has been censured by those 
who have objected with less latitude, and greater moder- 
ation ; and, in one instance, it has been thought excep- 
tionable by a gentleman who has declared himself the 
advocate of every other part of the system. 

I am greatly mistaken, notwithstanding, if there be 
* 1st Clause, 4th Section of the 1st Article. — Publius. 



The Federalist. 411 

any Article in the whole plan more completely defensible 
than this. Its propriety rests upon the evidence of this 
plain proposition, that every Government ought to contain 
in itself the means of its own preservation. Every just 
reasoner will, at first sight, approve an adherence to this 
rule, in the work of the Convention; and will disapprove 
every deviation from it, which may not appear to have 
been dictated by the necessity of incorporating into the 
work some particular ingredient, with which a rigid con- 
formity to the rule was incompatible. Even in this case, 
though he may acquiesce in the necessity, yet he will 
not cease to regard and to regret a departure from so 
fundamental a principle, as a portion of imperfection in 
the system which may prove the seed of future weak- 
ness, and perhaps anarchy. 

It will not be alleged, that an election law could have 
been framed and inserted in the Constitution, which 
would have been always applicable to every probable 
change in the situation of the country; and it will, there- 
fore, not be denied, that a discretionary power over elec- 
tions ought to exist somewhere. It will, I presume, be as 
readily conceded, that there were only three ways in 
which this power could have been reasonably modified 
and disposed ; that it must either have been lodged 
wholly in the National Legislature, or wholly in the 
State Legislatures, or primarily in the latter, and ulti- 
mately in the former. The last mode has, with reason, 
been preferred by the Convention. They have submitted 
the regulation of elections for the Foederal Government, 
in the first instance, to the local administrations; which, 
in ordinary cases, and when no improper views prevail, 
maybe both more convenient and more satisfactory; 
but they have reserved to the National authority a right 
to interpose, whenever extraordinary circumstances might 
render that interposition necessary to its safety. 

Nothing can be more evident, than that an exclusive 



412 The Federalist. 

power of regulating elections for the National Govern 
ment, in the hands of the State Legislatures, would 
leave the existence of the Union entirely at their mercy. 
They could at any moment annihilate it, by neglecting 
to provide for the choice of persons to administer its 
affairs. It is to little purpose to say, that a neglect 
or omission of this kind would not be likely to take 
place. The constitutional possibility of the thing, with 
out an equivalent for the risk, is an unanswerable objec 
tion. Nor has any satisfactory reason been yet assigned 
for incurring that risk. The extravagant surmises of 
a distempered jealousy, can never be dignified with that 
character. If we are in a humor to presume abuses of 
power, it is as fair to presume them on the part of the 
State Governments, as on the part of the General Gov- 
ernment. And as it is more consonant to the rules of 
a just theory, to intrust the Union with the care of its 
own existence, than to transfer that care to any other 
hands, if abuses of power are to be hazarded on the one 
side or on the other, it is more rational to hazard them 
where the power would naturally be placed, than where 
it would unnaturally be placed. 

Suppose an Article had been introduced into the 
Constitution, empowering the United States to regulate 
the elections for the particular States, would any man 
have hesitated to condemn it, both as an unwarrantable 
transposition of power, and as a premeditated engine 
for the destruction of the State Governments ? The 
violation of principle, in this case, would have required 
no comment ; and, to an unbiased observer, it will not 
be less apparent in the project of subjecting the exist- 
ence of the National Government, in a similar respect, 
to the pleasure of the State Governments. An impar- 
tial view of the matter cannot fail to result in a convic- 
tion, that each, as far as possible, ought to depend on 
'tself for its own preservation. 



TJie Federalist 413 

As an objection to this position, it may be remarked 
that the constitution of the National Senate would in- 
volve, in its full extent, the danger which it is suggested 
might flow from an exclusive power in the State Legis- 
latures to regulate the Foederal elections. It may be 
alleged, that by declining the appointment of Senators, 
they might at any time give a fatal blow to the Union ; 
and from this it may be inferred, that as its existence 
would be thus rendered dependent upon them in so es- 
sential a point, there can be no objection to intrusting 
them w 7 ith it, in the particular case under consideration. 
The interest of each State, it may be added, to maintain 
its representation in the National Councils, would be 
a complete security against an abuse of the trust. 

This argument, though specious, will not, upon exam- 
ination, be found solid. It is certainly true, that the 
State Legislatures, by forbearing the appointment of 
Senators, may destroy the National Government. But 
it will not follow, that because they have the power to 
do this in one instance, they ought to have it in every 
other. There are cases in which the pernicious tendency 
of such a power may be far more decisive, without any 
motive equally cogent with that which must have reg- 
ulated the conduct of the Convention in respect to the 
formation of the Senate, to recommend their admission 
into the system. So far as that construction may ex- 
pose the Union to the possibility of injury from the 
State Legislatures, it is an evil; but it is an evil which 
could not have been avoided without excluding the 
States, in their political capacities, wholly from a place 
in the organization of the National Government. II 
this had been done, it would doubtless have been inter- 
preted into an entire dereliction of the Foederal princi 
pie; and would certainly have deprived the State Gov 
ernments of that absolute safeguard, which they will 
enjoy under this provision. But however wise it may 



414 The Federalist. 

have been, to have submitted in this instance to an in- 
convenience, for the attainment of a necessary advantage 
or a greater good, no inference can be drawn from thence 
to favor an accumulation of the evil, where no necessity 
urges, nor any greater good invites. 

It may be easily discerned, also that the National 
Government would run a much greater risk, from a pow- 
er is the State Legislatures over the elections of its 
House of Representatives, than from their power of ap- 
pointing the members of its Senate. The Senators are 
to be chosen for the period of six years; there is to be a 
rotation, by which the seats of a third part of them are 
to be vacated and replenished every two years ; and no 
State is to be entitled to more than two Senators ; a 
quorum of the body is to consist of sixteen members. 
The joint result of these circumstances would be, that 
a temporary combination of a few States, to intermit 
the appointment of Senators, could neither annul the 
existence, nor impair the activity of the body ; and it 
is not from a general and permanent combination of the 
States, that we can have anything to fear. The first might 
proceed from sinister designs in the leading members 
of a few of the State Legislatures : the last would sup- 
pose a fixed and rooted disaffection in the great body 
of the People ; which will, either never exist at all, or 
will, in all probability, proceed from an experience of the 
inaptitude of the General Government to the advance- 
ment of their happiness : in which event, no good citi- 
zen could desire its continuance. 

But with regard to the Fcederal House of Represent- 
atives, there is intended to be a general election of mem- 
bers once in two years. If the State Legislatures were to 
3e invested with an exclusive power of regulating these 
elections, every period of making them would be a del- 
icate crisis in the National situation ; which might issue 
in a dissolution of the Union, if the leaders of a few of 



The Federalist. 41c 

the most important States should have entered into a 
previous conspiracy to prevent an election. 

I shall not deny, that there is a degree of weight in 
the observation, that the interest of each State, to be 
represented in the Fcederal Councils, will be a security 
against the abuse of a power over its elections in the 
hands of the State Legislatures. But the security w T ill 
not be considered as complete, by those who attend to 
the force of an obvious distinction between the interest 
of the People in the public felicity, and the interest of 
their local rulers in the power and consequence of their 
offices. The People of America may be warmly at- 
tached to the Government of the Union, at times when 
the particular rulers of particular States, stimulated by 
the natural rivalship of power, and by the hopes of per- 
sonal aggrandizement, and supported by a stong faction 
in each of those States, may be in a very opposite tem- 
per. This diversity of sentiment between a majority of 
the People, and the individuals who have the greatest 
credit in their councils, is exemplified in some of the 
States at the. present moment, on the present question. 
The scheme of separate Confederacies, which will al- 
ways multiply the chances of ambition, will be a "never 
failing bait to all such influential characters in the State 
administrations, as are capable of preferring their own 
emolument and advancement to the public weal. With 
so effectual a weapon in their hands as the exclusive 
power of regulating elections for the National Govern- 
ment, a combination of a few such men, in a few of the 
most considerable States, where the temptation will al- 
ways be the strongest, might accomplish the destruction 
of the Union, by seizing the opportunity of some casual 
dissatisfaction among the People, (and which perhaps 
they may themselves have excited,) to discontinue the 
choice of members for the Fcederal House of Repre- 
sentatives. It ought never to be forgotten, that a firm 



41b" The Federalist. 

Union of this country, under an efficient Government, 
will probably be an increasing object of jealousy to 
more than one nation of Europe ; and that enterprises 
to subvert it will sometimes originate in the intrigues of 
foreign powers, and will seldom fail to be patronized 
and abetted by some of them. Its preservation there- 
fore ought in no case, that can be avoided, to be com- 
mitted to the guardianship of any but those, whose 
situation will uniformly beget an immediate interest in 
the faithful and vigilant performance of the trust. 

PUBL1US. 



[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 26, 1788.] 

THE FCELERALIST. No. LIX. 



To the People of the State of New York 

"YJCT" E have seen, that an uncontrollable power over 
* * the elections for the Foederal Government could 
not, without hazard, be committed to the State Legisla- 
tures. Let us now see, what would be the danger on 
the other side : that is, from confiding the ultimate right 
of regulating its own elections to the Union itself. It 
is not pretended, that this right would e/e\ oe used for 
the exclusion of any State from its s^are in the repre- 
sentation. The interest of all would, in this respect at 
least, be the security of all. But it is alleged, that it 
might be employed in such a manner as to promote the 
election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of 
others, by confining the places of election to particular 
districts, and rendering it impracticable to the citizens 
lit large to partake in the choice. Of all chimerical sup- 
positions, this seems to be the most chimerical. On the 



The Federalist. 417 

one hand, no rational calculation of probabilities would 
lead us to imagine that the disposition, which a conduct 
so violent and extraordinary would imply, could ever 
find its way into the National Councils; and on the 
other, it may be concluded with certainty, that if so 
improper a spirit should ever gain admittance into them, 
it would display itself in a form altogether difTerent and 
far more decisive. 

The improbability of the attempt may be satisfacto- 
rily inferred from this single reflection, that it could never 
be made without causing an immediate revolt of the 
great body of the People, headed and directed by the 
State Governments. It is not difficult to conceive that 
this characteristic right of freedom may, in certain turbu- 
lent and factious seasons, be violated, in respect to a 
particular class of citizens, by a victorious and overbear- 
ing majority ; but that so fundamental a privilege, in a 
country so situated and enlightened, should be invaded 
to the prejudice of the great mass of the People, by the 
deliberate policy of the Government, without occasion- 
ing a popular revolution, is altogether inconceivable and 
incredible. 

In addition to this general reflection, there are consid- 
erations of a more precise nature, which forbid all appre- 
hension on the subject. The dissimilarity in the ingre- 
dients which will compose the National Government, 
and still more in the manner in which they will be 
brought into action in its various branches, must form 
a powerful obstacle to a concert of views, in any partial 
scheme of elections. There is sufficient diversity in the 
state of property, in the genius, manners, and habits of 
the People of the different parts of the Union, to occa- 
sion a material diversity of disposition in their Repre- 
sentatives towards the different ranks and conditions in 
society. And though an intimate intercourse under the 
same Government will promote a gradual assimilation, 
vol. i. 27 



418 The Federalist. 

in some of these respects, yet there are causes, as weU 
physical as moral, which may, in a greater or less de- 
gree, permanently nourish different propensities and in- 
clinations in this respect. But the circumstance which 
will be likely to have the greatest influence in the mat- 
ter, will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the sev- 
eral component parts of the Government. The House 
of Representatives being to be elected immediately by 
the People, the Senate by the State Legislatures, the 
President by Electors chosen for that purpose by the 
People, there would be little probability of a common 
interest to cement these different branches in a predilec- 
tion for any particular class of electors. 

As to the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation 
of " time and manner," which is all that is proposed to 
be submitted to the National Government in respect to 
that body, can affect the spirit which will direct the 
choice of its members. The collective sense of the State 
Legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous cir- 
cumstances of that sort; a consideration which alone 
ought to satisfy us, that the discrimination apprehended 
would never be attempted. For what inducement could 
the Senate have, to concur in a preference in which it- 
self would not be included ? Or to what purpose would 
it be established, in reference to one branch of the Leg- 
islature, if it could not be extended to the other ? The 
composition of the one would in this case counteract 
that of the other. And we can never suppose that it 
would embrace the appointments to the Senate, unless 
we can at the same time suppose the voluntary cooper- 
ation of the State Legislatures. If we make the latter 
supposition, it then becomes immaterial where the pow- 
er in question is placed, whether in their hands, or in 
those of the Union. 

But what is to be the object of this capricious partial- 
ity in the National Councils ? Is it to be exercised i/i a 



The Federalist. 419 

discrimination between the different departments of in* 
dustry, or between the different kinds of property, 01 
between the different degrees of property ? Will it lean 
in favor of the landed interest, or the moneyed interest, 
or the mercantile interest, or the manufacturing inter- 
est? Or, to speak in the fashionable language of the 
adversaries to the Constitution, will it court the eleva- 
tion of " the wealthy and the well-born," to the exclu- 
sion and debasement of all the rest of the society ? 

If this partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who 
are concerned in any particular description of industry 
or property, I presume it will readily be admitted, that 
the competition for it will lie between landed men and 
merchants. And I scruple not to affirm, that it is infi- 
nitely less likely that either of them should gain an 
ascendant in the National Councils, than that the one 
or the other of them should predominate in all the local 
Councils. The inference will be, that a conduct tend- 
ing to give an undue preference to either is much less to 
be dreaded from the former, than from the latter. 

The several States are in various degrees addicted to 
agriculture and commerce. In most, if not all of them 
agriculture is predominant. In a few of them, however, 
commerce nearly divides its empire; and in most of them 
has a considerable share of influence. In proportion as 
either prevails, it will be conveyed into the National rep- 
resentation ; and for the very reason, that this will be 
an emanation from a greater variety of interests, and in 
much more various proportions, than are to be found in 
any single State, it will be much less apt to espouse 
either of them with a decided partiality, than the repre- 
sentation of any single State. 

In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of 
jand, where the rules of an equal representation obtain, 
the landed interest must, upon the whole, preponderate 
'n the Government. As long as this interest prevails in 



420 The Federalist. 

most of the State Legislatures, so long it must main- 
tain a correspondent superiority in the National Senate 
which will generally be a faithful copy of the majorities 
of those Assemblies. It cannot therefore be presumed, 
that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile class will 
ever be a favorite object of this branch of the Foederal 
Legislature. In applying thus particularly to the Senate 
a general observation suggested by the situation of the 
country, I am governed by the consideration, that the 
credulous votaries of State power cannot, upon their 
own principles, suspect, that the State Legislatures 
would be warped from their duty by any external in- 
fluence. But in reality the same situation must have 
the same effect, in the primitive composition at least of 
the Foederal House of Representatives, an improper 
bias towards the mercantile class, is as little to be ex 
pected from this quarter as from the other. 

In order, perhaps, to give countenance to the objection 
at any rate, it may be asked, is there not danger of an 
opposite bias in the National Government, which may 
dispose it to endeavor to secure a monopoly of the Foed- 
eral administration to the landed class? As there is 
little likelihood, that the supposition of such a bias will 
have any terrors for those who would be immediately 
injured by it, a labored answer to this question will be 
dispensed with. It will be sufficient to remark, first, 
that for the reasons elsewhere assigned, it is less likely 
that any decided partiality should prevail in the Coun 
cils of the Union, than in those of any of its members. 
Secondly, that there would be no temptation to violate 
the Constitution in favor of the landed class, because 
that class would, in the natural course of things, enjoy 
as great a preponderancy as itself could desire. And, 
thirdly, that men accustomed to investigate the sources 
jf public prosperity, upon a large scale, must be too 
well convinced of the utility of commerce to be inclined 



The Federalist 421 

to inflict upon it so deep a wound, as would result from 
the entire exclusion of those who would best understand 
its interest, from a share in the management of them. 
The importance of commerce, in the view of revenue 
alone, must effectually guard it against the enmity of a 
body which would be continually importuned in its 
favor, by the urgent calls of public necessity. 

I the rather consult brevity, in discussing the prob- 
ability of a preference founded upon a discrimination 
between the different kinds of industry and property, be- 
cause, as far as I understand the meaning of the objec- 
tors, they contemplate a discrimination of another kind. 
They appear to have in view, as the objects of the pref- 
erence with which they endeavor to alarm us, those whom 
they designate by the description of "the wealthy and 
'the well-born." These, it seems, are to be exalted to an 
odious preeminence over the rest of their fellow-citizens. 
At one time, however, their elevation is to be a neces- 
sary consequence of the smallness of the representative 
body ; at another time, it is to be effected by depriving 
the People at large of the opportunity of exercising their 
right of suffrage in the choice of that body. 

But upon what principle is the discrimination of the 
places of election to be made, in order to answer the 
purpose of the meditated preference ? Are " the wealthy 
" and the well-born," as they are called, confined to par- 
ticular spots in the several States ? Have they, by some 
miraculous instinct or foresight, set apart in each of 
them, a common place of residence ? Are they only 
to be met with in the towns or cities? Or are they, 
on the contrary, scattered over the face of the country 
as avarice or chance may have happened to cast their 
own lot, or that of their predecessors ? If the latter is 
the case, (as every intelligent man knows it to be,*) is it 
not evident that the policy of confining the places ot 

* Particularly in the Southern States and in this State. — PvbUus. 



422 The Federalist. 

elections to particular districts, would be as subversive 
of its own aim, as it would be exceptionable on every 
other account ? The truth is, that there is no method of 
securing to the rich the preference apprehended, but by 
prescribing qualifications of property either for those 
who may elect, or be elected. But this forms no part 
of the power to be conferred upon the National Govern- 
ment. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the 
regulation of the times, the places, and the manner of 
elections. The qualifications of the persons who may 
choose, or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other 
occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and 
are unalterable by the Legislature. 

Let it however be admitted, for argument sake, that 
the expedient suggested might be successful; and let it 
at the same time be equally taken for granted, that all 
the scruples which a sense of duty, or an apprehension 
of the danger of the experiment might inspire, were 
overcome in the breasts of the National rulers ; still I 
imagine, it will hardly be pretended, that they could 
ever hope to carry such an enterprise into execution, 
without the aid of a military force sufficient to subdue 
the resistance of the great body of the People. The 
improbability of the existence of a force equal to that 
object, has been discussed and demonstrated in different 
parts of these papers ; but that the futility of the objec- 
tion under consideration may appear in the strongest 
light, it shall be conceded for a moment, that such a 
force might exist ; and the National Government shall 
be supposed to be in the actual possession of it. What 
will be the conclusion? With a disposition to invade 
the essential rights of the community, and with the 
means of gratifying that disposition, is it presumable 
that the persons who were actuated by it would amuse 
themselves in the ridiculous task of fabricating election 
aws for securing a preference to a favorite class of 



The Federalist 

men? Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct 
better adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement? 
Would they not rather boldly resolve to perpetuate 
themselves in office by one decisive act of usurpation 
than to trust to precarious expedients which, in spite of 
all the precautions that might accompany them, might 
terminate in the dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their 
authors? Would they not fear, that citizens, not less 
tenacious than conscious of their rights, would flock 
from the remotest extremes of their respective States to 
the places of election, to overthrow their tyrants, and to 
substitute men who would be disposed to avenge the 
violated majesty of the People? 

PUBLIUS. 



IFrom the New York Packet, Tuesday, February 26, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LX. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

THE more candid opposers of the provision respect- 
ing elections, contained in the plan of the Con- 
vention, when pressed in argument, will sometimes 
concede the propriety of that provision ; with this qual- 
ification, however, that it ought to have been accom- 
panied with a declaration, that all elections should be 
had in the counties where the electors resided. This, 
say they, was a necessary precaution against an abuse 
of the power. A declaration of this nature would cer- 
tainly have been harmless ; so far as it would have had 
:he effect of quieting apprehensions, it might not have 
been undesirable. But it would, in fact, have afforded 
little or no additional security against the danger appre- 



424 The Federalist 

hended ; and the want of it will never be considered, by 
an impartial and judicious examiner, as a serious, still 
less as an insuperable objection to the plan. The differ- 
ent views taken of the subject in the two preceding 
papers must be sufficient to satisfy all dispassionate and 
discerning men, that if the public liberty should ever be 
the victim of the ambition of the National rulers, the 
power under examination, at least, will be guiltless of 
the sacrifice. 

If those who are inclined to consult their jealousy 
only, would exercise it in a careful inspection of the 
several State Constitutions, they would find little less 
room for disquietude and alarm, from the latitude which 
most of them allow in respect to elections, than from 
the latitude which is proposed to be allowed to the 
National Government in the same respect. A review 
of their situation, in this particular, would tend greatly 
to remove any ill impressions which may remain in re- 
gard to this matter. But as that review would lead 
into long and tedious details, I shall content myself 
with the single example of the State in which I write. 
The Constitution of New York makes no other provi- 
sion for locality of elections, than that the members of 
the Assembly shall be elected in the counties; those of 
the Senate, in the great districts into which the State is 
or may be divided : these at present are four in number, 
and comprehend each from two to six counties. It may 
/eadily be perceived, that it would not be more difficult 
to the Legislature of New York to defeat the suffrages 
of the citizens of New York, by confining elections to 
particular places, than for the Legislature of the United 
States to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of the Union, 
by the like expedient. Suppose, for instance, the city 
of Albany was to be appointed the sole place of elec- 
tion for the county and district of which it is a part, 
Would not the inhabitants of that city speedily become 



The Federalist. 425 

the only electors of the members both of the Senate 
and Assembly for that county and district? Can we 
imagine, that the electors who reside in the remote sub- 
divisions of the county of Albany, Saratoga, Cambridge, 
&c, or in any part of the county of Montgomery, would 
take the trouble to come to the city of Albany, to give 
their votes for members of the Assembly or Senate 
sooner than they would repair to the city of New York 
to participate in the choice of the members of the Fed- 
eral House of Representatives ? The alarming indiffer- 
ence discoverable in the exercise of so invaluable a privi- 
lege under the existing laws, which afford every facility 
to it, furnishes a ready answer to this question. And, 
abstracted from any experience on the subject, we can 
be at no loss to determine, that when the place of elec- 
tion is at an inconvenient distance from the elector, the 
effect upon his conduct will be the same, whether that 
distance be twenty miles, or twenty thousand miles. 
Hence it must appear, that objections to the particular 
modification of the Foederal power of regulating elec- 
tions, will, in substance, apply with equal force to the 
modification of the like power in the Constitution of 
this State ; and for this reason it will be impossible to 
acquit the one, and to condemn the other. A similar 
comparison would lead to the same conclusion, in re- 
spect to the Constitutions of most of the other States. 
If it should be said, that defects in the State Consti- 
tutions furnish no apology for those which are to be 
found in the plan proposed, I answer, that as the for- 
mer have never been thought chargeable with inatten- 
tion to the security of liberty, where the imputations 
thrown on the latter can be shown to be applicable to 
them also, the presumption is, that they are rather the 
cavilling refinements of a predetermined opposition, 
than the well-founded inferences of a candid research 
after truth. To those who are disposed to consider, as 



426 The Federalist. 

innocent omissions in the State Constitutions, what they 
regard as unpardonable blemishes in the plan of the 
Convention, nothing can be said; or at most, they can 
only be asked to assign some substantial reason why 
the Representatives of the People, in a single State, 
should be more impregnable to the lust of power, or 
other sinister motives, than the Representatives of the 
People of the United States ? If they cannot do this, 
they ought at least to prove to us that it is easier to 
subvert the liberties of three millions of People, with the 
advantage of local Governments to head their opposi- 
tion, than of two hundred thousand People who are 
destitute of that advantage. And in relation to the point 
immediately under consideration, they ought to convince 
as that it is less probable that a predominant faction in 
a single State, should, in order to maintain its superior- 
ity, incline to a preference of a particular class of elec 
tors, than that a similar spirit should take possession of 
the Representatives of thirteen States, spread over a 
vast region, and in several respects distinguishable from 
each other by a diversity of local circumstances, preju- 
dices, and interests. 

Hitherto my observations have only aimed at a vindi- 
cation of the provision in question, on the ground of 
theoretic propriety, on that of the danger of placing the 
power elsewhere, and on that of the safety of placing it 
in the manner proposed. But there remains to be men- 
tioned a positive advantage, which will result from this 
disposition, and which could not as well have been ob- 
tained from any other: I allude to the circumstance 
of uniformity, in the time of elections for the Foederal 
House of Representatives. It is more than possible, 
that this uniformity may be found by experience to be 
of great importance to the public welfare; both as a 
security against the perpetuation of the same spirit in 
tfie body, and as a cure for the diseases of faction. If 



The Federalist. 427 

each State may choose its own time of election, it is 
possible there may be, at least, as many different periods 
as there are months in the year. The times of election 
in the several States, as they are now established for 
local purposes, vary between extremes as wide as March 
and November. The consequence of this diversity would 
be, that there could never happen a total dissolution or 
renovation of the body at one time. If an improper 
spirit of any kind should happen to prevail in it, that 
spirit would be apt to infuse itself into the new mem- 
bers, as they come forward in succession. The mass 
would be likely to remain nearly the same ; assimilating 
constantly to itself its gradual accretions. There is a 
contagion in example, which few men have sufficient 
force of mind to resist. I am inclined to think, that 
treble the duration in office, with the condition of a total 
dissolution of the body at the same time, might be less 
formidable to liberty than one third of that duration 
subject to gradual and successive alterations. 

Uniformity in the time of elections seems not less 
requisite for executing the idea of a regular rotation in 
the Senate, and for conveniently assembling the Legis- 
lature at a stated period in each year. 

It may be asked, Why then could not a time have 
been fixed in the Constitution ? As the most zealous 
adversaries of the plan of the Convention in this State, 
are, in general, not less zealous admirers of the Con- 
stitution of the State, the question may be retorted, and 
it may be asked, Why was not a time for the like pur- 
pose fixed in the Constitution of this State ? No better 
answer can be given than that it was a matter which 
might safely be intrusted to Legislative discretion ; and 
that if a time had been appointed, it might, upon 
experiment, have been found less convenient than some 
other time. The same answer may be given to the 
question put on the other side. And it may be added 



428 The Federalist. 

that the supposed danger of a gradual change being 
merely speculative, it would have been hardly advisable 
upon that speculation to establish, a*s a fundamental 
point, what would deprive several States of the con- 
venience of having the elections for their own Govern- 
ments, and for the National Government, at the same 

epochs. 

PUBLIUS. 



For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LXI, 



To the People of the State of New York* 

HAVING examined the constitution of the House 
of Representatives, and answered such of the ob- 
jections against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter 
next on the examination of the Senate. 

The heads into which this member of the Gov- 
ernment may be considered, are, I. The qualifica- 
tions of Senators ; II. The appointment of them by 
the State Legislatures; III. The equality of represen- 
tation in the Senate ; IV. The number of Senators, 
and the term for which they are to be elected ; V. The 
powers vested in the Senate. 

I. The qualifications proposed for Senators, as dis- 
tinguished from those of Representatives, consist in a 
more advanced age, and a longer period of citizenship. 
A Senator must be thirty years of age at least ; as 
a Representative must be twenty-five. And the former 
must have been a citizen nine years ; as seven years are 
required for the latter. The propriety of these distinc- 
tions is explained by the nature of the Senatorial trust 



The Federalist. 429 

which, requiring greater extent of information and 
stability of character, requires, at the same time, that 
the Senator should have reached a period of life most 
likely to supply these advantages ; and which, partici- 
pating immediately in transactions with foreign nations, 
ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly 
weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident 
to foreign birth and education. The term of nine years 
appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total 
exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and talents 
may claim a share in the public confidence, and an 
indiscriminate and hasty admission of them, which 
might create a channel for foreign influence on the Na- 
tional Councils. 

II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appoint- 
ment of Senators by the State Legislatures. Among 
the various modes which might have been devised for 
constituting this branch of the Government, that which 
has been proposed by the Convention is probably the 
most congenial with the public opinion. It is recom- 
mended by the double advantage of favoring a select 
appointment, and of giving to the State Governments 
such an agency in the formation of the Foederal Govern- 
ment, as must secure the authority of the former, and 
may form a convenient link between the two systems. 

III. The equality of representation in the Senate is 
another point, which, being evidently the result of com- 
promise between the opposite pretensions of the large 
and the small States, does not call for much discussion. 
If indeed it be right, that among a People thoroughly 
incorporated into one Nation, every district ought to 
have a. proportional share in the Government; and that 
among independent and sovereign States, bound to- 
gether by a simple league, the parties, however unequal 
Id size, ought to have an equal share in the common 
councils ; it does not appear to be without some reason. 



430 The Federalist. 

that in a compound republic, partaking both of the Na- 
tional and Fcederal character, the Government ought to 
be founded on a mixture of the principles of propor- 
tional and equal representation. But it is superfluous 
to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the Constitu- 
tion which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not 
of theory, but " of a spirit of amity, and that mutual 
* deference and concession which the peculiarity of our 
" political situation rendered indispensable." A common 
Government, with powers equal to its objects, is called 
for by the voice, and still more loudly by the political 
situation, of America. A Government, founded on prin- 
ciples more consonant to the wishes of the larger States, 
is not likely to be obtained from the smaller States. 
The only option, then, for the former, lies between the 
proposed Government, and a Government still more ob- 
jectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of pru- 
dence must be, to embrace the lesser evil ; and, instead 
of indulging a fruitless anticipation of the possible mis- 
chiefs which may ensue, to contemplate rather the 
advantageous consequences which may qualify the 
sacrifice. 

In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote 
allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recog- 
nition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the 
individual States, and an instrument for preserving that 
residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be 
no less acceptable to the large than to the small States ; 
since they are not less solicitous to guard, by every pos- 
sible expedient, against an improper consolidation of 
the States into one simple republic. 

Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in 
the constitution of the Senate is, the additional imped- 
iment it must prove against improper acts of legisla- 
tion. No law or resolution can now be passed without 
the concurrence, first, of a majority of the People, and, 



The Federalist. 433 

then, of a majority of the States. It must be acknowl- 
edged that this complicated check on legislation may, in 
some instances, be injurious as well as beneficial ; and 
that the peculiar defence which it involves in favor of 
the smaller States, would be more rational, if any inter- 
ests common to them, and distinct from those of the 
other States, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar 
danger. But as the larger States will always be able, 
by their power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable 
exertions of this prerogative of the lesser States, and as 
the facility and excess of law-making seem to be the 
diseases to which our Governments are most liable, it is 
not impossible that this part of the Constitution may be 
more convenient in practice, than it appears to many in 
contemplation. 

TV. The number of Senators, and the duration of 
their appointment, come next to be considered. In order 
to form an accurate judgment on both these points, it 
will be proper to inquire into the purposes which are to 
be answered by a Senate ; and in order to ascertain 
these, it will be necessary to review the inconveniences 
which a republic must suffer from the want of such an 
institution. 

First. It is a misfortune incident to republican Gov- 
ernment, though in a less degree than to other Govern- 
ments, that those who administer it may forget their 
obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to 
their important trust. In this point of view, a Senate, 
as a second branch of the Legislative Assembly, distinct 
from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all 
cases a salutary check on the Government. It doubles 
the security to the People, by requiring the concurrence 
of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or per- 
fidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would 
otherwise be sufficient. This is a precaution founded 
;>n such clear principles, and now so well understood in 



432 The Federalist. 

the United States, that it would be more than super- 
fluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that as the 
improbability of sinister combinations will be in propor- 
tion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, 
it must be politic to distinguish them from each other 
by every circumstance which will consist with a due 
harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine 
principles of republican Government. 

Secondly. The necessity of a Senate is not less in- 
dicated by the propensity of all single and numerous as- 
semblies, to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent 
passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into in- 
temperate and pernicious resolutions. Examples on this 
subject might be cited without number; and from pro- 
ceedings within the United States, as well as from the 
history of other nations. But a position that will not 
be contradicted, need not be proved. All that need be 
remarked, is, that a body which is to correct this infirm- 
ity, ought itself to be free from it, and consequently 
ought to be less numerous. It ought, moreover, to pos- 
sess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its 
authority by a tenure of considerable duration. 

Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a Senate 
lies in a want of due acquaintance with the objects and 
principles of legislation. It is not possible that an as- 
sembly of men called for the most part from pursuits of 
a private nature, continued in appointment for a short 
time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the in- 
tervals of public occupation to a study of the laws, the 
affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their country, 
should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of 
important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust. 
It may be affirmed, on the best grounds, that no small 
share of the present embarrassments of America is to be 
charged on the blunders of our Governments; and that 
these have proceeded from the heads rather than the 



The Federalist 433 

nearts of most of the authors of them. What indeed 
are all the repealing, explaining, and amending laws, 
which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so 
many monuments of deficient wisdom; so many im- 
peachments exhibited by each succeeding, against each 
preceding session ; so many admonitions to the People, 
of the value of those aids which may be expected from 
a well-constituted Senate ? 

A good Government implies two things : first, fidelity 
to the object of Government, which is the happiness of 
the People ; secondly, a knowledge of the means by 
which that object can be best attained. Some Govern- 
ments are deficient in both these qualities ; most Govern- 
ments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to assert, 
that in American Governments too little attention has 
been paid to the last. The Foederal Constitution avoids 
this error ; and what merits particular notice, it provides 
for the last in a mode which increases the security for 
the first. 

Fourthly. The mutability in the public councils aris- 
ing from a rapid succession of new members, however 
qualified they may be, points out, in the strongest man- 
ner, the necessity of some stable institution in the Gov- 
ernment. Every new election in the States is found to 
change one half of the Representatives. From this 
change of men must proceed a change of opinions ; and 
from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But 
a continual change even of good measures is inconsist- 
ent with every rule of prudence, and every prospect of 
success. The remark is verified in private life, and be- 
comes more just, as well as more important, in National 
transactions. 

To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable Govern- 
ment, would fill a volume. I will hint a few only, each 
of which will be perceived to be a source of innumer* 
able others. 

vol. i. 28 



434 The Federalist. 

In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence 
of other nations, and all the advantages connected with 
National character. An individual who is observed to 
be inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to carry on his 
affairs without any plan at all, is marked at once, by all 
prudent people, as a speedy victim to his own unstead- 
iness and folly. His more friendly neighbors may pity 
him, but all will decline to connect their fortunes with 
his ; and not a few will seize the opportunity of making 
their fortunes out of his. One nation is to another, 
what one individual is to another; with this melancholy 
distinction perhaps, that the former, with fewer of the 
benevolent emotions than the latter, .are under fewer 
restraints also from taking undue advantage from the 
indiscretions of each other. Every nation, consequently, 
whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and stability, 
may calculate on every loss which can be sustained 
from the more systematic policy of its wiser neighbors. 
But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily 
conveyed to America by the example of her own situa- 
tion. She finds that she is held in no respect by her 
friends ; that she is the derision of her enemies ; and that 
she is a prey to every nation which has an interest in 
speculating on her fluctuating councils and embarrassed 
affairs. 

The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more 
calamitous. It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It 
will be of little avail to the People, that the laws are 
made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so 
voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent 
that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or 
revised before they are promulged, or undergo such 
incessant changes that no man, who knows what the 
law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow. 
Law is defined to be a rule of action ; but how can that 
be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed? 



The Feeder alist. 435 

Another effect of public instability is the unreason- 
able advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterpris- 
ing, and the moneyed few, over the industrious and 
uninformed mass of the People. Every new regulation 
concerning commerce or revenue, or in any manner af- 
fecting the value of the different species of property, 
presents a new harvest to those who watch the change 
and can trace its consequences ; a harvest, reared not by 
themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body 
of their fellow-citizens. This is a state of things, in 
which it may be said, with some truth, that laws are 
made for the feiv, not for the many. 

In another point of view, great injury results from an 
unstable Government. The want of confidence in the 
public councils damps every useful undertaking, the 
success and profit of which may depend on a continu- 
ance of existing arrangements. What prudent mer- 
chant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch ot 
commerce, when he knows not but that his plans may 
be rendered unlawful before they can be executed? 
What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for 
the encouragement given to any particular cultivation 
or establishment, when he can have no assurance that 
his preparatory labors and advances will not render him 
a victim to an inconstant Government ? In a word, no 
great improvement or laudable enterprise can go for- 
ward, which requires the auspices of a steady system of 
National policy. 

But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminu- 
tion of attachment and reverence, which steals into the 
hearts of the People, towards a political system which 
betrays so many marks of infirmity, and disappoints so 
many of their flattering hopes. No Government, any 
more than an individual, will long be respected, without 
being truly respectable; nor be truly respectable, with- 
out possessing a certain portion of order and stability. 

PUBLIUS 



436 The Federalist 

For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LXIL 



To the People of the State of New Yokk : 

A FIFTH desideratum, illustrating the utility of a 
-£^- Senate, is the want of a due sense of National 
character. Without a select and stable member of the 
Government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only 
be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, 
proceeding from the causes already mentioned, but the 
National Councils will not possess that sensibility to the 
opinion of the world, which is perhaps not less neces- 
sary in order to merit, than it is to obtain its respect and 
confidence. 

An attention to the judgment of other nations is im- 
portant to every Government, for two reasons : the one 
is, that independently of the merits of any particular plan 
or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it 
should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise 
and honorable policy; the second is, that in doubtful 
cases, particularly where the National Councils may be 
warped by some strong passion, or momentary interest, 
the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world 
may be the best guide that can be followed. What has 
not America lost by her want of character with foreign 
nations ; and how many errors and follies would she not 
have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her meas- 
ures had, in every instance, been previously tried by the 
light in which they would probably appear to the un- 
biased part of mankind. 

Yet however requisite a sense of National character 
"nay be, it is evident that it can never be sufficiently 



The Federalist. 437 

possessed by a numerous and changeable body. It car 
only be found in a number so small that a sensible de- 
gree of the praise and blame of public measures may 
be the portion of each individual ; or in an assembly so 
durably invested with public trust, that the pride and 
consequence of its members may be sensibly incorpo- 
rated with the reputation and prosperity of the com- 
munity. The half-yearly Representatives of Rhode 
Island would probably have been little affected in their 
deliberations on the iniquitous measures of that State, 
by arguments drawn from the light in wbich such meas- 
ures would be viewed by foreign nations, or even by 
the sister States ; whilst it can scarcely be doubted, that 
if the concurrence of a select and stable body had been 
necessary, a regard to National character alone would 
have prevented the calamities under which that mis- 
guided People is now laboring. 

I add, as a sixth defect, the want, in some important 
cases, of a due responsibility in the Government to the 
People, arising from that frequency of elections, which 
in other cases produces this responsibility. This remark 
will, perhaps, appear not only new, but paradoxical. It 
must nevertheless be acknowledged, when explained, to 
be as undeniable as it is important. 

Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, must be lim- 
ited to objects within the power of the responsible party; 
and in order to be effectual, must relate to operations of 
that power, of which a ready and proper judgment can 
be formed by the constituents. The objects of Govern- 
ment may be divided into two general classes : the one 
depending on measures which have singly an immediate 
and sensible operation ; the other depending on a suc- 
cession of well-chosen and well-connected measures, 
;vhich have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation. 
The importance of the latter description to the collec- 
tive and permanent welfare of every country, needs no 



438 The Federalist. 

explanation. And yet it is evident, that an assembly 
elected for so short a term as to be unable to provide 
more than one or two links in a chain of measures, on 
which the general welfare may essentially depend, ought 
not to be answerable for the final result, any more than 
a steward or tenant, engaged for one year, could be 
justly made to answer for places or improvements which 
could not be accomplished in less than half a dozen 
years. Nor is it possible for the People to estimate the 
share of influence which their annual assemblies may 
respectively have on events resulting from the mixed 
transactions of several years. It is sufficiently difficult, 
to preserve a personal responsibility in the members of 
a numerous body, for such acts of the body as have an 
immediate, detached, and palpable operation on its con- 
stituents. 

The proper remedy for this defect must be an addi- 
tional body in the Legislative department, which having 
sufficient permanency to provide for such objects as re- 
quire a continued attention, and a train of measures, 
may be justly and effectually answerable for the attain- 
ment of those objects. 

Thus far I have considered the circumstances which 
point out the necessity of a well-constructed Senate, 
only as they relate to the Representatives of the People. 
To a People as little blinded by prejudice, or corrupted 
by flattery, as those whom I address, I shall not scruple 
to add, that such an institution may be sometimes ne- 
cessary, as a defence to the People against their own 
temporary errors and delusions. As the cool and delib- 
erate sense of the community ought, in all Governments, 
and actually will, in all free Governments, ultimately 
prevail over the views of its rulers : so there are particu- 
lar moments in public affairs, when the People, stim- 
ulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit ad- 
vantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of 



The Federalist 439 

interested men, may call for measures which they them 
selves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and 
condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will 
be the interference of some temperate and respectable 
body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, 
and to suspend the blow meditated by the People against 
themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain 
their authority over the public mind ? What bitter an- 
guish would not the People of Athens have often es- 
caped, if their Government had contained so provident 
a safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions ? 
Popular liberty might then have escaped the indelible 
reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock 
on one day, and statues on the next. 

It may be suggested, that a People spread over an 
extensive region cannot, like the crowded inhabitants of 
a small district, be subject to the infection of violent 
passions, or to the danger of combining in pursuit of 
unjust measures. I am far from denying that this is a 
distinction of peculiar importance. I have, on the con- 
trary, endeavored in a former paper to show, that it is 
one of the principal recommendations of a confederated 
republic. At the same time, this advantage ought not 
to be considered as superseding the use of auxiliary pre 
cautions. It may even be remarked, that the same ex 
tended situation, which will exempt the People of 
America from some of the dangers incident to lessei 
republics, will expose them to the inconveniency of 
remaining for a longer time under the influence of 
those misrepresentations which the combined industry 
of interested men may succeed in distributing among 
them. 

It adds no small weight to all these considerations, to 
ecollect that history informs us of no long-lived re- 
public, which had not a Senate. Sparta, Rome, and 
Carthage are, in fact, the only States to whom that 



440 The Federalist 

character can be applied. In each of the two first, there 
was a Senate for life. The constitution of the Senate 
in the last is less known. Circumstantial evidence 
makes it probable, that it was not different in this par- 
ticular from the two others. It is at least certain, that 
it had some quality or other which rendered it an anchor 
against popular fluctuations ; and that a smaller Council, 
drawn out of the Senate, was appointed not only for life, 
but filled up vacancies itself. These examples, though 
as unfit for the imitation, as they are repugnant to the 
genius, of America, are, notwithstanding, when compared 
with the fugitive and turbulent existence of other an- 
cient republics, very instructive proofs of the necessity 
of some institution that will blend stability with liberty. 
I am not unaware of the circumstances which distinguish 
the American from other popular Governments, as well 
ancient as modern ; and which render extreme circum- 
spection necessary, in reasoning from the one case to the 
other. But after allowing due weight to this consider- 
ation, it may still be maintained, that there are many 
points of similitude which render these examples not 
unworthy of our attention. Many of the defects, as we 
have seen, which can only be supplied by a Senatorial in- 
stitution, are common to a numerous assembly frequently 
elected by the People, and to the People themselves. 
There are others peculiar to the former, which require 
the control of such an institution. The People can 
never wilfully betray their own interests ; but they may 
possibly be betrayed by the Representatives of the Peo- 
ple ; and the danger will be evidently greater, where the 
whole Legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one 
body of men, than where the concurrence of separate 
and dissimilar bodies is required in every public Act. 

The difference most relied on, between the American 
and other republics, consists in the principle of represen- 
tation ; which is the pivot on which the former move, 



The Federalist. 441 

and which is supposed to have been unknown to the lat- 
ter, or at least to the ancient part of them. The use 
which has been made of this difference, in reasonings 
contained in former papers, will have shown, that I am 
disposed neither to deny its existence, nor to undervalue 
its importance. I feel the less restraint, therefore, in ob- 
serving, that the position concerning the ignorance of 
the ancient Governments on the subject of representa- 
tion, is by no means precisely true in the latitude com 
monly given to it. Without entering into a disquisition 
which here would be misplaced, I will refer to a few 
known facts, in support of what I advance. 

In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the 
Executive functions were performed, not by the People 
themselves, but by officers elected by the People, and 
representing the People in their Executive capacity. 

Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed by 
nine Archons, annually elected by the People at large. 
The degree of power delegated to them, seems to be left 
in great obscurity. Subsequent to that period, we find 
an Assembly, first of four, and afterwards of six hun- 
dred members, annually elected by the People ; and par- 
tially representing them in their Legislative capacity, 
since they were not only associated with the People in 
the function of making laws, but had the exclusive 
right of originating Legislative propositions to the Peo- 
ple. The Senate of Carthage, also, whatever might be 
its power, or the duration of its appointment, appears to 
to have been elective by the suffrages of the People. 
Similar instances might be traced in most, if not all 
the popular Governments of antiquity. 

Lastly, in Sparta, we meet w T ith the Ephori, and in 
Rome with the Tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in 
number, but annually e-ected by the whole body of the 
People, and considered as the Representatives of the 
People, almost in their plenipotentiary capacity. The 



442 The Federalist. 

Cosmi of Crete were also annually elected by iht People, 
and have been considered by some authors as an insti- 
tution analogous to those of Sparta and Rome, with 
this difference only, that in the election of that represent- 
ative body the right of suffrage was communicated to 
a part only of the People. 

From these facts, to which many others might be added, 
it is clear that the principle of representation was neither 
unknown to the ancients, nor wholly overlooked in their 
political Constitutions. The true distinction between 
these and the American Governments, lies in the total 
exclusion of Hie People, in their collective capacity, from 
any share in the latter, and not in the total exclusion of 
the Representatives of the People from the administration 
of the former. The distinction, however, thus qualified, 
must be admitted to leave a most advantageous superior- 
ity in favor of the United States. But to insure to this ad- 
vantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate 
it from the other advantage, of an extensive territory. 
For it cannot be believed, that any form of representative 
Government could have succeeded within the narrow 
limits occupied by the democracies of Greece. 

In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reason, 
illustrated by examples, and enforced by our own experi- 
ence, the jealous adversary of the Constitution will prob- 
ably content himself with repeating, that a Senate ap- 
pointed not immediately by the People, and for the term 
of six years, must gradually acquire a dangerous preemi- 
nence in the Government, and finally transform it into a 
tyrannical aristocracy. 

To this general answer, the general reply ought to be 
sufficient, that liberty may be endangered by the abuses 
of liberty, as well as by the abuses of power; that there 
are numerous instances of the former as well as of the 
*atter ; and that the former, rather than the latter, is ap- 
parently most to be apprehended by the United States 
But a more particular reply may jpe given. 



The Federalist. 443 

Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, 
it is to be observed, must in the first place corrupt itself; 
must next corrupt the State Legislatures ; must then cor- 
rupt the House of Representatives ; and must finally 
corrupt the People at large. It is evident that the Sen- 
ate must be first corrupted, before it can attempt an es- 
tablishment of tyranny. Without corrupting the State 
Legislatures, it cannot prosecute the attempt, because the 
periodical change of members would otherwise regener- 
ate the whole body. Without exerting the means of 
corruption with equal success on the House of Repre- 
sentatives, the opposition of that coequal branch of the 
Government would inevitably defeat the attempt ; and 
without corrupting the People themselves, a succes- 
sion of new Representatives would speedily restore all 
things to their pristine order. Is there any man who can 
seriously persuade himself, that the proposed Senate can, 
by any possible means within the compass of human 
address, arrive at the object of a lawless ambition, 
through all these obstructions? 

If reason condemns the suspicion, the same sentence 
is pronounced by experience. The Constitution of 
Maryland furnishes the most apposite example. The 
Senate of that State is elected, as the Fcederal Senate 
will be, indirectly by the People, and for a term less by 
one year only than the Fcederal Senate. It is distin- 
guished, also, by the remarkable prerogative of filling up 
its own vacancies within the term of its appointment, 
and at the same time, is not under the control of any 
such rotation as is provided for the Fcederal Senate. 
There are some other lesser distinctions, which would 
expose the former to colorable objections, that do not 
lie against the latter. If the Foederal Senate, therefore, 
really contained the danger which has been so loudly 
proclaimed, some symptoms at least of a like danger 
ought by this time to have been betrayed by the Senate 



444 The Fcederahst. 

of Maryland; but no such symptoms have appeared. 
On the contrary, the jealousies at first entertained by 
men of the same description with those who view with 
terror the correspondent part of the Foederal Constitu- 
tion, have been gradually extinguished by the progress 
of the experiment; and the Maryland Constitution is 
daily deriving, from the salutary operation of this part 
of it, a reputation in which it will probably not be ri- 
valled by that of any State in the Union. 

But if anything could silence the jealousies on this 
subject, it ought to be the British example. The Senate 
there, instead of being elected for a term of six years, 
and of being unconfined to particular families or for- 
tunes, is an hereditary Assembly of opulent nobles. 
The House of Representatives, instead of being elected 
for two years, and by the whole body of the People, is 
elected for seven years, and, in very great proportion, 
by a very small proportion of the People. Here, un- 
questionably, ought to be seen in full display the aristo- 
cratic usurpations and tyranny which are at some future 
period to be exemplified in the United States. Unfortu- 
nately, however, for the Anti-Fcederal argument, the 
British history informs us that this hereditary Assembly 
has not even been able to defend itself against the con- 
tinual encroachments of the House of Representatives; 
and that it no sooner lost the support of the monarch, 
than it was actually crushed by the weight of the popular 
branch. 

As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject, its 
examples support the reasoning which we have employed. 
In Sparta, the Ephori, the annual Representatives of the 
People, were found an overmatch for the Senate for life , 
continually gained on its authority; and finally drew 
all power into their own hands. The Tribunes of Rome, 
who were the Representatives of the People, prevailed, 
it is well known, in almost every contest with the Senate 



The Federalist. 445 

for life, and in the end gained the most complete tri- 
umph over it. The fact is the more remarkable, as 
unanimity was required in every act of the Tribunes, 
even after their number was augmented to ten. It proves 
the irresistible force possessed by that branch of a free 
Government, which has the People on its side. To 
these examples might be added that of Carthage, whose 
Senate, according to the testimony of Polybius, instead 
of drawing all power into its vortex, had, at the com- 
mencement of the second Punic War, lost almost the 
whole of its original portion. 

Besides the conclusive evidence resulting" from this 
assemblage of facts, that the Fcederal Senate will never 
be able to transform itself, by gradual usurpations, into 
an independant and aristocratic body, we are warranted 
in believing, that if such a revolution should ever happen 
from causes which the foresight of man cannot guard 
against, the House of Representatives, with the People 
on their side, will at all times be able to bring back the 
Constitution to its primitive form and principles. Against 
the force of the immediate Representatives of the People, 
nothing will be able to maintain even the Constitutional 
authority of the Senate, but such a display of enlight- 
ened policy, and attachment to the public good, as will 
divide with that branch of the Legislature the affections 
and support of the entire body of the People themselves 

PUBL1U& 



146 The Federalist. 

[From the New York Packet, Friday, March 7, 1788] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LXIII. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

IT is a just and not a new observation, that enemies 
to particular persons, and opponents to particular 
measures, seldom confine their censures to such things 
only in either as are worthy of blame. Unless on this 
principle, it is difficult to explain the motives of their 
conduct, who condemn the proposed Constitution m the 
aggregate, and treat with severity some of the most 
unexceptionable Articles in it. 

The second Section gives power to the President, u by 
" and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make 
" treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators pres- 

" ENT CONCUR." 

The power of making treaties is an important one, 
especially as it relates to war, peace, and commerce ; and 
it should not be delegated but in such a mode, and with 
such precautions, as will afford the highest security, that 
it will be exercised by men the best qualified for the 
purpose, and in the manner most conducive to the pub- 
lic good. The Convention appears to have been atten- 
tive to both these points ; they have directed the Presi- 
dent to be chosen by select bodies of Electors, to be 
Jeputed by the People for that express purpose; and 
they have committed the appointment of Senators to 
the State Legislatures. This mode has, in such cases, 
vastly the advantage of elections by the People in their 
collective capacity, where the activity of party zeal, tak- 
ing advantage of the supineness, the ignorance, and the 
hopes and fears of the unwary and interested, often 



The Federalist. 447 

places men in office by the votes of a small proportion 
of the Electors. 

As the select Assemblies for choosing the President, 
as well as the State Legislatures who appoint the Sen- 
ators, will in general be composed of the most enlight- 
ened and respectable citizens, there is reason to presume, 
that their attention and their votes will be directed to 
those men only who have become the most distin- 
guished by their abilities and virtue, and in whom the 
People perceive just grounds for confidence. The Con- 
stitution manifests very particular attention to this ob- 
ject. By excluding men under thirty-five from the first 
office, and those under thirty from the second, it confines 
the Electors to men of whom the People have had time 
to form a judgment, and with respect to whom they will 
not be liable to be deceived by those brilliant appear- 
ances of genius and patriotism, which, like transient 
meteors, sometimes mislead as well as dazzle. If the 
observation be well founded, that wise Kings will always 
be served by able ministers, it is fair to argue, that as an 
Assembly of select Electors possess, in a greater degree 
than Kings, the means of extensive and accurate infor- 
mation relative to men and characters, so will their ap- 
pointments bear at least equal marks of discretion and 
discernment. The inference which naturally results from 
these considerations is this, that the President and Sen- 
ators so chosen will always be of the number of those 
who best understand our National interests, whether 
considered in relation to the several States or to foreign 
Nations, who are best able to promote those interests, 
and whose reputation for integrity inspires and merits 
confidence. With such men the power of making trea- 
ties may be safely lodged. 

Although the absolute necessity of system, in the con- 
duct of any business, is universally known and acknowl- 
edged, yet the high importance of it in National affairs, 



448 The Federalist. 

has not yet become sufficiently impressed on the public 
mind. They who wish to commit the power under con- 
sideration to a popular assembly, composed of members 
constantly coming and going in quick succession, seem 
not to recollect, that such a body must necessarily be 
inadequate to the attainment of those great objects, 
which require to be steadily contemplated in all their 
relations and circumstances, and which can only be 
approached and achieved by measures, which not only 
talents, but also exact information, and often much time, 
are necessary to concert and to execute. It was wise, 
therefore, in the Convention to provide, not only that 
the power of making treaties should be committed to 
able and honest men, but also that they should continue 
in place a sufficient time to become perfectly acquainted 
with our National concerns, and to form and introduce 
a system for the management of them. The duration 
prescribed is such as will give them an opportunity of 
greatly extending their political information, and of ren- 
dering their accumulating experience more and more 
beneficial to their country. Nor has the Convention dis- 
covered less prudence, in providing for the frequent elec- 
tions of Senators in such a way as to obviate the incon- 
venience of periodically transferring those great affairs 
entirely to new men ; for by leaving a considerable res- 
idue of the old ones in place, uniformity and order, as 
well as a constant succession of official information, will 
be preserved. 

There are few who will not admit, that the affairs of 
trade and navigation should be regulated by a system 
cautiously formed and steadily pursued ; and that both 
our treaties and our laws should correspond with and be 
made to promote it. It is of much consequence that 
this correspondence and conformity be carefully main- 
tained ; and they who assent to the truth of this position 
Will see and confess, that it is well provided for by mak- 



Tlie Federalist. 449 

ing concurrence of the Senate necessary, both to treaties 
and to laws. 

It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of 
whatever nature, but that perfect secrecy and immediate 
despatch are sometimes requisite. There are cases where 
the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the per- 
sons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of 
discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on those 
persons, whether they are actuated by mercenary or 
friendly motives ; and there doubtless are many of both 
descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the Presi- 
dent, but who would not confide in that of the Senate, 
and still less in that of a large popular Assembly. The 
Convention have done well, therefore, in so disposing of 
the power of making treaties, that although the Presi- 
dent must, in forming them, act by the advice and con- 
sent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the 
business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence 
may suggest. 

They who have turned their attention to the affairs of 
men, must have perceived that there are tides in them ; 
tides very irregular in their duration, strength, and direc- 
tion, and seldom found to run twice exactly in the same 
manner or measure. To discern and to profit by these 
tides in National affairs, is the business of those who 
preside over them ; and they who have had much expe- 
rience on this head inform us, that there frequently are 
occasions when days, nay, even when hours are precious. 
The loss of a battle, the death of a Prince, the removal 
of a minister, or other circumstances intervening to 
change the present posture and aspect of affairs, may- 
turn the most favorable tide into a course opposite to 
our wishes. As in the field, so in the cabinet, there are 
moments to be seized as they pass, and they who pre- 
side in either, should be left in capacity to improve 
them. So often and so essentially have we heretofore 

TOL. I. 29 



450 The Federalist. 

Buffered from the want of secrecy and despatch, that the 
Constitution would have been inexcusably defective, if 
no attention had been paid to those objects. Those 
matters which in negotiations usually require the most 
secrecy and the most despatch, are those preparatory and 
auxiliary measures which are no otherwise important in 
a National view, than as they tend to facilitate the at- 
tainment of the objects of the negociation. For these, 
the President will find no difficulty to provide ; and 
should any circumstance occur, which requires the ad- 
vice and consent of the Senate, he may at any time 
convene them. Thus we see, that the Constitution pro- 
vides that our negotiations for treaties shall have every 
advantage which can be derived from talents, informa- 
tion, integrity, and deliberate investigations, on the one 
hand, and from secrecy and despatch, on the other. 

But to this plan, as to most others that have ever 
appeared, objections are contrived and urged. 

Some are displeased with it, not on account of any 
errors or defects in it, but because, as the treaties, when 
made, are to have the force of laws, they should be made 
only by men invested with Legislative authority. These 
gentlemen seem not to consider that the judgments of 
our courts, and the commissions constitutionally given 
by our Governor, are as valid and as binding on all per- 
sons whom they concern, as the laws passed by our 
Legislature. All Constitutional acts of power, whether 
in the Executive or in the Judicial department, have as 
much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded 
from the Legislature ; and therefore, whatever name be 
given to the power of making treaties, or however obli- 
gatory they may be when made, certain it is, that the 
People may, with much propriety, commit the power to 
a distinct body from the Legislature, the Executive, or 
the Judicial. It surely does not follow, that because 
they have given the power of making laws to the Legis- 



The Federalist. 451 

ature, that therefore they should likewise give them 
)ower to do every other act of sovereignty by which the 
citizens are to be bound and affected. 

Others, though content that treaties should be made 
in the mode proposed, are averse to their being the 
supreme laws of the land. They insist, and profess to 
believe, that treaties, like Acts of Assembly, should be 
repealable at pleasure. This idea seems to be new and 
peculiar to this country ; but new errors, as well as new 
truths, often appear. These gentlemen would do well to 
reflect, that a treaty is only another name for a bargain; 
and that it would be impossible to find a Nation who 
would make any bargain with us, which should be bind- 
ing on them absolutely, but on us only so long and so 
far as we may think proper to be bound by it. They 
who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal 
them ; and it will not be disputed that they who make 
treaties may alter or cancel them : but still let us not 
forget that treaties are made, not by only one of the con- 
tracting parties, but by both ; and consequently, that as 
the consent of both was essential to their formation at 
first, so must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel 
them. The proposed Constitution, therefore, has not in 
the least extended the obligation of treaties. They are 
just as binding, and just as far beyond the lawful reach 
of Legislative Acts now, as they will be at any future 
oeriod, or under any form of Government. 

However useful jealousy may be in republics, yet 
when like bile in the natural, it abounds too much in 
the body politic, the eyes of both become very liable to 
be deceived by the delusive appearances which that mal- 
ady casts on surrounding objects. From this cause, 
probably, proceed the fears and apprehensions of some, 
that the President and Senate may make treaties with- 
out an equal eye to the interests of all the States. Oth- 
ars suspect, that two thirds will oppress the remaining 



452 The Federalist. 

third, and ask, whether those gentlemen are made suffi- 
ciently responsible for their conduct; whether, if they 
act corruptly, they can be punished ; and if they make 
disadvantageous treaties, how are we to get rid of those 
treaties ? 

As all the States are equally represented in the Sen- 
ate, and by men the most able and the most willing to 
promote the interests of their constituents, they will all 
have an equal degree of influence in that body, especially 
while they continue to be careful in appointing proper 
persons, and to insist on their punctual attendance. In 
proportion as the United States assume a National form, 
and a National character, so will the good of the whole 
be more and more an object of attention ; and the Gov- 
ernment must be a weak one indeed, if it should forget, 
that the good of the whole can only be promoted by ad- 
vancing the good of each of the parts or members which 
compose the whole. It will not be in the power of the 
President and Senate to make any treaties, by which 
they, and their families and estates, will not be equally 
bound and affected with the rest of the community; and 
having no private interests distinct from that of the 
Nation, they will be under no temptations to neglect the 
latter. 

As to corruption, the case is not supposable. He must 
either have been very unfortunate in his intercourse with 
the world, or possess a heart very susceptible of such im- 
pressions, who can think it probable, that the President 
and two thirds of the Senate will ever be capable of such 
unworthy conduct. The idea is too gross, and too invid- 
ious, to be entertained. But in such a case, if it should 
ever happen, the treaty so obtained from us would, like 
all other fraudulent contracts, be null and void by the 
law of Nations. 

With respect to their responsibility, it is difficult to 
oonceive how it could be increased. Every considera- 



Tlie Federalist. 453 

fcion that can influence the human mind, such as honor, 
oaths, reputations, conscience, the love of country, and 
family affections and attachments, afford security for their 
fidelity. In short, as the Constitution has taken the ut- 
most care that they shall be men of talents and integ- 
rity, we have reason to be persuaded, that the treaties 
they make will be as advantageous, as, all circumstances 
considered, could be made ; and so far as the fear of pun- 
ishment and disgrace can operate, that motive to good 
behavior is amply afforded by the Article on the subject 

of impeachments. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Friday, March 7, 1 788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LXIV. 



To the People of the State of New Yokk : 

THE remaining powers which the plan of the Con- 
vention allots to the Senate, in a distinct capacity, 
are comprised in their participation with the Executive 
in the appointment to offices, and in their Judicial char- 
acter as a Court for the trial of impeachments. As in 
the business of appointments, the Executive will be the 
principal agent, the provisions relating to it will most 
properly be discussed in the examination of that depart- 
nent. We will therefore conclude this head, with a view 
w)f the Judicial character of the Senate. 

A well-constituted Court for the trial of impeach- 
ments is an object not more to be desired, than difficult 
jo be obtained in a Government wholly elective. The 
subjects of its jurisdiction are those offences which pro- 
ceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other 



454 The Federalist. 

words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust 
They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety 
be denominated political, as they relate chiefly to inju- 
ries done immediately to the society itself. The prose- 
cution of them, for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate 
the passions of the whole community, and to divide it 
into parties more or less friendly, or inimical, to the ac- 
cused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the 
preexisting factions, and will enlist all their animosities, 
partialities, influence, and interest on one side, or on the 
other; and in such cases, there will always be the great- 
est danger, that the decision will be regulated more by 
the comparative strength of parties, than by the real 
demonstrations of innocence or guilt. 

The delicacy and magnitude of a trust, which so deeply 
concerns the political reputation and existence of every 
man engaged in the administration of public affairs, speak 
for themselves. The difficulty of placing it rightly, in a 
Government resting entirely on the basis of periodical 
elections, will as readily be perceived, when it is consid- 
ered that the most conspicuous characters in it wall, from 
that circumstance, be too often the leaders, or the tools 
of the most cunning or the most numerous faction, and 
on this account, can hardly be expected to possess the 
requisite neutrality towards those whose conduct may 
be the subject of scrutiny. 

The Convention, it appears, thought the Senate the 
most fit depositary of this important trust. Those who 
can best discern the intrinsic difficulty of the thing, will 
be least hasty in condemning that opinion ; and will be 
most inclined to allow due weight to the arguments 
which may be supposed to have produced it. 

What, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the insti- 
tution itself? Is it not designed as a method of Na- 
tional inquest into the conduct of public men? If 
this be the design of it, who can so properly be the in 



The Federalist. 45* 

quisitors for the Nation as the Representatives of the 
Nation themselves ? It is not disputed that the power 
of originating the inquiry, or in other words, of prefer- 
ring the impeachment, ought to be lodged in the hands 
of one branch of the Legislative body : will not the rea- 
sons which indicate the propriety of this arrangement, 
strongly plead for an admission of the other branch of 
that body to a share of the inquiry ? The model, from 
which the idea of this institution has been borrowed, 
pointed out that course to the Convention. In Great 
Britain, it is the province of the House of Commons to 
prefer the impeachment ; and of the House of Lords to 
decide upon it. Several of the State Constitutions have 
followed the example. As well the latter, as the former, 
seem to have regarded the practice of impeachments, as 
a bridle in the hands of the Legislative body upon the 
Executive servants of the Government. Is not this the 
true light in which it ought to be regarded ? 

Where else than in the Senate could have been found 
a tribunal sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently indepen- 
dent ? "What other body would be likely to feel confi- 
dence enough in its own situation, to preserve, unawed 
and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an 
individual accused, and the Representatives of the Peo- 
ple, his accusers ? 

Could the Supreme Court have been relied upon as 
answering this description ? It is much to be doubted, 
whether the members of that tribunal would at all times 
be endowed with so eminent a portion of fortitude, as 
would be called for in the execution of so difficult a task ; 
and it is still more to be doubted, whether they would 
possess the degree of credit and authority, which might, 
on certain occasions, be indispensable towards reconcil- 
ing the People to a decision that should happen to clash 
with an accusation brought by their immediate Repre- 
sentatives. A deficiency in the first, would be fatal to 



4 1)6 The F&deralist 

the accused ; in the last, dangerous to the public tran- 
quillity. The hazard in both these respects, could only 
be avoided, if at all, by rendering that tribunal more nu- 
merous than would consist with a reasonable attention 
to economy. The necessity of a numerous Court for the 
trial of impeachments, is equally dictated by the nature 
of the proceeding. This can never be tied down by such 
strict rules, either in the delineation of the offence by the 
prosecutors, or in the construction of it by the Judges, as 
in common cases serve to limit the discretion of Courts 
in favor of personal security. There will be no jury to 
stand between the Judges, who are to pronounce the sen- 
tence of the law, and the party who is to receive or suffer 
it. The awful discretion which a Court of Impeachments 
must necessarily have, to doom to honor or to infamy the 
most confidential and the most distinguished characters 
of the community, forbids the commitment of the trust 
to a small number of persons. 

These considerations seem alone sufficient to author- 
ize a conclusion, that the Supreme Court would have 
been an improper substitute for the Senate, as a Court 
of Impeachments. There remains a further considera- 
tion, which will not a little strengthen this conclusion. 
It is this: — The punishment which may be the conse- 
quence of conviction upon impeachment, is not to ter- 
minate the chastisement of the offender. After having 
been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem 
and confidence, and honors and emoluments of his coun- 
try, he will still be liable to prosecution and punishment 
in the ordinary course of law. Would it be proper that 
the persons who had disposed of his fame, and his most 
valuable rights as a citizen, in one trial, should, in an- 
other trial, for the same offence, be also the disposers of 
his life and his fortune ? Would there not be the great* 
est reason to apprehend, that error, in the first sentence, 
would be the parent of error in the second sentence; 



The Feeder alls t. 45? 

That the strong bias of one decision would be apt to 
overrule the influence of any new lights which might 
be brought to vary the complexion of another decision ? 
Those who know anything of human nature, will not 
hesitate to answer these questions in the affirmative ; 
and will be at no loss to perceive, that by making the 
same persons Judges in both cases, those who might 
happen to be the objects of prosecution would, in a 
great measure, be deprived of the double security in- 
tended them by a double trial. The loss of life and 
estate would often be virtually included in a sentence 
which, in its terms, imported nothing more than dismis- 
sion from a present, and disqualification for a future 
office. It may be said, that the intervention of a Jury, 
in the second instance, would obviate the danger. But 
Juries are frequently influenced by the opinions of 
Judges. They are sometimes induced to find special 
verdicts, which refer the main question to the decision 
of the Court. Who would be willing to stake his life 
and his estate upon the verdict of a Jury acting under 
the auspices of Judges who had predetermined his guilt? 
Would it have been an improvement of the plan, to 
have united the Supreme Court with the Senate, in the 
formation of the Court of Impeachments ? This union 
vould certainly have been attended with several advan- 
tages ; but would they not have been overbalanced by 
the signal disadvantage, already stated, arising from the 
agency of the same Judges in the double prosecution to 
which the offender would be liable ? To a certain ex- 
tent, the benefits of that union will be obtained from 
making the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court the 
President of the Court of Impeachments, as is proposed 
to be done in the plan of the Convention ; while the 
inconveniences of an entire incorporation of the former 
into the latter will be substantially avoided. This was 
oerhaps the prudent mean I forbear to remark upon 



458 The Federalist. 

the additional pretext for clamor against the Judiciary 
which so considerable an augmentation of its authority 
would have afforded. 

"Would it have been desirable to have composed the 
Court for the trial of impeachments, of persons wholly 
distinct from the other departments of the Government ? 
There are weighty arguments, as well against, as in fa- 
vor of such a plan. To some minds it will not appear a 
trivial objection, that it could tend to increase the com- 
plexity of the political machine, and to add a new spring 
to the Government, the utility of which would at best be 
questionable. But an objection which will not be 
thought by any unworthy of attention, is this : a Court 
formed upon such a plan, would either be attended with 
a heavy expense, or might in practice be subject to a va- 
riety of casualties and inconveniences. It must either 
consist of permanent officers, stationary at the seat of 
Government, and of course entitled to fixed and regular 
stipends, or of certain officers of the State Governments, 
to be called upon whenever an impeachment was actu- 
ally depending. It will not be easy to imagine any third 
mode materially different, which could rationally be pro- 
posed. As the Court, for reasons already given, ought 
to be numerous, the first scheme will be reprobated by 
every man, who can compare the extent of the public 
wants with the means of supplying them ; the second 
will be espoused with caution by those who will seri- 
ously consider the difficulty of collecting men dispersed 
over the whole Union ; the injury to the innocent, from 
the procrastinated determination of the charges which 
might be brought against them ; the advantage to the 
guilty, from the opportunities which delay would afford 
to intrigue and corruption ; and in some cases the detri- 
ment to the State, from the prolonged inaction of men 
whose firm and faithful execution of their duty might 
have exposed them to the persecution of an intemperate 



The Federalist. 459 

or designing majority in the House of Representatives 
Though this latter supposition may seem harsh, and 
might not be likely often to be verified, yet it ought not 
to be forgotten that the demon of faction will, at cer- 
tain seasons, extend his sceptre over all numerous bod- 
ies of men. 

But though one or the other of the substitutes which 
have been examined, or some other that might be de- 
vised, should be thought preferable to the plan, in this 
respect, reported by the Convention, it will not follow 
that the Constitution ought for this reason to be rejected. 
If mankind were to resolve to agree in no institution of 
Government, until every part of it had been adjusted to 
the most exact standard of perfection, society would soon 
become a general scene of anarchy, and the world a des- 
ert. Where is the standard of perfection to be found ? 
Who will undertake to unite the discordant opinions of 
a whole community, in the same judgment of it; and to 
prevail upon one conceited projector to renounce his in- 
fallible criterion for the fallible criterion of his more con~ 
ceiled neighbor ? To answer the purpose of the adver- 
saries of the Constitution, they ought to prove, not 
merely that particular provisions in it are not the best 
which might have been imagined, but that the plan 
upon the whole is bad and pernicious. 

PUBUUS. 



460 m The Federalist. 

[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, March 11, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LXV. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

A RE VIEW of the principal objections that have 
appeared against the proposed Court for the trial 
of impeachments, will not improbably eradicate the re- 
mains of any unfavorable impressions which may still 
exist in regard to this matter. 

The first of these objections is, that the provision in 
question confounds Legislative and Judiciary authori- 
ties in the same body, in violation of that important and 
well-established maxim which requires a separation be- 
tween the different departments of power. The true 
meaning of this maxim has been discussed and ascer- 
tained in another place, and has been shown to be en- 
tirely compatible with a partial intermixture of those de- 
partments for special purposes, preserving them, in the 
main, distinct and unconnected. This partial inter- 
mixture is even, in some cases, not only proper, but ne- 
cessary to the mutual defence of the several members 
of the Government against each other. An absolute or 
qualified negative in the Executive upon the acts of the 
Legislative foody, is admitted by the ablest adepts in 
political science, to be an indispensable barrier against 
the encroachments of the latter upon the former. And 
it may, perhaps, with no less reason be contended, that 
the powers relating to impeachments are, as before in- 
timated, an essential check in the hands of that body 
upon the encroachments of the Executive. The division 
of them between the two branches of the Legislature, 
assigning to one the right of accusing, to the other the 



The Federalist. 461 

right of judging, avoids the inconvenience of making 
the same persons both accusers and Judges ; and guards 
against the danger of persecution, from the prevalency 
of a factious spirit in either of those branches. As the 
concurrence of two thirds of the Senate will be requi- 
site to a condemnation, the security to innocence, from 
this additional circumstance, will be as complete as 
itself can desire. 

It is curious to observe, with what vehemence this 
part of the plan is assailed, on the principle here taken 
notice of, by men who profess to admire, without excep- 
tion, the Constitution of this State ; while that Consti- 
tution makes the Senate, together with the Chancellor 
and Judges of the Supreme Court, not only a Court of 
Impeachments, but the highest Judicatory in the State, 
in all causes, civil and criminal. The proportion, in 
point of numbers, of the Chancellor and Judges to the 
Senators, is so inconsiderable, that the Judiciary au- 
thority of New York, in the last resort, may, with truth, 
be said to reside in its Senate. If the plan of the Con- 
vention be, in this respect, chargeable with a departure 
from the celebrated maxim which has been so often 
mentioned, and seems to be so little understood, how 
much more culpable must be the Constitution of New 
York?* 

A second objection to the Senate, as a Court of Im- 
peachments, is, that it contributes to an undue accumu- 
lation of power in that body, tending to give to the 
Government a countenance too aristocratic. The Sen- 
ate, it is observed, is to have concurrent authority with 
.he Executive in the formation of treaties and in the 
appointment to offices : if, say the objectors, to these 
Drerogatives is added that of deciding in all cases of 

* In that of Xew Jersey, also, sylvania, and South Carolina, one 

the final judiciary authority is in a branch of the Legislature is the 

oranch of the Legislature. In New Court for the trial of impeach' 

Hampshire, Massachusetts, Penn- ments. — Publius. 



462 The Federalist. 

impeachment, it will give a decided predominancy to 
senatorial influence. To an objection so little precise in 
itself, it is not easy to find a very precise answer. 
Where is the measure or criterion to which we can ap- 
peal, for determining what will give the Senate too 
much, too little, or barely the proper degree of influ- 
ence? Will it not be more safe, as well as more sim- 
ple, to dismiss such vague and uncertain calculations, to 
examine each power by itself, and to decide, on general 
principles, where it may be deposited with most advan- 
tage and least inconvenience ? 

If we take this course, it will lead to a more intelli- 
gible, if not to a more certain result. The disposition 
of the power of making treaties, which has obtained in 
the plan of the Convention, will, then, if I mistake not, 
appear to be fully justified by the considerations stated 
in a former number, and by others which will occur un- 
der the next head of our inquiries. The expediency of 
the junction of the Senate with the Executive, in the 
power of appointing to offices, will, I trust, be placed in 
a light not less satisfactory, in the disquisitions under 
the same head. And I flatter myself the observations 
in my last paper must have gone no inconsiderable way 
towards proving, that it was not easy, if practicable, to 
find a more fit receptacle for the power of determining 
impeachments, than that which has been chosen. If 
this be truly the case, the hypothetical dread of the too 
great weight of the Senate ought to be discarded from 
our reasonings. 

But this hypothesis, such as it is, has already been 
refuted in the remarks applied to the duration in office 
prescribed for the Senators. It was by them shown, as 
well on the credit of historical examples, as from the 
reason of the thing, that the most popular branch of every 
Government, partaking of the republican genius, by 
being generally the favorite of the People, will be as 



The Federalist. 463 

generally a full match, if not an overmatch, for every 
other member of the Government. 

But independent of this most active and operative 
principle, to secure the equilibrium of the National 
House of Representatives, the plan of the Convention 
has provided in its favor several important counterpoises 
to the additional authorities to be conferred upon the 
Senate. The exclusive privilege of originating money 
bills will belong to the House of Representatives. The 
same House will possess the sole right of instituting im- 
peachments : is not this a complete counterbalance to 
that of determining them ? The same House will be the 
umpire in all elections of the President, which do not 
unite the suffrages of a majority of the whole number 
of Electors ; a case which it cannot be doubted will 
sometimes, if not frequently, happen. The constant 
possibility of the thing must be a fruitful source of in- 
fluence to that body. The more it is contemplated, the 
more important will appear this ultimate, though contin- 
gent power, of deciding the competitions of the most 
illustrious citizens of the Union, for the first office in it. 
It would not perhaps be rash to predict, that as a mean 
of influence it will be found to outweigh all the peculiar 
attributes of the Senate. 

A third objection to the Senate as a Court of Im- 
peachments, is drawn from the agency they are to have in 
the appointments to office. It is imagined that they 
would be too indulgent Judges of the conduct of men, 
in whose official creation they had participated. The 
principle of this objection would condemn a practice, 
which is to be seen in all the State Governments, if not 
in all the Governments with which we are acquainted : 
I mean that of rendering those who hold offices during 
pleasure, dependent on the pleasure of those who ap- 
point them. With equal plausibility might it be alleged 
in this case, that the favoritism of the latter would al- 



i64 The Federalist. 

ways be an asylum for the misbehavior of the former. 
Bat that practice, in contradiction to this principle, pro- 
ceeds upon the presumption, that the responsibility of 
those who appoint, for the fitness and competency of the 
persons on whom they bestow their choice, and the in- 
terest they will have in the respectable and prosperous 
administration of affairs, will inspire a sufficient dispo- 
sition to dismiss from a share in it all such, who, by their 
conduct, shall have proved themselves unworthy of the 
confidence reposed in them. Though facts may not al 
ways correspond with this presumption, yet if it be, in 
the main, just, it must destroy the supposition that the 
Senate, who will merely sanction the choice of the Ex- 
ecutive, should feel a bias, towards the objects of that 
choice, strong enough to blind them to the evidences of 
guilt so extraordinary, as to have induced the Represent- 
atives of the Nation to become its accusers. 

If any further arguments were necessary to evince the 
improbability of such a bias, it might be found in the 
nature of the agency of the Senate in the business of 
appointments. 

It will be the office of the President to nominate, and, 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint. 
There will, of course, be no exertion of choice on the 
part of the Senate. They may defeat one choice of the 
Executive, and oblige him to make another ; but they 
cannot themselves choose — they can only ratify or re- 
ject the choice of the President. They might even en- 
tertain a preference to some other person, at the very mo- 
ment they were assenting to the one proposed ; because 
there might be no positive ground of opposition to him ; 
and they could not be sure, if they withheld their as- 
sent, that the subsequent nomination would fall upon 
their own favorite, or upon any other person in their es- 
timation more meritorious than the one rejected. Thus 
it could hardly happen, that the majority of the Senate 



The Federalist. 465 

would feel any other complacency towards the object of 
an appointment than such as the appearances of merit 
might inspire, and the proofs of the want of it destroy. 

A fourth objection to the Senate, in the capacity of a 
Court of Impeachments, is derived from their union with 
the Executive in the power of making treaties. This, it 
has been said, would constitute the Senators their own 
Judges, in every case of a corrupt or perfidious execution 
of that trust. After having combined with the Execu- 
tive in betraying the interests of the Nation in a ruinous 
treaty, what prospect, it is asked, would there be of their 
being made to suffer the punishment they would deserve 
when they were themselves to decide upon the accusa- 
tion brought against them for the treachery of which they 
had been guilty? 

This objection has been circulated with more earnest- 
ness, and with greater show of reason than any other 
which has appeared against this part of the plan ; and 
yet I am deceived, if it does not rest upon an erroneous 
foundation. 

The security essentially intended by the Constitution 
against corruption and treachery in the formation of 
treaties, is to be sought for in the numbers and charac- 
ters of those who are to make them. The joint agency 
of the Chief Magistrate of the Union, and of two thirds 
of the members of a body selected by the collective wis- 
dom of the Legislatures of the several States, is designed 
o be the pledge for the fidelity of the National Coun- 
cils in this particular. The Convention might with pro- 
priety have meditated the punishment of the Executive, 
for a deviation from the instructions of the Senate, or a 
want of integrity in the conduct of the negotiations com- 
mitted to him; they might also have had in view the 
punishment of a few leading individuals in the Senate, 
who should have prostituted their influence in that body 
Bis the mercenary instruments of foreign corruption : but 



466 The Feeder alist. 

they could not, with more or with equal propriety, have 
contemplated the impeachment and punishment of two 
thirds of the Senate, consenting to an improper treaty, 
than of a majority of that or of the other branch of the 
National Legislature, consenting to a pernicious or un- 
constitutional law : a principle which, I believe, has 
never been admitted into any Government. How, in 
fact, could a majority of the House of Representatives 
impeach themselves ? Not better, it is evident, than 
two thirds of the Senate might try themselves. And 
yet what reason is there, that a majority of the House 
of Representatives, sacrificing the interests of the soci- 
ety by an unjust and tyrannical act of legislation, should 
escape with impunity, more than two thirds of the Sen- 
ate, sacrificing the same interests in an injurious treaty 
with a foreign power ? The truth is, that in all such 
cases it is essential to the freedom, and to the necessary 
independence of the deliberations of the body, that the 
members of it should be exempt from punishment for 
acts done in a collective capacity ; and the security to 
the society must depend on the care which is taken to 
confide the trust to proper hands, to make it their inter- 
est to execute it with fidelity, and to make it as difficult 
as possible for them to combine in any interest opposite 
to that of the public good. 

So far as might concern the misbehavior of the Exec- 
utive in perverting the instructions, or contravening the 
views of the Senate, we need not be apprehensive of the 
want of a disposition in that body to punish the abuse 
of their confidence, or to vindicate their own authority. 
We may thus far count upon their pride, if not upon 
their virtue. And so far even as might concern the cor- 
ruption of leading members, by whose arts and influence 
the majority may have been inveigled into measures 
odious to the community, if the proofs of that corruption 
should be satisfactory, the usual propensity of humar 



The Federalist. 467 

nature will warrant us in concluding that there would 
be commonly no defect of inclination in the body to 
divert the public resentment from themselves by a ready 
sacrifice of the authors of their mismanagement and dis- 
grace. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, March 11, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LXVI. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

THE Constitution of the Executive department of the 
proposed Government, claims next our attention. 

There is hardly any part of the system which could 
have been attended with greater difficulty in the ar- 
rangement of it than this ; and there is, perhaps, none 
which has been inveighed against with less candor or 
criticised with less judgment. 

Here the writers against the Constitution seem to have 
taken pains to signalize their talent of misrepresentation. 
Calculating upon the aversion of the People to monarchy, 
they have endeavored to enlist all their jealousies and 
apprehensions in opposition to the intended President 
of the United States ; not merely as the embryo, but as 
the full-grown progeny of that detested parent. To es- 
tablish the pretended affinity, they have not scrupled to 
draw resources even from the regions of fiction. The 
authorities of a magistrate, in few instances greater, in 
some instances less, than those of a Governor of New 
York, have been magnified into more than royal prerog- 
atives. He has been decorated with attributes superior 
in dignity and splendor to those of a King of Great Brit- 



468 The Federalist 

ain. He has been shown to us with the diadem spar- 
kling on his brow and the imperial purple flowing in his 
train. He has been seated on a throne surrounded with 
minions and mistresses, giving audience to the Envoys 
of foreign potentates, in all the supercilious pomp of 
majesty. The images of Asiatic despotism and volup- 
tuousness have scarcely been wanting to crown the ex- 
aggerated scene. We have been taught to tremble at 
the terrific visages of murdering janizaries ; and to blush 
at the unveiled mysteries of a future seraglio. 

Attempts so extravagant as these to disfigure, or it 
might rather be said, to metamorphose the object, render 
it necessary to take an accurate view of its real nature 
and form : in order as well to ascertain its true aspect 
and genuine appearance, as to unmask the disingenuity, 
and expose the fallacy of the counterfeit resemblances 
which have been so insidiously, as well as industriously, 
propagated. 

In the execution of this task, there is no man who 
would not find it an arduous effort either to behold with 
moderation, or to treat with seriousness the devices, not 
less weak than wicked, which have been contrived to 
pervert the public opinion in relation to the subject. 
They so far exceed the usual, though unjustifiable li- 
censes of party artifice, that even in a disposition the 
most candid and tolerant, they must force the sentiments 
which favor an indulgent construction of the conduct of 
political adversaries to give place to a voluntary and un- 
reserved indignation. It is impossible not to bestow the 
imputation of deliberate imposture and deception upon 
the gross pretence of a similitude between a King of 
Great Britain and a magistrate of the character marked 
out for that of the President of the United States. It is 
still more impossible to withhold that imputation from 
the rash and barefaced expedients which have been 
employed to give success to the attempted imposition. 



The Federalist. 469 

In one instance, which T cite as a sample of the 
general spirit, the temerity has proceeded so far as tc 
ascribe to the President of the United States a powei 
which by the instrument reported is expressly allotted to 
the Executives of the individual States. I mean the 
power of filling casual vacancies in the Senate. 

This bold experiment upon the discernment of his 
countrymen, has been hazarded by a writer who (what- 
ever may be his real merit) has had no inconsiderable 
share in the applauses of his party ; * and who, upon this 
false and unfounded suggestion, has built a series of 
observations equally false and unfounded. Let him now 
be confronted with the evidence of the fact; and let him, 
if he be able, justify or extenuate the shameful outrage 
he has offered to the dictates of truth, and to the rules 
of fair dealing. 

The second Clause of the second Section of the sec- 
ond Article empowers the President of the United 
States " to nominate, and by and with the advice and 
| consent of the Senate, to appoint Ambassadors, other 
i public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme 
I Court, and all other officers of the United States, 
I whose appointments are not in the Constitution other- 
" wise provided for. and which shall be established by 
" law." Immediately after this Clause follows another 
in these words : " The President shall have power to fill 
1 up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of 
' the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire 
1 at the end of their next session." It is from this last 
provision that the pretended power of the President to 
fill vacancies in the Senate has been deduced. A slight 
attention to the connection of the Clauses, and to the 
obvious meaning of the terms, will satisfy us that the 
deduction is not even colorable. 

The first of these two Clauses, it is clear only provides 
* See Cato, No. V. — Publius. 



470 The Federalist. 

a mode for appointing such officers, " whose appoint- 
" ments are not otherwise provided for in the Constitu- 
" tion, and which shall be established by law ; " of course 
it cannot extend to the appointment of Senators, whose 
appointments are otherwise provided for in the Constitu- 
tion,* and who are established by the Constitution, and 
will not require a future establishment by law. This 
position will hardly be contested. 

The last of these two clauses, it is equally clear, can- 
not be understood to comprehend the power of filling 
vacancies in the Senate, for the following reasons: — 
First. The relation in which that Clause stands to the 
other, which declares the general mode of appointing 
officers of the United States, denotes it to be nothing 
more than a supplement to the other ; for the purpose 
of establishing an auxiliary method of appointment, in 
cases to which the general method was inadequate, 
The ordinary power of appointment is confined to the 
President and Senate jointly, and can therefore only be 
exercised during the session of the Senate ; but as it 
would have been improper to oblige this body to be con- 
tinually in session for the appointment of officers, and 
as vacancies might happen in their recess, which it 
might be necessary for the public service to fill without 
delay, the succeeding clause is evidently intended to 
authorize the President, singly, to make temporary ap- 
pointments " during the recess of the Senate, by grant- 
ing commissions which should expire at the end of 
" their next session." Secondly. If this Clause is to be 
considered as supplementary to the one which precedes, 
the vacancies of which it speaks must be construed to 
relate to the " officers " described in the preceding one ; 
and this, we have seen, excludes from its description 
the members of the Senate. Thirdly. The time within 
which the power is to operate, " during the recess of the 
* Article 1, Section 3, Clause 1. — Publius. 



The Federalist. 471 

u Senate," and the duration of the appointments, "to the 
I end of the next session " of that body, conspire to elu- 
cidate the sense of the provision, which, if it had been 
intended to comprehend Senators, would naturally have 
referred the temporary power of filling vacancies to the 
recess of the State Legislatures, who are to make the 
permanent appointments, and not to the recess of the 
National Senate, who are to have no concern in those 
appointments ; and would have extended the duration 
in office of the temporary Senators to the next session 
of the Legislature of the State, in whose representation 
the vacancies had happened, instead of making it to ex- 
pire at the end of the ensuing session of the National 
Senate. The circumstances of the body authorized to 
make the permanent appointments would, of course, 
have governed the modification of a power which re- 
lated to the temporary appointments ; and as the 
National Senate is the body, whose situation is alone 
contemplated in the Clause upon which the suggestion 
under examination has been founded, the vacancies to 
which it alludes can only be deemed to respect those 
officers in whose appointment that body has a concur- 
rent agency with the President. But lastly, the first and 
second Clauses of the third Section of the first Article, 
not only obviate all possibility of doubt, but destroy the 
pretext of misconception. The former provides, that 
" the Senate of the United States shall be composed of 
" two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legisla- 
" hire thereof for six years ; " and the latter directs, that, 
i: if vacancies in that body should happen by resignation 
If or otherwise, during the recess of the Legislature of 
k ' any State, the Executive thereof may make tempo- 
rary appointments until the next meeting of the Legis- 
K lature, which shall then fill such vacancies." Here is 
an express power given, in clear and unambiguous 
terms, to the State Executives, to fill the casual vacan- 



472 The Federalist. 

cies in the Senate, by temporary appointments ; which 
not only invalidates the supposition, that the Clause 
before considered could have been intended to confer 
that power upon the President of the United States, 
but proves that this supposition, destitute as it is even 
of the merit of plausibility, must have originated in an 
intention to deceive the People, too palpable to be 
obscured by sophistry, too atrocious to be palliated by 
hypocrisy. 

I have taken the pains to select this instance of mis- 
representation, and to place it in a clear and strong light, 
as an unequivocal proof of the unwarrantable arts which 
are practised, to prevent a fair and impartial judgment 
of the real merits of the Constitution submitted to the 
consideration of the People. Nor have I scrupled, in 
so flagrant a case, to allow myself in a severity of ani- 
madversion, little congenial with the general spirit of 
these papers. I hesitate not to submit it to the decision 
of any candid and honest adversary of the proposed 
Government, whether language can furnish epithets of 
too much asperity, for so shameless and so prostitute 
an attempt to impose on the citizens of America. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Friday, March 14, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LXVII. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of 
the United States, is almost the only part of the sys- 
tem, of any consequence, which has escaped without se« 
vere censure, or which has received the slightest mark of 



The Federalist. 473 

approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of 
these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to 
admit, that the election of the President is pretty well 
guarded.* I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not 
to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is 
at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the 
advantages, the union of which was to be wished for. 

It was desirable, that the sense of the People should 
operate in the choice of the person to whom so impor- 
tant a trust was to be confided. This end will be an- 
swered by committing the right of making it, not to any 
preestablished body, but to men chosen by the People 
for the special purpose, and at the particular conjunct- 
ure. 

It was equally desirable, that the immediate election 
should be made by men most capable of analyzing the 
qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circum- 
stances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious com- 
bination of all the reasons and inducements which were 
proper to govern their choice. A small number of per- 
sons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general 
mass, will be most likely to possess the information and 
discernment requisite to such complicated investigations. 

It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little op- 
portunity as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil 
was not least to be dreaded in the election of a magis- 
trate, who was to have so important an agency in the 
administration of the Government, as the President of 
the United States. But the precautions which have been 
so happily concerted in the system under consideration, 
promise an effectual security against this mischief. The 
choice of several, to form an intermediate body of Elec- 
tors, will be much less apt to convulse the community, 
with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the 
choice of one who was himself to be the final object of 

* Vide FcederaJ Farmer. — Publius. 



474 The Federalist. 

the public wishes. And as the Electors, chosen in each 
State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which 
they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will 
expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might 
be communicated from them to the People, than if they 
were all to be convened at one time, in one place. 

Nothing was more to be desired than that every prac- 
ticable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and 
corruption. These most deadly adversaries of republican 
Government might naturally have been expected to 
make their approaches from more than one quarter, but 
chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an im- 
proper ascendant in our Councils. How could they bet- 
ter gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own 
to the Chief Magistracy of the Union ? But the Con- 
vention have guarded against all danger of this sort, 
with the most provident and judicious attention. They 
have not made the appointment of the President to de- 
pend on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be 
tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes ; but 
they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate 
act of the People of America, to be exerted in the choice 
of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making 
the appointment. And they have excluded from eligibil- 
ity to this trust, all those who from situation might be 
suspected of too great devotion to the President in office 
No Senator, Representative, or other person holding a 
olace of trust or profit under the United States, can be 
of the numbers of the Electors. Thus without corrupt- 
ing the body of the People, the immediate agents in the 
election will at least enter upon the task free from any 
sinister bias. Their transient existence, and their de- 
tached situation, already taken notice of, afford a satis- 
factory prospect of their continuing so, to the conclusion 
-»f it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace 
bo considerable a number of men, requires time as weL 1 



The Federalist. 475 

as means. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to em- 
bark them, dispersed as they would be over thirteen 
States, in any combinations founded upon motives, 
which, though they could not properly be denominated 
corrupt, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from 
their duty. 

Another, and no less important desideratum was, that 
the Executive should be independent for his continuance 
in office on all but the People themselves. He might 
otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his com- 
plaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the dura- 
tion of his official consequence. This advantage will 
also be secured, by making his reelection to depend on 
a special body of representatives, deputed by the soci- 
ety for the single purpose of making the important 
choice. 

All these advantages will happily combine in the plan 
devised by the Convention ; which is, that the People 
of each State shall choose a number of persons as 
Electors, equal to the number of Senators and Repre- 
sentatives of such State in the National Government, 
who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some 
fit person as President. Their votes, thus given, are to 
be transmitted to the seat of the National Government ■ 
and the person who may happen to have a majority of the 
whole number of votes, will be the President. But as 
a majority of the votes might not always happen to cen- 
tre in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less 
than a majority to-be conclusive, it is provided, that, in 
such a contingency, the House of Representatives shall 
select out of the candidates, who shall have the five high- 
est number of votes, the man who in their opinion may 
be best qualified for the office. 

The process of election affords a moral certainty, that 
the office of President will never fall to the lot of any 
\aaan who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the 



476 The Federalist. 

requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and 
the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate 
a man to the first honors in a single State ; but it will 
require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to es- 
tablish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole 
Union, or of so considerable a portion of it, as would 
be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the 
distinguished office of President of the United States. 
It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a con- 
stant probability of seeing the station filled by characters 
preeminent for ability and virtue. And this will be 
thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the Con- 
stitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which 
the Executive in every Government must necessarily have 
in its good or ill administration. Though we cannot 
acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says, 

" For forms of Government let fools contest — 
" That which is best administered is best — " 

yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a 
good Government is its aptitude and tendency to produce 
a good administration. 

The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same man- 
ner with the President; with this difference, that the 
Senate is to do, in respect to the former, what is to be 
done by the House of Representatives, in respect to the 
] atter. 

The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice- 
President, has been objected to as superfluous, if not 
mischievous. It has been alleged, that it would have 
been preferable to have authorized the Senate to elect 
out of their own body an officer answering that descrip- 
tion. But two considerations seem to justify the ideas 
of the Convention in this respect. One is, that to se- 
cure at all times the possibility of a definite resolution 
of the body, it is necessary that the President should 
have only a casting vote. And to take the Senator of 



The Federalist. 477 

any State from his seat as Senator, to place him in that 
of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in re- 
gard to the State from which he came, a constant for a 
contingent vote. The other consideration is, that as the 
Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for 
the President, in the supreme Executive magistracy, all 
the reasons which recommend the mode of election pre- 
scribed for the one, apply with great, if not with equal 
force, to the manner of appointing the other. It is re- 
markable, that in this, as in most other instances, the 
objection which is made would lie against the Consti- 
tution of this State. We have a Lieutenant-Governor, 
chosen by the People at large, who presides in the Sen- 
ate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Govern- 
or, in casualties similar to those which would authorize 
the Vice-President to exercise the authorities, and dis- 
charge the duties of the President. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Friday, March 14, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LXVIII. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

T PROCEED now to trace the real characters of the 
■- proposed Executive, as they are marked out in the 
oian of the Convention. This will serve to place in a 
strong light the unfairness of the representations which 
have been made in regard to it. 

The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the 
Executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested 
in a single magistrate. This will scarcely, however, be 
considered as a point upon which any comparison car 



478 The Feeder a list. 

be grounded ; for if, in this particular, there be a resem« 
blance to the King of Great Britain, there is not less a 
resemblance to the Grand Seignior, to the Khan of Tar- 
tary, to the man of the seven mountains, or to the Gov- 
ernor of New York. 

That magistrate is to be elected for four years : and 
is to be reeligible as often as the People of the United 
States shall think him worthy of their confidence. In 
these circumstances, there is a total dissimilitude be- 
tween him and a King of Great Britain, who is an hered- 
itary monarch, possessing the crown as a patrimony 
descendible to his heirs forever ; but there is a close anal- 
ogy between him and a Governor of New York, who 
is elected for three years, and is reeligible without limi- 
tation or intermission. If we consider, how much less 
time would be requisite for establishing a dangerous 
influence in a single State, than for establishing a like 
influence throughout the United States, we must con- 
clude that a duration of four years for the Chief Magis- 
trate of the Union is a degree of permanency far less to 
be dreaded in that office, than a duration of three years 
for a correspondent office in a single State. 

The President of the United States would be liable to 
be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed 
from office ; and would afterwards be liable to prosecu- 
tion and punishment in the ordinary course of law. The 
person of the King of Great Britain is sacred and invio- 
lable ; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is 
amenable ; no punishment to which he can be subjected 
without involving the crisis of a National revolution. 
In this delicate and important circumstance of personal 
responsibility, the President of Confederated America 
would stand upon no better ground than a Governor of 
New York, and upon worse ground than the Governors 
of Maryland and Delaware 



The Federalist. 479 

The President of the United States is to have power to 
return a Bill, which shall have passed the two branches 
of the Legislature, for reconsideration ; and the Bill so 
returned is to become a law, if, upon that reconsidera- 
tion, it be approved by two thirds of both Houses. The 
King of Great Britain, on his part, has an absolute neg- 
ative upon the Acts of the two Houses of Parliament. 
The disuse of that power for a considerable time past, 
does not affect the reality of its existence ; and is to be 
ascribed wholly to the Crown's having found the means 
of substituting influence to authority, or the art of gain- 
ing a majority in one or the other of the two Houses, to 
the necessity of exerting a prerogative which could sel- 
dom be exerted without hazarding some degree of Na- 
tional agitation. The qualified negative of the Presi- 
dent differs widely from this absolute negative of the 
British sovereign ; and tallies exactly with the revision- 
ary authority of the Council of Revision of this State, 
of which the Governor is a constituent part. In this 
respect, the power of the President would exceed that of 
the Governor of New York, because the former would 
possess, singly, what the latter shares with the Chancel- 
lor and Judges ; but it would be precisely the same with 
that of the Governor of Massachusetts, whose Constitu- 
tion, as to this Article, seems to have been the original 
from which the Convention have copied. 

The President is to be the " Commander-in-Chief of 
"the army and navy of the United States, and of the 
" militia of the several States, when called into the act- 

* ual service of the United States. He is to have power 
" to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against 

* the United States, except in cases of impeachment; to 
" recommend to the consideration of Congress such 
u measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; 
"to convene, on extraordinary occasions, both Houses 
H of the Legislature, or either of them, and, in case of 



480 The Federalist. 

U disagreement between them with respect to the time of 
" adjournment, to adjourn them to such time as he shall 
"think proper; to take care that the laws be faithfully 
"executed ; and to commission all officers of the United 
" States." In most of these particulars, the power of 
the President will resemble equally that of the King of 
Great Britain, and of the Governor of New York. The 
most material points of difference are these: — First 
The President will have only the occasional command 
of such part of the militia of the Nation, as by Legisla- 
tive provision may be called into the actual service of 
the Union. The King of Great Britain, and the Gov- 
ernor of New York, have at all times the entire com- 
mand of all the militia within their several jurisdictions. 
In this Article, therefore, the power of the President 
would be inferior to that of either the Monarch, or the 
Governor. Secondly. The President is to be Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United 
States. In this respect, his authority would be nom- 
inally the same with that of the King of Great Britain, 
but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount 
to nothing more than the supreme command and direc- 
tion of the military and naval forces, as first General 
and Admiral of the Confederacy: while that of the Brit- 
ish King extends to the declaring of war and to the rais- 
ing' and regulating of fleets and armies ; all which by 
the Constitution under consideration, would appertain 
to the Legislature.* The Governor of New York, on 

* A writer in a Pennsylvania pa- II., Chap. 6, it was declared to be in 

per, under the signature of Tamony, the King alone, for that the sole 

has asserted that the King of Great supreme government and command 

Britain owes his prerogative as Com- of the militia within his Majesty's 

mander-in-Chief to an annual mu- realms and dominions, and of all 

tiny bill. The truth is, on the con- forces by sea and land, and of all 

trary, that his prerogative, in this forts and places of strength, ever 

respect, is immemorial, and was only was and is the undoubted right of 

disputed, "contrary to all reason his Majesty and his royal predeces- 

" and precedent," as Blackstone, sors, Kings and Queens of England 

vol. 1, page 262, expresses it, by the and that botih or either House of 

Long Parliament of Charles L; but Parliament cannot nor ought to pre 

by the statute the 13th of Charles tend to the same. — Publius. 



The Federalist. 481 

the other hand, is by the Constitution of the State vested 
only with the command of its militia and navy. But 
the Constitutions of several of the States expressly de- 
clare their Governors to be Commanders-in-Chief, as 
well of the army as navy ; and it may well be a ques- 
tion, whether those of New Hampshire and Massachu- 
setts, in particular, do not, in this instance, confer larger 
powers upon their respective Governors, than could be 
claimed by a President of the United States. Thirdly, 
The power of the President, in respect to pardons, would 
extend to all cases, except those of impeachment The 
Governor of New York may pardon in all cases, even in 
those of impeachment, except for treason and murder. 
Is not the power of the Governor, in this Article, on a 
calculation of political consequences, greater than that 
of the President? All conspiracies and plots against the 
Government, which have not been matured into actual 
treason, may be screened from punishment of every kind, 
by the interposition of the prerogative of pardoning. If 
a Governor of New York, therefore, should be at the head 
of any such conspiracy, until the design had been ripened 
into actual hostility, he could insure his accomplices and 
adherents an entire impunity. A President of the Union, 
on the other hand, though he may even pardon treason, 
when prosecuted in the ordinary course of law, could 
vihelter no offender, in any degree, from the effects of 
impeachment and conviction. Would not the prospect 
of a total indemnity for all the preliminary steps, be a 
greater temptation to undertake, and persevere in an en- 
terprise against the public liberty, than the mere pros- 
pect of an exemption from death and confiscation, if the 
final execution of the design, upon an actual appeal to 
arms, should miscarry ? Would this last expectation 
have any influence at all, when the probability was com- 
puted, that the person who was to afford that exemption 
might himself be involved in the consequences of the 
VOL. i. 31 



482 TJie Federalist. 

measure ; and might be incapacitated by his agency in 
it from affording the desired impunity? The better to 
judge of this matter, it will be necessary to recollect, 
that, by the proposed Constitution, the offence of treason 
is limited " to levying war upon the United States, and 
" adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and com- 
" fort ; " and that by the laws of New York it is confined 
within similar bounds. Fourthly. The President can 
only adjourn the National Legislature, in the single case 
of disagreement about the time of adjournment. The 
British monarch may prorogue or even dissolve the Par- 
liament. The Governor of New York may also pro- 
rogue the Legislature of this State for a limited time ; 
a power which, in certain situations, may be employed 
to very important purposes. 

The President is to have power, with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two 
thirds of the Senators present concur. The King of 
Great Britain is the sole and absolute representative 
of the Nation, in all foreign transactions. He can of his 
own accord make treaties of peace, commerce, alliance, 
and of every other description. It has been insinuated, 
that his authority in this respect is not conclusive, and 
that his conventions with foreign powers are subject to 
the revision, and stand in need of the ratification of Par- 
liament. But I believe this doctrine was never heard o^ 
until it was broached upon the present occasion. Every 
jurist* of that kingdom, and every other man acquainted 
with its Constitution, knows, as an established fact, that 
the prerogative of making treaties exists in the Crown in 
its utmost plenitude ; and that the compacts entered into 
by the royal authority have the most complete legal va- 
lidity and perfection, independent of any other sanction. 
The Parliament, it is true, is sometimes seen employing 
itself in altering the existing laws to conform them to the 

* Vide Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. 1, p. 257. — Publius 



The Federalist. 483 

stipulations in a new treaty ; and this may have possi- 
bly given birth to the imagination, that its cooperation 
was necessary to the obligatory efficacy of the treaty 
But this Parliamentary interposition proceeds from a 
different cause: from the necessity of adjusting a most 
artificial and intricate system of revenue and commer- 
cial laws, to the changes made in them by the operation 
of the treaty ; and of adapting new provisions and pre- 
cautions to the new state of things, to keep the machine 
from running into disorder. In this respect, therefore, 
there is no comparison between the intended power of 
the President and the actual power of the British sov- 
ereign. The one can perform alone what the other can 
only do with the concurrence of a branch of the Legis- 
lature. It must be admitted, that, in this instance, the 
power of the Foederal Executive would exceed that of 
any State Executive. But this arises naturally from the 
exclusive possession by the Union of that part of the 
sovereign power which relates to treaties. If the Con- 
federacy were to be dissolved, it would become a ques- 
tion, whether the Executives of the several States were 
not solely invested with that delicate and important pre- 
rogative. 

The President is also to be authorized to receive Am- 
bassadors, and other public Ministers. This, though it 
has been a rich theme of declamation, is more a matter 
of dignity than of authority. It is a circumstance which 
will be without consequence in the administration of the 
Government; and it was far more convenient that it 
should be arranged in this manner, than that there should 
be a necessity of convening the Legislature, or one of 
its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign Minister, 
though it were merely to take the place of a departed 
predecessor. 

The President is to nominate, and, with the advice and 
wnsent of the Senate, to appoint Ambassadors and other 



4S4 The Federalist. 

public Ministers, Judges of the Supreme Court, and in 
general all officers of the United States established by 
law, and whose appointments are not otherwise provided 
for by the Constitution. The King of Great Britain is 
emphatically and truly styled the fountain of honor. He 
not only appoints to all offices, but can create offices. 
He can confer titles of nobility at pleasure ; and has the 
disposal of an immense number of Church preferments. 
There is evidently a great inferiority in the power of the 
President, in this particular, to that of the British King; 
nor is it equal to that of the Governor of New York, if 
we are to interpret the meaning of the Constitution of 
the State by the practice which has obtained under it. 
The power of appointment is with us lodged in a Coun- 
cil, composed of the Governor and four members of the 
Senate, chosen by the Assembly. The Governor claims, 
and has frequently exercised the right of nomination, 
and is entitled to a casting vote in the appointment. If 
he really has the right of nominating, his authority is in 
this respect equal to that of the President, and exceeds 
it in the article of the casting vote. In the National 
Government, if the Senate should be divided, no ap- 
pointment could be made : in the Government of New 
York, if the Council should be divided, the Governor 
can turn the scale, and confirm his own nomination.* 
If we compare the publicity which ,xnust necessarily 
attend the mode of appointment by the President and 
an entire branch of the National Legislature, with the 
privacy in the mode of appointment by the Governor of 
New York, closeted in a secret apartment with at most 
four, and frequently with only two persons ; and if we 

* Candor, however, demands an tionally questioned. And independ- 
acknowledgment, that I do not ent of this claim, when we take into 
think the claim of the Governor to view the other considerations, and 
a right of nomination well founded, pursue them through all their con- 
Yet it is always justifiable to reason sequences, we shall be inclined to 
from the practice of a Government, draw much the same conclusion. — 
till its propriety has been constitu- Publius. 



The Federalist. 485 

at the same time consider, how much more easy it must 
be to influence the small number of which a Council of 
Appointment consists, than the considerable number of 
which the National Senate w T ould consist, we cannot 
hesitate to pronounce, that the power of the Chief Ma- 
gistrate of this State, in the disposition of offices, must, 
in practice, be greatly superior to that of the Chief Ma- 
gistrate ©f the Union. 

Hence it appears, that except as to the concurrent 
authority of the President in the Article of treaties, it 
would be difficult to determine whether that magistrate 
would, in the aggregate, possess more or less power than 
the Governor of New York. And it appears yet more 
unequivocally, that there is no pretence for the parallel 
which has been attempted between him and the King 
of Great Britain. But to render the contrast, in this 
respect, still more striking, it may be of use to throw 
the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer 
group. 

The President of the United States would be an offi 
cer elected by the People for four years : the King of 
Great Britain is a perpetual and hereditary Prince. The 
one would be amenable to personal punishment and 
disgrace : the person of the other is sacred and inviola- 
ble. The one would have a qualified negative upon the 
Acts of the Legislative body : the other has an absolute 
negative. The one would have a right to command the 
military and naval forces of the Nation : the other, in 
addition to this right, possesses that of declaring war, 
and of raising and regulating fleets and armies by his 
own authority. The one would have a concurrent power 
with a branch of the Legislature in the formation of 
treaties : the other is the sole possessor of the power of 
making treaties. The one would have a like concurrent 
authority in appointing to offices : the other is the sole 
author of all appointments. The one can confer no 



486 The Federalist. 

privileges whatever: the other can make denizens of 
aliens, noblemen of commoners ; can erect corporations 
with all the rights incident to corporate bodies. The 
one can prescribe no rales concerning the commerce or 
currency of the Nation : the other is in several respects 
the arbiter of commerce, and in this capacity can estab- 
lish markets and fairs, can regulate weights and meas- 
ures, can lay embargoes for a limited time, can coin 
money, can authorize or prohibit the circulation of for- 
eign coin. The one has no particle of spiritual juris- 
diction : the other is the supreme head and Governor of 
the National Church ! What answer shall we give to 
those who would persuade us, that things so unlike re- 
semble each other? — The same that ought to be given 
to those who tell us, that a Government, the whole 
power of which would be in the hands of the elective 
and periodical servants of the People, is an aristocracy, 

a monarchy, and a despotism. 

PUBLIUS. 



(From the New York Packet, Tuesday, March 18, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LXIX. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

THERE is an idea, which is not without its advo- 
cates, that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with 
the genius of republican Government. The enlightened 
well-wishers to this species of Government must at least 
hope that the supposition is destitute of foundation; 
since they can never admit its truth, without, at the 
same time, admitting the condemnation of their own 
principles. Energy in the Executive is a leading char- 



T/ie Federalist. 487 

acter in the definition of good Government. It is essen 
tial to the protection of the community against foreign 
attacks ; it is not less essential to the steady admin- 
istration of the laws ; to the protection of property 
against those irregular and high-handed combinations 
which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of jus- 
tice ; to the security of liberty against the enterprises 
and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. 
Every man, the least conversant in Roman story, knows 
how often that Republic was obliged to take refuge in 
the absolute power of a single man, under the formid 
able title of Dictator, as well against the intrigues of 
ambitious individuals, who aspired to the tyranny, and 
the seditions of whole classes of the community, whose 
conduct threatened the existence of all Government, as 
against the invasions of external enemies, who menaced 
the conquest and destruction of Rome. 

There can be no need, however, to multiply argu- 
ments or examples on this head. A feeble Executive 
implies a feeble execution of the Government. A feeble 
execution is but another phrase for a bad execution ; 
and a Government ill executed, whatever it may be in 
theory, must be, in practice, a bad Government. 

Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense 
will agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive, it 
will only remain to inquire, what are the ingredients, 
which constitute this energy ? How far can they be 
combined with those other ingredients which constitute 
safety in the republican sense? And how far does this 
combination characterize the plan which has been re- 
ported by the Convention? 

The ingredients which constitute energy in the Exec- 
utive are, first, unity ; secondly, duration ; thirdly, an 
adequate provision for its support: fourthly, competent 
powers. 

The ingredients which constitute safety in the repub* 



488 The Federalist. 

lican sense are, first, a due dependence on the People 
secondly, a due responsibility. 

Those politicians and statesmen who have been the 
most celebrated for the soundness of their principles, 
and for the justness of their views, have declared in favor 
of a single Executive, and a numerous Legislature. 
They have, with great propriety, considered energy as 
the most necessary qualification of the former, and have 
regarded this as most applicable to power in a single 
hand ; while they have, with equal propriety, considered 
the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, 
and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the 
People, and to secure their privileges and interests. 

That unity is conducive to energy, will not be dis- 
puted. Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch, will 
generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a 
much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any 
greater number ; and in proportion as the number is in- 
creased, these qualities will be diminished. 

This unity may be destroyed in two ways : either by 
vesting the power in two or more magistrates, of equal 
dignity and authority ; or by vesting it ostensibly in one 
man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and 
cooperation of others, in the capacity of Counsellors to 
him. Of the first, the two Consuls of Rome may serve 
as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in 
the Constitutions of several of the States. New York 
and New Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only States 
which have intrusted the Executive authority wholly to 
single men.* Both these methods of destroying the 
unity of the Executive have their partisans ; but the 
votaries of an Executive Council are the most numer- 
ous. They are both liable, if not to equal, to similar 

* New York has no Council ex- consult. But I think, from the 
cept for the single purpose of ap- terms of the Constitution, their res- 
pointing to offices ; New Jersey has olutions do not bind him. — Publius 
a Council whom the Governor may 



The Federalist. 

objections, and may in most lights be examined in con 
junction. 

The experience of other Nations will afford little in- 
struction on this head. As far, however, as it teaches 
anything, it teaches us not to be enamored of plurality 
in the Executive. We have seen that the Achseans, on 
an experiment of two Praetors, were induced to abolish 
one. The Eoman history records many instances of 
mischiefs to the Republic from the dissensions between 
the Consuls, and between the Military Tribunes, who 
were at times substituted to the Consuls. But it gives 
us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to 
the State from the circumstance of the plurality of those 
magistrates. That the dissensions between them were 
not more frequent or move fatal, is matter of astonish- 
ment, until we advert to the singular position in which 
the Republic was almost continually placed, and to the 
prudent policy pointed out by the circumstances of the 
State, and pursued by the Consuls, of making a division 
of the Government between them. The Patricians en- 
gaged in a perpetual struggle with the Plebeians for the 
preservation of their ancient authorities and dignities; 
the Consuls, who were generally chosen out of the for- 
mer body, were commonly united by the personal inter- 
est they had in the defence of the privileges of their 
order. In addition to this motive of union, after the 
arms of the Republic had considerably expanded the 
bounds of its empire, it became an established custom 
with the Consuls to divide the administration between 
themselves by lot; one of them remaining at Rome to 
govern the city and its environs; the other taking the 
command in the more distant provinces. This expe- 
dient must, no doubt, have had great influence in pre- 
senting those collisions and rivalships which might oth- 
erwise have embroiled the peace of the Republic. 

But quitting the dim light of historical research, 



490 The Federalist. 

attaching ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and 
good sense, we shall discover much greater cause to 
reject than to approve the idea of plurality in the Exec- 
utive, under any modification whatever. 

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any 
common enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of 
difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in 
which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, 
there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even 
animosity. From either, and especially from all these 
causes, the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring. 
Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, 
weaken the authority, and distract the plans and opera- 
tions of those whom they divide. If they should unfor- 
tunately assail the Supreme Executive Magistracy of a 
country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might 
impede or frustrate the most important measures of the 
Government, in the most critical emergencies of the 
State. And what is still worse, they might split the 
community into the most violent and irreconcilable fac- 
tions, adhering differently to the different individuals who 
composed the Magistracy. 

Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have 
had no agency in planning it, or because it may have 
been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they 
have been consulted, and have happened to disapprove, 
opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an indis- 
pensable duty of self-love. They seem to think them- 
selves bound in honor, and by all the motives of per- 
sonal infallibility, to defeat the success of what has been 
resolved upon contrary to their sentiments. Men of up- 
right, benevolent tempers have too many opportunities 
of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths this 
disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great 
interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the 
conceit, and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have 



The Federalist 491 

credit enough to make their passions and their caprices 
interesting to mankind. Perhaps the question now be 
fore the public may, in its consequences, afford melan 
choly proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or 
rather detestable vice in the human character. 

Upon the principles of a free Government, inconven- 
iences from the source just mentioned must necessarily 
be submitted to in the formation of the Legislature ; but 
it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce 
them into the constitution of the Executive. It is here 
too, that they may be most pernicious. In the Legisla- 
ture, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a 
benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of 
parties in that department of the Government, though 
they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often 
promote deliberation and circumspection ; and serve to 
check excesses in the majority. When a resolution too 
is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That 
resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But 
no favorable circumstances palliate, or atone for the dis- 
advantages of dissension in the Executive department. 
Here, they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at 
which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass 
and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to 
which they relate, from the first step to the final conclu- 
sion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities 
in the Executive, which are the most necessary ingredi- 
ents in its composition, — vigor and expedition; and 
this without any counterbalancing good. In the con- 
duct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is 
the bulwark of the National security, everything would 
be to be apprehended from its plurality. 

It must be confessed, that these observations apply 
with principal weight to the first case supposed, that 
«s, to a plurality of Magistrates of equal dignity and 
authority ; a scheme, the advocates for which are not 



492 The Federalist. 

likely to form a numerous sect; but they apply, though 
not with equal, yet with considerable weight to the proj- 
ect of a Council, whose concurrence is made constitu- 
tionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible 
Executive. An artful cabal in that Council would be 
able to distract and to enervate the whole system of ad- 
ministration. If no such cabal should exist, the mere 
diversity of views and opinions would alone be suffi- 
cient to tincture the exercise of the Executive authority 
with a spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness. 

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality 
in the Executive, and which lies as much against the 
last as the first plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults, 
and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two 
kinds, to censure and to punishment. The first is the 
most important of the two, especially in an elective 
office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in 
such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any 
longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him 
obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication 
of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in 
either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mut- 
ual accusations, to determine, on whom the blame or 
the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of per- 
nicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from 
one to another with so much dexterity, and under such 
plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in 
suspense about the real author. The circumstances 
which may have led to any National miscarriage or mis- 
fortune, are sometimes so complicated, that, where there 
are a number of actors who may have had different 
degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see 
upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, 
yet it may be impracticable to pronounce, to whose ac- 
count the evil which may have been incurred is truly 
chargeable. 



The Federalist. 493 

" I was overruled by my Council. The Council were 
u so divided in their opinions, that it was impossible 
" to obtain any better resolution on the point." These 
and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true 
or false. And who is there, that will either take the 
trouble or incur the odium, of a strict scrutiny into the 
secret springs of the transaction? Should there be found 
a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising 
task, if there happen to be collusion between the parties 
concerned, how easy is it to clothe the circumstances 
with so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what 
was the precise conduct of any of those parties? 

In the single instance in which the Governor of this 
State is coupled with a Council, that is, in the appoint- 
ment to offices, we have seen the mischiefs of it in the 
view now under consideration. Scandalous appoint- 
ments to important offices have been made. Some 
cases, indeed, have been so flagrant that all parties have 
agreed in the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry 
has been made, the blame has been laid by the Governor 
on the members of the Council ; who, on their part, have 
charged it upon his nomination : while the People re- 
main altogether at a loss to determine, by whose influ- 
ence their interests have been committed to hands so 
unqualified, and so manifestly improper. In tenderness 
to individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars. 

It is evident from these considerations, that the plu- 
rality of the Executive tends to deprive the People of 
the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful 
exercise of any delegated power : — First, the restraints 
of public opinion, which lose their efficacy as well on 
account of the division of the censure attendant on bad 
measures among a number, as on account of the uncer- 
tainty on whom it ought to fall ; and, secondly, the op- 
portunity of discovering with facility and clearness the 
misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to 



494 The Fcederalist. 

their removal from office, or to their actual punishment 
in cases which admit of it. 

In England, the King is a perpetual Magistrate; and 
it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the 
public peace, that he is unaccountable for his adminis- 
tration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can 
be wiser in that Kingdom, than to annex to the King a 
constitutional Council, who may be responsible to the 
Nation for the advice they give. Without this, there 
would be no responsibility whatever in the Executive 
department, an idea inadmissible in a free Government. 
But even there, the King is not bound by the resolutions 
of his Council, though they are answerable for the ad- 
vice they give. He is the absolute master of his own 
conduct in the exercise of his office ; and may observe 
or disregard the counsel given to him, at his sole discre- 
tion. 

But in a Republic, where every Magistrate ought to 
be personally responsible for his behavior in office, the 
reason, which in the British Constitution dictates the 
propriety of a Council, not only ceases to apply, but 
turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great 
Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited re- 
sponsibility of the Chief Magistrate ; which serves in 
some degree as a hostage to the National justice for his 
good behavior. In the American republic, it would serve 
to destroy, or would greatly diminish the intended and 
necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate him- 
self. 

The idea of a Council to the Executive, which has so 
generally obtained in the State Constitutions, has been 
derived from that maxim of republican jealousy which 
considers power as safer in the hands of a number of 
men than of a single man. If the maxim should be 
admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend, 
that the advantage on that side would not counterbal- 



The Federalist. 495 

ance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. 
But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the Ex 
ecutive power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this par- 
ticular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius pro- 
nounces to be " deep, solid, and ingenious," that " the 
I Executive power is more easily confined when it is 
kt one ; " * that it is far more safe there should be a single 
object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the People j 
and, in a word, that all multiplication of the Executive 
is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty. 

A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species 
of security sought for in the multiplication of the 
Executive, is unattainable. Numbers must be so great 
as to render combination difficult, or they are rather a 
source of danger than of security. The united credit 
and influence of several individuals mus^ be more 
formidable to liberty, than the credit and influence of 
either of them separately. When power, therefore, is 
placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to 
admit of their interests and views being easily combined 
in a common enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes 
more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when abused, 
than if it be lodged in the hands of one man ; who, 
from the very circumstance of his being alone, will be 
more narrowly watched and more readily suspected, 
and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as 
when he is associated w T ith others. The Decemvirs of 
Rome, whose name denotes their number,! were more 
10 be dreaded in their usurpation than any one of them 
would have been. No person would think of proposing 
an Executive much more numerous than that body ; 
from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number 
of the Council. The extreme of these numbers, is not 
too great for an easy combination ; and from such a 
combination, America would have more to fear, than 
* De Lolme. — Publius. t Ten. - Publiu*. 



i$6 The Federalist 

from the ambition of any single individual. A Council 
to a Magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he 
does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his 
good intentions ; are often the instruments and accom- 
plices of his bad ; and are almost always a cloak to his 
faults. 

I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; 
though it be evident that if the Council should be 
numerous enough to answer the principal end aimed at 
by the institution, the salaries of the members, who 
must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of 
Government, would form an item in the catalogue of 
public expenditures, too serious to be incurred for an 
object of equivocal utility. I will only add, that, prior 
to the appearance of the Constitution, I rarely met 
with an intelligent man from any of the States, who 
did not admit, as the result of experience, that the 
UNITY of the Executive of this State was one of the 
best of the distinguishing features of our Constitution. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, March 18, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LXX. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

DURATION in office has been mentioned as the 
second requisite to the energy of the Executive 
authority. This has relation to two objects: to the 
personal firmness of the Executive Magistrate, in the 
employment of his Constitutional powers ; and to the 
stability of the system of administration, which may 
have been adopted under his auspices. With regard to 



The Federalist 497 

the first, it must be evident, that the longer the duration 
in office, the greater will be the probability of obtaining 
so important an advantage. It is a general principle of 
human nature that a man will be interested in what- 
ever he possesses, in proportion to the firmness or 
precariousness of the tenure by which he holds it ; will 
be less attached to w x hat he holds by a momentary or 
uncertain title, than to what he enjoys by a durable or 
certain title ; and, of course, will be willing to risk 
more for the sake of the one, than for the sake of the 
other. This remark is not less applicable to a political 
privilege, or honor, or trust, than to any article of 
ordinary property. The inference from it is, that a 
man acting in the capacity of Chief Magistrate, under 
a consciousness that in a very short time he must lay 
down his office, will be apt to feel himself too little 
interested in it, to hazard any material censure or per- 
plexity, from the independent exertion of his powers, or 
from encountering the ill-humors, however transient, 
which may happen to prevail, either in a considerable 
part of the society itself, or even in a predominant 
faction in the Legislative body. If the case should 
only be, that he might lay it down, unless continued by 
a new choice, and if he should be desirous of being 
continued, his wishes, conspiring with his fears, would 
tend still more powerfully to corrupt his integrity, or 
debase his fortitude. In either case, feebleness and 
irresolution must be the characteristics of the station. 

There are some, who would be inclined to regard the 
servile pliancy of the Executive to a prevailing current, 
either in the community, or in the Legislature, as its 
best recommendation. But such men entertain very 
crude notions, as well of the purposes for which Gov- 
ernment was instituted, as of the true means by which 
the public happiness may be promoted. The repub- 
lican principle demands, that the deliberate sense of the 

vol. i. 32 



498 The Federalist. 

community should govern the conduct of those to 
whom they intrust the management of their affairs; 
but it does not require an unqualified complaisance to 
every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient 
impulse which the People may receive from the arts 
of men, who flatter their prejudices to betray their 
interests. It is a just observation, that the People 
commonly intend the public good. This often applies 
to their very errors. But their good sense would 
despise the adulator who should pretend, that they 
always reason right about the means of promoting it. 
They know from experience, that they sometimes err ; 
and the wonder is, that they so seldom err as they do, 
beset as they continually are, by the wiles of parasites 
and sycophants ; by the snares of the ambitious, the 
avaricious, the desperate ; by the artifices of men who 
possess their confidence more than they deserve it; and 
of those who seek to possess, rather than to deserve it. 
When occasions present themselves, in which the 
interests of the People are at variance with their 
inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they 
nave appointed to be the guardians of those interests, 
to withstand the temporary delusion, in order to give 
them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate 
reflection. Instances might be cited, in which a con- 
duct of this kind has saved the People from very fatal 
consequences of their own mistakes, and has procured 
lasting monuments of their gratitude to the men who 
had courage and magnanimity enough to serve them at 
the peril of their displeasure. 

But however inclined we might be, to insist upon an 
unbounded complaisance in the Executive to the in- 
clinations of the People, we can with no propriety 
contend for a like complaisance to the humors of the 
Legislature. The latter may sometimes stand in 
opposition to the former ; and at other times the People 



The Federalist. 499 

may be entirely neutral. In either supposition, it is 
certainly desirable, that the Executive should be in a 
situation to dare to act his own opinion with vigor and 
decision. 

The same rule which teaches the propriety of a 
partition between the various branches of power, 
teaches us likewise that this partition ought to be so 
contrived as to render the one independent of the other. 
To what purpose separate the Executive or the Judi- 
ciary from the Legislative, if both the Executive and 
the Judiciary are so constituted as to be at the absolute 
devotion of the Legislative ? Such a separation must 
be merely nominal, and incapable of producing the ends 
for which it was established. It is one thing to be sub- 
ordinate to the laws, and another to be dependent on the 
Legislative body. The first comports with, the last vio- 
lates, the fundamental principles of good Government; 
and whatever may be the forms of the Constitution, 
unites all power in the same hands. The tendency of 
the Legislative authority to absorb every other, has 
been fully displayed and illustrated by examples in 
some preceding numbers. In Governments purely re- 
publican, this tendency is almost irresistible. The 
Representatives of the People, in a popular Assembly, 
seem sometimes to fancy, that they are the People 
themselves, and betray strong symptoms of impatience 
and disgust at the least sign of opposition from any 
other quarter ; as if the exercise of its rights, by either 
the Executive or Judiciary, were a breach of their 
privilege, and an outrage to their dignity. They often 
appear disposed to exert an imperious control over the 
other departments ; and as they commonly have the 
People on their side, they always act with such mo- 
mentum, as to make it very difficult for the other 
members of the Government to maintain the balance 
of the Constitution. 



500 The Federalist. 

It may perhaps be asked, how the shortness of the 
duration in office can affect the independence of the 
Executive on the Legislature, unless the one were 
possessed of the power of appointing or displacing the 
other. One answer to this inquiry may be drawn from 
the principle already remarked, that is, from the slender 
interest a man is apt to take in a short-lived advantage, 
and the little inducement it* affords him to expose 
himself, on account of it, to any considerable incon- 
venience or hazard. Another answer, perhaps more 
obvious, though not more conclusive, will result from 
the consideration of the influence of the Legislative 
body over the People ; which might be employed to 
prevent the reelection of a man who, by an upright 
resistance to any sinister project of that body, should 
have made himself obnoxious to its resentment. 

It may be asked also, whether a duration of four 
years would answer trie end proposed ; and if it would 
not, whether a less period, which would at least be 
recommended by greater security against ambitious 
designs, would not, for that reason, be preferable to a 
longer period, which was, at the same time, too short 
for the purpose of inspiring the desired firmness and 
independence of the Magistrate. 

It cannot be affirmed, that a duration of four years, 
or any other limited duration, would completely answer 
the end proposed; but it would contribute towards it 
in a degree which would have a material influence 
upon the spirit and character of the Government. 
Between the commencement and termination of such 
a period, there would always be a considerable interval, 
in which the prospect of annihilation would be suffi- 
ciently remote, not to have an improper effect upon the 
conduct of a man indued with a tolerable portion of 
fortitude ; and in which he might reasonably promise 
bimself, that there would be time enough before it 



The Federalist. 501 

arrived, to make the community sensible of the pro- 
priety of the measures he might incline to pursue. 
Though it be probable, that, as he approached the 
moment when the public were, by a new election, to 
signify their sense of his conduct, his confidence, and 
with it his firmness, would decline ; yet both the one 
and the other would derive support from the oppor- 
tunities which his previous continuance in the station 
had afforded him, of establishing himself in the esteem 
and good-will of his constituents. He might, then, 
hazard with safety, in proportion to the proofs he had 
given of his wisdom and integrity, and to the title he 
had acquired to the respect and attachment of his 
fellow-citizens. As on the one hand, a duration of four 
years will contribute to the firmness of the Executive 
in a sufficient degree to render it a very valuable in- 
gredient in the composition, so on the other, it is not 
enough to justify any alarm for the public liberty. If a 
British House of Commons, from the most feeble 
beginnings, from the mere power of assenting or dis- 
agreeing to the imposition of a new tax, have, by rapid 
strides, reduced the prerogatives of the Crown and the 
privileges of the nobility within the limits they conceived 
to be compatible with the principles of a free Govern- 
ment, while they raised themselves to the rank and 
consequence of a coequal branch of the Legislature ; 
if they have been able, in one instance, to abolish both 
the royalty and the aristocracy, and to overturn all the 
«inci nt establishments, as well in the Church as State; 
if they have been able, on a recent occasion, to make 
the Monarch tremble at the prospect of an innovation* 
attempted by them ; wnat would be to be feared from 
an elective Magistrate of four years' duration, with the 
confined authorities of a President of the United 

* This was the case with respect and rejected in the House of Lords, 
to Mr. Fox's India bill, which was to the entire satisfaction, as it is 
iarried in the House of Commons, said, of the People. — Publius. 



502 The Federalist 

States ? What, but that he might be unequal to the 
task which the Constitution assigns him ? I shall only 
add, that if his duration be such as to leave a doubt 
of his firmness, that doubt is inconsistent with a jeal- 
ousy of his encroachments. 

FUBLIUS. 



[From the New York Packet, Friday, March 21, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXI. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

THE administration of Government, in its largest 
sense, comprehends all the operations of the body 
politic, whether Legislative, Executive, or Judiciary; but 
in its most usual, and perhaps in its most precise 
signification, it is limited to Executive details, and falls 
peculiarly within the province of the Executive depart- 
ment. The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the 
preparatory plans of finance, the application and disburse- 
ment of the public moneys in conformity to the general 
appropriations of the Legislature, the arrangement of 
the army and navy, the direction of the operations of 
war : these, and other matters of a like nature, constitute 
what seems to be most properly understood by the ad- 
ministration of Government. The persons, therefore, 
to whose immediate management these different matters 
are committed, ought to be considered as the assistants 
or deputies of the Chief Magistrate ; and on this account, 
they ought to derive their offices from his appointment, 
at least from his nomination, and ought to be subject to 
his superintendence. This view of the subject will at 
once suggest to us the intimate connection between the 



The Federalist. 503 

duration of the Executive Magistrate in office, and the 
stability of the system of administration. To reverse and 
undo what has been done by a predecessor, is very often 
considered by a successor as the best proof he can give 
of his own capacity and desert ; and in addition to this 
propensity, where the alteration has been the result of 
public choice, the person substituted is warranted in 
supposing, that the dismission of his predecessor has 
proceeded from a dislike to his measures ; and that the 
less he resembles him, the more he will recommend him- 
self to the favor of his constituents. These considera- 
tions, and the influence of personal confidences and at- 
tachments, would be likely to induce every new Presi- 
dent to promote a change of men to fill the subordinate 
stations ; and these causes together could not fail to 
occasion a disgraceful and ruinous mutability in the 
administration of the Government. 

With a positive duration of considerable extent, I con- 
nect the circumstance of re eligibility. The first is neces- 
sary to give to the officer himself the inclination and the 
resolution to act his part well, and to the community time 
and leisure to observe the tendency of his measures, and 
thence to form an experimental estimate of their merits. 
The last is necessary to enable the People, when they 
see reason to approve of his conduct, to continue him 
in the station, in order to prolong the utility of his tal- 
ents and virtues, and to secure to the Government the 
advantage of permanency in a wise system of adminis- 
tration. 

Nothing appears more plausible at first sight, nor more 
ill-founded upon close inspection, than a scheme which 
n relation to the present point has had some respectable 
advocates, — I mean that of continuing the Chief Mag- 
istrate in office for a certain time, and then excluding 
him from it, either for a limited oeriod or forever after. 
This exclusion, whether temporary or perpetual, would 



504 The Federalist. 

have nearly the same effects ; and these effects would bo 
for the most part rather pernicious than salutary. 

One ill effect of the exclusion would be a diminution 
of the inducements to good behavior. There are few 
men who would not feel much less zeal in the discharge 
of a duty, when they were conscious that the advan- 
tages of the station with which it was connected must 
be relinquished at a determinate period, than when they 
were permitted to entertain a hope of obtaining-, by merit- 
ing', a continuance of them. This position will not be 
disputed, so long as it is admitted, that the desire of re- 
ward is one of the strongest incentives of human con- 
duct ; or that the best security for the fidelity of man- 
kind, is to make their interest coincide with their duty. 
Even the love of fame, the ruling passion of the noblest 
minds, which would prompt a man to plan and under- 
take extensive and arduous enterprises for the public 
benefit, requiring considerable time to mature and per- 
fect them, if he could flatter himself with the prospect 
of being allowed to finish what he had begun, would, 
on the contrary, deter him from the undertaking, when 
he foresaw that he must quit the scene before he could 
accomplish the work, and must commit that, together 
with his own reputation, to hands which might be un- 
equal or unfriendly to the task. The most to be expected 
from the generality of men, in such a situation, is the 
negative merit of not doing harm, instead of the positive 
merit of doing good. 

Another ill effect of the exclusion would be the temp- 
tation to sordid views, to peculation, and, in some in- 
stances, to usurpation. An avaricious man, who might 
happen to fill the office, looking forward to a time when he 
must at all events yield up the emoluments he enjoyed, 
would feel a propensity, not easy to be resisted by such 
a man, to make the best use of the opportunity he en 
joyed, while it lasted ; and might not scruple to have 



The Federalist. 505 

recourse to the most corrupt expedients to make the 
harvest as abundant as it was transitory ; though the 
same man, probably, with a different prospect before 
him, might content himself with the regular perquisites 
of his situation, and might even be unwilling to risk the 
consequences of an abuse of his opportunities. His ava- 
rice might be a guard upon his avarice. Add to this, that 
the same man might be vain or ambitious, as well as 
avaricious. And if he could expect to prolong his hon- 
ors by his good conduct, he might hesitate to sacrifice 
his appetite for them to his appetite for gain. But with 
the prospect before him of approaching and inevitable 
annihilation, his avarice would be likely to get the vic- 
tory over his caution, his vanity, or his ambition. 

An ambitious man too, when he found himself seated 
on the summit of his country's honors, when he looked 
forward to the time at which he must descend from the 
exalted eminence forever, and reflected that no exertion 
of merit on his part could save him from the unwelcome 
reverse: such a man, in such a situation, would be much 
more violently tempted to embrace a favorable conjunct- 
ure for attempting the prolongation of his power, at every 
personal hazard, than if he had the probability of an- 
swering the same end by doing his duty. 

Would it promote the peace of the community, or the 
stability of the Government, to have half a dozen men 
tvho had had credit enough to be raised to the seat of 
the Supreme Magistracy, wandering among the People 
like discontented ghosts, and sighing for a place which 
they were destined never more to possess? 

A third ill effect of the exclusion would be, the depriv- 
ing the community of the advantage of the experience 
gained by the Chief Magistrate in the exercise of his 
office. That experience is the parent of wisdom, is an 
adage, the truth of which is recognized by the wisest as 
well as the simplest of mankind. What more desirable 



506 The Federalist 

or more essential than this quality in the Governors of 
Nations ? Where more desirable or more essential than 
in the first Magistrate of a Nation? Can it be wise 
to put this desirable and essential quality under the ban 
of the Constitution ; and to declare that the moment it 
is acquired, its possessor shall be compelled to abandon 
the station in which it was acquired, and to which it is 
adapted ? This, nevertheless, is the precise import of 
all those regulations which exclude men from serving 
their country, by the choice of their fellow-citizens, after 
they have by a course of service fitted themselves for 
doing it with a greater degree of utility. 

A fourth ill effect of the exclusion would be, the ban- 
ishing men from stations in which, in certain emergen- 
cies of the State, their presence might be of the great- 
est moment to the public interest or safety. There is 
no Nation which has not, at one period or another, ex- 
perienced an absolute necessity of the services of par- 
ticular men, in particular situations, perhaps it would 
not be too strong to say, to the preservation of its polit- 
ical existence. How unwise, therefore, must be every 
such self-denying ordinance, as serves to prohibit a Na- 
tion from making use of its own citizens, in the manner 
best suited to its exigencies and circumstances! With- 
out supposing the personal essentiality of the man, it is 
evident that a change of the Chief Magistrate, at the 
breaking out of a war, or at any similar crisis, for another, 
even of equal merit, would at all times be detrimental 
to the community, inasmuch as it would substitute in- 
experience to experience, and would tend to unhinge and 
set afloat the already settled train of the administration. 

A fifth ill effect of the exclusion would be, that it 
would operate as a constitutional interdiction of stability 
in the administration. By necessitating a change of 
men, in the first office of the Nation, it would necessi- 
tate a mutability of measures. It is not generally to be 



The Fcsderalist. 507 

expected, that men will vary, and measures remain uni- 
form. The contrary is the usual course of things. And 
we need not be apprehensive that there will be too much 
stability, while there is even the option of changing; 
nor need we desire to prohibit the People from contin- 
uing their confidence where they think it may be safely 
placed, and where, by constancy on their part, they may 
obviate the fatal inconveniencies of fluctuating councils 
and a variable policy. 

These are some of the disadvantages which would flow 
from the principle of exclusion. They apply most forci- 
bly to the scheme of a perpetual exclusion ; but when 
we consider, that even a partial exclusion would always 
render the readmission of the person a remote and pre- 
carious object, the observations which have been made 
will apply nearly as fully to one case as to the other. 

What are the advantages promised to counterbalance 
these disadvantages ? They are represented to be : 1st. 
Greater independence in the Magistrate ; 2d, Greater 
security to the People. Unless the exclusion be perpet- 
ual, there will be no pretence to infer the first advan- 
tage. But even in that case, may he have no object be- 
yond his present station, to which he may sacrifice his in- 
dependence ? May he have no connections, no friends, 
for whom he may sacrifice it? May he not be less will- 
ing, by a firm conduct, to make personal enemies, when 
he acts under the impression, that a time is fast ap- 
proaching, on the arrival of which he not only may, but 
must be exposed to their resentments, upon an equal, 
perhaps upon an inferior footing ? It is not an easy 
point to determine whether his independence would be 
most promoted or impaired by such an arrangement. 

As to the second supposed advantage, there is still 
greater reason to entertain doubts concerning it. If the 
exclusion were to be perpetual, a man of irregular ambi- 
tion, of whom alone there could be reason in any case to 



508 The Federalist. 

entertain apprehension, would, with infinite reluctance, 
yield to the necessity of taking his leave forever of a 
post, in which his passion for power and preeminence 
had acquired the force of habit. And if he had been 
fortunate or adroit enough to conciliate the good-will of 
the People, he might induce them to consider as a very 
odious and unjustifiable restraint upon themselves, a 
provision which was calculated to debar them of the 
right of giving a fresh proof of their attachment to a 
favorite. There may be conceived circumstances in 
which this disgust of the People, seconding the thwarted 
ambition of such a favorite, might occasion greater dan- 
ger to liberty, than could ever reasonably be dreaded 
from the possibility of a perpetuation in office, by the 
voluntary suffrages of the community, exercising a con- 
stitutional privilege. 

There is an excess of refinement in the idea of disa- 
bling the People to continue in office men who had en- 
titled themselves, in their opinion, to approbation and 
confidence ; the advantages of which are at best specu- 
lative and equivocal, and are overbalanced by disadvan- 
tages far more certain and decisive. 

PUBLIUa 



[From the New York Packet, Friday, March 21, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXII. 



To the People of the State of New York: 

THE third ingredient towards constituting the vigor 
of the Executive authority, is an adequate provision 
for its support. It is evident, that without proper atten- 
tion to this Article, the separation of the Executive from 



The Federalist 509 

the Legislative department would be merely nominal 
and nugatory. The Legislature, with a discretionary 
power over the salary and emoluments of the Chief 
Magistrate, could render him as obsequious to their will, 
as they might think proper to make him. They might, 
in most cases, either reduce him by famine, or tempt 
him by largesses, to surrender at discretion his judgment 
o their inclinations. These expressions, taken in all 
the latitude of the terms, would no doubt convey more 
than is intended. There are men who could neither be 
distressed, nor won, into a sacrifice of their duty ; but 
this stern virtue is the growth of few soils ; and in the 
main it will be found, that a power over a man's sup- 
port is a power over his will. If it were necessary to 
confirm so plain a truth by facts, examples would not be 
wanting, even in this country, of the intimidation or se- 
duction of the Executive by the terrors, or allurements, 
of the pecuniary arrangements of the Legislative body. 
It is not easy, therefore, to commend too highly the 
judicious attention which has been paid to this subject 
in the proposed Constitution. It is there provided, that 
"The President of the United States shall, at stated 
" times, receive for his service a compensation which 
' shall neither be increased, nor diminished, during the 
"period for which he shall have been elected; and he 
" shall not receive within that period any other emolument 
" from the United States, or any of them." It is impos- 
sible to imagine any provision which would have been 
more eligible than this. The Legislature, on the ap- 
pointment of a President, is once for all to declare w T hat 
shall be the compensation for his services during the 
time for which he shall have been elected. This done, 
they will have no power to alter it, either by increase or 
diminution, till a new period of service by a new elec- 
tion commences. They can neither weaken his fortitude 
ay operating upon his necessities, nor corrupt his in- 



510 The Federalist. 

tegrity by appealing to his avarice. Neither the Union, 
nor any of its members, will be at liberty to give, nor 
will he be at liberty to receive, any other emolument 
than that which may have been determined by the first 
act. He can of course have no pecuniary inducement 
to renounce or desert the independence intended for him 
by the Constitution. 

The last of the requisites to energy, which have been 
enumerated, are competent powers. Let us proceed to 
consider those which are proposed to be vested in the 
President of the United States. 

The first thing that offers itself to our observation, is 
the qualified negative of the President upon the Acts or 
Resolutions of the two Houses of the Legislature ; or, 
in other words, his power of returning all Bills with ob- 
jections ; to have the effect of preventing their becom- 
ing laws, unless they should afterwards be ratified by 
two thirds of each of the component members of the 
Legislative body. 

The propensity of the Legislative department to in- 
trude upon the rights, and to absorb the powers, of the 
other departments, has been already suggested and re- 
peated ; the insufficiency of a mere parchment delinea- 
tion of the boundaries of each, has also been remarked 
upon ; and the necessity of furnishing each with consti- 
tutional arms for its own defence, has been inferred and 
proved. From these clear and indubitable principles, 
results the propriety of a negative, either absolute or 
qualified, in the Executive, upon the Acts of the Legis- 
lative branches. Without the one or the other, the 
former would be absolutely unable to defend himself 
against the depredations of the latter. He might grad- 
ually be stripped of his authorities by successive Reso- 
lutions, or annihilated by a single vote. And in the one 
node or the other, the Legislative and Executive pow- 
ers might speedily come to be blended in the same 



The Federalist. 51.1 

hands. If even no propensity had ever discovered itself 
in the Legislative body, to invade the rights of the Ex- 
ecutive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretic pro- 
priety would of themselves teach us, that the one ought 
not to be left at the mercy of the other, but ought to 
possess a constitutional and effectual power of self- 
defence. 

But the power in question has a further use. It not 
only serves as a shield to the Executive, but it furnishes 
an additional security against the enaction of improper 
laws. It establishes a salutary check upon the Legis- 
lative body, calculated to guard the community against 
the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse 
unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to in- 
fluence a majority of that body. 

The propriety of a negative has, upon some occa- 
sions, been combated by an observation, that it was not 
to be presumed a single man would possess more virtue 
and wisdom than a number of men; and that unless this 
presumption should be entertained, it v/ould be im- 
proper to give the Executive Magistrate any species of 
control over the Legislative body. 

But this observation, when examined, will appear 
rather specious than solid. The propriety of the thing 
does not turn upon the supposition of superior wisdom 
or virtue in the Executive ; but upon the supposition, 
that the Legislative will not be infallible; that the love 
of power may sometimes betray it into a disposition to 
encroach upon the rights of the other members of the 
Government; that a spirit of faction may sometimes 
pervert its deliberations; that impressions of the mo- 
ment may sometimes hurry it into measures which it- 
self, on maturer reflection, would condemn. The. pri- 
mary inducement to conferring the power in question 
upon the Executive is, to enable him to defend himself 
the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of 



512 The Federalist. 

the community against the passing of bad laws, through 
haste, inadvertence, or design. The oftener a measure 
is brought under examination, the greater the diversity 
in the situations of those who are to examine it, the less 
must be the danger of those errors which flow from 
want of due deliberation, or of those missteps which 
proceed from the contagion of some common passion or 
interest. It is far less probable, that culpable views of 
any kind should infect all the parts of the Government 
at the same moment and in relation to the same ob- 
ject, than that they should by turns govern and mislead 
every one of them. 

It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing 
bad laws includes that of preventing good ones; and 
may be used to the one purpose as well as to the other. 
But this objection will have little weight with those 
who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that incon- 
stancy and mutability in the laws, which form the great- 
est blemish in the character and genius of our Govern- 
ments. They will consider every institution calculated 
to restrain the excess of law-making, and to keep things 
in the same state in which they may happen to be at 
any given period, as much more likely to do good than 
harm ; because it is favorable to greater stability in the 
system of Legislation. The injury which may possibly 
be done by defeating a few good laws, will be amply 
compensated by the advantage of preventing a number 
of bad ones. 

Nor is this all. The superior weight and influence 
of the Legislative body in a free Government, and the 
hazard to the Executive in a trial of strength with that 
body, afford a satisfactory security that the negative 
wouid generally be employed with great caution ; and 
there would oftener be room for a charge of timidity 
than of rashness in the exercise of it. A King of 
Great Britain, with all his train of sovereign attributes^ 



The Federalist 513 

and with all the influence he draws from a thousand 
sources, would, at this day, hesitate to put a negative 
upon the Joint Resolutions of the two Houses of Parlia- 
ment. He would not fail to exert the utmost resources 
of that influence to strangle a measure disagreeable to 
him, in its progress to the throne, to avoid being re- 
duced to the dilemma of permitting it to take effect, or 
of risking the displeasure of the Nation, by an opposi- 
tion to the sense of the Legislative body. Nor is it 
probable, that he would ultimately venture to exert his 
prerogatives, but in a case of manifest propriety, or ex- 
treme necessity. All well-informed men in that King- 
dom will accede to the justness of this remark. A very 
considerable period has elapsed since the negative of the 
Crown has been exercised. 

If a Magistrate so powerful and so well fortified as 
a British monarch, would have scruples about the ex- 
ercise of the power under consideration, how much 
greater caution may be reasonably expected in a Presi- 
dent of the United States, clothed for the short period 
of four years, with the Executive authority of a Gov' 
ernment wholly and purely republican ? 

It is evident, that there would be greater danger of his 
not using his power when necessary, than of his using 
it too often, or too much. An argument, indeed, against 
its expediency, has been drawn from this very source. 
It has been represented, on this account, as a power 
odious in appearance, useless in practice. But it will 
not follow, that because it might be rarely exercised, it 
would never be exercised. In the case for which it is 
chiefly designed, that of an immediate attack upon the 
constitutional rights of the Executive, or in a case in 
which the public good was evidently and palpably sacri- 
ficed, a man of tolerable firmness would avail himself 
of his constitutional means of defence, and would listen 
X) the admonitions of duty and responsibility. In the 

vol. i. 33 



514 The Federalist. 

former supposition, his fortitude would be stimulated 
by his immediate interest in the power of his office ; in 
the latter, by the probability of the sanction of his con- 
stituents ; who, though they would naturally incline to 
the Legislative body in a doubtful case, would hardly 
suffer their partiality to delude them in a very plain 
case. I speak now with an eye to a Magistrate possess- 
ing only a common share of firmness. There are men 
who, under any circumstances, will have the courage to 
do their duty at every hazard. 

But the Convention have pursued a mean in this 
business, which will both facilitate the exercise of the 
power vested in this respect in the Executive magis- 
trate, and make its efficacy to depend on the sense of a 
considerable part of the Legislative body. Instead of 
an absolute negative, it is proposed to give the Exec- 
utive the qualified negative already described. This is 
a power which would be much more readily exercised 
than the other. A man who might be afraid to defeat 
a law by his single veto, might not scruple to return 
it for reconsideration ; subject to being finally rejected 
only in the event of more than one third of each House 
concurring in the sufficiency of his objections. He 
would be encouraged by the reflection, that if his op- 
position should prevail, it would embark in it a very 
respectable proportion of the Legislative body, whose in- 
fluence would be united with his in supporting the pro- 
priety of his conduct in the public opinion. A direct 
and categorical negative has something in the appearance 
of it more harsh, and more apt to irritate, than the mere 
suggestion of argumentative objections to be approved 
or disapproved by those to whom they are addressed. 
In proportion as it would be less apt to offend, it would 
be more apt to be exercised ; and for this very reason, 
it may in practice be found more effectual. It is to be 
hoped that it will not often happen that improper views 



TJie Feeder a list. 515 

will govern so large a proportion as two thirds of both 
branches of the Legislature at the same time; and this 
too in spite of the counterpoising weight of the Ex- 
ecutive. It is at any rate far less probable that this 
should be the case, than that such views should taint 
the resolutions and conduct of a bare majority. A 
power of this nature in the Executive, will often have 
a silent and unperceived, though forcible operation. 
When men, engaged in unjustifiable pursuits, are 
aware that obstructions may come from a quarter 
which they cannot control, they will often be re- 
strained by the bare apprehension of opposition, from 
doing what they would with eagerness rush into, if no 
such external impediments were to be feared. 

This qualified negative, as has been elsewhere re- 
marked, is in this State vested in a Council, consisting 
of the Governor, with the Chancellor and Judges of the 
Supreme Court, or any two of them. It has been 
freely employed upon a variety of occasions, and fre- 
quently with success. And its utility has become so 
apparent, that persons who, in compiling the Constitu- 
tion, were violent opposers of it, have from experience 
become its declared admirers.* 

I have in another place remarked, that the Convention, 
in the formation of this part of their plan, had departed 
from the model of the Constitution of this State, in 
favor of that of Massachusetts. Two strong reasons 
may be imagined for this preference. One is that the 
Tudges, who are to be the interpreters of the law, might 
receive an improper bias, from having given a previous 
opinion in their revisionary capacities ; the other is that 
by being often associated with the Executive, they might 
be induced to embark too far in the political views of 
that Magistrate, and thus a dangerous combination 

* Mr. Abraham Yates, a warm vention, is of this number — Pub 
>pponent of the plan of the Con- Hits. 



516 The Federalist. 

might by degrees be cemented between the Executive 
and Judiciary departments. It is impossible to keep the 
Judges too distinct from every other avocation than that 
of expounding the laws. It is peculiarly dangerous to 
place them in a situation to be either corrupted or influ- 
enced by the Executive. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From (lie New York Packet, Tuesday, March 25, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXIII. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

THE President of the United States is to be " Com 
" mander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the 
" United States, and of the militia of the several 
" States when called into the actual service of the 
" United States." The propriety of this provision is so 
evident in itself, and it is, at the same time, so consonant 
to the precedents of the State Constitutions in general, 
that little need be said to explain or enforce it. Even 
those of them which have, in other respects, coupled the 
Chief Magistrate with a Council, have for the most part 
concentrated the military authority in him alone. Of 
all the cares or concerns of Government, the direction 
of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which 
distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. 
The direction of war, implies the direction of the com- 
mon strength ; and the power of directing and employ- 
ing the common strength, forms a usual and essential 
part in the definition of the Executive authority. 

u The President may require the opinion, in writing; 
* of the principal officer in each of the Executive de» 



Tlie Federalist. 517 

u partments, upon any subject relating to the duties oi 
" their respective offices." This I consider as a mere 
redundancy in the plan ; as the right for which it pro- 
vides would result of itself from the office. 

He is also to be authorized " to grant reprieves and 
" pardons for offences against the United States, except 
"in cases of impeachment" Humanity and good policy 
conspire to dictate, that the benign prerogative of par- 
doning should be as little as possible fettered or embar- 
rassed. The criminal code of every country partakes 
so much of necessary severity, that without an easy ac- 
cess to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice 
would w T ear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel. 
As the sense of responsibility is always strongest, in 
proportion as it is undivided, it may be inferred, that a 
single man would be most ready to attend to the force 
of those motives which might plead for a mitigation of 
the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to considera- 
tions, which were calculated to shelter a fit object of its 
vengeance. The reflection that the fate of a fellow- 
creature depended on his sole flat, would naturally in- 
spire scrupulousness and caution ; the dread of being 
accused of weakness or connivance would beget equal 
circumspection, though of a different kind. On the 
other hand, as men generally derive confidence from 
their numbers, they might often encourage each other 
in an act of obduracy, and might be less sensible to the 
apprehension of suspicion or censure for an injudicious 
or affected clemency. On these accounts, one man 
appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy 
pf Government, than a body of men. 

The expediency of vesting the power of pardoning in 
the President has, if I mistake not, been only contested 
in relation to the crime of treason. This, it has been 
urged, ought to have depended upon the assent of one, 
or both of the branches of the Legislative body. I shall 



518 The Federalist 

not deny that there are strong reasons to be assigned 
for requiring in this particular the concurrence of that 
body, or of a part of it. As treason is a crime levelled 
at the immediate being of the society, when the laws 
have once ascertained the guilt of the offender, there 
seems a fitness in referring the expediency of an act of 
mercy towards him to the judgment of the Legislature. 
And this ought the rather to be the case, as the suppo- 
sition of the connivance of the Chief Magistrate ought 
not to be entirely excluded. But there are also strong 
objections to such a plan. It is not to be doubted, that 
a single man of prudence and good sense is better fitted, 
in delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives which 
may plead for and against the remission of the punish- 
ment, than any numerous body whatever. It deserves 
particular attention, that treason will often be connected 
with seditions which embrace a large proportion of the 
community; as lately happened in Massachusetts. In 
every such case, we might expect to see the representa- 
tion of the People tainted with the same spirit which 
had given birth to the offence. And when parties were 
pretty equally matched, the secret sympathy of the 
friends and favorers of the condemned person, availing 
itself of the good-nature and weakness of others, might 
frequently bestow impunity where the terror of an ex- 
ample was necessary. On the other hand, when the 
sedition had proceeded from causes which had inflamed 
the resentments of the major party, they might often be 
found obstinate and inexorable, when policy demanded 
a conduct of forbearance and clemency. But the prin- 
cipal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in 
this case in the Chief Magistrate is this : in seasons 
of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical mo- 
ments, when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insur- 
gents or rebels may restore the tranquillity of the Com- 
monwealth ; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved 



The Federalist. 519 

it may never be possible afterwards to recall. The dila 
tory process of convening the Legislature, or one of its 
branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to 
the measure, would frequently be the occasion of letting 
slip the golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a day 
an hour, may sometimes be fatal. If it should be ob 
served, that a discretionary power, with a view to such 
contingencies, might be occasionally conferred upon the 
President, it may be answered in the first place, that it 
is questionable, whether, in a limited Constitution, that 
power could be delegated by law; and in the second 
place, that it would generally be impolitic beforehand 
to take any step which might hold out the prospect of 
impunity. A proceeding of this kind, out of the usual 
course, would be likely to be construed into an argu- 
ment of timidity or of weakness, and would have a 

tendency to embolden guilt. 

PUBLIUS. 



For the Independent Journal. 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXIV. 



To the People of the State op New York : 

THE President is to have power, " by and with tne 
" advice and consent of the Senate, to make trea- 
"* ties, provided two thirds of the Senators present con- 
* cur. " 

Though this provision has been assailed on different 
grounds, with no small degree of vehemence, I scruple 
not to declare my firm persuasion, that it is one of the 
best digested and most unexceptionable parts of the 
plan. One ground of objection is the trite topic of the 



520 The Federalist. 

intermixture of powers ; some contending that the 
President ought alone to possess the power of making 
treaties ; others, that it ought to have been exclusively 
deposited in the Senate. Another source of objection 
is derived from the small number of persons by whom 
a treaty may be made. Of those who espouse this ob- 
jection, a part are of opinion that the House of Repre- 
sentatives ought to have been associated in the business, 
while another part seem to think that nothing more was 
necessary than to have substituted two thirds of all the 
members of the Senate, to two thirds of the members 
present. As I flatter myself the observations made in 
a preceding number, upon this part of the plan, must 
have sufficed to place it, to a discerning eye, in a very 
favorable light, I shall here content myself with offering 
only some supplementary remarks, principally with a 
view to the objections which have been just stated. 

With regard to the intermixture of powers, I shall rely 
upon the explanations already given in other places, of 
the true sense of the rule upon which that objection is 
founded; and shall take it for granted, as an inference 
from them, that the union of the Executive with the 
Senate, in the Article of treaties, is no infringement of 
that rule. I venture to add, that the particular nature 
of the power of making treaties, indicates a peculiar 
propriety in that union. Though several writers on the 
subject of Government place that power in the class of 
Executive authorities, yet this is evidently an arbitrary 
disposition ; for if we attend carefully to its operation, it 
will be found to partake more of the Legislative than of 
the Executive character, though it does not seem strictly 
to fall within the definition of either of them. The essence 
of the Legislative authority is to enact laws, or, in othei 
words, to prescribe rules for the regulation of the society; 
while the execution of the laws, and the employment of 
the common strength, either for this purpose, or for the 



The Federalist. 521 

common defence, seem to comprise all the functions of 
the Executive magistrate. The power of making trea- 
ties is, plainly, neither the one nor the other. It relates 
neither to the execution of the subsisting laws, nor to 
the enaction of new ones ; and still less to an exertion 
of the common strength. Its objects are contracts 
with foreign Nations, which have the force of law, but 
derive it from the obligations of good faith. They are 
not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but 
agreements between sovereign and sovereign. The power 
in question seems therefore to form a distinct depart- 
ment, and to belong, properly, neither to the Legislative 
nor to the Executive. The qualities elsewhere detailed, 
as indispensable in the management of foreign negotia- 
tions, point out the Executive as the most fit agent in 
those transactions; while the vast importance of the 
trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly 
for the participation of the whole or a portion of the 
Legislative body in the office of making them. 

However proper or safe it may be in Governments, 
where the Executive Magistrate is an hereditary mon- 
arch, to commit to him the entire power of making 
treaties, it would be utterly unsafe and improper to in- 
trust that power to an elective Magistrate of four years' 
duration. It has been remarked, upon another occasion, 
and the remark is unquestionably just, that an hereditary 
monarch, though often the oppressor of his People, has 
personally too much at stake in the Government, to be in 
any material danger of being corrupted by foreign pow- 
ers. But a man raised from the station of a private cit- 
izen to the rank of Chief Magistrate, possessed of but 
a moderate or slender fortune, and looking forward to 
a period not very remote, when he may probably be 
obliged to return to the station from which he was taken, 
might sometimes be under temptations to sacrifice his 
duty to his interest, which it would require superlative 



522 The Federalist. 

virtue to withstand. An avaricious man might be empt- 
ed to betray the interests of the State to the acquisition 
of wealth. An ambitious man might make his own 
aggrandizement, by the aid of a foreign power, the price 
of his treachery to his constituents. The history of 
human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion 
of human virtue, which would make it wise in a Nation 
to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, 
as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of 
the world, to the sole disposal of a Magistrate created 
and circumstanced as would be a President of the 
United States. 

To have intrusted the power of making treaties to the 
Senate alone, would have been to relinquish the benefits 
of the constitutional agency of the President in the con- 
duct of foreign negotiations. It is true, that the Senate 
would, in that case, have the option of employing him 
in this capacity ; but they would also have the option 
of letting it alone ; and pique or cabal might induce the 
latter rather than the former. Besides this, the ministe- 
rial servant of the Senate could not be expected to enjoy 
the confidence and respect of foreign powers in the same 
degree with the constitutional representatives of the 
Nation ; and of course, would not be able to act with 
an equal degree of weight or efficacy. While the Union 
would, from this cause, lose a considerable advantage in 
the management of its external concerns, the People 
would lose the additional security which would result 
from the cooperation of the Executive. Though it 
would be imprudent to confide in him solely so impor- 
tant a trust, yet it cannot be doubted, that his partici- 
pation would materially add to the safety of the society. 
It must indeed be clear, to a demonstration, that the 
joint possession of the power in question, by the Presi- 
dent and Senate, would afford a greater prospect of se- 
curity, than the separate possession of it by either of 



TJie Federalist. 52S 

them. And whoever has maturely weighed the circum- 
stances which must concur in the appointment of a Pres* 
ident, will be satisfied that the office will always bid fair 
to be filled by men of such characters, as to render theif 
concurrence in the formation of treaties peculiarly desir- 
able, as well on the score of wisdom, as on that of integ- 
rity. 

The remarks made in a former number, which has 
been alluded to in another part of this paper, will apply 
with conclusive force against the admission of the House 
of Representatives to a share in the formation of trea- 
ties. The fluctuating, and, taking its future increase 
into the account, the multitudinous composition of that 
body, forbid us to expect in it those qualities which are 
essential to the proper execution of such a trust. Accu- 
rate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; 
a steady and systematic adherence to the same views; 
a nice and uniform sensibility to National character; 
decision, secrecy, and despatch, are incompatible with the 
genius of a body so variable and so numerous. The 
very complication of the business, by introducing a ne- 
cessity of .the concurrence of so many different bodies, 
would of itself afford a solid objection. The greater 
frequency of the calls upon the House of Representa- 
tives, and the greater length of time which it would often 
be necessary to keep them together when convened, to 
obtain their sanction in the progressive stages of a treaty, 
would be source of so great inconvenience and expense, 
as alone ought to condemn the project. 

The only objection which remains to be canvassed, is 
that which would substitute the proportion of two thirds 
of all the members composing the senatorial body, to 
that of two thirds of the members present. It has been 
shown, under the second head of our inquiries, that all 
provisions which require more than the majority of any 
body to its Resolutions, have a direct tendency to em 



524 The Federalist. 

barrass the operations of the Government, and an indi- 
rect one to subject the sense of the majority to that of 
the minority. This consideration seems sufficient to 
determine our opinion, that the Convention have gone 
as far in the endeavor to secure the advantage of num- 
bers in the. formation of treaties, as could have been 
reconciled either with the activity of the public councils 
or with a reasonable regard to the major sense of the 
community. If two thirds of the whole number of 
members had been required, it would, in many cases, 
from the non-attendance of a part, amount in practice 
to a necessity of unanimity. And the history of every 
political establishment in which this principle has pre- 
vailed, is a history of impotence, perplexity, and disorder. 
Proofs of this position might be adduced from the ex- 
amples of the Roman Tribuneship, the Polish Diet, and 
the States General of the Netherlands; did not an ex- 
ample at home render foreign precedents unnecessary. 

To require a fixed proportion of the whole body, 
would not, in all probability, contribute to the advan- 
tages of a numerous agency, better than merely to re- 
quire a proportion of the attending members. The 
former, by making a determinate number at all times 
requisite to a resolution, diminishes the motives to punct- 
ual attendance. The latter, by making the capacity of 
the body to depend on a proportion which may be varied 
by the absence or presence of a single member, has the 
contrary effect. And as, by promoting punctuality, it 
tends to keep the body complete, there is great likeli- 
hood that its resolutions would generally be dictated by 
as great a number in this case, as in the other; while 
there would be much fewer occasions of delay. It 
ought not to be forgotten that under the existing Con- 
federation, two members may, and usually do represent 
a State ; whence it happens that Congress, who now 
are solely invested with all the powers of the Union, 



The Feeder alist. 

rarely consists of a greater number of persons than would 
compose the intended Senate. If we add to this, that 
as the members vote by States, and that where there is 
only a single member present from a State, his vote is 
lost, it will justify a supposition that the active voices 
in the Senate, where the members are to vote individu- 
ally, would rarely fall short in number of the active 
voices in the existing Congress. When, in addition to 
these considerations, we take into view the cooperation 
of the President, we shall not hesitate to infer that the 
People of America would have greater security against 
an improper use of the power of making treaties, under 
the new Constitution, than they now enjoy under the 
Confederation. And when we proceed still one step 
further, and look forward to the probable augmentation 
of the Senate, by the erection of new States, we shall 
not only perceive ample ground of confidence in the 
sufficiency of the members, to whose agency that power 
will be intrusted ; but we shall probably be led to con- 
clude, that a body more numerous than the Senate 
would be likely to become, would be very little fit for 
the proper discharge of the trust. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From the Neio York Packet, Tuesday, Ajiril 1, 1788.J 

THE FEDERALIST, No. LXXV. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

THE President is "to nominate, and, by and with 
"the advice and consent of the Senate, to ap- 
'< point Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con- 
* auls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other offi- 



526 The Federalist. 

u cers of the United States, whose appointments are not 
u otherwise provided for in the Constitution. But the 
" Congress may by law vest the appointment of such 
"inferior officers as they think proper, in the President 
" alone, or in the Courts of law, or in the Heads of de- 
" partments. The President shall have power to fill up 
" all vacancies which may happen during the recess of 
" the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire 
11 at the end of their next session." 

It has been observed in a former paper, that " the true 
u test of *a good Government is its aptitude and tendency 
"to produce a good administration." If the justness of 
this observation be admitted, the mode of appointing the 
officers of the United States contained in the foregoing 
clauses, must, when examined, be allowed to be entitled 
to particular commendation. It is not easy to conceive 
a plan better calculated than this to promote a judi- 
cious choice of men for filling the offices of the Union 
and it will not need proof, that on this point must es 
sentially depend the character of its administration. 

It will be agreed on all hands, that the power of ap- 
pointment, in ordinary cases, ought to be modified in 
pne of three ways. It ought either to be vested in a 
single man ; or in a select Assembly of a moderate 
number; or in a single man, with the concurrence of 
such an Assembly. The exercise of it by the People at 
large will be readily admitted to be impracticable ; as 
waiving every other consideration, it would leave them 
jttle time to do anything else. When, therefore, men- 
tion is made in the subsequent reasonings, of an Assem- 
bly or body of men, what is said must be understood 
to relate to a select body or Assembly, of the descrip- 
tion already given. The People collectively, from their 
number and from their dispersed situation, cannot be 
regulated in their movements by that systematic spirit 
of cabal and intrigue, which will be urged as the chief 



The Federalist. 527 

objections to reposing the power in question in a body 
of men. 

Those who have themselves reflected upon the subject 
or who have attended to the observations made in othet 
parts of these papers, in relation to the appointment of 
the President, will, I presume, agree to the position, that 
there would always be great probability of having the 
place supplied by a man of abilities, at least respectable. 
Premising this, I proceed to lay it down as a rule, that 
one man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and 
estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular of- 
fices, than a body of men of equal, or perhaps even of 
superior discernment. 

The sole and undivided responsibility of one man 
will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty, and a more 
exact regard to reputation. He will, on this account, 
feel himself under stronger obligations, and more inter- 
ested to investigate with care the qualities requisite to 
the stations to be filled, and to prefer with impartiality 
the persons who may have the fairest pretensions to 
them. He will have fewer personal attachments to grat- 
ify, than a body of men who may each be supposed to 
have an equal number; and will be so much the less 
table to be misled by the sentiments of friendship and of 
affection. A single well-directed man, by a single un- 
derstanding, cannot be distracted and warped by that di- 
versity of views, feelings, and interests, which frequently 
distract and warp the resolutions of a collective body. 
There is nothing so apt to agitate the passions of man- 
kind as personal considerations, whether they relate to 
ourselves or to others, who are to be the objects of our 
choice or pre Terence. Hence, in every exercise of the 
power of appointing to offices by an Assembly of men, 
we must expect to see a full display of all the private 
and party likings and dislikes, partialities and antipathies, 
ttachments and animosities, which are felt by those who 



528 The Faderalist. 

compose the Assembly. The choice which may at any 
time happen to be made under such circumstances, will 
of course be the result either of a victory gained by one 
party over the other, or of a compromise between the 
parties. In either case, the intrinsic merit of the can- 
didate will be too often out of sight. In the first, the 
qualifications best adapted to uniting the suffrages of 
the party, will be more considered than those which fit 
the person for the station. In the last, the coalition will 
commonly turn upon some interested equivalent: " Give 
" us the man we wish for this office, and you shall have 
"the one you wish for that." This will be the usual 
condition of the bargain. And it wdll rarely happen 
that the advancement of the public service will be the 
primary object either of party victories, or of party ne- 
gotiations. 

The truth of the principles here advanced seems to 
have been felt by the most intelligent of those who have 
found fault with the provision made, in this respect, by 
the Convention. They contend that the President ought 
solely to have been authorized to make the appointments 
under the Fcederal Government. But it is easy to show, 
that every advantage to be expected from such an ar- 
rangement would, in substanee, be derived from the 
power of nomination, which is proposed to be conferred 
upon him ; while several disadvantages which might 
attend the absolute power of appointment in the hands 
of that officer would be avoided. In the act of nomina- 
tion, his judgment alone would be exercised; and as it 
would be his sole duty to point out the man, who with 
the approbation of the Senate should fill an office, his 
responsibility would be as complete as if he were to 
make the final appointment. There can, in this view, 
be no difference between nominating and appointing. 
The same motives which would influence a proper dis- 
charge of his duty in one case, would exist in the other 



The Faderalist. 529 

And as no man could be appointed but on his previous 
nomination, every man who might be appointed would 
be, in fact, his choice. 

But might not his nomination be overruled ? I grant 
it might, yet this could only be to make place for 
another nomination by himself. The person ultimately 
appointed must be the object of his preference, though 
perhaps not in the first degree. It is also not very prob- 
able that his nomination would often be overruled. The 
Senate could not be tempted, by the preference they 
might feel to another, to reject the one proposed; be- 
cause they could not assure themselves, that the person 
they might wish would be brought forward by a second 
or by any subsequent nomination. They could not even 
be certain, that a future nomination would present a 
candidate in any degree more acceptable to them ; and 
as their dissent might cast a kind of stigma upon the in- 
dividual rejected, and might have the appearance of a 
reflection upon the judgment of the Chief Magistrate, 
it is not likely that their sanction would often be re- 
fused, where there were not special and strong reasons for 
the refusal. 

To what purpose then require the cooperation of the 
Senate ? I answer, that the necessity of their concur- 
rence would have a powerful, though, in general, a silent 
operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit 
of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly 
to preventing the appointment of unfit characters from 
State prejudice, from family connection, from personal 
attachment, or from a view to popularity. In addition 
to this, it would be an efficacious source of stability in 
the administration. 

It will readily be comprehended, that a man who had 
himself the sole disposition of offices, would be governed 
much more by his private inclinations and interests, than 
when he was bound to submit the propriety of his choice 

vol. i. 34 



530 The Federalist. 

to the discussion and determination of a different and 
independent body, and that body an entire branch of 
the Legislature. The possibility of rejection would be 
a strong motive to care in proposing. The danger to 
his own reputation, and, in the case of an elective Mag- 
istrate, to his political existence, from betraying a spirit 
of favoritism, or an unbecoming pursuit of popularity, 
to the observation of a body whose opinion would have 
great weight in forming that of the public, could not 
fail to operate as a barrier to the one and to the other. 
He would be both ashamed and afraid to bring forward, 
for the most distinguished or lucrative stations, candi- 
dates who had no other merit than that of coming from 
the same State to which he particularly belonged, or of 
being in some way or other personally allied to him, or 
of possessing the necessary insignificance and pliancy to 
render them the obsequious instruments of his pleasure. 
To this reasoning it has been objected, that the Presi- 
dent, by the influence of the power of nomination, may 
secure the complaisance of the Senate to his views. 
The supposition of universal venality in human nature, 
is little less an error in political reasoning, than the sup- 
position of universal rectitude. The institution of dele- 
gated power implies, that there is a portion of virtue and 
honor among mankind, which may be a reasonable foun- 
dation of confidence ; and experience justifies the theory. 
It has been found to exist in the most corrupt periods of 
the most corrupt Governments. The venality of the 
British House of Commons has been long a topic of 
accusation against that body, in the country to which 
they belong, as well as in this ; and it cannot be doubted 
that the charge is, to a considerable extent, well founded. 
But it is as little to be doubted, that there is always a 
targe proportion of the body, which consists of indepen- 
dent and public-spirited men, who have an influential 
weight in the councils of the Nation. Hence it is, (the 



The Federalist. 531 

present reign not excepted,) that the sense of that body 
is often seen to control the inclinations of the monarch, 
both with regard to men and to measures. Though it 
might therefore be allowable to suppose, that the Exec- 
utive might occasionally influence some individuals in 
the Senate, yet the supposition, that he could in gen- 
eral purchase the integrity of the whole body, would be 
forced and improbable. A man disposed to view hu- 
man nature as it is, without either flattering its virtues, 
or exaggerating its vices, will see sufficient ground of 
confidence in the probity of the Senate, to rest satisfied, 
not only that it will be impracticable to the Executive 
to corrupt or seduce a majority of its members, but that 
the necessity of its cooperation, in the business of ap- 
pointments, will be a considerable and salutary restraint 
upon the conduct of that Magistrate. Nor is the integ- 
rity of the Senate the only reliance. The Constitution 
has provided some important guards against the danger 
of Executive influence upon the Legislative body: it 
declares, that " No Senator or Representative shall, dur- 
ing the time for which he was elected, be appointed to 
" any civil office under the United States, which shall 
u have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall 
" have been increased during such time ; and no person, 
ft holding any office under the United States, shall be a 
"member of either House during his continuance in 

» office." 

PUBLIUS. 



532 The Federalist. 

[From the New York Packet, Friday, April 4, 1788.] 

THE FEDERALIST. No. LXXVI. 



To the People of the State of New York : 

IT has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be 
expected from the cooperation of the Senate, in the 
business of appointments, that it would contribute to 
the stability of the administration. The consent of that 
body would be necessary to displace as well as to ap- 
point. A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, 
would not occasion so violent or so general a revolution 
in the officers of the Government as might be expected, 
if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in 
any station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness 
for it, a new President would be restrained from at- 
tempting a change in favor of a person more agreeable 
to him, by the apprehension that a discountenance of 
the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some 
degree of discredit upon himself. Those who can best 
estimate the value of a steady administration will be 
most disposed to prize a provision, which connects the 
official existence of public men with the approbation oi 
disapprobation of that body, which, from the greater 
permanency of its own composition, will in all probabil- 
ity be less subject to inconstancy than any other mem- 
ber of the Government. 

To this union of the Senate with the President, in the 
Article of appointments, it has in some cases been sug- 
gested, that it would serve to give the President an un- 
due influence over the Senate ; and in others that it 
would have an opposite tendency ; a strong proof that 
aeither suggestion is true. 



The Federalist. 533 

To state the first in its proper form, is to refute it. It 
amounts to this, — the President would have an im- 
proper influence over the Senate ; because the Senate 
would have the power of restraining him. This is an 
absurdity in terms. It cannot admit of a doubt that 
the entire power of appointment would enable him 
much more effectually to establish a dangerous empire 
over that body, than a mere power of nomination sub- 
ject to their control. 

Let us take a view of the converse of the proposition: 
"the Senate would influence the Executive." As I 
have had occasion to remark in several other instances, 
the indistinctness of the objection forbids a precise an- 
swer. In what manner is this influence to be exerted? 
In relation to what objects ? The power of influencing 
a person, in the sense in which it is here used, must im- 
ply a power of conferring a benefit upon him. How 
could the Senate confer a benefit upon the President by 
the manner of employing their right of negative upon 
his nominations ? If it be said they might sometimes 
gratify him by an acquiescence in a favorite choice, 
w T hen public motives might dictate a different conduct, I 
answer, that the instances in which the President could 
be personally interested in the result, would be too few 
to admit of his being materially affected by the com- 
pliances of the Senate. The power which can origi- 
nate the disposition of honors and emoluments, is more 
Likely to attract than to be attracted by the power which 
can merely obstruct their course. If by influencing the 
President be meant restraining him, this is precisely 
what must have been intended. And it has been shown 
that the restraint would be salutary, at the same time 
that it would not be such as to destroy a single advan- 
tage to be looked for from the uncontrolled agency of 
that Magistrate. The right of nomination would pro- 
duce all the good of that of appointment, and would in 
a great measure avoid its evils. 



534 The Federalist. 

Upon a comparison of the plan for the appointment 
of the officers of the proposed Government, with that 
which is established by the Constitution of this State, a 
decided preference must be given to the former. In that 
plan, the power of nomination is unequivocally vested 
in the Executive. And as there would be a necessity 
for submitting each nomination to the judgment of an 
entire branch of the Legislature, the circumstances at- 
tending an appointment, from the mode of conducting 
it, would naturally become matters of notoriety ; and 
the public would be at no loss to determine, what part 
had been performed by the different actors. The blame 
of a bad nomination would fall upon the President 
singly and absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good 
one would lie entirely at the door of the Senate; ag- 
gravated by the consideration of their having counter- 
acted the good intentions of the Executive. If an ill 
appointment should be made, the Executive for nomi- 
nating, and the Senate for approving, would participate, 
though in different degrees, in the opprobrium and dis- 
grace. 

The reverse of all this characterizes the manner of 
appointment in this State. The Council of Appoint- 
ment consists of from three to five persons, of whom the 
Governor is always one. This small body, shut up in 
a private apartment, impenetrable to the public eye, 
proceed to the execution of the trust committed to 
them. It is known that the Governor claims the right 
of nomination, upon the strength of some ambiguous 
expressions in the Constitution ; but it is not known 
to what extent, or in what manner he exercises it ; nor 
upon what occasions he is contradicted or opposed. The 
censure of a bad appointment on account of the uncer- 
tainty of its author, and for want of a determinate ob- 
ject, has neither poignancy nor duration. And while 
an unbounded field for cabal and intrigue lies open, at 



The Federalist 535 

idea of responsibility is lost. The most that the public 
can know, is that the Governor claims the right of nom- 
ination ; that two out of the inconsiderable number of 
four men can too often be managed without much dif- 
ficulty ; that if some of the members of a particular 
Council should happen to be of an uncomplying char- 
acter, it is frequently not impossible to get rid of theii 
opposition, by regulating the times of meeting in such a 
manner as to render their attendance inconvenient; and 
that from whatever cause it may proceed, a great num- 
ber of very improper appointments are from time to 
time made. Whether a Governor of this State avails 
himself of the ascendant he must necessarily have, in 
this delicate and important part of the administration, 
to prefer to offices men who are best qualified for them, 
or whether he prostitutes that advantage to the advance- 
ment of persons whose chief merit is their implicit de« 
votion to his will, and to the support of a despicable 
and dangerous system of personal influence, are ques- 
tions which, unfortunately for the community, can only 
be the subjects of speculation and conjecture. 

Every mere Council of Appointment, however con- 
stituted, will be a conclave, in which cabal and intrigue 
will have their full scope. Their number, without an 
unwarrantable increase of expense, cannot be large 
enough to preclude a facility of combination. And as 
each member will have his friends and connections to 
provide for, the desire of mutual gratification will beget 
a scandalous bartering of votes and bargaining for 
places. The private attachments of one man might 
easily be satisfied; but to satisfy the private attachments 
of a dozen, or of twenty men, would occasion a mo- 
nopoly of all the principal employments of the Govern- 
ment, in a few families, and would lead more directly 
to an aristocracy or an oligarchy, than any measure that 
x>uld be contrived. If, to avoid an accumulation of 



536 The Federalist. 

offices, there was to be a frequent change in the persons 
who were to compose the Council, this would involve 
the mischiefs of a mutable administration in their full 
extent. Such a Council would also be more liable to 
Executive influence than the Senate, because they 
would be fewer in number, and would act less imme- 
diately under the public inspection. Such a Council, 
in fine, as a substitute for the plan of the Convention, 
would be productive of an increase of expense, a multi- 
plication of the evils which spring from favoritism and 
intrigue in the distribution of public honors, a decrease 
of stability in the administration of the Government, 
and a diminution of the security against an undue in- 
fluence of the Executive. And yet such a Council has 
been warmly contended for as an essential amendment 
in the proposed Constitution. 

I could not with propriety conclude my observations 
on the subject of appointments, without taking notice of 
a scheme, for which there have appeared some, though 
but few advocates ; I mean that of uniting the House 
of Representatives in the power of making them. I 
shall, however, do little more than mention it, as I can- 
not imagine that it is likely to gain the countenance 
of any considerable part of the community. A body 
so fluctuating, and at the same time so numerous, can 
never be deemed proper for the exercise of that power. 
Its unfitness will appear manifest to all, when it is rec- 
ollected that in half a century it may consist of three 
or four hundred persons. All the advantages of the 
stability, both of the Executive and of the Senate, 
would be defeated by this union; and infinite delays 
and embarrassments would be occasioned. The ex- 
ample of most of the States in their local Constitutions, 
encourages us to reprobate the idea. 

The only remaining powers of the Executive are 
comprehended in giving information to Congress of the 



The Federalist. 537 

Btate of the Union ; in recommending to their consider 
ation such measures as he shall judge expedient ; in 
convening them, or either branch, upon extraordinary 
occasions; in adjourning them when they cannot them- 
selves agree upon the time of adjournment; in receiv- 
ing Ambassadors and other public Ministers ; in faith- 
fully executing the laws; and in commissioning all the 
officers of the United States. 

Except some cavils about the power of convening 
either House of the Legislature, and that of receiving 
Ambassadors, no objection has been made to this class 
of authorities ; nor could they possibly admit of any. 
It required, indeed, an insatiable avidity for censure, to 
invent exceptions to the parts which have been excepted 
to. In regard to the power of convening either House 
uf the Legislature, I shall barely remark, that in respect 
to the Senate at least, we can readily discover a good 
reason for it. As this body has a concurrent power with 
the Executive in the Article of treaties, it might often 
be necessary to call it together with a view to this ob- 
ject, when it would be unnecessary and improper to 
convene the House of Representatives. As to the re- 
ception of Ambassadors, what I have said in a former 
paper will furnish a sufficient answer. 

We have now completed a survey of the structure 
and powers of the Executive department, which, I have 
endeavored to show, combines, as far as republican prin- 
ciples will admit, all the requisites to energy. The 
remaining inquiry is, — Does it also combine the req- 
uisites to safety, in the republican sense, — a due de- 
pendence on the People — a due responsibility? The 
answer to this question has been anticipated in the in- 
vestigation of its other characteristics, and is satisfactori- 
y deducible from these circumstances ; from the election 
of the President once in four years by persons immedi- 
ately chosen by the People for that purpose ; and from 



538 The Federalist. 

his being, at all times, liable to impeachment, trial, dis- 
mission from office, incapacity to serve in any other, and 
to forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent prosecution 
in the common course of law. But these precautions, 
great as they are, are not the only ones which the plan 
of the Convention has provided in favor of the public 
security. In the only instances in which the abuse of 
the Executive authority was materially to be feared, the 
Chief Magistrate of the United States would, by that 
plan, be subjected to the control of a branch of the Leg- 
islative body. What more could be desired by an en- 
lightened and reasonable people ? 

PTJBLIUS. 



[From M'Lean's Edition, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIIL] 

[THE FEDERALIST.] No. LXXVIIL 

[To the People of the State of New York:] 

WE proceed now to an examination of the Judiciary 
department of the proposed Government. 

In unfolding the defects of the existing Confederation 
the utility and necessity of a Fcederal Judicature have 
been clearly pointed out. It is the less necessary to re- 
capitulate the considerations there urged, as the propri- 
ety of the institution in the abstract is not disputed ; the 
only questions which have been raised being relative to 
the manner of constituting it, and to its extent. To 
these points, therefore, our observations shall be confined. 

The manner of constituting it seems to embrace these 
several objects: — 1st, The mode of appointing the 
Judges ; — 2d, The tenure by which they are to hold 
their places ; — 3d. The partition of the Judiciary au- 



The Federalist. 539 

fchority between different courts, and their relations tc 
each other. 

First. As to the mode of appointing the Judges ; this 
is the same with that of appointing the officers of the 
Union in general, and has been so fully discussed in the 
two last numbers, that nothing can be said here which 
would not be useless repetition. 

Second. As to the tenure by which the Judges are 
to hold their places : this chiefly concerns their duration 
in office ; the provisions for their support ; the precautions 
for their responsibility. 

According to the plan of the Convention, all Judges 
who may be appointed by the United States are to hold 
their offices during' good behavior; which is conformable 
to the most approved of the State Constitutions, and 
among the rest, to that of this State. Its propriety hav- 
ing been drawn into question by the adversaries of that 
plan, is no light symptom of the rage for objection, which 
disorders their imaginations and judgments. The 
standard of good behavior for the continuance in office 
of the Judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most 
valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of 
Government. In a monarchy, it is an excellent barrier 
to the despotism of the Prince ; in a republic it is a no 
less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppres- 
sions of the representative body. And it is the best 
expedient which can be devised in any Government, to 
secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration 
of the laws. 

Whoever attentively considers the different depart- 
ments of power must perceive, that, in a Government 
ID which they are separated from each other, the Judici- 
ary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the 
least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitu- 
tion ; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or 
injure them. The Executive not only .dispenses the 



540 The Federalist. 

honors, but holds the sword of the community. The 
Legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes 
the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen 
are to be regulated. The Judiciary, on the contrary, has 
no influence over either the sword or the purse ; no direc- 
tion either of the strength or of the wealth of the society ; 
and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly 
be said to have neither force nor will, but merely judg- 
ment ; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the 
Executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments. 

This simple view of the matter suggests several im- 
portant consequences. It proves incontestably, that the 
Judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three 
departments of power ; * that it can never attack with 
success either of the other two ; and that all possible 
care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their 
attacks. It equally proves, that though individual op- 
pression may now and then proceed from the courts of 
justice, the general liberty of the People can never be 
endangered from that quarter: I mean so long as the 
Judiciary remains truly distinct from both the Legisla- 
ture and Executive. For I agree, that "there is no 
" liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from 
" the Legislative and Executive powers."! And it proves, 
in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing to fear 
from the Judiciary alone, but would have everything to 
fear from its union with either of the other departments; 
that as all the effects of such an union must ensue from 
a dependence of the former on the latter, notwithstand- 
ing a nominal and apparent separation ; that as, from 
the natural feebleness of the Judiciary, it is in continual 
jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its 
coordinate branches; and that as nothing can contribute 

* The celebrated Montesquieu, "judiciary is next to nothing/ 

speaking of them, says, " Of the Spirit of Laws, Vol. I. page 186. — 

" three powers above mentioned, the Publius. 

1 1dem, page 181. — Publius. 



The Federalist. 541 

so much to its firmness and independence as perma 
nency in office, this quality may therefore be justly re- 
garded as an indispensable ingredient in its constitu- 
tion ; and in a great measure, as the citadel of the public 
justice and the public security. 

The complete independence of the Courts of justice 
is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a 
limited Constitution, I understand one which contains 
certain specified exceptions to the Legislative authority ; 
such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of at- 
tainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations 
of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way 
than through the medium of the Courts of justice; 
whose duty it must be to declare all Acts contrary to 
the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without 
this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges 
would amount to nothing. 

Some perplexity respecting the rights of the Courts to 
pronounce Legislative acts void, because contrary to the 
Constitution, has arisen from an imagination that the 
doctrine would imply a superiority of the Judiciary to 
the Legislative power. It is urged that the authority 
which can declare the acts of another void, must neces- 
sarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared 
void. As this doctrine is of great importance in all the 
American Constitutions, a brief discussion of the ground 
on which it rests cannot be unacceptable. 

There is no position which depends on clearer prin- 
ciples, than that every act of a delegated authority, con- 
trary to the tenor of the commission under which it is 
exercised, is void. No Legislative act, therefore, contrary 
to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this, would 
be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal ; 
lhat the servant is above his master ; that the Represent- 
atives of the People are superior to the People them- 
selves ; that men acting by virtue of powers, may do not 



542 The Federalist. 

only what their powers do not authorize, but what they 
forbid. 

If it be said that the Legislative body are themselves 
the constitutional judges of their own powers, and that 
the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon 
the other departments, it may be answered, that this 
cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be 
collected from any particular provisions in the Constitu- 
tion. It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the Con- 
stitution could intend to enable the Representatives of 
the People to substitute their will to that of their con- 
stituents. It is far more rational to suppose, that the 
Courts were designed to be an intermediate body be- 
tween the People and the Legislature, in order, among 
other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned 
to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the 
proper and peculiar province of the Courts. A Con- 
stitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the Judges, 
as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to 
ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any 
particular Act proceeding from the Legislative body. If 
there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance be- 
tween the two, that which has the superior obligation 
and validity ought, of course, to be preferred ; or in other 
words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the 
statute ; the intention of the People to the intention of 
their agents. 

Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a 
superiority of the Judicial to the Legislative power. It 
only supposes that the power of the People is superior 
to both ; and that where the will of the Legislature, de- 
clared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the 
People, declared in the Constitution, the Judges ought 
to be governed by the latter rather than the former 
They ought to regulate their decisions by the funda- 
mental laws, rather than by those which are not funda- 
mental. 



The Federalist. 543 

This exercise of judicial discretion, in determining 
between two contradictory laws, is exemplified in a fa- 
miliar instance. It not uncommonly happens, that there 
are two statutes existing at one time, clashing in whole 
or in part with each other, and neither of them contain- 
ing any repealing clause or expression. In such a case, 
it is the province of the Courts to liquidate and fix their 
meaning and operation ; so far as they can, by any fair 
construction, be reconciled to each other, reason and law 
conspire to dictate that this should be done ; where this 
is impracticable, it becomes a matter of necessity to 
give effect to one, in exclusion of the other. The rule 
which has obtained in the Courts for determining their 
relative validity is, that the last in order of time shall be 
preferred to the first. But this is a mere rule of con- 
struction, not derived from any positive law, but from 
the nature and reason of the thing. It is a rule not 
enjoined upon the Courts by Legislative provision, but 
adopted by themselves, as consonant to truth and pro- 
priety, for the direction of their conduct as interpreters 
of the law. They thought it reasonable, that between 
the interfering acts of an equal authority, that which 
was the last indication of its will should have the pref- 
erence. 

But in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and 
subordinate authority, of an original and derivative 
power, the nature and reason of the thing indicate the 
converse of that rule as proper to be followed. They 
teach us, that the prior act of a superior ought to be 
preferred to the subsequent act of an inferior and subor- 
dinate authority ; and that accordingly, whenever a par- 
ticular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be 
the duty of the Judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter 
and disregard the former. 

It can be of no weight to say that the Courts, on the 
pretence of a repugnancy, may substitute their own 



544 The Federalist 

pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the Legis 
lature. This might as well happen in the case of two 
contradictory statutes ; or it might as well happen in 
every adjudication upon any single statute. The Courts 
must declare the sense of the law ; and if they should 
be disposed to exercise will instead of judgment, the 
consequence would equally be the substitution of their 
pleasure to that of the Legislative body. The obser- 
vation, if it proved anything, would prove that there 
ought to be no Judges distinct from that body. 

If then the Courts of justice are to be considered as 
the bulwarks of a limited Constitution, against Legis- 
lative encroachments, this consideration will afford a 
strong argument for the permanent tenure of Judicial 
offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to 
that independent spirit in the Judges, which must be es- 
sential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty. 

This independence of the Judges is equally requisite 
to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals; 
from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of 
designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, 
sometimes disseminate among the People themselves, 
and which, though they speedily give place to better 
information, and more deliberate reflection, have a ten- 
dency, in the mean time, to occasion dangerous innova- 
tions in the Government, and serious oppressions of the 
minor party in the community. Though I trust the 
friends of the proposed Constitution will never concur 
with its enemies,* in questioning that fundamental prin- 
ciple of republican Government, which admits the right 
of the People to alter or abolish the established Constitu- 
tion, whenever they find it inconsistent with their happi- 
ness, yet it is not to be inferred from this principle, that 
the Representatives of the People, whenever a momen- 

* Vide Protest of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania, Martin^ 
Speech, &c. — PubUus. 



The Federalist. 545 

tary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of 
their constituents, incompatible with the provisions in 
the existing Constitution, would, on that account, be 
justifiable in a violation of those provisions ; or that the 
Courts would be under a greater obligation to connive 
at infractions in this shape, than when they had pro- 
ceeded wholly from the cabals of the Representative 
body. Until the People have, by some solemn and au- 
thoritative act, annulled or changed the established form, 
it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as in- 
dividually ; and no presumption, or even knowledge of 
their sentiments, can warrant their Representatives in a 
departure from it, prior to such an act. But it is easy 
to see, that it would require an uncommon portion of 
fortitude in the Judges to do their duty as faithful 
guardians of the Constitution, where Legislative inva- 
sions of it had been instigated by the major voice of 
the community. 

But it is not with a view to infractions of the Con- 
stitution only, that the independence of the Judges may 
be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional 
ill humors in the society. These sometimes extend no 
farther than to the injury of the private rights of par- 
ticular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws. 
Here also the firmness of the Judicial magistracy is of 
vast importance in mitigating the severity, and confin- 
ing the operation of such laws. It not only serves to 
moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may 
have been passed, but it operates as a check upon the 
Legislative body in passing them ; who, perceiving that 
obstacles to the success of iniquitous intention are to be 
expected from the scruples of the Courts, are in a man- 
ner compelled, by the very motives of the injustice they 
meditate, to qualify their attempts. This is a circum- 
stance calculated to have more influence upon the char- 
acter of our Governments, than but few may be aware 

vol. i. 35 



546 The Federalist. 

of. The benefits of the integrity and moderation of the 
Judiciary have already been felt in more States than 
one; and though they may have displeased those whose 
sinister expectations they may have disappointed, they 
must have commanded the esteem and applause of aK 
the virtuous and disinterested. Considerate men, of 
every description, ought to prize whatever will tend to 
beget or fortify that temper in the Courts; as no man 
can be sure that he may not be to-morrow the victim of 
a spirit of injustice, by which he may be a gainer to-day. 
And every man must now feel, that the inevitable ten- 
dency of such a spirit is to sap the foundations of public 
and private confidence, and to introduce in its stead 
universal distrust and distress. 

That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights 
of the Constitution, and of individuals, which we per- 
ceive to be indispensable in the Courts of justice, can 
certainly not be expected from Judges who hold their 
offices by a temporary commission. Periodical appoint- 
ments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, 
would, in some way or other, be fatal to their necessary 
independence. If the power of making them was com- 
mitted either to the Executive or Legislature, there 
would be danger of an improper complaisance to the 
branch which possessed it ; if to both, there would be 
an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either ; 
if to the People, or to persons chosen by them for the 
special purpose, there would be too great a disposition 
to consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing 
would be consulted but the Constitution and the laws. 

There is yet a further and a weighty reason for the 
permanency of the Judicial offices ; which is deducible 
from the nature of the qualifications they require. It 
has been frequently remarked, with great propriety, that 
a voluminous code of laws is one of the inconveniences 
necessarily connected with the advantages of a free Gov 



The Federalist. 547 

ernment. To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the Courts, 
it is indispensable that they should be bound down by 
strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and 
point out their duty in every particular case that comes 
before them ; and it will readily be conceived from the 
variety of controversies which grow out of the folly and 
wickedness of mankind, that the records of those prece- 
dents must unavoidably swell to a very considerable 
bulk, and must demand long and laborious study to 
acquire a competent knowledge of them. Hence it is, 
that there can be but few men in the society, who will 
have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the 
stations of Judges. And making the proper deductions 
for the ordinary depravity of human nature, the number 
must be still smaller of those who unite the requisite 
integrity with the requisite knowledge. These consid- 
erations apprize us, that the Government can have no 
great option between fit characters ; and that a tempo- 
rary duration in office, which would naturally discour- 
age such characters from quitting a lucrative line of 
practice to accept a seat on the Bench, would have 
a tendency to throw the administration of justice into 
hands less able, and less well qualified, to conduct 
it with utility and dignity. In the present circum- 
stances of this country, and in those in which it is 
likely to be for a long time to come, the disadvantages 
on this score would be greater than they may at first 
sight appear; but it must be confessed, that they are 
far inferior to those which present themselves undei 
the other aspects of the subject. 

Upon the whole, there can be no room to doubt that 
the Convention acted wisely, in copying from the models 
of those Constitutions which have established good be- 
havior as the tenure of their Judicial offices, in point of 
duration ; and that so far from being blamable on this 
account, their plan would have been inexcusably defec- 



548 The Federalist. 

tive, if it had wanted this important feature of good 
Government. The experience of Great Britain affords 
an illustrious comment on the excellence of the institu- 
tion. 

PUBLIUS. 



{From M'Lean's Edition, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIIL] 

[THE FEDERALIST.] No. LXXIX. 



[To the People of the State of New York.:] 

NEXT to permanency in office, nothing can con- 
tribute more to the independence of the Judges, 
than a fixed provision for their support. The remark 
made in relation to the President is equally applicable 
here. In the general course of human nature, a power 
over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will. 
And we can never hope to see realized in practice, the 
complete separation of the Judicial from the Legislative 
power, in any system which leaves the former dependent 
for pecuniary resources on the occasional grants of the 
latter. The enlightened friends to good Government, in 
every State, have seen cause to lament the want of pre- 
cise and explicit precautions in the State Constitutions 
on this head. Some of these indeed have declared, that 
permanent * salaries should be established for the Judges ; 
but the experiment has in some instances shown, that 
such expressions are not sufficiently definite to preclude 
Legislative evasions. Something still more positive and 
unequivocal has been evinced to be requisite. The plan 
of the Convention accordingly has provided, that the 

* Vide Constitution of Massachusetts, Chapter 2, Section 1, Article 13 
— Publius. 



The Federalist. 54S 

Judges of the United States " shall at stated times re- 
"ceive for their services a compensation, which shall 
4< not be diminished during their continuance in office." 

This, all circumstances considered, is the most eligible 
provision that could have been devised. It will readi- 
ly be understood, that the fluctuations in the value of 
money, and in the state of society, rendered a fixed rate 
of compensation in the Constitution inadmissible. What 
might be extravagant to-day, might in half a century 
become penurious and inadequate. It was therefore 
necessary to leave it to the discretion of the Legislature 
to vary its provisions in conformity to the variations in 
circumstances ; yet under such restrictions as to put it 
out of the power of that body to change the condition 
of the individual for the worse. A man may then be 
sure of the ground upon which he stands, and can never 
be deterred from his duty by the apprehension of being 
placed in a less eligible situation. The Clause which 
has been quoted combines both advantages. The sal- 
aries of Judicial offices may from time to time be al- 
tered, as occasion shall require, yet so as never to lessen 
the allowance with which any particular Judge comes 
into office, in respect to him. It will be observed, that 
a difference has been made by the Convention between 
the compensation of the President and of the Judges. 
That of the former can neither be increased nor dimin- 
ished. That of the latter can only not be diminished. 
This probably arose from the difference in the duration of 
the respective offices. As the President is to be elected 
for no more than four years, it can rarely happen that an 
adequate salary, fixed at the commencement of that 
period, will not continue to be such to its end. But 
with regard to the Judges, who, if they behave properly, 
vvill be secured in their places for life, it may well hap- 
pen, especially in the early stages of the Government, 
that a stipend, which would be very sufficient at their 



550 The Federalist. 

first appointment, would become too small in the prog- 
ress of their service. 

This provision for the support of the Judges bears 
every mark of prudence and efficacy ; and it may be 
safely affirmed, that together with the permanent tenure 
of their offices, it affords a better prospect of their in- 
dependence than is discoverable in the Constitutions ol 
any of the States, in regard to their own Judges. 

The precautions for their responsibility are comprised 
in the Article respecting impeachments. They are liable 
to be impeached for malconduct, by the House of Rep- 
resentatives, and tried by the Senate; and, if convicted, 
may be dismissed from office, and disqualified for hold- 
ing any other. This is the only provision on the point, 
which is consistent with the necessary independence of 
the Judicial character; and is the only one which we 
find in our own Constitution in respect to our own 
Judges. 

The want of a provision for removing the Judges on 
account of inability, has been a subject of complaint. 
But all considerate men will be sensible, that such a pro- 
vision would either not be practised upon, or would be 
more liable to abuse, than calculated to answer any good 
purpose. The mensuration of the faculties of the mind 
has, I believe, no place in the catalogue of known arts. 
An attempt to fix the boundary between the regions of 
ability and inability, would much oftener give scope to 
oersonal and party attachments and enmities, than ad- 
vance the interests of justice, or the public good. The 
result, except in the case of insanity, must for the most 
part be arbitrary ; and insanity, without any formal or 
express provision, may be safely pronounced to be a virt- 
ual disqualification. 

The Constitution of New York, to avoid investiga 
fcions that must forever be vague and dangerous, has 
taken a particular age as the criterion of inability. Na 



The Federalist. 551 

nan can be a Judge beyond sixty. I believe there are 
few at present, who do not disapprove of this provision 
There is no station, in relation to which it is less proper 
than to that of a Judge. The deliberating and compar- 
ing faculties generally preserve their strength much be- 
yond that period, in men who survive it ; and when, in 
addition to this circumstance, we consider, how few 
there are who outlive the season of intellectual vigor 
and how improbable it is that any considerable pro- 
portion of the Bench, whether more or less numerous, 
should be in such a situation at the same time, we shall 
be ready to conclude, that limitations of this sort have 
Little to recommend them. In a republic, where fortunes 
are not affluent, and pensions not expedient, the dismis- 
sion of men from stations in which they have served 
their country long and usefully, on which they depend 
for subsistence, and from which it will be too late to 
resort to any other occupation for a livelihood, ought to 
have some better apology to humanity, than is to be 
found in the imaginary danger of a superannuated 
Bench. 

PUBL1US. 



[From M'Lean's Edition, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIII.] 

[THE FEDERALIST.] No. LXXX. 



["To the People of the State of New York :] 

r pO judge with accuracy of the proper extent of the 
-■- Fcederal Judicature, it will be necessary to con- 
sider, in the first place, what are its proper objects. 

It seems scarcely to admit of controversy, that the 
Judiciary authority of the Union ought to extend to 



552 The Federalist. 

these several descriptions of cases: 1st, To all those 
which arise out of the laws of the United States, passed 
in pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of 
Legislation ; 2d, To all those which concern the exe- 
cution of the provisions expressly contained in the Arti- 
cles of Union ; 3d, To all those in which the United 
States are a party; 4th, To all those which involve the 
peace of the Confederacy, whether they relate to the 
intercourse between the United States and foreign na- 
tions, or to that between the States themselves; 5th, 
To all those which originate on the high seas, and are 
of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction ; and, lastly, to all 
those in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed 
to be impartial and unbiased. 

The first point depends upon this obvious consider- 
ation, that there ought always to be a constitutional 
method of giving efficacy to constitutional provisions. 
What, for instance, would avail restrictions on the au- 
thority of the State Legislatures, without some consti- 
tutional mode of enforcing the observance of them ? 
The States, by the plan of the Convention, are prohib- 
ited from doing a variety of things ; some of which are 
incompatible with the interests of the Union, and others 
with the principles of good Government. The imposi- 
tion of duties on imported articles, and the emission of 
paper money, are specimens of each kind. No man of 
sense will believe, that such prohibitions would be scru- 
pulously regarded, without some effectual power in the 
Government to restrain or correct the infractions of 
them. This power must either be a direct negative on 
the State laws, or an authority in the Fcederal Courts 
to overrule such as might be in manifest contravention 
of the Articles of Union. There is no third course that 
I can imagine. The latter appears to have been thought 
by the Convention preferable to the former, and, I pre* 
sume, will be most agreeable to the States. 



The Federalist. 553 

As to the second point, it is impossible, by any argu- 
ment or comment, to make it clearer than it is in itself 
If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety 
of the Judicial power of a Government being coexten- 
sive with its Legislative, may be ranked among the 
number. The mere necessity of uniformity in the inter- 
pretation of the National laws, decides the question. 
Thirteen independent Courts of final jurisdiction over 
the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra 
in Government, from which nothing but contradiction 
and confusion can proceed. 

Still less need be said in regard to the third point. 
Controversies between the Nation and its members or 
citizens, can only be properly referred to the National 
tribunals. Any other plan would be contrary to reason, 
to precedent, and to decorum. 

The fourth point rests on this plain proposition, that 
the peace of the whole ought not to be left at the dis- 
posal of a part. The Union will undoubtedly be an- 
swerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its mem- 
bers. And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to 
be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it. As 
the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of 
Courts, as well as in any other manner, is with reason 
classed among the just causes of war, it will follow, that 
the Foederal Judiciary ought to have cognizance of all 
causes in which the citizens of other countries are con- 
cerned. This is not less essential to the preservation of 
the public faith, than to the security of the public tran- 
quillity. A distinction may perhaps be imagined be- 
tween cases arising upon treaties and the laws of nations 
and those which may stand merely on the footing of 
the municipal law. The former kind may be supposed 
Droper for the Fcederal jurisdiction, the latter for that of 
the States. But it is at least problematical, whether an 
unjust sentence against a foreigner, where the subject of 



554 The Federalist. 

controversy was wholly relative to the lex loci, woulc 
not, if unredressed, be an aggression upon his Sovereign, 
as well as one which violated the stipulations of a treaty, 
or the general Law of Nations. And a still greater ob- 
jection to the distinction would result from the immense 
difficulty, if not impossibility, of a practical discrimina- 
tion between the cases of one complexion and those of 
the other. So great a proportion of the cases in which 
foreigners are parties, involve National questions, that it 
is by far most safe and most expedient to refer all those 
in which they are concerned to the National tribunals. 

The power of determining causes between two States, 
between one State and the citizens of another, and be- 
tween the citizens of different States, is perhaps not less 
essential to the peace of the Union than that which has 
been just examined. History gives us a horrid picture 
of the dissensions and private wars which distracted and 
desolated Germany prior to the institution of the Impe- 
rial Chamber by Maximilian, towards the close of the 
fifteenth century ; and informs us, at the same time, of 
the vast influence of that institution in appeasing the 
disorders and establishing the tranquillity of the Empire. 
This was a Court invested with authority to decide 
finally all differences among the members of the Ger- 
manic body. 

A method of terminating territorial disputes between 
the States, under the authority of the Foederal head, was 
not unattended to, even in the imperfect system by which 
they have been hitherto held together. But there are 
many other sources, besides interfering claims of boun- 
dary, from which bickerings and animosities may spring 
up among the members of the Union. To some of these 
we have been witnesses in the course of our past expe- 
rience. It will readily be conjectured that I allude to 
the fraudulent laws which have been passed in too many 
af the States. And though the proposed Constitution 



The Federalist. 555 

establishes particular guards against the repetition of 
those instances which have heretofore made their appear- 
ance, yet it is warrantable to apprehend, that the spirit 
which produced them will assume new shapes that could 
not be foreseen nor specifically provided against. What- 
ever practices may have a tendency to disturb the har- 
mony between the States, are proper objects of Foederal 
superintendence and control. 

It may be esteemed the basis of the Union, that " the 
I citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privi- 
I leges and immunities of citizens of the several States." 
And if it be a just principle that every Government ought 
to possess the means of executing' its own provisions, by its 
own authority, it will follow, that in order to the invio- 
lable maintenance of that equality of privileges and im- 
munities to which the citizens of the Union will be enti- 
tled, the National Judiciary ought to preside in all cases 
in which one State or its citizens are opposed to another 
State or its citizens. To secure the full effect of so fun- 
damental a provision against all evasion and subterfuge, 
it is necessary that its construction should be committed 
to that tribunal, which having no local attachments will 
be likely to be impartial between the different States and 
their citizens, and which, owing its official existence to 
the Union, will never be likely to feel any bias inauspi- 
cious to the principles on which it is founded. 

The fifth point will demand little animadversion. 
The most bigoted idolizers of State authority have not 
thus far shown a disposition to deny the National Judi- 
ciary the cognizance of maritime causes. These so gen- 
erally depend on the Laws of Nations, and so commonly 
affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall within the 
considerations which are relative to the public peace. 
The most important part of them are, by the present 
Confederation, submitted to Foederal jurisdiction. 

The reasonableness of the agency of the National 



556 The Federalist. 

Courts in cases in which the State tribunals cannot be 
supposed to be impartial, speaks for itself. No man 
ought certainly to be a Judge in his own cause, or in 
any cause, in respect to which he has the least interest 
or bias. This principle has no inconsiderable weight in 
designating the Foederal courts as the proper tribunals 
for the determination of controversies between different 
States and their citizens. And it ought to have the 
same operation in regard to some cases between citi- 
zens of the same State. Claims to land under grants 
of different States, founded upon adverse pretensions of 
boundary, are of this description. The Courts of neither 
of the granting States could be expected to be unbiased. 
The laws may have even prejudged the question, and 
tied the Courts down to decisions in favor of the grants 
of the State to which they belonged. And even where 
this had not been done, it would be natural that the 
Judges, as men, should feel a strong predilection to the 
claims of their own Government. 

Having thus laid down and discussed the principles 
which ought to regulate the constitution of the Foederal 
Judiciary, we will proceed to test, by these principles, 
the particular powers of which, according to the plan of 
the Convention, it is to be composed. It is to compre- 
hend " all cases in law and equity arising under the Con- 
" stitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties 
"made, or which shall be made, under their authority, 
"to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Minis- 
" ters, and Consuls ; to all cases of admiralty and mari- 
time jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United 
" States shall be a party; to controversies between two 
" or more States ; between a State and citizens of an- 
" other State ; between citizens of different States ; be- 
u tween citizens of the same State, claiming lands under 

* grants of different States ; and between a State or the 

* citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, and sub- 



Tlie Federalist. 557 

M jects." This constitutes the entire mass of the Judi- 
cial authority of the Union. Let us now review it in 
detail. It is then to extend, 

First. To all cases in law and equity, arising under 
the Constitution and the laics of the United States. This 
corresponds with the two first classes of causes, which 
have been enumerated, as proper for the jurisdiction of 
the United States. It has been asked, what is meant 
by "cases arising under the Constitution," in contra- 
distinction from those " arising under the laws of the 
I United States ? " The difference has been already ex- 
plained. All the restrictions upon the authority of the 
State Legislatures furnish examples of it. They are not, 
for instance, to emit paper money ; but the interdiction 
results from the Constitution, and will have no connec- 
tion with any law of the United States. Should paper 
money, notwithstanding, be emitted, the controversies 
concerning it would be cases arising upon the Constitu- 
tion and not the laws of the United States, in the ordi- 
nary signification of the terms. This may serve as a 
sample of the whole. 

It has also been asked, What need of the word "equi- 
ty?" What equitable causes can grow out of the Consti- 
tution and laws of the United States ? There is hardly 
a subject of litigation between individuals, which may 
not involve those ingredients of fraud, accident, trust, or 
hardship, which would render the matter an object of 
equitable, rather than of legal jurisdiction, as the dis- 
tinction is known and established in several of the 
States. It is the peculiar province, for instance, of a 
Court of Equity to relieve against what are called hard 
bargains: these are contracts in which, though there may 
have been no direct fraud or deceit, sufficient to invali- 
date them in a Court of Law, yet there may have been 
some undue and unconscionable advantage taken of the 
necessities or misfortunes of one of the parties, which 



558 The Federalist. 

a Court of Equity would not tolerate. In such cases, 
where foreigners were concerned on either side, it would 
be impossible for the Fcederal judicatories to do justice 
without an equitable as well as a legal jurisdiction. 
Agreements to convey lands claimed under the grants 
of different States, may afford another example of the 
necessity of an equitable jurisdiction in the Foederal 
Courts. This reasoning may not be so palpable in those 
States where the formal and technical distinction be* 
tween Law and Equity is not maintained, as in this 
State, where it is exemplified by every day's practice. 

The Judiciary authority of the Union is to extend, 

Second. To treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the authority of the United States, and to all 
cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and 
Consuls. These belong to the fourth class of the enu- 
merated cases, as they have an evident connection with 
the preservation of the National peace. 

Third. To cases of admiralty and maritime juris- 
diction. These form, altogether, the fifth of the enu- 
merated classes of causes, proper for the cognizance of 
the National Courts. 

Fourth. To controversies to which the United States 
shall be a party. These constitute the third of those 
classes. 

Fifth. To controversies between two or more States ; 
between a State and citizens of another State ; between 
citizens of different States. These belong to the fourth 
of those classes, and partake, in some measure, of the 
nature of the last. 

Sixth. To cases between the citizens of the same 
State, claiming lands under grants of different States, 
These fall within the last class, and are the only in- 
stances in which the proposed Constitution directly content' 
plates the cognizance of disputes between the citizens of 
the same State, 



The Federalist. 55S 

Seventh. To cases between a State and the citizens 
thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects. These 
have been already explained to belong to the fourth 
of the enumerated classes, and have been shown to be, 
in a peculiar manner, the proper subjects of the National 
judicature. 

From this review of the particular powers of the 
Fcederal Judiciary, as marked out in the Constitution, 
it appears, that they are all conformable to the principles 
which ought to have governed the structure of that de- 
partment, and which were necessary to the perfection 
of the system. If some partial inconveniences should 
appear to be connected with the incorporation of any of 
them into the plan, it ought to be recollected, that the 
National Legislature will have ample authority to make 
such exceptions, and to prescribe such regulations, as will 
be calculated to obviate or remove these inconveniences. 
The possibility of particular mischiefs can never be 
viewed, by a well-informed mind, as a solid objection to 
a general principle, which is calculated to avoid general 
mischiefs, and to obtain general advantages. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From M'Lean's Edition, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIIL] 

[THE FEDERALIST.] No. LXXXI. 



[To the People of the State of New York:] 

LET us now return to the partition of the Judiciary 
authority between different Courts, and their rela- 
tions to each other. 

"The Judicial power of the United States is" (by 



560 The Federalist. 

the plan of the Convention) " to be vested in one Su« 
" preme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Con- 
egress may, from time to time, ordain and establish."* 

That there ought to be one Court of supreme and 
final jurisdiction, is a proposition which is not likely 
to be contested. The reasons for it have been assigned 
in another place, and are too obvious to need repetition. 
The only question that seems to have been raised con- 
cerning it, is, whether it ought to be a distinct body, or 
a branch of the Legislature. The same contradiction 
is observable in regard to this matter, which has been 
remarked in several other cases. The very men who 
object to the Senate as a Court of Impeachments, on 
the ground of an improper intermixture of powers, ad- 
vocate, by implication at least, the propriety of vesting 
the ultimate decision of all causes, in the whole or in a 
part of the Legislative body. 

The arguments, or rather suggestions, upon which this 
charge is founded, are to this effect: — "The authority 
" of the proposed Supreme Court of the United States, 
" which is to be a separate and independent body, will be 
" superior to that of the Legislature. The power of 
" construing the laws according to the spirit of the Con- 
" stitution, will enable that Court to mould them into 
" whatever shape it may think proper ; especially as its 
" decisions will not be in any manner subject to the revi- 
" sion or correction of the Legislative body. This is as 
" unprecedented as it is dangerous. In Britain, the Ju- 
" dicial power, in the last resort, resides in the House of 
" Lords, which is a branch of the Legislature ; and this 
"part of the British Government has been imitated in 
" the State Constitutions in general. The Parliament of 
% Great Britain, and the Legislatures of the several 
11 States, can at any time rectify, by law, the exception- 
K able decisions of their respective Courts. But the errors 
* Article 3, Sec. 1. — Publius. 



The Federalist. 561 

' and usurpations of the Supreme Court of the United 
I States will be uncontrollable and remediless." This, 
upon examination, will be found to be altogether made 
up of false reasoning upon misconceived fact. 

In the first place, there is not a syllable in the plan 
under consideration which directly empowers the National 
Courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the 
Constitution, or which gives them any greater latitude in 
this respect than may be claimed by the Courts of every 
State. I admit, however, that the Constitution ought 
to be the standard of construction for the laws, and that 
wherever there is an evident opposition, the laws ought to 
give place to the Constitution. But this doctrine is not 
deducible from any circumstance peculiar to the plan of 
the Convention ; but from the general theory of a limited 
Constitution ; and as far as it is true, is equally applica- 
ble to most, if not to all the State Governments. There 
can be no objection, therefore, on this account, to the 
Fcederal judicature, which will not lie against the local 
judicatures in general, and which will not serve to con- 
demn every Constitution that attempts to set bounds 
to Legislative discretion. 

But perhaps the force of the objection may be thought 
to consist in the particular organization of the Supreme 
Court: in its being composed of a distinct body of 
magistrates instead of being one of the branches of the 
Legislature, as in the Government of Great Britain and 
that of this State. To insist upon this point, the au- 
thors of the objection must renounce the meaning they 
have labored to annex to the celebrated maxim, requiring 
a separation of the departments of power. It shall, never- 
theless, be conceded to them, agreeably to the interpreta- 
tion given to that maxim in the course of these papers, 
'hat it is not violated by vesting the ultimate power of 
judging in a part of the Legislative body. But though 
this be not an absolute violation of that excellent rule, yet 

vol. i 36 



562 The Federalist. 

it verges so nearly upon it, as on this account alone tobe| 
less eligible than the mode preferred by the Convention, 
From a body which had even a partial agency in passingl 
bad laws, we could rarely expect a disposition to temper! 
and moderate them in the application. The same spirit 
which had operated in making them would be too apt 
in interpreting them; still less could it be expected, that 
men who had infringed the Constitution, in the character 
of Legislators, would be disposed to repair the breach in 
the character of Judges. Nor is this all ; every reason 
which recommends the tenure of good behavior for Ju- 
dicial offices, militates against placing the Judiciary 
power, in the last resort, in a body composed of men 
chosen for a limited period. There is an absurdity in 
referring the determinations of causes, in the first in- 
stance, to Judges of permanent standing ; in the last, 
to those of a temporary and mutable constitution. And 
there is a still greater absurdity in subjecting the deci- 
sions of men selected for their knowledge of the laws, 
acquired by long and laborious study, to the revision 
and control of men, who, for want of the same advan- 
tage, cannot but be deficient in that knowledge. The 
members of the Legislature will rarely be chosen with 
a view to those qualifications which fit men for the sta- 
tions of Judges ; and as, on this account, there will be 
great reason to apprehend all the ill consequences of 
defective information, so, on account of the natural pro- 
pensity of such bodies to party divisions, there will be 
no less reason to fear, that the pestilential breath of fac- 
tion may poison the fountains of justice. The habit of 
being continually marshalled on opposite sides, will be 
too apt to stifle the voice both of law and of equity. 

These considerations teach us to applaud the wisdom 
of those States, who have committed the Judicial power, 
in the last resort, not to a part of the Legislature, but to 
distinct and independent bodies of men. Contrary to 



The Fadderalist. 563 

the supposition of those who have represented the plan 
of the Convention, in this respect, as novel and unpre- 
cedented, it is but a copy of the Constitutions of New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Georgia; and the preference which has been given to 
those models is highly to be commended. 

It is not true, in the second place, that the Parliament 
of Great Britain, or the Legislatures of the particular 
States, can rectify the exceptionable decisions of their 
respective Courts, in any other sense than might be done 
by a future Legislature of the United States. The 
theory, neither of the British, nor the State Constitutions, 
authorizes the revisal of a Judicial sentence by a Legis- 
lative act. Nor is there anything in the proposed Con- 
stitution, more than in either of them, by which it is for- 
bidden. In the former, as well as in the latter, the impro- 
priety of the thing on the general principles of law and 
reason, is the sole obstacle. A Legislature, without ex- 
ceeding its province, cannot reverse a determination 
once made in a particular case ; though it may prescribe 
a new rule for future cases. This is the principle, and 
it applies in all its consequences, exactly in the same 
manner and extent, to the State Governments, as to the 
National Government now under consideration. Not 
the least difference can be pointed out in any view of 
the subject. 

It may in the last place be observed, that the supposed 
danger of Judiciary encroachments on the Legislative au- 
thority, which has been upon many occasions reiterated, 
is in reality a phantom. Particular misconstructions 
and contraventions of the will of the Legislature, may 
now and then happen ; but they can never be so exten- 
sive as to amount to an inconvenience, or in any sen- 
Bible degree to affect the order of the political system, 
This may be inferred with certainty, from the general 



564 The Federalist. 

nature of the Judicial power; from the objects to whicl 
it relates; from the manner in which it is exercised 
from its comparative weakness ; and from its total inca- 
pacity to support its usurpations by force. And the 
inference is greatly fortified by the consideration of the 
important constitutional check which the power of in- 
stituting impeachments in one part of the Legislative 
body; and of determining upon them in the other, would 
give to that body upon the members of the Judicial 
department. This is alone a complete security. There 
never can be danger that the Judges, by a series of de- 
liberate usurpations on the authority of the Legislature, 
would hazard the united resentment of the body in- 
trusted with it, while this body was possessed of the 
means of punishing their presumption, by degrading 
them from their stations. While this ought to remove 
all apprehensions on the subject, it affords, at the same 
time, a cogent argument for constituting the Senate a 
Court for the Trial of Impeachments. 

Having now examined, and, I trust, removed the ob- 
jections to the distinct and independent organization of 
the Supreme Court, I proceed to consider the propriety 
of the power of constituting inferior Courts,* and the 
relations which will subsist between these and the 
former. 

The power of constituting inferior Courts, is evidently 
calculated to obviate the necessity of having recourse to 
the Supreme Court in every case of Foederal cognizance. 
It is intended to enable the National Government to in- 
stitute or authorize, in each State or district of the 

* This power has been absurdly evident design of the provision is, 

represented as intended to abolish to enable the institution of local 

all the County Courts in the several Courts, subordinate to the Supreme, 

States, which are commonly called either in States or larger districts. 

Inferior Courts. But the expres- It is ridiculous to imagine that 

sions of the Constitution are, to con- County Courts were in contempla- 

etitute "tribunals inferior to tion. — Publius. 
"the Supreme Court ; " and the 



The Federalist. 566 

United States, a tribunal competent to the determination 
of matters of National jurisdiction within its limits. 

But why, it is asked, might not the same purpose 
have been accomplished by the instrumentality of the 
State Courts? This admits of different answers. 
Though the fitness and competency of those Courts 
should be allowed in the utmost latitude, yet the sub- 
stance of the power in question may still be regarded as 
a necessary part of the plan, if it were only to em- 
power the National Legislature to commit to them the 
cognizance of causes arising out of the National Con- 
stitution. To confer the power of determining such 
causes upon the existing Courts of the several States, 
would perhaps be as much " to constitute tribunals," 
as to create new Courts with the like power. But ought 
not a more direct and explicit provision to have been 
made in favor of the State Courts ? There are, in my 
opinion, substantial reasons against such a provision : 
the most discerning cannot foresee, how far the preva- 
lency of a local spirit may be found to disqualify the 
local tribunals for the jurisdiction of National causes ; 
whilst every man may discover, that Courts constituted 
like those of some of the States would be improper 
channels of the Judicial authority of the Union. State 
Judges, holding their offices during pleasure, or from 
year to year, will be too little independent to be relied 
upon for an inflexible execution of the National laws. 
And if there was a necessity for confiding the original 
cognizance of causes arising under those laws to them, 
there would be a correspondent necessity for leaving the 
door of appeal as wide as possible. In proportion to 
the grounds of confidence in, or distrust of the subor- 
dinate tribunals, ought to be the facility or difficulty of 
appeals. And well satisfied as I am of the propriety of 
\he appellate jurisdiction, in the several classes of causes 
to which it is extended by the plan of the Convention, 



566 The Federalist 

I should consider everything calculated to give, in prac- 
tice, an unrestrained coarse to appeals, as a source of 
public and private inconvenience. 

I am not sure, but that it will be found highly expe- 
dient and useful, to divide the United States into four 
or five, or half a dozen districts ; and to institute 
Fcederal Court in each district, in lieu of one in every 
State. The Judges of these Courts, with the aid of the 
State Judges, may hold circuits for the trial of causes 
in the several parts of the respective districts. Justice 
through them may be administered with ease and de- 
spatch ; and appeals may be safely circumscribed within 
a narrow compass. This plan appears to me at pres- 
ent the most eligible of any that could be adopted ; 
and in order to it, it is necessary that the power of 
constituting inferior Courts should exist in the full ex- 
tent in which it is to be found in the proposed Constitu- 
tion. 

These reasons seem sufficient to satisfy a candid 
mind, that the want *of such a power would have been 
a great defect in the plan. Let us now examine, in 
what manner the Judicial authority is to be distributed 
between the Supreme and the inferior Courts of the 
Union. 

The Supreme Court is to be invested with original ju- 
risdiction, only " in cases affecting Ambassadors, other 
" public Ministers, and Consuls, and those in which a 
" State shall be a party." Public Ministers of every class 
are the immediate representatives of their Sovereigns. 
All questions in which they are concerned are so directly 
connected with the public peace, that, as well for the 
preservation of this, as out of respect to the sovereignties 
they represent, it is both expedient and proper, that such 
questions should be submitted in the first instance to the 
highest judicatory of the Nation. Though Consuls have 
not in strictness a diplomatic character, yet as they are 



The Federalist. 567 

the public agents of the Nations to which they belong 
the same observation is in a great measure applicable tc 
them. In cases in which a State might happen to be a 
party, it would ill suit its dignity to be turned over to an 
inferior tribunal. 

Though it may rather be a digression from the imme- 
diate subject of this paper, I shall take occasion to 
mention here a supposition which has excited some 
alarm upon very mistaken grounds. It has been sug- 
gested that an assignment of the public securities of one 
State to the citizens of another would enable them to 
prosecute that State in the Fcsderal Courts for the 
amount of those securities : a suggestion, which the 
following considerations prove to be without foundation. 

It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be 
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent, 
This is the general sense, and the general practice of 
mankind ; and the exemption, as one of the attributes 
of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the Government of 
every State in the Union. Unless therefore, there is a 
surrender of this immunity in the plan of the Conven- 
tion, it will remain with the States, and the danger inti- 
mated must be merely ideal. The circumstances which 
are necessary to produce an alienation of State sover- 
eignty, were discussed in considering the Article of tax- 
ation, and need not be repeated here. A recurrence to 
the principles there established will satisfy us, that there 
is no color to pretend that the State Governments would 
by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege 
of paying their own debts in their own way, free from 
every constraint, but that which flows from the obliga- 
tions of good faith. The contracts between a nation 
and individuals are only binding on the conscience of 
the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive 
c orce. They confer no right of action, independent of 
the sovereign will. To what purpose would it be to 



568 The Federalist. 

authorize suits against States for the debts they owe 1 
How could recoveries be enforced ? It is evident, ii 
?ould not be done, without waging war against the con- 
tracting State ; and to ascribe to the Foederal Courts, by 
mere implication, and in destruction of a preexisting 
right of the State Governments, a power which would 
involve such a consequence, would be altogether forced 
and unwarrantable. 

Let us resume the train of our observations. We 
have seen, that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court would be confined to two classes of causes, and 
those of a nature rarely to occur. In all other cases of 
Foederal cognizance, the original jurisdiction would ap- 
pertain to the inferior tribunals ; and the Supreme Court 
would have nothing more than an appellate jurisdiction, 
" with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as 
" the Congress shall make." 

The propriety of this appellate jurisdiction has been 
scarcely called in question in regard to matters of law ; 
but the clamors have been loud against it as applied 
to matters of fact. Some well-intentioned men in this 
State, deriving their notions from the language and forms 
which obtain in our Courts, have been induced to con- 
sider it as an implied supersedure of the trial by jury, in 
favor of the civil-law mode of trial, which prevails in 
our Courts of Admiralty, Probates, and Chancery. A 
technical sense has been affixed to the term " appellate," 
which, in our law parlance, is commonly used in refer- 
ence to appeals in the course of the civil law. But if I 
am not misinformed, the same meaning would not be 
given to it in any part of New England. There an ap- 
peal from one jury to another, is familiar both in lan- 
guage and practice, and is even a matter of course, until 
♦here have been two verdicts on one side. The word 
li appellate," therefore, will not be understood in the 
Bame sense in New England as in New York, which 



The Federalist. 569 

shows the impropriety of a technical interpretation da» 
rived from the jurisprudence of any particular State. 
The expression, taken in the abstract, denotes nothing 
more than the power of one tribunal to review the pro- 
ceedings of another, either as to the law or fact, or both. 
The mode of doing it may depend on ancient custom or 
legislative provision, (in a new Government it must de- 
pend on the latter,) and may be with or without the aid 
of a jury, as may be judged advisable. If, therefore, the 
reexamination of a fact once determined by a jury, 
should in any case be admitted under the proposed Con- 
stitution, it may be so regulated as to be done by a sec- 
ond jury, either by remanding the cause to the Court 
below for a second trial of the fact, or by directing an 
issue immediately out of the Supreme Court. 

But it does not follow that the reexamination of a 
fact once ascertained by a jury, will be permitted in the 
Supreme Court. Why may not it be said, with the 
strictest propriety, when a writ of error is brought from 
an inferior to a superior Court of law in this State, that 
the latter has jurisdiction of the fact, as well as the 
law ? It is true it cannot institute a new inquiry con- 
cerning the fact, but it takes cognizance of it as it ap- 
pears upon the record, and pronounces the law arising 
upon it.* This is jurisdiction of both fact and law ; 
nor is it even possible to separate them. Though the 
common-law Courts of this State ascertain disputed 
facts by a jury, yet they unquestionably have jurisdic- 
tion of both fact and law; and accordingly when 
the former is agreed in the pleadings, they have no re- 
course to a jury, but proceed at once to judgment. I 
contend, therefore, on this ground, that the expressions, 
" appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact," do not 
necessarily imply a reexamination in the Supreme Court 
of facts decided by juries in the inferior Courts. 

* This word is composed of jus ing or pronouncing of the law. — 
and dictio, juris dictio, or a speak- Publius. 



570 The Federalist. 

The following train of ideas may well be imagined to 
have influenced the Convention, in relation to this par- 
ticular provision. The appellate jurisdiction of the Su- 
preme Court (it may have been argued) will extend to 
causes determinable in different modes, some in the 
course of the common law, others in the course of the 
civil law. In the former, the revision of the law only 
will be, generally speaking, the proper province of the 
Supreme Court ; in the latter, the reexamination of the 
fact is agreeable to usage, and in some cases, of which 
prize causes are an example, might be essential to the 
preservation of the public peace. It is therefore neces- 
sary, that the appellate jurisdiction should, in certain 
cases, extend in the broadest sense to matters of fact. 
It will not answer to make an express exception of cases 
which shall have been originally tried by a jury, because 
in the Courts of some of the States all causes are tried 
in this mode;* and such an exception would preclude 
the revision of matters of fact, as well where it might 
be proper, as where it might be improper. To avoid all 
inconveniences, it will be safest to declare generally, 
that the Supreme Court shall possess appellate jurisdic 
tion, both as to law and fact, and that this jurisdiction 
shall be subject to such exceptions and regulations 
as the National Legislature may prescribe. This will 
enable the Government to modify it in such a manner as 
will best answer the ends of public justice and security. 

This view of the matter, at any rate, puts it out of all 
doubt that the supposed abolition of the trial by jury, 
by the operation of this provision, is fallacious and un- 
true. The Legislature of the United States would cer- 
rainly have full power to provide, that in appeals to the 
Supreme Court there should be no reexamination of facts, 

* I hold that the States will have in many cases of Foederal cogni 
concurrent jurisdiction with the zance, as will be explained in m* 
Vibordinate Fcederal judicatories, next paper. — Publius. 



Tlie Federalist. 571 

where they had been tried in the origina. causes by 
juries. This would certainly be an authorized excep- 
tion ; but if, for the reason already intimated, it should 
be thought too extensive, it might be qualified with a 
limitation to such causes only as are determinable at 
common law in that mode of trial. 

The amount of the observations hitherto made on the 
authority of the Judicial department is this : that it has 
been carefully restricted to those causes which are mani- 
festly proper for the cognizance of the National Judica- 
ture ; that in the partition of this authority, a very small 
portion of original jurisdiction has been reserved to the 
Supreme Court, and tfie rest consigned to the subordinate 
tribunals; that the Supreme Court will possess an appel- 
late jurisdiction both as to law and fact, in all the cases 
referred to them, but subject to any exceptions and regu- 
lations which may be thought advisable ; that this ap- 
pellate jurisdiction does, in no case, abolish the trial by 
jury ; and that an ordinary degree of prudence and in- 
tegrity in the National Councils, will insure us solid ad- 
vantages from the establishment of the proposed Judici- 
ary, without exposing us to any of the inconveniences 
which have been predicted from that source. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From M'Leax's Edition, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIIL] 

[THE FEDERALIST.] No. LXXXIL 



[To the People of the State of New York:] 

THE erection of a new Government, whatever care o 
wisdom may distinguish the work, cannot fail tc 
originate questions of intricacy and nicety; and theae 



572 The Federalist. 

may, in a particular manner, be expected to flow from 
the establishment of a Constitution founded upon the 
total or partial incorporation of a number of distinct 
sovereignties. 'Tis time only that can mature and per- 
fect so compound a system, can liquidate the meaning 
of all the parts, and can adjust them to each other in 
a harmonious and consistent whole. 

Such questions, accordingly, have arisen upon the 
plan proposed by the Convention, and particularly con- 
cerning the Judiciary department. The principal of 
these respect the situation of the State Courts, in regard 
to those causes which are to be submitted to Foederal 
jurisdiction. Is this to be exclusive, or are those Courts 
to possess a concurrent jurisdiction? If the latter, in 
what relation will they stand to the National tribunals ? 
These are inquiries which we meet with in the mouths 
of men of sense, and which are certainly entitled to at- 
tention. 

The principles established in a former paper* teach 
us that the States will retain all preexisting authorities 
which may not be exclusively delegated to the Foederal 
head ; and that this exclusive delegation can only exist 
in one of three cases : where an exclusive authority is, 
in express terms, granted to the Union ; or where a par- 
ticular authority is granted to the Union, and the exer- 
cise of a like authority is prohibited to the States ; or 
where an authority is granted to the Union, with which 
a similar authority in the States would be utterly in- 
compatible. Though these principles may not apply 
with the same force to the Judiciary, as to the Legisla- 
tive power, yet I am inclined to think, that they are, in 
the main, just with respect to the former, as well as the 
latter. And under this impression, I shall lay it down 
as a rule, that the State Courts will retain the jurisdic- 
tion they now have, unless it appears to be taken away 
in one of the enumerated modes. 

* No. XXXI. — Publius. 



The Federalist. 573 

The only thing in the proposed Constitution, which 
wears the appearance of confining the causes of Fcederal 
cognizance to the Foederal Courts, is contained is this 
passage : — " The Judicial power of the United States 
"shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such in- 
ferior Courts as the Congress shall from time to time 
"ordain and establish." This might either be construed 
to signify, that the Supreme and subordinate Courts of 
the Union should alone have the power of deciding 
those causes, to which their authority is to extend ; or 
simply to denote, that the organs of the National Judi- 
ciary should be one Supreme Court, and as many sub- 
ordinate Courts as Congress should think proper to ap- 
point; or in other words, that the United States should 
exercise the Judicial power with which they are to be 
invested, through one supreme tribunal, and a certain 
number of inferior ones, to be instituted by them. The 
first excludes, the last admits, the concurrent jurisdic- 
tion of the State tribunals ; and as the first would 
amount to an alienation of State power by implication, 
the last appears to me the most natural and the most 
defensible construction. 

But this doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction is only 
clearly applicable to those descriptions of causes, of 
which the State Courts have previous cognizance. It 
is not equally evident in relation to cases which may 
grow out of, and be peculiar to, the Constitution to be 
established ; for not to allow the State Courts a right of 
jurisdiction in such cases, can hardly be considered as 
the abridgment of a preexisting authority. I mean not 
therefore to contend that the United States, in the 
course of legislation upon the objects intrusted to 
their direction, may not commit the decision of causes 
arising upon a particular regulation to the Foederal 
Courts, solely, if such a measure should be deemed ex- 
pedient; but I hold that the State Courts will be di- 



574 The Federalist. 

vested of no part of their primitive jurisdiction, furthei 
than may relate to an appeal ; and I am even of opinion 
that in every case in which they were not expressly 
excluded by the future acts of the National Legislature, 
they will of course take cognizance of the causes to 
which those acts may give birth. This I infer from the 
nature of Judiciary power, and from the general genius 
of the system. The Judiciary power of every Govern- 
ment looks beyond its own local or municipal laws, and 
in civil cases lays hold of all subjects of litigation be- 
tween parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes 
of dispute are relative to' the laws of the most distant 
part of the globe. Those of Japan, not less than of 
New York, may furnish the objects of legal discussion 
to our Courts. When in addition to this we consider 
the State Governments and the National Governments, 
as they truly are, in the light of kindred systems, and as 
parts of one whole, the inference seems to be conclu- 
sive, that the State Courts would have a concurrent juris- 
diction, in all cases arising under the laws of the Union, 
where it was not expressly prohibited. 

Here another question occurs : What relation would 
subsist between the National and State Courts in these 
instances of concurrent jurisdiction ? I answer, that an 
appeal would certainly lie from the latter, to the Su- 
preme Court of the United States. The Constitution 
in direct terms gives an appellate jurisdiction to the 
Supreme Court in all the enumerated cases of Fcederal 
cognizance, in which it is not to have an original one, 
without a single expression to confine its operation to 
the inferior Foederal Courts. The objects of appeal, not 
the tribunals from which it is to be made, are alone 
contemplated. From this circumstance, and from the 
reason of the thing, it ought to be construed to extend 
to the State tribunals. Either this must be the case, 01 
the local Courts must be excluded from a concurrent 



The Federalist 57t 

jurisdiction in matters of National concern, else the 
Judiciary authority of the Union may be eluded at the 
pleasure of every plaintiff or prosecutor. Neither of 
these consequences ought, without evident necessity, to 
be involved; the latter would be entirely inadmissible, 
as it would defeat some of the most important and 
avowed purposes of the proposed Government, and 
would essentially embarrass its measures. Nor do I 
perceive any foundation for such a supposition. Agree- 
ably to the remark already made, the National and State 
systems are to be regarded as one whole, The Courts of 
the latter will of course be natural auxiliaries to the exe- 
cution of the laws of the Union, and an appeal from them 
will as naturally lie to that tribunal, which is destined 
to unite and assimilate the principles of National justice 
and the rules of National decisions. The evident aim of 
the plan of the Convention is, that all the causes of the 
specified classes shall, for weighty public reasons, re- 
ceive their original or final determination in the Courts 
of the Union. To confine, therefore, the general expres- 
sions giving appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme 
Court, to appeals from the subordinate Fcederal Courts, 
instead of allowing their extension to the State Courts, 
would be to abridge the latitude of the terms, in subver- 
sion of the intent, contrary to every sound rule of in- 
terpretation. 

But could an appeal be made to lie from the State 
Courts to the subordinate Fcederal judicatories ? This is 
another of the questions which have been raised, and of 
greater difficulty than the former. The following con- 
siderations countenance the affirmative. The plan of 
the Convention, in the first place, authorizes the Nation- 
al Legislature " to constitute tribunals inferior to the 
'' Supreme Court." * It declares, in the next place, that 
f the Judicial power of the United States shall be vestea 

* Sec. 8th. Art. 1st. — Publius. 



576 The Federalist. 

#< in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as 
r * Congress shall ordain and establish ;" and it then pro- 
ceeds to enumerate the cases, to which this Judicial 
power shall extend. It afterwards divides the jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court into original and appellate, but 
gives no definition of that of the subordinate Courts. 
The only outlines described for them are, that they shall 
be " inferior to the Supreme Court," and that they shall 
not exceed the specified limits of the Foederal Judiciary. 
Whether their authority shall be original or appellate, or 
both, is not declared. All this seems to be left to the 
discretion of the Legislature. And this being the case, 
I perceive at present no impediment to the establishment 
of an appeal from the State Courts to the subordinate 
National tribunals ; and many advantages attending the 
power of doing it may be imagined. It would diminish 
the motives to the multiplication of Foederal Courts, and 
would admit of arrangements calculated to contract the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The State 
tribunals may then be left with a more entire charge 
of Foederal causes ; and appeals, in most cases in which 
they may be deemed proper, instead of being carried to 
the Supreme Court, may be made to lie from the State 

Courts to District Courts of the Union. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From M'Lean's Edition, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIIL] 

[THE FEDERALIST.] No. LXXXIIL 



[To the People of the State of New York :] 

T I1HE objection to the plan of the Convention, which 
■-■- has met with most success in this State, and per- 
haps in several of the other States, is that relative to the 



The Federalist. 577 

Wan* of a constnu Aortal provision for the trial by jury in 
civil cases. The disingenuous form in which this objec- 
tion is usually stated, has been repeatedly adverted to 
and exposed; but continues to be pursued in all the con- 
versations and writings of the opponents of the plan. 
The mere silence of the Constitution in regard to civil 
causes, is represented as an abolition of the trial by jury ; 
and the declamations to which it has afforded a pretext 
are artfully calculated to induce a persuasion, that this 
pretended abolition is complete and universal; extending 
not only to every species of civil, but even to criminal 
causes. To argue with respect to the latter, would, how- 
ever, be as vain and fruitless, as to attempt the serious 
proof of the existence of matter, or to demonstrate any 
of those propositions, which, by their own internal evi- 
dence, force conviction, when expressed in language 
adapted to convey their meaning. 

With regard to civil causes, subtleties almost too con- 
temptible for refutation have been employed to counte- 
nance the surmise, that a thing, which is only not pro- 
vided for, is entirely abolished. Every man of discern- 
ment must at once perceive the wide difference between 
silence and abolition. But as the inventors of this fallacy 
have attempted to support it by certain legal maxims of 
interpretation, which they have perverted from their true 
meaning, it may not be wholly useless to explore the 
ground they have taken. 

The maxims on which they rely are of this nature : 
" A specification of particulars is an exclusion of gen- 
erals;" or, " The expression of one thing is the exclu- 
sion of another." Hence, say they, as the Constitu- 
tion has* established the trial by jury in criminal cases, 
and is silent in respect to civil, this silence is an implied 
prohibition of trial by jury, in regard to the latter. 

The rules of legal interpretation are rules of common 
tense, adopted by the Courts in the construction of the 

vol. i. 37 



578 The Federalist. 

laws. The true test, therefore, of a just application of 
them, is its conformity to the source from which they 
are derived. This being the case, let me ask, if it is 
consistent with common sense to suppose, that a provi- 
sion obliging the Legislative power to commit the trial 
of criminal causes to juries, is a privation of its right to 
authorize or permit that mode of trial in other cases? 
Is it natural to suppose, that a command to do one thing 
is a prohibition to the doing of another, which there was 
a previous power to do, and which is not incompatible 
with the thing commanded to be done ? If such a sup- 
position would be unnatural and unreasonable, it can- 
not be rational to maintain, that an injunction of the 
trial by jury in certain cases, is an interdiction of it in 
others. 

A power to constitute Courts is a power to prescribe 
the mode of trial ; and consequently, if nothing way 
said in the Constitution, on the subject of Juries, the 
Legislature would be at liberty, either to adopt that in- 
stitution, or to let it alone. This discretion, in regard to 
criminal causes, is abridged by the express injunction of 
trial by jury in all such cases; but it is of course left at 
arge in relation to civil causes, there being a total silence 
on this head. The specification of an obligation to try 
all criminal causes in a particular mode, excludes indeed 
the obligation or necessity of employing the same mode 
in civil causes, but does not abridge the power of the 
Legislature to exercise that mode, if it should be thought 
proper. The pretence, therefore, that the National Leg- 
islature would not be at full liberty to submit all the 
civil causes of Foederal cognizance to the determination 
of juries, is a pretence destitute of all just foundation. 

From these observations this conclusion results, that 
the trial by jury in civil cases would not be abolished ; 
and that the use attempted to be made of the maxims 
which have been quoted, is contrary to reason and com- 



The Federalist, £76 

un.cn sense, and therefore not admissible. Even if these 
maxims had a precise technical sense, corresponding 
with the ideas of those who employ them upon the 
present occasion, which, however, is not the case, they 
would still be inapplicable to a Constitution of Govern- 
ment. In relation to such a subject, the natural and ob- 
vious sense of its provisions, apart from any technical 
rules, is the true criterion of construction. 

Having now seen that the maxims relied upon will 
not bear the use made of them, let us endeavor to ascer- 
tain their proper use and true meaning. This will be 
best done by examples. The plan of the Convention de- 
clares, that the power of Congress, or, in other words, of 
the National Legislature, shall extend to certain enumer- 
ated cases. This specification of particulars evidently 
excludes all pretension to a general Legislative author- 
ity ; because an affirmative grant of special powers 
would be absurd, as well as useless, if a general author- 
ity was intended. 

In like manner, the Judicial authority of the Fcederal 
Judicatures is declared by the Constitution to compre- 
hend certain cases particularly specified. The expres- 
sion of those cases marks the precise limits, beyond 
which the Fcederal Courts cannot extend their jurisdic- 
tion ; because the objects of their cognizance being 
enumerated, the specification would be nugatory, if it 
did not exclude all ideas of more extensive authority. 

These examples are sufficient to elucidate the maxims 
which have been mentioned, and to designate the man- 
ner in which they should be used. But that there may 
be no possibility of misapprehension upon this subject, 
I shall add one case more, to demonstrate the proper 
use of these maxims, and the abuse which has been 
made of them. 

Let us suppose that by the laws of this State a mar- 
ried woman was incapable of conveying her estate, and 



580 The Federalist. 

that the Legislature, considering this as an evil, should en- 
act that she might dispose of her property by deed ex- 
ecuted in the presence of a magistrate. In such a case 
there can be no doubt but the specification would 
amount to an exclusion of any other mode of convey- 
ance; because the woman having no previous power to 
alienate her property, the specification determines the 
particular mode which she is, for that purpose, to avail 
herself of. But let us further suppose that in a subse- 
quent part of the same Act it should be declared that 
no woman should dispose of any estate of a determinate 
value without the consent of three of her nearest rela- 
tions, signified by their signing the deed ; could it be in- 
ferred from this regulation that a married woman might 
not procure the approbation of her relations to a deed 
for conveying property of inferior value? The posi- 
tion is too absurd to merit a refutation, and yet this is 
precisely the position which those must establish who 
contend that the trial by juries, in civil cases, is abol- 
ished, because it is expressly provided for in cases of 
a criminal nature. 

From these observations, it must appear unquestion- 
ably true, that trial by jury is in no case abolished by 
the proposed Constitution ; and it is equally true, that 
in those controversies between individuals in which the 
great body of the People are likely to be interested, that 
Anstitution will remain precisely in the same situation in 
which it is placed by the State Constitutions, and will 
be in no degree altered or influenced by the adoption of 
the plan under consideration. The foundation of this 
assertion is, that the National Judiciary will have no 
cognizance of them, and of course they will remain de- 
terminable as heretofore by the State Courts only, and 
in the manner which the State Constitutions and laws 
prescribe. All land causes, except where claims under 
the grants of different States come into question, and all 



The Federalist. 581 

ither controversies between the citizens of the same 
State, unless where they depend upon positive violations 
of the Articles of Union, by Acts of the State Legisla- 
tures, will belong exclusively to the jurisdiction of the 
State tribunals. Add to this, that admiralty causes, 
and almost all those which are of equity jurisdiction, are 
determinable under our own Government without the 
intervention of a jury; and the inference from the whole 
will be, that this institution, as it exists with us at pres- 
ent, cannot possibly be affected, to any great extent, by 
the proposed alteration in our system of Government. 

The friends and adversaries of the plan of the Con- 
tention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in 
the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if there is 
any difference between them it consists in this: the 
former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty ; the 
latter represent it as the very palladium of free Govern- 
ment. For my own part, the more the operation of the 
institution has fallen under my observation, the more 
reason I have discovered for holding it in high estima- 
tion ; and it would be altogether superfluous to examine 
to what extent it deserves to be esteemed useful or 
essential in a representative republic, or how much 
more merit it may be entitled to, as a defence against 
the oppressions of an hereditary monarch, than as a 
barrier to the tyranny of popular Magistrates in a popu- 
lar Government. Discussions of this kind would be more 
curious than beneficial, as all are satisfied of the utility 
of the institution, and of its friendly aspect to liberty, 
But I must acknowledge that I cannot readily discern 
the inseparable connection between the existence of lib- 
erty, and the trial by jury in civil cases. Arbitrary im- 
peachments, arbitrary methods of prosecuting pretended 
offences, and arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary con- 
victions, have ever appeared to me to be the great en- 
gines of Judicial despotism ; and these have all relation 



582 The Federalist. 

to criminal proceedings. The trial by jury in criminal 
cases, aided by the habeas corpus Act, seems therefore 
to be alone concerned in the question. And both of 
these are provided for, in the most ample manner, in 
the plan of the Convention. 

It has been observed, that trial by jury is a safeguard 
against an oppressive exercise of the power of taxation. 
This observation deserves to be canvassed. 

It is evident that it can have no influence upon the 
Legislature, in regard to the amount of the taxes to be 
laid, to the objects upon which they are to be imposed, 
or to the rule by which they are to be apportioned. If 
it can have any influence, therefore, it must be upon the 
mode of collection, and the conduct of the officers in- 
trusted with the execution of the revenue laws. 

As to the mode of collection in this State, under our 
own Constitution, the trial by jury is in most cases out 
of use. The taxes are usually levied by the more sum- 
mary proceeding of distress and sale, as in cases of rent. 
And it is acknowledged on all hands, that this is essen- 
tial to the efficacy of the revenue laws. The dilatory 
course of a trial at law to recover the taxes imposed 
on individuals, would neither suit the exigencies of the 
public, nor promote the convenience of the citizens. It 
would often occasion an accumulation of costs, more 
burdensome than the original sum of the tax to be levied. 

And as to the conduct of the officers of the revenue, 
the provision in favor of trial by jury in criminal cases, 
will afford the security aimed at. Wilful abuses of a 
public authority, to the oppression of the subject, and 
every species of official extortion, are offences against 
the Government ; for which the persons who commit 
them may be indicted and punished according to the 
circumstances of the case. 

Tr e excellence of the trial by jury in civil cases ap- 
pears o depend on circumstances foreign to the preser 



The Federalist. 583 

nation of liberty. The strongest argument in its favor 
is, that it is a security against corruption. As there is 
always more time, and better opportunity, to tamper 
with a standing body of magistrates, than with a jury 
summoned for the occasion, there is room to suppose, 
that a corrupt influence would more easily find its way 
to the former than to the latter. The force of this con- 
sideration is, however, diminished by others. The 
Sheriff, who is the summoner of ordinary juries, and the 
Clerks of Courts, who have the nomination of special 
juries, are themselves standing officers, and acting indi- 
vidually, may be supposed more accessible to the touch 
of corruption than the Judges, who are a collective body. 
It is not difficult to see, that it would be in the power of 
those officers to select jurors who would serve the pur- 
pose of the party as well as a corrupted Bench. In the 
next place, it may fairly be supposed, that there would 
be less difficulty in gaining some of the jurors promis- 
cuously taken from the public mass, than in gaining men 
who had been chosen by the Government for their pro- 
bity and good character. But making every deduction 
for these considerations, the trial by jury must still be a 
valuable check upon corruption. It greatly multiplies 
the impediments to its success. As matters now stand, 
it would be necessary to corrupt both Court and jury; 
for where the jury have gone evidently wrong, the Court 
will generally grant a new trial, and it would be in most 
cases of little use to practice upon the jury, unless the 
Court could be likewise gained. Here then is a double 
security ; and it will readily be perceived, that this com- 
plicated agency tends to preserve the purity of both in- 
stitutions. By increasing the obstacles to success, it 
discourages attempts to seduce the integrity of either. 
The temptations to prostitution, which the Judges might 
lave to surmount, must certainly be much fewer, while 
Hie cooperation of a jury i« necessary, than they roigh- 



584 The Federalist. 

be, if they had themselves the exclusive determination 
of all causes. 

Notwithstanding, therefore, the doubts I have ex- 
pressed, as to the essentiality of trial by jury in civil 
cases, to liberty, I admit that it is in most cases, under 
proper regulations, an excellent method of determining 
questions of property ; and that on this account alone, 
it would be entitled to a constitutional provision in its 
favor if it were possible to fix the limits within which 
it ought to be comprehended. There is, however, in all 
cases, great difficulty in this ; and men not blinded by 
enthusiasm, must be sensible, that in a Fcederal Gov- 
ernment, which is a composition of societies whose 
ideas and institutions in relation to the matter ma- 
terially vary from each other, that difficulty must be- 
not a little augmented. For my own part, at every 
new view I take of the subject, I become more 
convinced of the reality of the obstacles, which, we are 
authoritatively informed, prevented the insertion of a 
provision on this head in the plan of the Convention. 

The great difference between the limits of the jury 
trial in different States, is not generally understood. 
And as it must have considerable influence on the sen- 
tence we ought to pass upon the omission complained 
of in regard to this point, an explanation of it is neces- 
sary. In this State, our Judicial establishments resem- 
ble, more nearly than in any other, those of Great 
Britain. We have Courts of common law, Courts of 
Probates, (analogous in certain matters to the spiritual 
Courts in England,) a Court of Admiralty, and a Court 
of Chancery. In the Courts of common law only, the 
trial by jury prevails, and this with some exceptions. In 
all the others, a single Judge presides, and proceeds in 
general either according to the course of the canon or 
civil law, without the aid of a jury.* In New Jerse), 

* It has been erroneously insinu- Chancery, that this Court generally 
|ted, with regard to the Court of tries disputed facts by a jury. The 



The Federalist 585 

there is a Court of Chancery which proceeds like ours 
but neither Courts of Admiralty, nor of Probates, in the 
sense in which these last are established with us. In 
that State the Courts of common law have the cogni- 
zance of those causes, which with us are determinable in 
the Courts of Admiralty and of Probates, and of course 
the jury trial is more extensive in New Jersey, than in 
New York. In Pennsylvania, this is perhaps still more 
the case, for there is no Court of Chancery in that State, 
and its common-law Courts have equity jurisdiction. It 
has a Court of Admiralty, but none of Probates, at least 
on the plan of ours. Delaware has in these respects im- 
itated Pennsylvania. Maryland approaches more nearly 
to New York, as does also Virginia, except that the 
latter has a plurality of Chancellors. North Carolina 
bears most affinity to Pennsylvania ; South Carolina to 
Virginia. I believe, however, that in some of those 
States which have distinct Courts of Admiralty, the 
causes depending in them are triable by juries. In 
Georgia there are none but common-law Courts, and an 
appeal of course lies from the verdict of one jury to an- 
other, which is called a special jury, and for which a 
particular mode of appointment is marked out. In Con- 
necticut, they have no distinct Courts either of Chancery 
or of Admiralty, and their Courts of Probates have no 
jurisdiction of causes. Their common-law Courts have 
admiralty, and, to a certain extent, equity jurisdiction 
In cases of importance, their General Assembly is the 
only Court of Chancery. In Connecticut, therefore, the 
trial by jury extends in practice further than in any other 
State yet mentioned. Rhode Island is % I believe, in this 
particular, pretty much in the situation of Connecticut 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire, in regard to the 
blending of law, equity, and admiralty jurisdictions, are 

truth is, that references to a jury in validity of a devise of land come* 
Aiat Court rarely happen, and are in into question. — Publius. 
V> case necessary hut where the 



586 The Federalist. 

in a similar piedicament. In the four Eastern States, the 
trial by jury not only stands upon a broader foundation 
than in the other States, but it is attended with a pecul- 
iarity unknown, in its full extent, to any of them. 
There is an appeal of course from one jury to another, 
till there have been two verdicts out of three on one side. 

From this sketch it appears, that there is a material 
diversity, as well in the modification as in the extent of 
the institution of trial by jury in civil cases, in the sev- 
eral States ; and from this fact, these obvious reflections 
flow : first, that no general rule could have been fixed 
upon by the Convention, which would have corresponded 
with the circumstances of all the States ; and secondly, 
that more, or at least as much might have been hazarded, 
by taking the system of any one State for a standard, as 
by omitting a provision altogether, and leaving the mat- 
ter as has been done to Legislative regulation. 

The propositions which have been made for supplying 
the omission, have rather served to illustrate, than to 
obviate the difficulty of the thing. The minority of 
Pennsylvania have proposed this mode of expression for 
the purpose — Ci Trial by jury shall be as heretofore" — 
and this I maintain would be senseless and nugatory. 
The United States, in their united or collective capacity, 
are the object to which all general provisions in the Con- 
stitution must necessarily be construed to refer. Now, 
it is evident, that though trial by jury, with various lim- 
itations, is known in each State individually, yet in the 
United States, as such, it is, at this time altogether un- 
known; because the present Foederal Government has 
no Judiciary power whatever ; and consequently, there is 
no proper antecedent or previous establishment, to which 
the term heretofore could relate. It would therefore be 
destitute of a precise meaning, and inoperative from its 
mcertainty. 

As on the one hand, the form of the provision would 



The Federalist. 587 

uot fulfil the intent of its proposers ; so on the other, if 
T apprehend that intent rightly, it would be in itself in- 
expedient. I presume it to be, that causes in the Fcederal 
Courts should be tried by jury, if, in the State where the 
Courts sat, that mode of trial would obtain in a similar 
case in the State Courts, — that is to say, admiralty 
causes should be tried in Connecticut by a jury, in New 
York without one. The capricious operation of so dis- 
similar a method of trial in the same cases, under the 
same Government, is of itself sufficient to indispose 
every well-regulated judgment towards it. Whether 
the cause should be tried with or without a jury, would 
depend, in a great number of cases, on the accidental 
situation of the Court and parties. 

But this is not, in my estimation, the greatest objec- 
tion. I feel a deep and deliberate conviction, that there 
are many cases in which the trial by iury is an ineligible 
one. I think it so particularly, in cases which concern 
the public peace with foreign nations ; tnat is, in most 
cases where the question turns wholly on the Laws of 
Nations. Of this nature, among others, are all prize 
causes. Juries cannot be supposed competent to investi- 
gations, that require a thorough knowledge of the laws 
and usages of nations ; and they will sometimes be under 
the influence of impressions which will not suffer them 
to pay sufficient regard to those considerations of public 
policy, which ought to guide their inquiries. There 
would of course be always danger, that the rights of 
other nations might be infringed by their decisions, so as 
to afford occasions of reprisal and war. Though the 
proper province of juries be to determine matters of fact, 
yet in most cases, legal consequences are complicated 
with fact in such a manner, as to render a separation 
impracticable. 

It will add great weight to this remark, in relation to 
orize causes, to mention that the method of determining 



588 The bwderalist. 

them has been thought worthy of particular regulation 
in various treaties between different powers of Europe, 
and that, pursuant to such treaties, they are determinable 
in Great Britain in the last resort before the King himself 
in his Privy Council, where the fact as well as the law 
undergoes a reexamination. This alone demonstrates 
the impolicy of inserting a fundamental provision in the 
Constitution which would make the State systems a 
standard for the National Government in the Article un- 
der consideration, and the danger of encumbering the 
Government with any constitutional provisions, the pro- 
priety of which is not indisputable. 

My convictions are equally strong, that great advan- 
tages result from the separation of the equity from the 
law jurisdiction ; and that the causes which belong to 
the former, would be improperly committed to juries. 
The great and primary use of a Court of equity is to 
give relief in extraordinary cases, which are exceptions * 
to general rules. To unite the jurisdiction of such cases 
with the ordinary jurisdiction, must have a tendency to 
unsettle the general rules, and to subject every case that 
arises to a special determination ; while a separation of 
the one from the other has the contrary effect of render- 
ing one a sentinel over the other, and of keeping each 
within the expedient limits. Besides this, the circum- 
stances that constitute cases proper for Courts of equity 
are in many instances so nice and intricate, that they 
are incompatible with the genius of trials by jury. They 
require often such long, deliberate and critical inves- 
tigation, as would be impracticable to men called from 
their occupations, and obliged to decide before they were 
permitted to return to them. The simplicity and expe- 
dition which form the distinguishing characters of this 

* It is true that the principles by are in the main applicable to spb- 

virion that relief is governed are cial circumstances, which form ex 

now reduced to a regular system ; cepticns to general rules. — Publius 
Vut it is not the less true that they 



The Federalist. 58tf 

mode of trial require, that the matter to be decided 
should be reduced to some single and obvious point ; 
while the litigations usual in Chancery, frequently com- 
prehend a long train of minute and independent partic- 
ulars. 

It is true, that the separation of the equity from the 
legal jurisdiction is peculiar to the English system of 
jurisprudence : which is the model that has been fol- 
lowed in several of the States. But it is equally true, 
that the trial by jury has been unknown in every case 
in which they have been united. And the separation 
is essential to the preservation of that institution in its 
pristine purity. The nature of a Court of equity will 
readily permit the extension of its jurisdiction to mat- 
ters of law ; but it is not a little to be suspected, that 
the attempt to extend the jurisdiction of the Courts of 
law to matters of equity will not only be unproductive 
o^* the advantages which may be derived from Courts 
ot Chancery, on the plan upon which they are estab- 
lished in this State, but will tend gradually to change 
the nature of the Courts of law, and to undermine thr 
trial by jury, by introducing questions too complicated 
for a decision in that mode. 

These appear to be conclusive reasons against incor- 
porating the systems of all the States, in the formation 
of the National Judiciary, according to what may be 
conjectured to have been the intent of the Pennsylvania 
minority. Let us now examine, how far the proposition 
of Massachusetts is calculated to remedy the supposed 
defect. 

It is in this form : " In civil actions between citizens 
f of different States, every issue of fact, arising in actions 
1 at common law, may be tried by a jury if the parties, 
P! or either of them, request it." 

This, at best, is a proposition confined to one descrip- 
tion of causes ; and the inference is fair, either that the 



D90 The Federalist. 

Massachusetts Convention considered that as the only 
class of Fcederal causes, in which the trial by jury would 
be proper ; or that if desirous of a more extensive pro- 
vision, they found it impracticable to devise one which 
would properly answer the end. If the first, the omis- 
,sion of a regulation respecting so partial an object can 
never be considered as a material imperfection in the 
system. If the last, it affords a strong corroboration of 
the extreme difficulty of the thing. 

But this is not all: if we advert to the observations 
already made respecting the Courts that subsist in the 
several States of the Union, and the different powers ex- 
ercised by them, it will appear, that there are no expres- 
sions more vague and indeterminate than those which 
have been employed to characterize that species of causes 
which it is intended shall be entitled to a trial by jury. 
In this State, the boundaries between actions at com- 
mon law and actions of equitable jurisdiction, are ascer« 
tained in conformity to the rules which prevail in Eng- 
land upon that subject. In many of the other States, 
the boundaries are less precise. In some of them, every 
cause is to be tried in a Court of common law, and upon 
that foundation every action may be considered as an 
action at common law, to be determined by a jury, if 
the parties, or either of them, choose it. Hence the 
same irregularity and confusion would be introduced by 
a compliance with this proposition, that I have already 
noticed as resulting from the regulation proposed by the 
Pennsylvania minority. In one State a cause would 
receive its determination from a jury, if the parties, or 
either of them, requested it; but in another State, a 
cause exactly similar to the other, must be decided with- 
out the intervention of a jury, because the State judi- 
catories varied as to common-law jurisdiction. 

It is obvious, therefore, that the Massachusetts prop- 
osition, upon this subject, cannot operate as a general 



The Federalist. 591 

regulation, until some uniform plan, with respect to the 
limits of common-law and equitable jurisdictions, shall 
be adopted by the different States. To devise a plan of 
that kind, is a task arduous in itself, and which it would 
require much time and reflection to mature. It would be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to suggest any gen- 
eral regulation that would be acceptable to all the States 
in the Union, or that would perfectly quadrate with the 
several State institutions. 

It may be asked, Why could not a reference have been 
made to the Constitution of this State, taking that, 
which is allowed by me to be a good one, as a standard 
for the United States ? I answer, that it is not very 
probable the other States should entertain the same 
opinion of our institutions which we do ourselves. It is 
natural to suppose that they are hitherto more attached 
to their own, and that each would struggle for the pref- 
erence. If the plan of taking one State as a model for 
the whole had been thought of in the Convention, it is 
to be presumed that the adoption of it in that body, 
would have been rendered difficult by the predilection 
of each representation in favor of its own Government ; 
and it must be uncertain, which of the States would 
have been taken as the model. It has been shown that 
many of them would be improper ones. And I leave 
it to conjecture, whether, under all circumstances, it is 
most likely that New York, or some other State, would 
have been preferred. But admit that a judicious selec- 
tion could have been effected in the Convention, still 
there would have been great danger of jealousy and dis- 
gust in the other States, at the partiality which had been 
shown to the institutions of one. The enemies of the 
plan would have been furnished with a fine pretext for 
raising a host of local prejudices against it, which per- 
haps might have hazarded, in no inconsiderable degree, 
»ts final establishment. 



592 The Federalist. 

To avoid the embarrassments of a definition of the 
cases which the trial by jury ought to embrace, it is 
sometimes suggested by men of enthusiastic tempers, 
that a provision might have been inserted for establish- 
ing it in all cases whatsoever. For this, I believe no 
precedent is to be found in any member of the Union ; 
and the considerations which have been stated in discuss- 
ing the proposition of the minority of Pennsylvania, 
must satisfy every sober mind, that the establishment 
of the trial by jury in all cases, would have been an un- 
pardonable error in the plan. 

In short, the more it is considered, the more arduous 
will appear the task of fashioning a provision in such a 
form as not to express too little to answer the purpose, 
or too much to be advisable ; or which might not have 
opened other sources of opposition to the great and 
essential object of introducing a firm National Govern- 
ment. 

I cannot but persuade myself on the other hand, that 
the different lights in which the subject has been placed 
in the course of these observations, will go far towards 
removing in candid minds the apprehensions they may 
have entertained on the point. They have tended to 
show, that the security of liberty is materially concerned 
only in the trial by jury in criminal cases, which is pro- 
vided for in the most ample manner in the plan of the 
Convention ; that even in far the greatest proportion of 
civil cases, and those in which the great body of the com- 
munity is interested, that mode of trial will remain in its 
full force, as established in the State Constitutions, un- 
touched and unaffected by the plan of the Convention ; 
that it is in no case abolished* by that plan; and that 
Miere are great, if not insurmountable difficulties, in the 

* Vide No. LXXXI.,in which the ters of fact being vested in the Su- 
pposition of its being abolished preme Court, is examined and re 
by the appellate jurisdiction in mat- futed. — Publius. 



The Federalist. 593 

way of making any precise and proper provision for it, 
in a Constitution for the United States. 

The best judges of the matter will be the least anxious 
for a constitutional establishment of the trial by jury in 
civil cases, and will be the most ready to admit, that the 
changes which are continually happening in the affairs 
of society, may render a different mode of determining 
questions of property preferable in many cases in which 
that mode of trial now prevails. For my part I ac- 
knowledge myself to be convinced, that even in this 
State it might be advantageously extended to some cases 
to which it does not at present apply, and might as ad- 
vantageously be abridged in others. It is conceded by 
all reasonable men, that it ought not to obtain in all 
cases. The examples of innovations which contract its 
ancient limits as well in these States as in Great Britain, 
afford a strong presumption that its former extent has 
been found inconvenient; and give room to suppose 
that future experience may discover the propriety and 
utility of other exceptions. I suspect it to be impos- 
sible in the nature of the thing, to fix the salutary point 
at which the operation of the institution ought to stop ; 
and this is with me a strong argument for leaving the 
matter to the discretion of the Legislature. 

This is now clearly understood to be the case in 
Great Britain, and it is equally so in the State of Con- 
necticut ; and yet it may be safely affirmed, that more 
numerous encroachments have been made upon the trial 
by jury in this State since the Revolution, though pro- 
vided for by a positive Article of our Constitution, than 
has happened in the same time either in Connecticut or 
Great Britain. It may be added, that these encroach- 
ments have generally originated with the men who en- 
deavor to persuade the People they are the warmest de- 
fenders of popular liberty, but who have rarely suffered 
constitutional obstacles to arrest them in a favorite career. 

vol. i. 38 



594 The Federalist. 

The truth is, that the general genius of a Government is 
all that can be substantially relied upon for permanent 
effects. Particular provisions, though not altogether 
useless, have far less virtue and efficacy than are com- 
monly ascribed to them ; and the want of them will 
never be, with men of sound discernment, a decisive 
objection to any plan which exhibits the leading char- 
acters of a good Government. 

It certainly sounds not a little harsh and extraordinary 
to affirm that there is no security for liberty in a Con- 
stitution which expressly establishes the trial by jury in 
criminal cases, because it does not do it in civil also ; 
while it is a notorious fact that Connecticut, which has 
been always regarded as the most popular State in the 
Union, can boast of no constitutional provision for 

either. 

PUBLIUS. 



[From M'Lean's Edition, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIII.J 

[THE FQEDERALIST.] NO. LXXXIV. 



[To the People of the State of New Yoke:] 

IN the course of the foregoing review of the Consti- 
tion, I have taken notice of, and endeavored to an- 
swer most of the objections which have appeared against 
it. There, however, remain a few which either did not 
fall naturally under any particular head, or were forgot- 
ten in their proper places. These shall now be discussed ; 
but as the subject has been drawn into great length, I 
shall so far consult brevity, as to comprise all my obser- 
vations on these miscellaneous points in a single paper. 
The most considerable of the remaining objections is 



The Federalist. 595 

that the plan of the Convention contains no Bill of Rights 
Among other answers given to this, it has been upon 
different occasions remarked, that the Constitutions of 
several of the States are in a similar predicament. I 
add, that New York is of the number. And yet the 
opposers of the new system, in this State, who profess 
an unlimited admiration for its Constitution, are among 
the most intemperate partisans of a Bill of Rights. To 
justify their zeal in this matter, they allege two things : 
one is, that though the Constitution of New York has 
no Bill of Rights prefixed to it, yet it contains, in the 
body of it, various provisions in favor of particular 
privileges and rights, which, in substance, amount to 
the same thing ; the other is, that the Constitution 
adopts, in their full extent, the common and statute 
law of Great Britain, by which many other rights, not 
expressed in it, are equally secured. 

To the first I answer, that the Constitution proposed 
by the Convention contains, as well as the Constitution 
of this State, a number of such provisions. 

Independent of those which relate to the structure of 
the Government, we find the following : — Article 1, Sec- 
tion 3, Clause 7, " Judgment in cases of impeachment 
"shall not extend further than to removal from office, 
"and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of 
" honor, trust, or profit under the United States ; but the 
" party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject 
" to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment accord- 
" ing to law." Section 9, of the same Article, Clause 2, 
"The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
" suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or inva- 
u sion the public safety may require it." Clause 3, 
w No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be 

* passed." Clause 7, " No title of nobility shall be 

* granted by the United States ; and no person hold- 

* ing any office of profit or trust under them, shall, 



596 The Federalist. 

' l without the consent of the Congress, accept of anj 
u present, emolument, office, or title of any kind what- 
" ever, from any king, prince, or foreign State." Article 
3, Section 2, Clause 3, " The trial of all crimes, except 
" in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury ; and such 
" trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes 
"shall have been committed ; but when not committed 
"within any State, the trial shall be at such place or 
" places as the Congress may by law have directed." 
Section 3, of the same Article, " Treason against the 
" United States shall consist only in levying war against 
" them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid 
" and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason, 
" unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same 
"overt act, or on confession in open Court." And 
Clause 3, of the same Section, " The Congress shall 
" have power to declare the punishment of treason ; but 
" no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, 
" or forfeiture, except during the life of the person at- 
" tainted." 

It may well be a question, whether these are not, 
upon the whole, of equal importance with any which 
are to be found in the Constitution of this State. The 
establishment of the writ of habeas corpus, the prohibi- 
tion of ex post facto laws, and of titles of nobility, to 
which we have no corresponding provisions in our Consti- 
tution, are perhaps greater securities to liberty and repub- 
licanism than any it contains. The creation of crimes 
after the commission of the fact, or, in other words, the 
subjecting of men to punishment for things which, 
when they were done, were breaches of no law, and 
the practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all 
ages, the favorite and most formidable instruments of 
tyranny. The observations of the judicious Blackstone,* 
in reference to the latter, are well worthy of recital ; 

* Vide Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. 1, page 136. — Publim. 



The Federalist. 597 

* To bereave a man of life," (says he,) " or by violence tc 
I confiscate his estate without accusation or trial, would 
u be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, as must 
I at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the 
" whole nation ; but confinement of the person, by se- 
I cretly hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings are 
" unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, 
I and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary 
I Government." And as a remedy for this fatal evil 
he is everywhere peculiarly emphatical in his enco- 
miums on the habeas corpus Act, which in one place he 
calls " the bulwark of the British Constitution." * 

Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of 
the prohibition of titles of nobility. This may truly be 
denominated the corner-stone of Republican Govern- 
ment ; for so long as they are excluded, there can never 
be serious danger that the Government will be any 
other than that of the People. 

To the second, that is, to the pretended establishment 
of the common and statute law by the Constitution, I 
answer, that they are expressly made subject " to such 
" alterations and provisions as the Legislature shall from 
" time to time make concerning the same." They are 
therefore at any moment liable to repeal by the ordinary 
Legislative power, and of course have no constitu- 
tional sanction. The only use of the declaration was 
to recognize the ancient law, and to remove doubts 
which might have been occasioned by the Revolution. 
This consequently can be considered as no part of a 
declaration of rights ; which under our Constitutions 
must be intended as limitations of the power of the 
Government itself. 

It has been several times truly remarked, that Bills of 
Rights are, in their origin, stipulations between kings and 
heir subjects, abridgments of prerogative in favor of 

* Vide Blackstoxe's Commentaries, vol. 4, page 438. — Publius. 



598 The Federalist. 

privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to the 
prince. Such was Magna Charta, obtained by the 
Barons, sword in hand, from King John. Such were 
the subsequent confirmations of that charter by suc- 
ceeding princes. Such was the Petition of Right as- 
sented to by Charles L, in the beginning of his re^gn. 
Such, also, was the Declaration of Right presented by the 
Lords and Commons to the Prince of Orange in 1688, 
and afterwards thrown into the form of an Act of Parlia- 
ment called the Bill of Rights. It is evident, therefore, 
that, according to their primitive signification, they have 
no application to Constitutions professedly founded upon 
the power of the People, and executed by their im- 
mediate representatives and servants. Here, in strict- 
ness, the People surrender nothing ; and as they retain 
everything, they have no need of particular reservations. 
" We, the People of the United States, to secure the 
" blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do 
u ordain and establish this Constitution for the United 
" States of America." Here is a better recognition of 
popular rights, than volumes of those aphorisms which 
make the principal figure in several of our State Bills 
of Rights, and which would sound much better in a 
treatise of ethics, than in a Constitution of Govern- 
ment. 

But a minute detail of particular rights is certainly 
far less applicable to a Constitution like that under con- 
sideration, which is merely intended to regulate the gen- 
eral political interests of the Nation, than to a Constitu- 
tion which has the regulation of every species of per- 
sonal and private concerns. If, therefore, the loud 
clamors against the plan of the Convention, on this 
Bcore, are well founded, no epithets of reprobation will 
be too strong for the Constitution of this State. But 
the truth is, that both of them contain all which, in 
relation to their objects, is reasonably to be desired. 



The Federalist. 59S 

I go further, and affirm, that Bills of Rights, in the 
sense and to the extent in which they are contended for, 
are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution 
but would even be dangerous. They would contain vari 
ous exceptions to powers not granted ; and on this very 
account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more 
than were granted. For why declare that things shall 
not be done which there is no power to do ? Why, for 
instance, should it be said, that the liberty of the press 
shall not be restrained, when no power is given by 
which restrictions may be imposed ? I will not contend 
that such a provision would confer a regulating power; 
but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed 
to usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming that power. 
They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the 
Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity 
of providing against the abuse of an authority, which 
was not given, and that the provision against restrain- 
ing the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication, 
that a power to prescribe proper regulations concerning it 
was intended to be vested in the National Government 
This may serve as a specimen of the numerous handles 
which would be given to the doctrine of constructive 
powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal for 
Bills of Rights. 

On the subject of the liberty of the press, as much 
has been said, I cannot forbear adding a remark or two : 
.n the first place, I observe, that there is not a syllable 
concerning it in the Constitution of this State ; in the 
next, I contend, that whatever has been said about it in 
that of any other State, amounts to nothing. What 
signifies a declaration, that " the liberty of the press shall 
" be inviolably preserved ? " What is the liberty of the 
Dress ? Who can give it any definition which would 
not leave the utmost latitude for evasion ? I hold it to 
be impracticable ; and from this I infer, that its security, 



600 The Federalist. 

whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any Con- 
stitution respecting it, must altogether depend on public 
opinion, and on the general spirit of the People and of 
the Government.* And here, after all, as is intimated 
upon another occasion, must we seek for the only solid 
basis of all our rights. 

There remains but one other view of this matter to 
conclude the point. The truth is, after all the declama- 
tion we have heard, that the Constitution is itself, in 
every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, a Bill 
of Rights. The several Bills of Rights in Great Britain 
form its Constitution, and conversely the Constitution 
of each State is its Bill of Rights. And the proposed 
Constitution, if adopted, will be the Bill of Rights of 
the Union. Is it one object of a Bill of Rights to de- 
clare and specify the political privileges of the citizens in 
the structure and administration of the Government? 
This is done in the most ample and precise manner in 
the plan of the Convention ; comprehending various 
precautions for the public security, which are not to be 
found in any of the State Constitutions. Is another ob- 
ject of a Bill of Rights to define certain immunities and 

* To show that there is a power if duties of any kind may be laid 
in the Constitution, by which the without a violation of that liberty, 
liberty of the press may be affected, it is evident that the extent must 
recourse has been had to the power depend on Legislative discretion, 
of taxation. It is said, that duties regulated by public opinion ; so 
may be laid upon publications so that, after all, general declarations 
high as to amount to a prohibition, respecting the liberty of the press, 
I know not by what logic it could will give it no greater security than 
be maintained, that the declarations it will have without them. The 
in the State Constitutions, in favor same invasions of it may be ef- 
of the freedom of the press, would fected under the State Constitu- 
be a constitutional impediment to tions which contain those declara- 
the imposition of duties upon pub- tions through the means of taxa- 
lications by the State Legislatures, tion, as under the proposed Con- 
It cannot certainly be pretended stitution, which has nothing of the 
that any degree of duties, however kind. It would be quite as signifi- 
low, would be an abridgment of the cant to declare, that Government 
liberty of the press. We know that ought to be free, that taxes ought 
newspapers are taxed in Great not to be excessive, &c, as that the 
Britain, and yet it is notorious that liberty of the press ought not to be 
the press nowhere enjoys greater restrained. — Publius. 
iberty than in that country. And 



The Federalist. 601 

modes of proceeding, which are relative to personal ana 
private concerns ? This we have seen has also been at- 
tended to, in a variety of cases, in the same plan. Ad- 
verting therefore to the substantial meaning of a Bill of 
Rights, it is absurd to allege that it is not to be found in 
the work of the Convention. It may be said that it does 
not go far enough, though it will not be easy to make 
this appear; but it can with no propriety be contended, 
that there is no such thing. It certainly must be imma- 
terial what mode is observed as to the order of declaring 
the rights of the citizens, if they are to be found in any 
part of the instrument which establishes the Government. 
And hence it must be apparent, that much of what has 
been said on this subject rests merely on verbal and 
nominal distinctions, entirely foreign from the substance 
of the thing. 

Another objection, which has been made, and which, 
from the frequency of its repetition, it is to be presumed 
is relied on, is of this nature : It is improper " (say the 
objectors) "to confer such large powers, as are proposed, 
upon the National Government ; because the seat of that 
Government must of necessity be too remote from many 
of the States to admit of a proper knowledge on the part 
of the constituent, of the conduct of the representative 
body." This argument, if it proves anything, proves that 
there ought to be no General Government whatever. For 
the powers which, it seems to be agreed on all hands, 
ought to be vested in the Union, cannot be safely intrusted 
to a body which is not under every requisite control. But 
there are satisfactory reasons to show, that the objection 
is, in reality, not well founded. There is in most of the 
arguments which relate to distance a palpable illusion of 
the imagination. What are the sources of information, 
by which the people in Montgomery county must regulate 
their judgment of the conduct of their Representatives in 
the State Legislature ? Of personal observation they 



602 The Federalist. 

can have no benefit. This is confined to the citizens on 
the spot. They must therefore depend on the informa- 
tion of intelligent men, in whom they confide; and how 
must these men obtain their information ? Evidently 
from the complexion of public measures, from the pub- 
lic prints, from correspondences with their Representa- 
tives, and with other persons who reside at the place of 
their deliberation. This does not apply to Montgomery 
county only, but to all the counties at any considerable 
distance from the seat of Government. 

It is equally evident, that the same sources of informa- 
tion would be open to the People, in relation to the con- 
duct of their Representatives in the General Government ; 
and the impediments to a prompt communication which 
distance may be supposed to create, will be overbalanced 
by the effects of the vigilance of the State Governments. 
The Executive and Legislative bodies of each State will 
be so many sentinels over the persons employed in every 
department of the National administration ; and as it 
will be in their power to adopt and pursue a regular and 
effectual system of intelligence, they can never be at a 
loss to know the behavior of those who represent their 
constituents in the National Councils, and can readily 
communicate the same knowledge to the People. Their 
disposition to apprise the community of whatever may 
prejudice its interests from another quarter, may be relied 
upon, if it were only from the rivalship of power. And 
we may conclude with the fullest assurance, that the 
People, through that channel, will be better informed of 
the conduct of their National Representatives, than they 
can be, by any means they now possess, of that of their 
State Representatives. 

It ought also to be remembered, that the citizens who 
inhabit the country at and near the seat of Government 
will, in all questions that affect the general liberty and 
orosperity, have the same interest with those who are at 



The Federalist 60S 

a distance ; and that they will stand ready to sound the 
alarm when necessary, and to point out the actors in any 
pernicious project. The public papers will be expedi- 
tious messengers of intelligence to the most remote 
inhabitants of the Union. 

Among the many curious objections which have ap- 
peared against the proposed Constitution, the most ex- 
traordinary and the least colorable is derived from the 
want of some provision respecting the debts due to the 
United States. This has been represented as a tacit re- 
linquishment of those debts, and as a wicked contrivance 
to screen public defaulters. The newspapers have 
teemed with the most inflammatory railings on this 
head; yet there is nothing clearer than that the sugges- 
tion is entirely void of foundation, the ofTspring of ex- 
treme ignorance or extreme dishonesty. In addition to 
the remarks I have made upon the subject in another 
place, I shall only observe, that as it is a plain dictate 
of common sense, so it is also an established doctrine 
of political law, that, "States neither lose any of their 
" rights, nor are discharged from any of their obligations, 
" by a change in the form of their civil Government" * 

The last objection of any consequence, which I at 
present recollect, turns upon the article of expense. If it 
were even true, that the adoption of the proposed Gov- 
ernment would occasion a considerable increase of ex- 
pense, it would be an objection that ought to have no 
weight against the plan. The great bulk of the citizens 
of America are with reason convinced, that Union is the 
basis of their political happiness. Men of sense of all 
parties now, with few exceptions, agree that it cannot 
be preserved under the present system, nor without rad- 
ical alterations ; that new and extensive powers ought to 

* Vide Rutherford's Institutes, 11, chap. ix. sect. viii. and ix. — 
rol. 2. book 11, chap. x. sect. xiv. Publius. 
md xv. Vide also Grotids, book 



304 The Federalist. 

be granted to the National head, and that these require 
a different organization of the Foederal Government ; a 
single body being an unsafe depository of such ample 
authorities. In conceding all this, the question of ex- 
pense must be given up ; for it is impossible, with any de- 
gree of safety, to narrow the foundation upon which the 
system is to stand. The two branches of the Legisla- 
ture are, in the first instance, to consist of only sixty-five 
persons, which is the same number of which congress, 
under the existing Confederation, may be composed. It is 
true, that this number is intended to be increased ; but 
this is to keep pace with the progress of the population 
and resources of the country. It is evident that a less 
number would, even in the first instance, have been un- 
safe ; and that a continuance of the present number 
would, in a more advanced stage of population, be i 
very inadequate representation of the People. 

Whence is the dreaded augmentation of expense to 
spring? One source indicated, is the multiplication of 
offices under the new Government. Let us examine 
this a little. 

It is evident that the principal departments of the ad- 
ministration under the present Government, are the same 
which will be required under the new. There are now 
a Secretary of War, a Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a 
Secretary for Domestic Affairs, a Board of Treasury con- 
sisting of three persons, a Treasurer, assistants, clerks, 
&c. These offices are indispensable under any system, 
and will suffice under the new as well as the old. As to 
Ambassadors and other ministers and agents in foreign 
countries, the proposed Constitution can make no other 
difference, than to render their characters, where they 
reside, more respectable, and their services more useful. 
As to persons to be employed in the collection of the 
revenues, it is unquestionably true that these will form a 
very considerable addition to the number of Foederal offi 



TJie Federalist. 605 

tiers ; but it will not follow, that this will occasion an 
increase of public expense. It will be in most cases 
nothing more than an exchange of State for National 
officers. In the collection of all duties, for instance, the 
persons employed will be wholly of the latter description. 
The States individually will stand in no need of any for 
this purpose. What difference can it make in point of 
expense, to pay officers of the customs appointed by 
the State or by the United States ? There is no good 
reason to suppose, that either the number or the salaries 
of the latter, will be greater than those of the former. 

Where then are we to seek for those additional articles 
of expense, which are to swell the account to the enor- 
mous size that has been represented to us ? The chief 
item which occurs to me, respects the support of the 
Judges of the United States. I do not add the President, 
because there is now a President of Congress, whose ex- 
penses may not be far, if anything, short of those which 
will be incurred on account of the President of the 
United States. The support of the Judges will clearly 
be an extra expense, but to what extent will depend on 
the particular plan which may be adopted in regard to 
this matter. But upon no reasonable plan can it 
amount to a sum which will be an object of material 
consequence. 

Let us now see what there is to counterbalance any 
extra expense that may attend the establishment of the 
proposed Government. The first thing which presents 
itself is, that a great part of the business which now keeps 
Congress sitting through the year, will be transacted by 
the President. Even the management of foreign nego- 
tiations will naturally devolve upon him, according to 
general principles concerted with the Senate, and subject 
to their final concurrence. Hence it is evident, that a 
jortion of the year will suffice for the session of both 
^he Senate and the House of Representatives : we may 



506 The Federalist. 

suppose about a fourth for the latter, and a third, or per- 
haps half, for the former. The extra business of treaties 
and appointments may give this extra occupation to the 
Senate. From this circumstance we may infer, that un- 
til the House of Representatives shall be increased greatly 
beyond its present number, there will be a considerable 
saving of expense from the difference between the con- 
stant session of the present, and the temporary session 
of the future Congress. 

But there is another circumstance, of great impor- 
tance in the view of economy. The business of the 
United States has hitherto occupied the State Legisla- 
tures, as well as Congress. The latter has made requisi- 
tions which the former have had to provide for. Hence it 
has happened, that the sessions of the State Legislatures 
have been protracted greatly beyond what was necessary 
for the execution of the mere local business of the States. 
More than half their time has been frequently employed 
in matters which related to the United States. Now the 
members who compose the legislatures of the several 
States amount to two thousand and upwards; which 
number has hitherto performed what under the new sys- 
tem will be done in the first instance oy sixty-five per- 
sons, and probably at no future period by above a fourth 
or a fifth of that number. The Congress under the pro- 
posed Government will do all the business of the United 
States themselves, without the intervention of the State 
Legislatures, who thenceforth will have only to attend to 
the affairs of their particular States, and will not have to 
sit in any proportion as long as they have heretofore 
done. This difference, in the time of the sessions of the 
State Legislatures, will be clear gain, and will alone 
form an article of saving, which may be regarded as an 
equivalent for any additional objects of expense that 
may be occasioned by the adoption of the new system. 

The result from these observations is, that the sources 



The Federalist 607 

of additional expense from the establishment of the 
proposed Constitution, are much fewer than may have 
been imagined; that they are counterbalanced by con- 
siderable objects of saving; and that while it is ques- 
tionable on which side the scale will preponderate, it is 
certain that a Government less expensive would be 
incompetent to the purposes of the Union. 

PUBLIUS. 



IFrom M'Lean's Edition, New York, M.DCC.LXXXVIIL] 

[THE FEDERALIST.] No. LXXXY. 



^To the People of the State of New York:] 

A CCORDING to the formal division of the subject 
-^*- of these papers, announced in my first number, there 
would appear still to remain for discussion, two points, — 
" the analogy of the proposed Government to your own 
" State Constitution," and " the additional security which 
" its adoption will afford to republican Government, to 
" liberty, and to property." But these heads have been 
so fully anticipated and exhausted in the progress of 
the work, that it would now scarcely be possible to do 
anything more than repeat, in a more dilated form, 
what has been heretofore said ; which the advanced 
stage of the question, and the time already spent upon 
it, conspire to forbid. 

It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of 
the Convention to the Act which organizes the Govern- 
ment of this State holds, not less with regard to many 
of the supposed defects, than to the real excellences of 
the former. Among the pretended defects, are the re- 
eligibility of the Executive ; the want of a Council ; the 



608 The Federalist. 

omission of a formal Bill of Rights ; the omission of a 
provision respecting the liberty of the press : these and 
several others, which have been rioted in the course of 
our inquiries, are as much chargeable on the existing 
Constitution of this State, as on the one proposed for the 
Union ; and a man must have slender pretensions to 
consistency, who can rail at the latter for imperfections, 
which he finds no difficulty in excusing in the former. 
Nor indeed can there be a better proof of the insincerity 
and affectation of some of the zealous adversaries of 
the plan of the Convention among us, who profess to be 
the devoted admirers of the Government under which 
they live, than the fury with which they have attacked 
that plan, for matters in regard to which our own Con- 
stitution is equally, or perhaps more vulnerable. 

The additional securities to republican Government, to 
liberty, and to property, to be derived from the adoption 
of the plan under consideration, consist chiefly in the 
restraints which the preservation of the Union will im- 
pose on local factions and insurrections, and on the 
ambition of powerful individuals in single States, who 
might acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders 
and favorites, to become the despots of the People ; in 
the diminution of the opportunities to foreign intrigue, 
which the dissolution of the Confederacy would invite 
and facilitate ; in the prevention of extensive military 
establishments, which could not fail to grow out of wars 
between the States in a disunited situation ; in the ex- 
press guaranty of a republican form of Government to 
each ; in the absolute and universal exclusion of titles 
of nobility ; and in the precautions against the repetition 
of those practices on the part of the State Governments, 
which have undermined the foundations of property and 
credit, have planted mutual distrust in the breasts of all 
classes of citizens, and have occasioned an almost uni« 
;ersa] prostration of morals. 



The Federalist. 609 

Thus have I, Fellow- Citizens, executed the task I had 
assigned to myself; with what success, your conduct 
must determine. I trust at least you will admit that I 
have not failed in the assurance I gave you respecting 
the spirit with which my endeavors should be conducted. 
I have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and 
have studiously avoided those asperities which are too 
apt to disgrace political disputants of all parties, and 
which have been not a little provoked by the language 
and conduct of the opponents of the Constitution. The 
charge of a conspiracy against the liberties of the Peo- 
ple, which has been indiscriminately brought against the 
advocates of the plan, has something in it too wanton 
and too malignant, not to excite the indignation of every 
man who feels in his own bosom a refutation of the 
calumny. The perpetual changes which have been rung 
upon the wealthy, the well-born, and the great, have been 
such as to inspire the disgust of all sensible men. And 
the unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations 
which have been in various ways practised to keep the 
truth from the public eye, have been of a nature to de- 
mand the reprobation of all honest men. It is not im- 
possible that these circumstances may have occasionally 
betrayed me into intemperances of expression which I did 
not intend : it is certain, that I have frequently felt a 
struggle between sensibility and moderation ; and if the 
former has in some instances prevailed, it must be my 
excuse, that it has been neither often, nor much. 

Let us now pause, and ask ourselves, whether, in the 
course of these papers, the proposed Constitution has 
not been satisfactorily vindicated from the aspersions 
thrown upon it; and whether it has not been shown to 
be worthy of the public approbation, and necessary to 
the public safety and prosperity. Every man is bound 
to answer these questions to himself, according to the 
best of his conscience and understanding, and to act 

vol. i. 39 



510 The Federalist. 

agreeably to the genuine and sober dictates of his judg- 
ment. This is a duty from which nothing can give him 
a dispensation. 'Tis one that he is called upon, nay, 
constrained by all the obligations that form the bands 
of society, to discharge sincerely and honestly. No 
partial motive, no particular interest, no pride of opin- 
ion, no temporary passion or prejudice, will justify to 
himself, to his country, or to his posterity, an improper 
election of the part he is to act. Let him beware of an 
obstinate adherence to party; let him reflect, that the 
object upon which he is to decide is not a particular in- 
terest of the community, but the very existence of the 
Nation ; and let him remember, that a majority of 
America has already given its sanction to the plan 
which he is to approve or reject. 

I shall not dissemble, that I feel an entire confidence 
in the arguments which recommend the proposed sys- 
tem to your adoption ; and that I am unable to discern 
any real force in those by which it has been opposed. I 
am persuaded, that it is the best which our political 
situation, habits, and opinions will admit, and superior 
to any the Revolution has produced. 

Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan, 
that it has not a claim to absolute perfection, have 
afforded matter of no small triumph* to its enemies. 
" Why," say they, "should we adopt an imperfect thing? 
" Why not amend it and make it perfect before it is 
" irrevocably established ? " This may be plausible 
enough, but it is only plausible. In the first place I re- 
mark, that the extent of these concessions has been 
greatly exaggerated. They have been stated as amount- 
ing to an admission, that the plan is radically defective ; 
and that without material alterations, the rights and the 
interests of the community cannot be safely confided to 
*t. This, as far as I have understood the meaning of 
those who make the concessions, is an entire perversion 



The Federalist. 6V 

of their sense. No advocate of the measure can be 
found, who will not declare as his sentiment, that the 
system, though it may not be perfect in every parr, is, 
upon the whole, a good one ; is the best that the present 
views and circumstances of the country will permit; 
and is such an one as promises every species of security 
which a reasonable People can desire. 

I answer in the next place, that I should esteem it the 
extreme of imprudence to prolong the precarious state 
of our National affairs, and to expose the Union to the 
jeopardy of successive experiments, in the chimerical 
pursuit of a perfect plan. I never expect to see a perfect 
work from imperfect man. The result of the delibera- 
tions of all collective bodies, must necessarily be a com- 
pound as well of the errors and prejudices, as of the 
good sense and wisdom of the individuals of whom 
they are composed. The compacts which are to em- 
brace thirteen distinct States, in a common bond of 
amity and union, must as necessarily be a compromise 
of as many dissimilar interests and inclinations, How 
can perfection spring from such materials ? 

The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet 
lately published in this city* are unanswerable to show 
the utter improbability of assembling a new Convention, 
under circumstances in any degree so favorable to a 
happy issue, as those in which the late Convention met, 
deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the argu- 
ments there used, as I presume the production itself has 
had an extensive circulation. It is certainly well worthy 
the perusal of every friend to his country. There is, 
however, one point of light in which the subject of 
amendments still remains to be considered ; and in which 
it has not yet been exhibited to public view. I cannot 
resolve to conclude without first taking a survey of it in 
this aspect. 

* Entitled " An Address to the People of the State of New York." — Pub- 



612 The Federalist. 

It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstia 
tion, that it will be far more easy to obtain subsequent 
than previous amendments to the Constitution. The 
moment an alteration is made in the present plan, it be- 
comes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and must 
undergo a new decision of each State. To its com- 
plete establishment throughout the Union, it will there- 
fore require the concurrence of thirteen States. If, on 
the contrary, the Constitution proposed should once be 
ratified by all the States as it stands, alterations in it 
may at any time be effected by nine States. Here then 
the chances are as thirteen to nine * in favor of subse- 
quent amendments, rather than of the original adoption 
of an entire system. 

This is not all. Every Constitution for the United 
States must inevitably consist of a great variety of par- 
ticulars, in which thirteen independent States are to be 
accommodated in their interests or opinions of interest. 
We may of course expect to see, in any body of men 
charged with its original formation, very different com- 
binations of the parts upon different points. Many of 
those who form a majority on one question, may become 
the minority on a second, and an association dissimilar 
to either may constitute the majority on a third. Hence 
the necessity of moulding and arranging all the par- 
ticulars which are to compose the whole, in such a man- 
ner as to satisfy all the parties to the compact; and 
hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties 
and casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a 
final Act. The degree of that multiplication must evi- 
dently be in a ratio to the number of particulars and 
the number of parties. 

But every Amendment to the Constitution, if once 
established, would be a single proposition, and might be 

* It may rather be said ten, for the measure, three fourths musf 
though two thirds may set on foot ratify. — Publius. 



The Federalist. 613 

brought forward singly. There would then be no neces- 
sity for management or compromise, in relation to any 
other point; no giving, nor taking. The will of the 
requisite number would at once bring the matter to a 
decisive issue. And consequently, whenever nine, or 
rather ten States, were united in the desire of a partic- 
ular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take 
place. There can, therefore, be no comparison between 
the facility of effecting an amendment, and that of 
establishing in the first instance a complete Constitu- 
tion. 

In opposition to the probability of subsequent amend- 
ments, it has been urged, that the persons delegated to 
the administration of the National Government, will 
always be disinclined to yield up any portion of the 
authority of which they were once possessed. For my 
own part, I acknowledge a thorough conviction, that 
any amendments which may, upon mature consideration, 
be thought useful, will be applicable to the organization 
of the Government, not to the mass of its powers; and 
on this account alone, I think there is no weight in the 
observation just stated. I also think there is little 
weight in it on another account. The intrinsic difficulty 
of governing thirteen States at any rate, independent 
of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit 
and integrity, will, in my opinion, constantly impose on 
the National rulers the necessity of a spirit of accom- 
modation to the reasonable expectations of their constit- 
uents. But there is yet a further consideration, which 
proves beyond the possibility of doubt, that the obser- 
vation is futile. It is this, that the National rulers, 
whenever nine States concur, will have no option upon 
the subject. By the fifth Article of the plan, the Con- 
gress will be obliged, " on the application of the Legis- 
latures of two thirds of the States," (which at present 
amount to nine,) " to call a Convention for proposing 



614 The Federalist. 

u Amendments, which shall he valid to all intents and 
u purposes, as part of the Constitution, when ratified by 
" the Legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by 
" Conventions in three fourths thereof." The words of 
this Article are peremptory. The Congress " shall call 
" a Convention." Nothing in this particular is left to 
the discretion of that body. And of consequence, all 
the declamation about the disinclination to a change, 
vanishes in air. Nor however difficult it may be sup- 
posed to unite two thirds, or three fourths of the State 
Legislatures, in amendments which may affect local 
interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such 
difficulty in a union on points which are merely relative 
to the general liberty or security of the People. We 
may safely rely on the disposition of the State Legisla- 
tures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the 
National authority. 

If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is, 
that I am myself deceived by it ; for it is, in my con- 
ception, one of those rare instances in which a politi- 
cal truth can be brought to the test of a mathematical 
demonstration. Those who see the matter in the same 
light with me, however zealous they may be for amend- 
ments, must agree in the propriety of a previous adop- 
tion, as the most direct road to their own object. 

The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the estab- 
lishment of the Constitution, must abate in every man, 
who is ready to accede to the truth of the following 
observations of a writer, equally solid and ingenious: 
" To balance a large State or society," (says he,) " wheth- 
14 er monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a 
" work of so great difficulty, that no human genius, 
" however comprehensive, is able by the mere dint of 
'reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of 
''many must unite in the work; Experience must 
* guide their labor; Time must bring it to perfection 






The Federalist. 615 



* and the feeling of inconveniences must correct the 
I mistakes which they inevitably fall into, in their first 
u trials and experiments." * These judicious reflections 
contain a lesson of moderation to all the sincere lovers 
of the Union, and ought to put them upon their guard 
against hazarding anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alien- 
ation of the States from each other, and perhaps the 
military despotism of a victorious demagogue, in the 
pursuit of what they are not likely to obtain, but from 
time and experience. It may be in me a defect of po- 
litical fortitude, but I acknowledge that I cannot enter- 
tain an equal tranquillity with those who affect to treat 
the dangers of a longer continuance in our present situ- 
ation as imaginary. A Nation, without a National 
Government, is, in my view, an awful spectacle. The 
establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound 
peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole People, is a 
prodigy, to the completion of which I look forward 
with trembling anxiety. I can reconcile it to no rules 
of prudence to let go the hold we now have, in so ardu- 
ous an enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States ; 
and after having passed over so considerable a part of the 
ground, to recommence the course. I dread the more 
the consequences of new attempts, because I know that 
powerful individuals, in this and in other States, are 
enemies to a general National Government in every 

possible shape. 

PUBLIUS. 

* Hume's Essays, vol. 1, page 128. — The Rise of Arts and Sciences. — 
?ubliu». 



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